The representation and Interpretation of the Spanish nationalists’ ideological positions in the periodicals of Lithuanian right-wing parties (1936–1939)

Political candidates' ideological positions have been used to explain success in inter-party competition, but little is known about how they impact success in intra-party competition. Here, candidates' positions on the Left–Right and GAL–TAN dimensions are analysed in three Finnish parliamentary elections (2011, 2015, 2019). Candidates' ideological positions are measured in terms of their ideological distance from their own party's median candidate. Absolute ideological distances between candidates and their party's median candidate decrease candidates' preference votes. Furthermore, the effects are contingent on the general ideological position of the candidate's party. However, these interactions do not follow any clear pattern, as more rightist candidates in right-wing parties and more green-alternative-libertarian candidates in traditional-authoritarian-nationalist parties all experience a decrease in their preference votes. This effect is large enough to be a decisive factor in intra-party competition between the last candidate that was elected and the first one that was not.

This article examines whether gender affects candidates’ position on the economic and cultural dimensions of political competition in nine West European countries. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey, we find that female candidates hold, on average, more liberal views than their male party colleagues. These gender differences vary according to the nature of issues. Female candidates are more liberal than their party colleagues on the cultural dimension, but we find no systematic differences in policy preferences on economic issues. Moreover, gender differences vary according to parties’ ideological position on the left–right scale with a more pronounced gender gap in right-wing parties. Our findings contribute to the literature on female candidates and on the impact of women in politics more broadly.

The paper deals with the ideological position of a newly formed business-firm party called ANO in the contemporary political environment of the Czech Republic. Although the advent of the party was truly rapid and ANO is a fairly unique formation, it is possible to employ some conventional analytical tools to reveal the party’s ideological position. Firstly, I show that ANO is a vote-seeking party and it is therefore possible to analyse it in accordance with a Downsian spatial modelling. Next, I describe a roll call analysis method that is able to objectively identify the party’s ideological position based on legislators’ parliamentary votes. After I form several hypotheses, a data set consisting of 8,559 roll calls of 215 members of the Chamber of Deputies is depicted. Finally, the results show that ANO is located in the ideological centre, closer to social democrats rather than to right-wing parties. Besides this, ANO covers a smaller ideological space compared to traditional political parties. Finally, the results do not anticipate a potential split of ANO in the near future since the party’s legislators have acted cohesively in the parliament so far.

Environmental taxes have been discussed as one of the main mechanisms to deal with environmental problems. Nonetheless, instruments of this type have rarely been implemented, and the adoption of new or higher environmental taxes has faced resistance in some countries. The purpose of this work is to identify one possible political answer to why adoption of environmental taxes varies. One explanation is that legislatures' ideological position affects the degree of usage of taxes generally and environ- mental taxes in particular. For example, right-wing parties tend to be less associated with environmental concerns and more associated with lower government intervention. This paper presents evidence that reflects this relationship, showing the positive association of more left-wing legislatures with higher levels of environmental taxation. A panel of data for 37 developed and developing countries over 16 years is used considering the percentage of total revenue from environmentally related taxes, the ratio of this revenue to total energy use and tax levels in industry and household sectors. The results show that most of these impacts involve environmentally related taxes in the industry sector. Proportional representation electoral systems and high seat concentration by few parties appear to be necessary conditions for the negative relation of right-wing ideology with environmental taxes.

This chapter sketches the general electoral and ideological evolution of the FrP, including its origin as an anti-tax revolt, gradual transformation to a more clear-cut radical right-wing populist party followed by a profound party crisis, and recent developments towards a junior partner in a right-wing governing coalition. It considers the degree to which the FrP has moved into the mainstream by assessing party change along four key dimensions: programmatic scope, ideological position on niche issues, anti-establishment orientation and behaviour, and linkages to right-wing extremism. The chapter interprets the findings in light of changing goals and priorities by the party leadership. Finally, the chapter discusses how these goals have been informed by internal and external constraints and opportunities. Like most other radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) in Norway was initially dismissed as a short-lived vehicle of protest, and as a single-issue-oriented, ideologically extreme, and un-coalition able party.

Classic studies of protest politics have traditionally defended the dominant left-wing orientation of protesters. However, some recent research has highlighted the general spread of protest by the increasing participation of right-wing individuals. Has this process meant an ‘ideological normalisation’ of protesters? The present article tackles this question by examining competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideology and political protest. Through a hierarchical multilevel design, the article tests whether left-wing (or right-wing) supporters are more likely to stay at home when left-wing (right-wing) parties are in power and whether they intensify their protest activities when they are more distant from the government’s ideological position. The article shows that left-wing individuals protest more under right-wing governments than under left-wing governments and yet, they are the group which protest the most also under left-wing governments. Both party mobilisation and values appear to be behind these individuals' greater propensity to participate regardless of the governments' ideological orientation.

An all-embracing problem description. The Swedish drug issue as a political catalyst 1982–2000

Reactions to the rise of far-right parties that advocate democratic backsliding, and the dilution of socially liberal democratic norms present a dilemma for existing political parties. How should existing political parties respond to this challenge? A commonly adopted strategy is to apply a cordon sanitaire which excludes radical right-wing challengers from the government-forming process. Do voters support this policy? Leveraging data from Spain – where the mainstream right has accommodated the radical right-wing party, VOX, via numerous governing coalitions – I rely on individual citizens’ views on how parties should respond to rise of the far-right party, to answer this question. Empirically, the results show very low-level support for the cordon sanitaire in Spain. Indeed, the modal position of the electorate, regardless of their ideological position, is to treat the party just like any other. These results are not conditioned by the propensity of individuals to identify VOX as indeed being a “radical right” party. These descriptive findings suggest that whilst radical right-wing parties may present an inimical threat to democratic norms, citizens do not necessarily view the means of squashing this threat to be one of strategic exclusion. This likely explains why the mainstream right has been able to institutionalise VOX as a political ally: where strategic exclusion is not expected, the mainstream right need not fear violating an expectation that does not exist.

Referendums are promoted for various reasons. Parties support referendums for strategic and institutional reasons and motivations (see Sitter and Rahat, this book, Chapters 5 and 6 respectively), but ideological considerations may also play a role in explaining the support for and the use of referendums. This chapter focuses on the fundamental and ideological viewpoints on direct democracy. It analyses the debate on referendums in the Netherlands. The question is, do ideological positions matter? Do the leftist parties differ from right-wing parties in their outlook towards direct democracy? The chapter starts with an outline of the history and the actual situation of the referendum in the Netherlands. In this section, the focus is on two cases: the failure of the introduction of a binding referendum at the national level and the referendum on the EU constitution in 2005. The chapter then analyses the ongoing referendum debate between the political parties in the Netherlands. Attention is paid to the positions of parties in party manifestos and to the differences in opinions within political parties. It is shown that party ideology is an important factor in explaining the positions in the debate on the referendum. The ideological debate on the referendum is also reflected in the media among opinion makers. An analysis of newspaper articles yields insight into ideological perspectives on direct democracy as well as the main arguments that are used in the debate on referendums.

Environmental taxes have been discussed as one of the main mechanisms to deal with environmental problems. Nonetheless, instruments of this type have rarely been implemented, and the adoption of new or higher environmental taxes has faced resistance in some countries. The purpose of this work is to identify one possible political answer to why adoption of environmental taxes varies. One explanation is that legislatures’ ideological position affects the degree of usage of taxes generally and environmental taxes in particular. For example, right-wing parties tend to be less associated with environmental concerns and more associated with lower government intervention. This paper presents evidence that reflects this relationship, showing the positive association of more left-wing legislatures with higher levels of environmental taxation. A panel of data for 37 developed and developing countries over 16 years is used considering the percentage of total revenue from environmentally related taxes, the ratio of this revenue to total energy use and tax levels in industry and household sectors. The results show that most of these impacts involve environmentally related taxes in the industry sector. Proportional representation electoral systems and high seat concentration by few parties appear to be necessary conditions for the negative relation of right-wing ideology with environmental taxes.

This paper examines the impact of dispositional Need for Cognitive Closure (NFC) on different political attitudes and on the “person blame” and the “system blame” dimensions. Two hundred and thirty‐four psychology students completed a questionnaire containing the Italian version of the Need for Closure scale, a measure of political and ideological attitudes, a measure of the person‐system blame dimensions, and a measure of past voting. Results showed that high NFC individuals (vs. low NFCs) reported having voted for a right‐wing party and holding more conservative attitudes. High NFCs (vs. low NFCs) turned out to have stronger anti‐immigrant attitudes, to be more nationalistic, to prefer an autocratic leadership and a centralized form of political power. High NFCs also value religiosity more highly than low NFCs. High NFCs (vs. low NFCs) scored lower on pluralism and multiculturalism. Furthermore, high NFCs (vs. low NFCs) revealed a tendency to blame individuals for social problems, but no significant difference was found with regard to the system blame dimension. Results are discussed in the light of the motivated social cognition approach (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003).

This chapter analyzes the discourses that built the ideal man rooted in different ideological positions in the two asides of the conflict. It pays special attention to the model constructed in the ranks of the faction. The chapter examines the most important features of the project set forth by the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera (1923-30) aimed at restoring masculinity. The beginning of the Spanish Civil War in 1936 shattered the process of change. The war confronted opposite visions of what was understood to be true masculinity. It was also Franco's faction that more flowingly expressed the categories of masculinity and nation. Thus, the so-called national faction totally merged the ideas of the Spanish nation and manhood, creating an emphatic concept of the male, which took shape through the three-year period of the conflict. Keywords: Franco's faction; Miguel Primo de Rivera; masculinity; Spanish Civil War; Spanish manhood

In this paper, I analyze the parliamentary discourses on immigration in France and Canada from January 2006 to December 2013 in order to answer the question: What arguments are put forward in parliamentary arenas in order to justify more restrictive immigration policies? Despite their different models of integration and citizenship, France and Canada are facing very similar discussions, involving the same arguments and the same theoretical reflections. Critical discourse analysis shows that immigration is an extremely divisive issue in the political landscape: in both countries, right-wing political parties try to restrict in the name of economic imperatives, while left-wing political parties seek to establish more liberal policies. This finding goes against some studies, which argue that right-wing political parties, influenced by the neoliberal ideology, call for more open borders to immigration. Within the debates, references to national histories, models of integration, and civic values are not especially prominent, especially when compared with the omnipresent discourses of economics. The justifications for more restrictive immigration policies often reveal the dominant position of a global ideology prioritizing values of competitiveness and cost-effectiveness in an era of post-Fordist capitalism. The treatment of refugees, asylum seekers, and illegal immigrants is a paradigmatic example of the trends I have identified. These kinds of immigrants are often at the heart of justifications for implementing restrictive measures. Our empirical material shows that Roma people are particularly targeted by these restrictions in both countries.

Neighbors and friends: How do European political parties respond to globalization?

This chapter looks at data on the manifestos of political parties across Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries to examine how political actors have reframed their perspectives on welfare in light of the intensification of global economic competition since the 1970s. In particular, it focuses on how — and how far — left- and right-wing parties have converged in terms of their social and economic policy agendas and, relatedly, to what degree perceived intensification of global economic pressures has driven partisan convergence. Analysis of the data suggests that, despite a considerable degree of convergence of party preferences after 1980, the rather broad-brush notion of a general ‘race to the right’ is overstated, as the processes of shifting ideological party positions vary hugely in different countries. More importantly, some of the identified processes of convergence seem to at least qualify key assumptions/statements within the competition state literature. Further exploration and clarification on these different processes of government ideology convergence are clearly warranted.