Abstract

Sampled on listed companies which implemented equity incentives after equity division reform, this paper studied the relationship between levels of equity-based incentives and company performance, which is represented by market and integrated accounting performance. We find that a significant difference of companies' performance after giving executive equity-based incentive. Moreover, there's a significantly positive relationship between companies' performance and the levels of restricted stock incentive, but there's a non-significantly positive relationship between companies' performance and the levels of stock option incentive. At the same time, the findings also revealed a number of issues in China's securities market, as well as internal governance structure of listed companies.

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