Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines a question that only received serious attention in the years after Aquinas's death: in virtue of which of its properties — that is, the essence or the personal property — is it possible for a divine person to be incarnate? The issue is just to do with the feature of the divine person that allows it to sustain (to exemplify) human nature. The property in virtue of which it is possible for a divine person to have a human nature is referred to as a divine person's S-property. The question, then, is whether the S-property is the Son's essence (or a property itself had in virtue of his essence), or the Son's personal property (or a property itself had in virtue of his personal property).
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