The problem of unconceived alternatives in science and religion

Experience and the Ultimacy of God: In Memoriam John Edwin Smith

In this paper, I develop a critical assessment of epistemic instrumentalism as advocated by Kyle Stanford (2006). Epistemic instrumentalism is based on the claim that the criterion for the reliability of any theory is the absence of what Stanford calls ‘unconceived alternatives’. This means that the theory is reliable if and only if it does not admit of alternatives. Since most scientific theories do admit of unconceived alternatives, Stanford claims, they cannot be reliable. In contrast, ‘common sense’ claims are not exposed to unconceived alternatives, therefore they are reliable. Here, I analyse the definition of ‘common sense’ and argue that it is equally vulnerable to the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’, pushing epistemic instrumentalism position to scepticism. The consequence is that the position of epistemic instrumentalist has nothing to stand on.

Moses Maimonides/Rambam

Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Epistemology of Religious Diversity in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion

In this chapter, I present in canonical (or standard) form and then evaluate key arguments against scientific realism (or for antirealism about science). The first argument is known as the “pessimistic induction” or the “pessimistic meta-induction.” In its original formulation, attributed to Larry Laudan (Philos Sci 48(1):19–49, 1981), the argument is based on a list of theories that are supposed to be counterexamples to the realist thesis that empirical success is a mark of (approximate) truth. Other formulations of the argument have it as an inductive argument from a sample of theories that were discarded in the past to the conclusion that our present scientific theories will probably be discarded as well. The second argument is a positive argument for Bas van Fraassen’s (The scientific image. Oxford University Press, New York, 1980) antirealist position, namely, Constructive Empiricism. The third argument proceeds from the observation that scientists cannot claim to be in a privileged epistemic position. According to this argument, it is unlikely that our best scientific theories are (approximately) true because scientists are not especially skilled at developing theories that are likely true or approximately true. A contemporary proponent of this argument for antirealism is Brad Wray (Int Stud Philos Sci 22(3):317–326, 2008). The fourth is an argument for antirealism from what Kyle Stanford (Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford University Press, New York, 2006) calls the “Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). According to Stanford, the historical record of science reveals that past scientists typically failed to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, then-successful theories. This is supposed to make it more likely that present scientists fail to conceive of alternatives to their favorite, now-successful theories. For these reasons, Stanford argues, we should not believe our present scientific theories are (approximately) true. The fifth argument purports to show that many of the scientific theories we currently accept will be discarded sometime in the future, as the “pessimistic induction” does, but it proceeds from the premise that the research goals and interests of scientists change over time (Wray, Brad K., Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018).

God and Goddess Emerging

In earlier work I have argued that the most substantial threat to scientific realism arises from the problem of unconceived alternatives: the repeated failure of past scientists and scientific communities to conceive of alternatives to extant scientific theories, even when such alternatives were both (1) well confirmed by the evidence available at the time and (2) sufficiently scientifically serious as to be later embraced by actual scientific communities. In this paper I explore Charles Darwin's development and defense of his ‘pangenesis’ theory of inheritance and conclude that this particular historical example offers impressive support for the challenge posed to realism by this problem of unconceived alternatives. 1. Introduction2. Darwin and pangenesis: The search for the material basis of generation and heredity3. A crucial unconceived alternative: common-cause mechanisms of inheritance4. Galton and common-cause inheritance5. Conclusion

This study examines Richard Swinburne's thoughts on the relationship between God and time, one of the forefathers of the modern philosophy of religion. I will analyze Swinburne's critiques of classical theism's conception of God acting in the timeless/eternal and possessing the present, and asses to which extent the philosopher's temporal conception of God can overcome classical theism's difficulties. The idea of God being incorporated in time, according to theism, would make God a prisoner of time. God would be constrained by time and the natural laws that govern it, and situating creation under the concept of eternal time, as Swinburne claims, would pose some difficulties for classical theism's assumptions. Swinburne contends that the concept of eternal God as owning the present raises a number of theological-philosophical issues, including human freedom, God's goodness, and how God acts in time. Swinburne finds traditional theism's theories of human will inadequate, claiming that in order to provide for human freedom, God voluntarily intervenes in time and limits his own self-knowledge. Swinburne acknowledges that God must operate in time by claiming that acts connected to the essence of the act occur across in a certain period of time rather than in moments. In other words, contrary to what classical theism argues, God does not act in his eternal present. According to him, God acts through time because acts do not occur in moments but in certain period of time. Examining Swinburne's idea of time and the relationship between God and time within this framework is critical for revealing the challenges caused by the idea of timeless God presented by classical theism. The purpose of this research is to determine which difficulties classical theism and Swinburne's arguments on the relationship between God and time answer and which problems they open up in theological and philosophical dimensions. Another goal of the research is to provide a critical viewpoint on both points of view. Swinburne's The Christian God, The Coherence of Theism, and Space and Time is evaluated in the study using the textual analysis approach and secondary source data. In conclusion, according to Swinburne, classical theism's conception of God is defended as a result of assumptions about certain divine attributes such as immutability, perfection, power, and knowledge. It is also clear that these assumptions raise some theological problems. The idea of God's temporality, on the other hand, was put forward in order to solve some problems regarding human will, God's goodness, and God's agency. As a result, the temporal notion of God solves some of the challenges created by the timeless conception of God in classical theism, yet classical theism has several presuppositions that prevent it from accepting this view. The assumptions that both sides make on certain issues serve as their starting point. Both perspectives' conclusions point to further issues that need to be addressed.

Reading the Universe of Signs <i>Well</i>: Prospects for Partnering Theosemiotic with a Christian Semiotic Theology

Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the problem, showing how her general strategy is undermined by evidence I have already offered in support of what I have called the 'problem of unconceived alternatives'. I then go on to show why her strategy will not generally (if ever) allow us to formulate and test exhaustive spaces of hypotheses in cases of fundamental scientific theorizing.

The above title leads quite naturally to two sets of questions: (1) What is philosophy of theology? Is it the same as philosophy of religion? Is it the same as philosophical theology? Philosophy of theology is not the same as either philosophy of religion or philosophical theology. Rather, philosophy of theology is a branch of philosophy of science in general, just as philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology or philosophy of psychology. (2) If philosophy of theology is a branch of philosophy of science in general, then how can Karl Popper's work in the philosophy of science prove fruitful for the development of a philosophy of theology? Does not Popper maintain that scientific assertions must be falsifiable by experience? How can one maintain, within a Popperian perspective, that philosophy of theology is a branch of philosophy of science in general? The view that Popper's use of falsifiability as a criterion for demarcating the realm of science excludes theology from among the sciences rests on a common but mistaken reading of Popper. Rather Popper's criterion of demarcation merely excludes theology from among the empirical sciences. This exclusion, far from being alarming to the theologians view their discipline, accords well with it. In Theology and the Philosophy of Science,1 Wolfhart Pannenberg provides us with one approach to philosophy of theology (although he does not use that term). In that work, Pannenberg shows an uncommon familiarity with a broad range of traditions in the philosophy of science. (He does, however, misinterpret Popper in the all too common manner.) Pannenberg develops his philosophy of theology in terms of the hermeneutical tradition of philosophy of science as developed through philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas and Hans Georg Gadamer. In the present paper I want to argue that one can also develop a philosophy of theology (to my mind, a more fruitful philosophy of theology than that developed by Pannenberg) from the general approach to philosophy of science which is found in Popper's works. The present paper is divided into three parts. Part 1 will attempt to clear up the misinterpretation of Popper's general philosophy of science which, while it is not exactly rare among philosophers, is notoriously common among theologians. Part 2 will lay out the task of philosophy of theology, distinguishing it from philosophy

ABSTRACTThis paper explores the nature and working of Spinoza’s philosophical religion. In doing so, it critically engages with Carlos Fraenkel’s study of the tradition of philosophical religions and Spinoza’s place in it. Spinoza can be said to be part of this tradition because the relation of his philosophical conception of God to the conceptions of God of some popular religions (especially Christianity) can be construed as that of the universal versus the particular, in which the particular expresses something of the universal, in an inadequate yet more readily accessible way. The account of Spinoza’s philosophical religion provided is kindred to Fraenkel’s, but it also explicitly discusses a crucial issue which Fraenkel only sparingly addresses, viz. the question how we must envisage the transition from a confused, imaginary to a more rational conception of God. A related issue the paper addresses concerns the question whether – and, if so, how – the dogmas of the universal faith can be reinterpreted philosophically. These discussions underpin a critical assessment of Fraenkel’s claim that Spinoza’s philosophical religion project is, ultimately, flawed.

1. Realism, Pessimism, and Underdetermination 1.1 Scientific Realism: What's at Stake? 1.2 Problems for Pessimism and Underdetermination 1.3 Recurrent, Transient Underdetermination, and a New Induction over the History of Science 2. Chasing Duhem: The Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 2.1 Duhem's Worry: Eliminative Inferences and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives 2.2 Confirmation: Holism, Eliminative Induction, and Bayesianism 2.3 Pessimism Revisited 3. Darwin and Pangenesis: The Search for the Material Basis of Generation and Heredity 3.1 Preliminary Worries 3.2 Pangenesis: Darwin's Mad Dream and Beloved Child 3.3 Darwin's Failure to Grasp Galton's Common Cause Mechanism for Inheritance 4. Galton and the Strip Theory 4.1 The Transfusion Experiments: A Dreadful Disappointment to Them Both 4.2 Galton's Strip Theory and Its Maturational, Invariant Conception of Inheritance 4.3 Galton's Understanding of Correlation and Variable Influences in Development 5. August Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm 5.1 German Biology at the End of the Nineteenth Century and Weismann's Theory of the Germ-Plasm 5.2 Germinal Specificity, the Search for a Mechanism of Cellular Differentiation and the Reservation of the Germ-Plasm 5.4 Productive and Expendable Germinal Resources 5.5 Conclusion: Lessons from History 6. History Revisited: Pyrrhic Victories for Scientific Realism 6.1 Realist Responses to the Historical Record 6.2 Once More into the Breach: The Pessimistic Induction 6.3 Reference without Descriptive Accuracy 6.4 Diluting Approximate Truth 7. Selective Confirmation and the Historical Record: Another Such Victory over the Romans? 7.1 Realism, Selective Confirmation, and Retrospective Judgments of Idleness 7.2 Theoretical Posits: They Work Hard for the Money 7.3 Trust and Betrayal 7.4 Structural Realism and Retention 7.5 Selective Confirmation: No Refuge for Realism 8. Science without Realism? References Index

In the preface, we explained and defended our decision to focus our attention in this book primarily on the Western monotheistic religious traditions. Those traditions claim, in some rough sense, to share a common concept of God; and one of the most important enterprises in theistic philosophy of religion has been the task of analyzing that concept and exploring some of its more puzzling and problematic aspects. In this and the following two chapters we too shall take up this task, paying special attention to those attributes of God that have traditionally been regarded as most important and of the greatest philosophical interest. Before turning to our discussion of the attributes of God, it will be helpful first to say a few words both about what we mean when we talk about “the” concept of God and about how we might go about unpacking that concept. The concept of God Theologians in the Western tradition have characterized “the concept of God” in a variety of different ways. For some, the concept of God is just the concept of the ultimate reality, or the source and ground of all else; for others it is the concept of a maximally perfect being. Still others would say that to be God is to be the one and only being worthy of worship, so that analyzing the concept of God would involve coming to a full understanding of worship-worthiness.

The pessimistic induction over scientific theories (Poincare in Science and hypothesis, Dover, New York, 1905/1952) holds that present theories will be overthrown as were past theories. The pessimistic induction over scientists (Stanford in Exceeding our grasp: science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) holds that present scientists cannot conceive of future theories just as past scientists could not conceive of present theories. The pessimistic induction over realists (Wray in Synthese 190(18):4321–4330, 2013) holds that present realists are wrong about present theories just as past realists were wrong about past theories. The pessimistic induction over antirealist theories (Park in Organon F 21(1):3–21, 2014) holds that the latest antirealist explanation of the success of science (Lyons in Philos Sci 70(5):891–901, 2003) has hidden problems just as its eight predecessors did. In this paper, I (1) criticize the pessimistic inductions over scientific theories, scientists, and realists, (2) introduce a pessimistic induction over antirealist theories, and then (3) construct two new pessimistic inductions. One is a pessimistic induction over antirealists according to which the author of the latest antirealist proposal cannot see hidden problems with his proposal just as his antirealist predecessors could not see hidden problems with their proposals. The other is the pessimistic induction over pessimists according to which since past pessimists have been wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twentieth century to the early twenty-first century, future pessimists will also be wrong about their present scientific theories from the early twenty-first century to the early twenty-second century.