Abstract
Wittgensteinian solution to the problem of other minds is usually associated with Wittgenstein?s position that psychological concepts do not describe but express mental states. In his book An Essay on Philosophical Psychology An Essay on Philosophical Psychology L. Kojen (2009) develops an interpretation of Wittgenstein according to which Wittgenstein himself was aware that all psychological concepts cannot be analyzed in terms of the expression of inner states. My goal in this paper is to examine whether the admission that psychological concepts have descriptive uses involves a return to mentalism and a reintroduction of skepticism regarding other minds. By relying on developmental psychology, I hope to show: a) that expression is the primary function of psychological concepts as it occurs first in child?s development, and b) that the descriptive uses appear later with language acquisitioion but do not lead to the skeptical problem of other minds.
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