The Prize Papers

Maritime security is a broad and vague area, though it could be defined as the security dealing with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. Indian Ocean has become multifaceted and dynamic. Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the Indian Ocean Region transitions from an international backwater, a mere route for maritime trade, to a major global nexus of resource, human, economic and environmental issues. The Indian Ocean Region contains a large proportion of the world's failed and failing states, including 11 of the 20 states listed in Foreign Policy Journal 's 2009 article 'The Failed State Index'. 2 The non-traditional threats to security comprise threat of non-state actors. The trafficking of narcotics, weapons and people continues to be a great concern. The likelihood of terrorist attack has become a major concern. Although terrorist attacks on shipping remain relatively low, the threat of terrorism must be viewed as credible. Any major attack can easily disrupt global economy. Maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continue to be dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially hijacking of merchant vessels. Therefore, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region is an apt model of Buzan and Weaver's 'regional security complex', that is, a group of states united by common security problems of the region. 3Geographically, the Indian Ocean is the third-largest ocean in the world, covering 68.556 million sq. km or 20 per cent of the earth's water surface. 4 Broadly, it has been bounded by India in its north; Africa in its west; Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, Malaysiaand Australia in its east; and Antarctica in its south. The Indian Ocean also embraces many seas like Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Mannar and the Gulf of Oman. The major ports in the Indian Ocean are Chennai, Colombo, Durban, Jakarta, Kolkata, Melbourne, Mumbai and Richards Bay. 5 There are several choke points in the Indian Ocean such as the Mozambique Channel, the Bab-elMandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Lombok Strait. 6 According to Michel and Sticklor, 38 states have influence over the Indian Ocean Region. Some of the 38 states are Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. France and United Kingdom are also included because of their island territories. 7 These countries draw 40 per cent of the world's total coastlines. In 2010, the population of Indian Ocean Region comprises almost onethird, that is 35.70 per cent, of the world's total population while the average Human Development Index of this region is only 0.597 in comparison to the world average of 0.682. Looking at the brief history of the Indian Ocean, one can say that the Indian Ocean has been a significant route, making it accessible for traders from the worldwide. The western Indian Ocean was dominated by the Persians from the third century to the seventh century while the Arabs dominated the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean from seventh century to the fourteenth century. The Arabs occupied the coastline of East Africa, the north-western coastline of India and Southeast Asia. Rais is of the view that the neglect of the naval strategy by the Arabs led European traders to enter the Indian Ocean. 8The Portuguese came with the aim to monopolize over the Asian trade, especially in spices. The Portuguese occupied Colombo, Socotra, Goa and Melaka, but by the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch started occupying most of the Portuguese domains. The Dutch formed the United East India Company in 1602 to promote the eastern trade. It is said that Spain's occupation of Portugal in 1580 and religious intolerance and lack of commercial associations in Portugal led to weaken Portugal, while newly discovered Brazil diverted its focus from the Indian Ocean. Because of the lack of resources, the Dutch failed in effectively controlling the region. The war with England and alteration in Dutch colonial policies led Dutch to lose their domination to the British and the French in the seventeenth century. The English established the East India Company in 1601, while the French East India Company was established in 1604. The Indian Ocean has been called 'British Lake'. 9By the end of the Second World War, almost all the countries of Indian Ocean area got independence from the colonial domination. However, following the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, the Indian Ocean occupied centre stage in the foreign policies of the super power because of their strategic and economic interest in the region. Chomsky argued that the United States is interested in the region because of its oil reserves. However, the Cold War reached the Indian Ocean in the 1960s and 1970s. Both the United States and the USSR tried to install their naval bases and submarines in the Indian Ocean. The United Nations declared the Indian Ocean as the zone of peace in 1971. Bouchard and Crumplin argued that the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Israel-Palestine war of 1973, Gulf oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s gave Indian Ocean a geostrategic importance. After the end of Cold War, the United States intervened in Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 brought instability to the region. The war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009 also brought turmoil to the region. It is argued that India is a great power in the Indian Ocean Region while China is also gradually proving its presence in the region. 10Maritime rights of the nations are enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but these rights are sometimes in conflict with their strategic interests. The Indian Ocean Region has now turned into a multidimensional and dynamic region; however, it was neglected for a long time. Venkatshamy is of the view that Indian Ocean has an increasingly important role to play in the geopolitics in the coming times. Forty-eight out of 63 ports in Asia are located in the Indian Ocean Region. By 2013, it has become the pivot of trade and energy as the region has 61 per cent of total global container traffic besides 70 per cent of the petroleum products transportation. 11 The Malacca Strait is the major shipping route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, connecting Asia, Middle East and Europe. The 550-mile strait is a vital choke point in the Indian Ocean as more than 50,000 merchant ships travel by the waterways every year. 12 'If Straits get blocked, almost half of the world's fleet would need to reroute through the Sunda or Lombok Straits.' 13 The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region has made many extra-regionalstates to keep a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 14 It is said that most of the armed conflicts are located in the Indian Ocean Region. According to Venkatshamy, 45 per cent of the world's conflicts (such as Palestine and Israel, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and 75 per cent of the world natural disasters occur in the Indian Ocean Region. 15The region is said to be very rich in the natural resources like gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium. It is estimated that the region contains almost 55 per cent of recognized oil reserves and around 40 per cent of gas reserves. According to Berlin, in 2011, 40 per cent of trade in oil transports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 per cent through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Most of the energy exports from the five major world oil producers pass the narrow route of the Indian Ocean. 16 It is argued that the growing interest of the Gulf Cooperation countries in the Indian Ocean is because of the gradual increase in the consumption of energy by India and China. It is argued that countries like the United States, China, India and Japan are increasingly depending on energy supplied by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran, making Indian Ocean Region more and more important in the coming decades or rather century. 17Besides its economic importance, Indian Ocean Region also has military significance. The island of Diego Garcia has been a major airnaval base of the United States in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also installed some major naval task forces such as Combined Task Force 152 and Combined Task Force 150, while France has its naval bases installed in Djibouti, Reunion and Abu Dhabi. China has commercial ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. Port construction by the Chinese is also under way in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is argued that Marao Atoll in Maldives is among potential Chinese military bases.

An evaluation of tsunami hazard using Bayesian approach in the Indian Ocean

With the implementation of trade protectionism by western countries dominated by the US and EU, particularly the redefinition of trade rules by the Trump administration based on the “America First” policy, over the past two years, China’s foreign trade and investment will expand into the Indian Ocean region at a faster pace, and China will become an increasingly important economic and security stakeholder in the region. Moreover, the US is shifting its strategic focus from anti-terrorism to checking “strategic rivals”, hoping the countries within the Indian Ocean region like India and Australia will assume more security responsibilities. That causes new changes to the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and the strategic competition among powers in the Indian Ocean region is increasingly intensified. Meanwhile, instead of being eased, the instability of the security situation across the Indian Ocean shows a sign of further deterioration. In the future, the US will still be the biggest variable that affects the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and India, as a power within the region, will become a main variable that affects the international environment in the region. Amid the changing international environment across the Indian Ocean region, China will have fast growing demand for security in the region, which will prompt China to include the Indian Ocean into its strategic vision to meet its rising economic interests and security demand in the region and ease the pressure from the strategic competition among powers. According to this report, although China is not a country in the Indian Ocean, it’s a country close to the Indian Ocean. That is to say, China is the power outside but closest to the Indian Ocean. As the economic relations between China and the countries along the Indian Ocean coast has become increasingly closer in recent years, both traditional and non-traditional security challenges are growing in the region; in particular, given the strategic importance of the Eastern Indian Ocean, which is adjacent to South China Sea, to China’s peripheral environment, actively creating the political, economic and security environment favorable to China in the Indian Ocean region will be a choice for China’s foreign strategy in the next decade or even a longer period of time. In the Indian Ocean region, China has been, is, and will always be a builder that promotes economic prosperity, a participant that develops international rules and a contributor that safeguards common security. The main objective of China’s Indian Ocean strategy is to safeguard its freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and ensure its security of maritime transport, and to have the capability to expand its economic interest in the Indian Ocean region. This requires China to have corresponding military defense and projection capabilities, and to play a constructive role that matches its own capabilities in the field of security governance in the Indian Ocean.KeywordsIndian Ocean strategyInternational EnvironmentStrategic GameBelt and Road Initiative

Population structure, phylogeography and demographic history of Tenualosa ilisha populations in the Indian Ocean region inferred from mitochondrial DNA sequence variation

In terms of geographical location and natural endowments, Indian Ocean and the coastal areas naturally have the gene to become a stage for the game of world powers and a key region for the competition of interests; the Indian Ocean Region today is experiencing not only the gradual change of international architecture but also the reconstruction of maritime order in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly important in its strategic position but it is still not the “center stage” or “strategic center” in global politics and economics; in recent years, China’s ambition towards the Indian Ocean has been growing, but that ambition is still a subordinate direction of its geo-strategy (maritime strategy). We shall have rational understanding about the geographical environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the geographical risks in China’s the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean; the principal geographical risk for China in the Indian Ocean Region is not the security of Indian Ocean sea routes but two others: first, regionalization of structural contradictions between big powers; second, complicated and fragile geopolitical ecology in relevant Indian Ocean areas. From the perspective of geostrategic adjustments by big powers, the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” concept indicates the competition between big powers in the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly complicated. The US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, makes the Indian Ocean a major geo-direction in containing China, while the India’s “Maritime Doctrine” also strengthens vigilance against China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, the geopolitical competition between big powers including the US and India are major challenges and geographical risks for China in this region. From the perspective of regional geopolitical ecology, issues like cultural conflicts, resource disputes, poverty, turbulence, territorial disputes and terrorism in the shatter belt make geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Rim complex and fragile, and geographical risks and security in this region have significant spillover effect; local turmoil and political risks with instability in relevant regions have become another main geographical risk for China. Adverse impacts of the two on China’s maintaining and expanding its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region go far beyond the security of Indian Ocean sea routes and unconventional security threats like the Indian Ocean pirates and regional terrorismKeywordsIndian OceanGeo-environmentGeographical risksIndo-Pacific strategyChina’s Indian Ocean strategy

China’s port facility construction projects in the Indian Ocean (IO) region, particularly those in Gwadar and Djibouti, have led to a heated debate among strategists over whether the country has been carrying out a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, an alleged Chinese scheme to challenge America’s military predominance in South Asia. Although Beijing has denied the existence of such a strategy, it has enhanced its strategic ties with littoral countries in the IO region over the past few years. This article discusses the evolution of Beijing’s IO strategy and examines the nature of these Chinese port projects. It argues that rather than simply copying the American model of developing military bases overseas, China has been deliberating a more sophisticated plan for its physical presence there—creating a new set of ‘overseas strategic pivots’. These ‘pivots’ are designed to help Beijing sustain its anti-piracy campaign and serve as forward stations for the transportation of China’s imported energy and merchandise while, with a relatively low-key stance, reducing any unnecessary opposing actions by rival powers. In addition, their political and economic functions are to a certain extent greater than their military functions despite the fact that they appear to be military bases. More importantly, these ‘pivots’ can help China create closer partnerships with littoral governments in the IO region, which suggests that the country is trying to create a friendly international environment favouring its plan to step into the global maritime domain.

The Sino-Indian competition is not a recent development when it comes to global and regional affairs. In recent years, the crisis between China and India has manifested serious geostrategic risks to the stability and safety of the South Asian region and maritime domain. This paper precisely analyses the Sino Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean where both the Asian powers are regarded as one of the most significant naval capabilities for their geostrategic vision. An overview of China’s and India’s strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is what this study aims to convey in the first section. The section analyzes the geo political and geo-economic importance of Indian Ocean for both China and India. The latter section sheds light on China’s growing concern for the IOR stemmed from its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) security and explains the expanding activities of China in the region. The Indian security community views China’s continued modernization of its military, increased power projection in the Indian Ocean, and political and economic ties with the IOR states as measures to counterbalance India’s dominance in the region. The next section outlines how China’s increasing sway in the IOR is becoming a major worry for New Delhi. In an effort to project power and protect its strategic interests both inside and outside the IOR, India has worked to modernize and bolster its armed forces over the past ten years, particularly the navy. India is currently envisioning a more grandiose and newer role for itself in the IOR by procuring infrastructure in a number of IOR countries. India has been trying to thwart China’s attempts to establish IOR dominance. This, combined with India’s essential naval build-up and overwhelming spatial advantage, would significantly challenge China’s goal of enhancing its leverage in the IOR through its “String of Pearls.” Thus, all these counter activities of the two Asian powers against each other have gradually been fueling the maritime competition in the IOR a more intense one. BIMRAD Journal VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, DEC 2024; PP-63-84

The Mangroves for the Future initiative (MFF) has operated since 2006 as a strategic regional and partnership-led programme working in response to the continued degradation of coastal ecosystems, which threatens the livelihoods and security of coastal communities and makes them more vulnerable to impacts from climate change. MFF follows the principle that healthy coastal ecosystems (principally mangroves, coral reefs and sea grass beds) can contribute significantly to human well-being and the resilience of man and nature to climate change. In its initial phase to 2010, MFF supported India, Indonesia, Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Thailand to deliver a targeted response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Since then, country membership has expanded to include Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, Pakistan and Viet Nam and the initiative has grown towards a wider response to the current and emerging challenges for coastal management in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions. MFF is also engaged with Malaysia on an outreach basis; and with the Philippines as a dialogue country. Co-chaired by International Union for Conservation of nature (IUCN) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and Wetland International (WI) as institutional partners, MFF provides a unique platform for representatives from governments, civil society and private sectors to meet, discuss and take actions together at both regional and national scales. At the regional level, MFF is governed by a Regional Steering Committee that provides strategic leadership for policy change and advocacy and also serves as a forum for country to country information exchange and discussions on emerging issues of regional importance. Within each MFF member country, a National Coordination body has oversight on the programme implementation as guided by its National Strategy and Action Plan and delivery of the small, medium and regional grant facilities. Through its inclusive partnership approach, MFF has significantly strengthened the collaboration between the key stakeholders from governments, civil society, and private sectors addressing national and regional coastal zone management issues. In particular, the MFF initiative has supported national and local governments in developing and implementing participatory and sustainable resource management strategies, and, through awareness and capacity building activities, empowered coastal communities to participate in the decision making processes relating to the management of the natural resources on which they depend for their livelihoods. The present paper elaborates successful examples of regional collaboration initiated through MFF that have contributed to better coastal governance in India Ocean region. The examples include the transboundary cooperation between Pakistan and Iran in Gawatar Bay, between India and Sri Lanka for in the Gulf of Mannar, and between Guangxi and Quang Ninh Provinces in China and Viet Nam. The paper also highlights the importance of the Sustainable Development Goals, especially the Goal 14 and concepts like Blue Economy for sustainable ocean and coastal management in the light of the rapid development in maritime trade, race for exploration of the ocean bed for mineral resources, unsustainable exploitation of fish resources, and increasing pollution load to ocean waters from rapidly developing coastal urban growth in the IndianOcean region.

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).This essay first summarizes China's growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China's presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China's failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.China's Imperatives in the Indian OceanChina's primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country's strategic thinking.An additional factor is that China's military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed by a considerable and growing margin. China's naval presence has grown in connection with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China's One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.India's Aspirations in the Indian OceanIndia considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less India's ocean. 1 As Donald Berlin has commented, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region-the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. 2India's views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country's colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled India's Monroe Doctrine. The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider. …

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance systems (ISR) have been playing a significant role in providing robust situational awareness of the maritime domain. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the ISR systems of India and China in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), a region of immense geopolitical significance and a theatre of power projection for both the countries. After tracing the evolution of ISR from ancient time to modern era, the study underscores the critical role of ISR in maritime security and strategic advantage, particularly in the IOR. The paper finds that, in accordance with its Two Ocean strategy, China has been expanding its ISR infrastructure in the IOR. Chinese naval activities, including submarine deployment, research vessels suspected of conducting covert surveillance in the eastern Indian Ocean, classified use of its satellite systems, use of air based ISR systems as force multipliers, and acquisition of bases in the IOR has potential to alter power dynamics in the IOR. These developments allow China to exert geopolitical influence and potentially challenge India’s traditionally dominant position in the IOR. The paper further delves into examining factors influencing the ISR force structure of India and China, including defence expenditure, military modernisation drive, development in Defence Industrial Base (DIB), and the role of commandand-control structure. Finally, this research tries to provide recommendations for India to enhance its ISR infrastructure, emphasizing the need to invest in HUMINT and TECHINT capabilities and enhanced inter-agency coordination. Overall, the paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the ISR landscape in the IOR.

ABSTRACTThis study investigates inter‐dependency between various wave parameters. It includes the mean wave direction (MWD), swell MWD, wind direction, maximum significant wave height (MSWH), resultant of wind direction and swell MWD, mean wave period (MWP), and peak wave period (PWP) using daily data from altimeter measurements, European Centre for Medium‐Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) Re‐Analysis Interim (ERA‐Interim), and ERA‐20C datasets in a changing climate for the past two decades in Indian Ocean region. It also examined the variability in monthly anomalies using linear circular correlation maps. The analysis used quality checked and well calibrated altimeter data from eight satellite missions for MSWH, and WAM (wave model) output from ERA‐Interim and ERA‐20C datasets for other variables. Spatial variability of correlation coefficient maps explained their inter‐dependency. Directional statistics methods explain the directional wave characteristics. Correlation maps signify that regions over the western sectors of Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal are swell dominant. Over these regions the swell MWD clearly dominated the total MWD (combined effects from wind‐sea and swells). For regions in Arabian Sea, the resultant of wind direction and swell MWD contributed about 91%, whereas contribution from swell MWD alone is about 86%. The variability in monthly anomaly MSWH exhibited a specific pattern that resembles the movement of synoptic systems from Southern Ocean propagating north‐eastwards reaching various destinations in the Bay of Bengal basin, having a strong positive correlation with MWD and swell MWD. Over the tropical South Indian Ocean (TSIO) region, the obtained feature correlates with the surface current pattern of Agulhas retroflection. These patterns are distinctly visible in the correlation maps between MSWH and resultant of wind direction and swell MWD as well wind direction monthly anomaly maps. For the North Indian Ocean an out of phase relation exists between the variability of MWSH with PWP monthly anomalies.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) turned out to be the most engaging region for global activities in recent years. The Indian Ocean consists of the most important trade routes of the world. The Indian Ocean provides a way to move through various regions of the world. World's huge economic players always keep an eye on the IOR for its strategic importance. The Indian Ocean is a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and it also provides a way to the Pacific Ocean through the Strait of Malacca. It is the main shipping channel for the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. The Indian Ocean region is spread over 28 states, three continents and covers 17.5% of the global land area. The IOR is home to almost 36% of the population of the world. The region is proven to have a rich petroleum resources and other metals. Indian Ocean is also a rich source of fish and its export. Major Sea routes of the world pass through the Indian Ocean that connects the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia with Europe and the Americas. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has become a home for economic developments, disputes, conflicts, and competition for regional influence by regional and extra-regional powers. The Trade flow from IOR across the globe has its importance for the global economy as well as regional countries. The growing presence of regional power (China) is a major concern for India and other regional countries and that has compelled them to reshape their maritime strategies. This article aims to state the importance of IOR in Indian reference and Chinese presence in IOR and its strategies.

<p>Iodine chemistry plays an essential role in controlling the radiation budget by changing various atmospheric parameters. Iodine in the atmosphere is known to cause depletion of ozone via catalytic reaction cycles. It alters the atmospheric oxidation capacity, and lead to ultrafine particle formation that acts as potential cloud condensation nuclei. The ocean is the primary source of iodine; it enters the atmosphere through fluxes of gaseous reactive iodine species. At the ocean surface, seawater iodide reacts with tropospheric ozone (gas) to form inorganic iodine species in gaseous form. These species namely, hypoiodous acid (HOI) and molecular iodine (I<sub>2</sub>) quickly photolyse to release reactive iodine (I) in the atmosphere. This process acts as a significant sink for tropospheric ozone contributing to ~16% ozone loss throughout the troposphere. Reactive iodine released in the atmosphere undergoes the formation of iodine monoxide (IO) or higher oxides of iodine (I<sub>x</sub>O<sub>x</sub>) via self-recombination reactions. It is known that inorganic iodine fluxes (HOI and I<sub>2</sub>) contribute to 75% of the detected IO over the Atlantic Ocean. However, we did not observe this from ship-based MAX-DOAS studies between 2014-2017. At present, there are no direct observations of inorganic iodine (HOI; few for I<sub>2</sub>) and are estimated via empirical methods derived from the interfacial kinetic model by Carpenter et al. in 2013. Based on the kinetic model, estimation of HOI and I<sub>2</sub> fluxes depends on three parameters, namely, ozone concentration, surface iodide concentration, and the wind speed. This parameterisation for inorganic fluxes assumes a sea surface temperature (SST) of 293 K and has limiting wind speed conditions. Since the parameterisation conditions assumed SST of 293 K higher uncertainties due to errors in activation energy creeps in the estimation of HOI flux compared to I<sub>2</sub> as the flux of HOI is ~20 times greater than that of I<sub>2</sub>. For three consecutive expeditions in the Indian and Southern Ocean, we detected ~1 pptv of IO in the marine boundary layer. These levels are not explained by the calculated inorganic fluxes by using observed and predicted sea surface iodide concentrations. This method of iodine flux estimation is currently used in all global models, along with the MacDonald et al. 2014 iodide estimation method. Model output using these parameterisations have not been able to match the observed IO levels in the Indian and Southern Ocean region. This discrepancy suggests that the process of efflux of iodine to the atmosphere may not be fully understood, and the current parametrisation does not do justice to the observations. It also highlights that the flux of organic iodine may also play a role in observed IO levels, especially in the Indian Ocean region. A correlation of 0.7 was achieved above the 99% confidence limit for chlorophyll-a with observed IO concentration in this region. There is a need to carry more observations to improve the estimation technique of iodine sea-air flux thus improving model predictions of IO in the atmosphere.</p>

Preliminary studies on ITCZ show that the displacement of this system can play an undeniable role in the climate of tropical regions as well as in surrounding areas. The purpose of this study is to investigate the annual ITCZ movement in the Indian Ocean and East Africa region and to select the appropriate and reliable index for ITCZ positioning. To conduct this research, the ERA-interim reanalysis gridded data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) was used to determine the location and spatial displacement of the ITCZ. The results showed that the HCC index is the appropriate index to detect the annual ITCZ displacement in all months of the year. The SH and P indices were in second place in terms of importance and accuracy in identifying the behavior and spatial displacement of the ITCZ system. The TCWV index has been a weak index to detect the ITCZ annual location and displacement. During the three months of winter, the ITCZ bends off the east coast of Africa to the southern latitudes and enters the waters of the Indian Ocean along the northwest-southeast. In the other words, the average ITCZ position on land is about 5˚–6˚ north latitude over the waters of the Indian Ocean. On the contrary, from April to the end of September, in the range of 30˚–50˚ E (Sudan), the ITCZ bends and extends to the northeast. During the summer months, this northward movement sometimes reaches up to 20˚.

Despite having the longest coastline and the broadest jurisdiction of waters in the region, Australia has not been a major force in the Indian Ocean region for a long time, which is related to its maritime strategy and diplomatic tradition focusing on the Pacific Ocean. However, as the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy, China’s BRI projects and India's big ambition further in this area, along with Australia's economic ties with the region, Australia is putting more attention and resource to the Indian Ocean region, stirring up security situation of this region and complicating strategic competition. From both structural pressure and unit-level incentive, it is highly necessary for Australia to re-examine the way it interacts with countries within the region and major external powers on the Indian Ocean. In terms of system pressure, Australia is noticing the strategic competitiveness escalating and even a “power vacuum” in the Indian Ocean region brought by the relative decline of American power, as well as the traditional and non-traditional threats to its western coast. At the reductive level, the transfer of domestic resources development and export to the west front of Australia, with the economic opportunities presenting in the Indian Ocean region also enable it to recognize those significant opportunities and benefits. Of course, as to specific policies and policy implementation of Australia on the Indian Ocean still, to some extent, depends on the evolution of its complex domestic politics, but what is certain is that Australia will continue to boost its influence on the political, economic and security situation of the Indian Ocean region, which might put forward new challenges on the dynamic of Sino Australian relationsKeywordsAustralian national strategyIndian Ocean regional orderMajor Power relations