The Principle of Loyalty in the Contractual Relationship: Insurance Seeker –Insurance Intermediary – Insurer

Abstract

Having attempted to define the duty of loyalty of the parties to the tripartite relationship: insurance seeker – insurance intermediary – insurer, the author of the article tries to answer the question whether it can be classified as an obligation of increased trust. He applies the dogmatic as well as empirical legal methodologies in order to implement the previous research hypotheses. The perception of loyalty varies from obligation to obligation. This duty intensifies in relationships based on cooperation and broadly understood intermediation, which is characterised by decision-making freedom of the ordering party before the conclusion of the contract with a contractor specified by the intermediary and independence of the insurance broker’s activities. The formula is based on a significant risk and trust at the same time. Firstly, insurance brokers do not know whether the presented offer will satisfy insurance seekers and, secondly, they cannot be sure if their offer will be finally accepted. Therefore, on the one hand, the duty of loyalty requires the intermediaries to provide extensive information about all the circumstances of the potential transaction, and, on the other hand, the same duty burdens the insurance customers with the obligation to confirm the actual situation caused by the insurance broker, in which the intended goal has been achieved. All in all, the intermediary’s purpose can only be accomplished with the participation of the insurance seeker. The aim of the article is to develop the model for the proper implementation of the tripartite obligation relationship, consisting of the entity seeking insurance cover, insurance intermediary and insurer.