The primacy of the parallel: informal governance in the Romanian projectocracy

The article analyses the problem of choosing the optimal form of state government at the present stage of development of the Ukrainian state. The evolution of the form of state government is studied and five main stages of its transformation in Ukraine from the moment of independence to the present day are identified. The advantages and disadvantages of the presidential-parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential forms of government in the Ukrainian realities are analysed. The key factors influencing the change of the form of government in Ukraine are identified: the political situation, the state of civil society and European integration processes. The tendency towards parliamentarisation of the public administration system in Ukraine in view of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration processes is revealed. The impact of the transformation of the form of government on the processes of socio-political consolidation in Ukraine is analysed. It is substantiated that the change in the form of government is not only an institutional reform, but also an important factor in consolidating society around democratic values and the European integration course of the state, the effectiveness of which depends on a number of socio-political conditions. It is demonstrated that institutional changes without an appropriate public consensus and maturity of political institutions do not guarantee the achievement of political stability. It is established that the parliamentary form of government has a higher consolidation potential due to the wider representation of social groups and a more balanced distribution of power.

The article is devoted to the study of the peculiarities of the form of government as a structural basis for the exercise of power, formed within the framework of constitutional law, under the condition of representation of the main socio-economic groups of society. The purpose of the study is to establish the peculiarities of the form of state government as a factor in the formation of democratic institutional design. Features of the form of government as a factor of institutionalization of relations between authorized centers of power are characterized. It was emphasized that the modernization of the form of government in the political agenda may indicate a lack of deep consensus regarding the development of the political system. The significance of changes for institutional design within the evolution of the form of state government, which depends on the level of satisfaction of the requirements and needs of key political players, is analyzed. The significance of the political experience of Ukraine, which during the last decades has shown that political expediency is a more significant principle than considerations of preserving constitutional stability, is revealed. It was found that the existence of the current form of government in Ukraine is the result of the evolution of certain institutions, first of all, the institution of the presidency. In the context of the experience of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the assessment of the crisis phenomena of 2008 and 2010 becomes important, in particular the pressure of the demands of socio-economic balancing, which caused the “internal national reading” of the functioning of the form of government. It is revealed that the use of the existing potential of the form of government to ensure advantages in political competition led to the authoritarianization of the institution of the prime minister in modern Hungary. It has been proven that the international community’s fixation on the deterioration of the state of human rights protection has become a clear evidence of the influence of the form of government on inter-institutional interactions, in particular, in increasing the pressure of public authorities on civil society. It was established that the contradictions between high standards and the demands of the consumer society caused the support of right-wing conservative populist political forces. It was found that the situation in modern Slovakia shows that the parliamentary republic as a form of government also ensured the transition to democracy and the observance of democratic procedures. It was established that the trends of “non-normative” use of the power potential of the form of state government may indicate the search for a national model of balance between branches of government and key officials. It was concluded that a high level of self-regulation in the political system corresponds to a high level of civil political activity, responsibility and consensus of political elites, professionalism of the political class as a whole.

Political theory and practice show that parliamentary democracies, including in Europe, independently or almost independently of the forms and systems of government that they are implementing, are divided into systems of positive and negative parliamentarism. An indicator of the dichotomy is presence (constitutionally provided) or absence (constitutionally unprovided) of the vote of confidence/investiture in expected/hypothetical government. It actualizes the issue of the influence of vote of confidence/investiture on the formation of minority governments (and other types of governments) in the European parliamentary democracies. Accordingly, the article is dedicated to analyzing the institute of vote of confidence/investiture and statistical outlining its impact on the formation of minority government in European parliamentary democracies. It is argued that the presence or absence of votes of confidence/investiture and their combinations and procedural patterns affect the frequency of formation of minority governments in different ways. Among such patterns there are the following: participation or non-participation of parliament in the procedure of vote of confidence/investiture and formation of government (presence or absence of vote of investiture); type of parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture («ex ante» or «ex post»); the rule of deciding on a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture in a government (by absolute, relative or negative parliamentary majority); permissible number of formateurs or alternatives of governments for parliamentary vote of investiture; the right to nominate prime ministers/formateurs or alternatives of governments; the number of attempts to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence/investiture; consequence of the failure to get vote of confidence/investiture. As a consequence, checking the correlation between the various patterns of votes of investiture and the frequency of formation of minority governments generally shows that the institutional design of votes investiture mostly and averaging does not affect the frequency of formation of minority governments, although some patterns of votes of investiture are decisive.

Forms of government, i.e. forms of state organization, are monarchy - the head of state is the monarch, and republic - the head of state is the president as an elected person. Between the monarchies themselves, as well as between the republics as a form of government, there are certain differences that are conditioned by historical, cultural, national and other specificities. In the conceptual history of the state, the forms of state government have long been discussed. The first philosophical observations about the forms of government were given by Plato in the work States. Monarchy is a form of government in which the executor and bearer of the highest state power is a permanently crowned person - a monarch who is not legally responsible, but is sovereign and "above" the law, is not subject to legal sanctions, and his position is fundamentally different from others in terms of the privileges he enjoys. In a broader sense, a monarchy is a form of government in which the basic power is exercised by one person. In the narrower sense, monarchy is a form of government in which the function of head, or head of state, is performed by one person who is not subject to legal and political responsibility, who performs his function for life, and that function is, as a rule, hereditary. To denote a monarchy, this name is not always used, but the expressions: empire - emperor, empire - emperor, duchy - duke etc. (the size of the territory, the size of the population, the real political power of the state) etc.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate factors that influence the application of governance mechanism in family small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Indonesia.Design/methodology/approachThis study used multiple regression analysis to examine the hypothesis. For data collection, questionnaires were distributed to 337 owners and managers of SMEs around 7 districts in Java Island in Indonesia.FindingsThe result indicates that uncertainty influences the application of formal governance in family SMEs in Indonesia. Meanwhile, asset specificity has impact on both formal and relational governance in the context of firms. Financial and non-financial objectives did not impact both formal and relational governance.Research limitations/implicationsThough this research was carried out in a particular cultural context, this study was not specifically designed to examine the interaction between cultural variables and family corporate governance variables. In the future, there is need for a study that examines how culture can influence the practice of formal and relational governance in family business.Practical implicationsThe study will give guidance to owners or managers of family business in terms of governance mechanism when uncertainty increases. This evidence suggests that family firms need to adopt formal governance within family firms when uncertainty exists.Social implicationsThe research finding indicated that uncertainty influenced the application of formal governance in family SMEs in Indonesia. This research finding suggests that family firms need to adopt formal governance when uncertainty exists. The adoption of formal governance, however, may implicate to some others organizational areas in family firms such as leadership, recruitment and selection and corporate culture.Originality/valueThis study is one of the few on family SMEs, which applied the transaction cost theory. Most of the studies use agency theory for investigating governance mechanism in the family business. This study is one of the few on family SMEs, which applied the transaction cost. This study provides an explanation about a factor that influences a family firm to choose formal and relational governance within the firm.

As the word demos denotes, the democracy is generally considered as the rule or governance based on the general base of people in which monarchy or oligarchy form is excluded. We have a classical view about the four forms of government, which was proposed by Platonic concepts. Most idealistic form of government, in his prongs, could be found in Crete and Sparta, which was nevertheless not a democratic form. His accolade of these two nations, which, of course, would be a kind of God’s product so to be most benevolent, humanly appealing, efficient and philanthropic. This means the democratic form of government is not best, but most favored alternative to police the society. The political terms, henceforth, would supervene the concept of democracy, and, for many reasons and on historical wake, democracy is generally accepted as practically most desired form of rule or governance. While some modern scholar revealed, a mini-republic can be a niche to contest the merits of various forms of governance. We can gauge a scope of elements we value through the governance process, human intrinsic, efficiency, equality, welfare and even individual happiness. As the time is a small city community, called a polis, in Plato and Socrates, a mini republic can be well envisaged in understanding the Platonic Republic. In that case, most benevolent ruler may be superior to any other form of governance, which can be a philosopher’s Republic. The ideal ruler would behave and govern with mighty intelligence and concomitant power to rule. It is idealistic to produce maximum happiness of polis constituents. The worst contras, however, a tyranny, comes that the constituents legitimately expel their ruler by a collective vote. This extreme contrast and the way of process also could be ascertained in the ancient form of oriental monarchy. The dynasty could be legitimately revoked to restore new heritage of emperor or Kings where a kind of rebellion, as elucidated by Locke, is well justified in the name of heaven’s command. Given the size of polis or governed territory, there are separate ways to redress the evils of tyranny while the Oriental culture has not recognized the kind of formal vote methods. Any means to expel the tyranny could be embraced to rebel. For our purpose of grasp through this working paper, I would theorize on the traditional elements of public policy and democratic form of government.

شاهنامه طرحی انداموار و یکپارچه دارد و اگر هم دارای دو بخش اسطوره‌ای و تاریخی است، این دو بخش به هم پیوسته هستند: بخش اسطوره‌ای به آفرینش و بخش تاریخی به تداوم آن توجه دارد. یکی از انگیزه‌های بنیادی در تدوین شاهنامه، احیای هویت ایرانی بوده است. همین مسألة احیای هویت موجب شده شاهنامه جایگاه حماسة ملی بیابد و از همان آغاز محتوایی پیدا کند که با تکیه بر مسائل فرهنگی، رسالتی سیاسی را دنبال می‌کند. مبنای فرهنگی شاهنامه عبارت است از نبرد اهورامزدا و اهریمن؛ چنین مبنایی هم توجیه چگونگی آفرینش و هم تداوم‌بخش زندگی جمعی است و هرگونه بازاندیشی در پیوند آفرینش با تداوم حیات به پدیدار شدن الگویی سیاسی می‌انجامد؛ نمونه‌های نخستین انسان به شاهان آغازین و الگوهای پادشاهی بدل می‌شوند و نبرد از اهورا و اهریمن به نمایندگان آن ها منتقل می‌شود و خویشکاری انسان را تجلی می‌بخشد. در بخش اسطوره‌ای، ایرانیان شکلی ابتدائی از حکومت را طرح کرده‌اند و آن را در گزینه‌های متعددی گنجانده‌اند تا به الگوی مناسبی برای حکومت دست یابند. وقتی به الگوی مناسب دست یافته‌اند آن را آرمان خود کرده‌اند؛ پس از آن در بخش تاریخی، برایش در پی جایگزینی واقعی برآمده‌اند.

Authoritarian regimes can make surprising constitutional choices. Many adopt sham constitutions packed with rights guarantees that they do not uphold. Others, however, adopt brutally candid constitutions that forthrightly limit or omit a variety of basic rights. The result is a considerable degree of constitutional variation among authoritarian regimes. In this contribution to an edited volume, we find that some of this variation can be explained by distinguishing among different strains of authoritarianism. As an empirical matter, we find that constitutional candor is more common among monarchical and military regimes than civilian or party-based dictatorships. As a theoretical matter, we argue that this pattern reflects the divergent strategic incentives faced by different types of authoritarian regimes.Our empirical analysis compares the constitutional choices of four different types of regimes — democratic regimes, monarchical regimes, military regimes, and civilian or party-based regimes — over the period from 1981 to 2008. Specifically, we estimate a multinomial logit model in which the predictor variable of interest is the type of regime, and the dependent variable is the type of constitution adopted. This regression analysis confirms the existence of statistically significant differences among monarchical, military, and civilian dictatorships that cannot be explained by variables such as economic development, geographic region, or civil war. Even after controlling for such variables, civilian dictatorships are significantly less likely to practice constitutional candor, and more likely to adopt sham constitutions, than either monarchical or military dictatorships. These findings support our hypothesis that authoritarian regimes are rational, self-interested actors that make constitutional choices on the basis of strategic calculations which vary from one type of regime to another. On the one hand, adoption of a sham constitution offers authoritarian rulers a relatively cheap way of appealing ideologically to domestic and international constituencies. On the other hand, adoption of a candid constitution can help authoritarian rulers to resolve a variety of coordination problems. A relatively candid constitution can be useful to an authoritarian regime as a means of allocating power and resolving conflict within the regime, and of generating self-reinforcing popular beliefs about the ubiquity of government control and the consequences of opposition or dissent. Conversely, a sham constitution can backfire by depriving regime members of a device for overcoming internal coordination problems while simultaneously providing regime opponents with a coordination device of their own. The three types of authoritarian regimes balance the costs and benefits of constitutional candor largely in the manner that we would expect under this hypothesis. Compared to civilian or party-based dictatorships, monarchical regimes enjoy greater historical legitimacy, while military regimes enjoy superior capacity for coercion. These advantages ought to render monarchical and military regimes less dependent than civilian regimes on ideological approval or international acceptance, and more at liberty to adopt unappealingly candid constitutions. By contrast, because civilian regimes are not as well positioned to flout the expectations of domestic and international audiences, they may weigh the costs of constitutional candor more heavily. Consistent with this account, civilian regimes are in fact less prone to constitutional candor than either monarchical or military regimes.

During the last decades democracy aid, which aims at fostering democracy in aid recipient countries, has become a popular type of foreign aid among major donor countries. This article asks whether the effect of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. According to previous research the rulers' risk of losing power varies among types of regimes. Theoretically, we may assume that when the risk of losing power is low, authoritarian rulers tend to be more willing to accept democracy aid, given the other benefits that foreign aid could bring to the ruler. In addition, it is also easier to implement democracy aid projects where certain political institutions are in place. The theoretical argument is tested using time series cross-section analysis on a global data set covering 143 aid-receiving countries from 1990 to 2007. The results show that the impact of democracy aid differs between different types of authoritarian regimes. Democracy aid has a positive impact on democracy levels in the most stable types of authoritarian regimes where political institutions are also in place, that is, one-party regimes.

The creation of the public corporation in the 19th century drove out the partnership as the predominant form of organizational governance. Yet, within the professional services sector, partnerships have survived and prospered. Moreover, professional services firms that chose to abandon the partnership form tended to become private rather than public corporations. Drawing upon several theories, we compare the efficiency of the partnership relative to corporate forms of governance in the context of the professional services sector. We argue that the professional partnership minimizes agency costs associated with both the private and public corporation. We also argue from tournament theory and property rights theory that partnerships have superior incentive systems for professionals in particular and knowledge workers more generally. However, drawing upon structural-contingency theory, we identify limiting conditions, which affect the relative efficiency of the partnership. We argue that the corporation, especially the private corporation, will be the preferred form of governance where the limiting conditions are prevalent. Nevertheless, we also argue that under specific conditions the partnership form of governance will persist and prosper because it remains unusually suited to the management of knowledge workers.

This article aims not only to analyze the existing forms of state governance, but also to understand their impact on society - to what extent they contribute to the protection of citizens' rights, social justice, economic stability and general well-being. Changing geopolitical and economic situations around the world often force states to adapt to new challenges and transform their governance models for further stability and global competitiveness. Therefore, within the framework of the article, it is important to identify what external and internal factors influence the choice of state governance methods. Today, forms of state governance have become not only a target topic in discussions related to the state system, but also have a key importance in development processes. The study of the topic is important, as it provides an opportunity to understand how existing governance systems are able to respond to modern challenges, and what steps need to be taken to ensure that forms of state governance are effective and sustainable in our current conditions. Keywords: Public administration, form of state, forms of government, monarchy, politeia, aristocratic democracy, presidential republic․

The past few decades have brought an enormous increase in county government reorganization. Even though the traditional form of commission government is still most prevalent, over 1,100 counties across the country now operate under some version of an appointed administrator or elected chief executive form of government (Jeffery, et al., 1989, 120). In 1960, only about 83 counties had such chief executives (Governmental Research Institute, 1980, 12). Most of these so-called reform counties are populous enough that a majority of Americans now live in reorganized counties. Yet almost nothing is known in any comparative or systematic sense about the consequences of this far-reaching change in local government structure. Perhaps 30 years ago this lack of knowledge might have been understandable. But today, many counties enjoy a large measure of governmental autonomy, and urban counties in particular have taken on a wide range of optional services previously reserved to city governments. A sizable literature has analyzed the effects of the urban reform movement on city governments, but we have little understanding of the policy consequences of changes in governmental structure among American counties. A frequently tested hypothesis in the urban policy literature is that reform governments should tax and spend less than nonreformed municipalities. Yet, the results of such research have been mixed. As discussed below, some studies confirm the basic thesis that reformers were largely successful in immunizing city government from the big spending preferences of lower-income ethnic and minority voters. Others find that changing the form of municipal government has little if any effect on taxing and spending policy. Regardless of the lack of definitive findings in the urban policy literature, we should profit from a brief discussion of the theoretical literature on the policy impact of reform at the city level. We will follow that discussion with a consideration of some of the special characteristics of counties that might cause them to behave differently from municipal jurisdictions under conditions of reorganization. To assess the effects of a change in county structure, we employ an interrupted time-series design. Our analysis covers the period from 1974 to 1992. It will include 10 counties that changed their form and 10 control counties that have operated continuously under the commission form. Can County Modernization Affect Public Policy? The literature in urban politics has long suggested that the form of city government should have policy consequences. Soon after the turn of the century, the good government movement sought various ways to free the nation's large cities from the clutches of corrupt political machines. In addition to eliminating graft and corruption, the reformers sought local governments that were efficient, businesslike, and more responsive to the popular will. To accomplish these goals, reform groups promoted such institutional devices as the civil service, non-partisan ballots, at-large elections, and the city manager form of government. Implementing civil service and creating new electoral arrangements (including the direct primary and the initiative and referendum) represented the main assault on machine rule and its dishonest practices. But for greater economy, efficiency, and rational decision making, reformers eventually embraced the council-manager plan. The municipal reform movement quickly picked up substantial support from the business and professional community. In fact, some observers contended that the underlying purpose of the reform agenda was to foster a local government commitment to efficiency and scientific management that would help promote a climate for private profit-making (Judd, 1988, 108). Not coincidentally, an emphasis on businesslike practices and efficient service delivery would also presumably deflect the objectives of particularistic interests. …

The initial version of the Constitution of Ukraine established a form of government that can be classified as mixed republican only conditionally. Elements of presidentialism inherent in this form of government indicate a significant distortion of the essence of a mixed republic. The form of government fundamentally limited the influence of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the executive branch and administratively subordinated it to the President of Ukraine. Securing the leading role of the President of Ukraine in the state mechanism, the form of government did not establish some of the fundamentally important elements of a mixed republic. Despite the obvious functional similarity of the form of government with the presidential republic, it was not identical to it. This form of government did not show a “rigid” separation of powers and anticipated the institutions that were atypical for a presidential republic. Therefore, the form of government established by the primary edition of the Constitution of Ukraine cannot be defined either as a mixed republican or presidential. This atypical form of government occupied, in fact, an intermediate position between these two types of republic. The amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine dated on December 8, 2004 brought the form of government closer to a “full-fledged” mixed republic and, on the whole, ensured its compliance with the criteria of a parliamentary-presidential republic. The form of government limits the influence of the President of Ukraine on the executive branch in favor of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The parliamentary method of forming the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and its parliamentary responsibility have shifted the center of political attraction to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. By changing the mechanism of government accountability to society, the form of government makes it possible to identify the parties whose political course is carried out by the Government. The amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine dated on December 8, 2004 eliminated the administrative subordination of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to the President of Ukraine and ensured a real dualism of the executive branch. At the same time, the existing form of government demonstrates a number of serious defects and it is filled with the risks of constitutional conflicts. In the Fundamental Law, the mechanism of interaction between the highest bodies of the state is regulated fragmentarily, and their competence relationships are contradictory. As a result, in conditions of party confrontation, the form of government significantly loses its functionality. The construction of a “full-fledged” mixed republic in Ukraine requires the constitutional consolidation of its most important elements in its natural form.

The government is provided with macro-control function in the market that can affect corporate resource allocation and economic efficiency through administrative or economic policies. A large number of studies have explored the impacts of government industrial policies, subsidies and other direct interventional economic measures on corporate total factor productivity. However, it lacks the understanding of government procurement, an economic tool that uses market procurement mechanisms to exert governance effects on companies. Few studies have noticed that the government can act as a customer to guide and support suppliers’ production and operation through market procurement, which helps to promote corporate innovation and improve production efficiency.This paper verifies the role and internal mechanism of major government customers in promoting corporate total factor productivity based on Chinese listed companies’ voluntarily disclosed data of major government customers in 2008—2017. This paper finds that: Major government customers can significantly improve suppliers’ total factor productivity. The effects of major government customers on corporate total factor productivity are more prominent in customers with higher government governance efficiency and higher government level, and in companies with larger technological distances and higher product market competition. The mechanism analysis shows that major government customers promote total factor productivity by improving corporate innovation investment and resource allocation efficiency.The contributions of this paper are as follows: First, from the perspective of government as a major corporate customer, this paper expands the research on government functions and confirms the effectiveness of market-oriented governance tools. Second, this paper supplements the empirical evidence of corporate total factor productivity incentives from the perspective of supply chain and verifies the positive effect of major government customers on corporate economic efficiency. Besides, it has noticed the discrepancy of governance effects under different government characteristics or corporate characteristics, which enriches studies on the relationship between government and enterprise. Third, this paper reveals the internal mechanism of major government customers on corporate total factor productivity and deepens the understanding of how government customers affect corporate behaviors. It has some implications for policy-makers and analysts. At first, listed companies should attach importance to the positive governance effect of government customers on total factor productivity. Then, governments should focus on the conditions and mechanisms for government customers to play a positive role and improve government governance efficiency. Last but not least, both governments and listed companies should understand the relationship between government and market correctly, and promote the government to play a better role in the market.

The food industry is expanding quantitatively and qualitatively, with consumer trends changing all the time (Costa and Jongen 2006). One consumer trend growing over the years is food consumption, especially in sustainable food consumption (Vermeir and Verbeke 2006). As with the theme of the conference highlighting enlightened marketing during challenging times, the paradigm of consumption has changed due to the increase in consumers’ interest in food consumption. Food consumption has moved past the concept of just nutrient intake. Nowadays, food consumption is intertwined with the environment, society, and culture (Duchin 2005). For example, Subway used to be a leading retailer in food retailing; however, nowadays, that is not enough. Subway is losing sales as other restaurants that focus more holistically on sustainable food consumption are increasing in market share (Taylor 2018). This is not only affecting consumers at restaurants but also in-home food consumption. Reflecting this belief, the World Summit on Sustainable Development conducted by the United Nations emphasized sustainable food consumption as a concept of food consumption that considers various qualitative factors (WSSD 2002). Sustainable food consumption is defined as economic development through food choices beneficial to individuals, society, and the environment, and that can enhance the quality of life for consumers. It refers to food consumption that minimizes environmental pollution and social problems (Sustainable Development Commission 2005). This is related to eco-friendly food consumption because it considers the consumers’ health and the environment. However, sustainable food consumption can be influenced by socio-cultural factors (Verbeke 2005). The specific content ensures that consumers are consuming stable and nutritious food. It can contribute to public social interest, including satisfying the needs of low-income families (Johnston et al. 2014). Overall, the results of our study confirm our three hypotheses, that consumers getting food assistance from governmental programs the findings show that consumers on governmental food assistance programs are more likely to suffer from emotional health issues, are more likely to consume fewer fruits and vegetables, and are more likely not to limit their caloric food intake, compared to consumers who do not get assistance from governmental programs. As research has shown, consumers on governmental assistance programs are those who are in lower-income brackets (Cutler and Katz 1992; Duchin 2005). Therefore, our findings illustrate that, unfortunately, sustainable food consumption is harder for consumers with lower incomes. Since, our findings illustrate that, unfortunately, sustainable food consumption is harder for consumers with lower incomes, marketers must know how to communicate healthy and sustainable food choices effectively to consumers of all income levels, and to those who use or do not use governmental assistance programs to help buy food.