The Press and the Suez Crisis: A Myth Re-Examined

Abstract

The Suez crisis of 1956 was undoubtedly a watershed in British foreign policy. The decision to use force against Egypt did not produce the anticipated victory. Though Britain had emerged victorious and jubilant from the Second World War, it came out of the Suez debacle badly shaken and its voice in world politics stripped of effective power. If the nation was uncertain about its military strength in September 1939, it was at least united in its resolve and sure of its task, but the military invasion of Suez in 1956 was shadowed by public wrangling from beginning to end. Indeed, there can be few events in contemporary British history which have managed to split national sentiments as markedly as Suez. Yet it is still not possible to assess conclusively the role of the Fleet Street press in the formation of public opinion and its effects on policy towards Egypt. The national press, it is clear, had played a vital part in the national debate over the rights and wrongs of the government's policies towards Nasser and the Suez canal. That there were differences of attitude between newspapers is beyond doubt and of great significance for a liberal democratic theory of the press. What is less certain is the link between the policies of different newspapers and their effects on readers and public opinion or the part they played in directing foreign policy. A quarter of a century after the event, there still remains a shroud of mystery surrounding the press and the crisis. Guillaume Parmentier's recent article' raises some important issues. In describing the differences between national newspapers and their general hostility (albeit, he claims, exaggerated) against the whole question of intervention in Egypt, he charts the sea changes in their attitudes. He also tackles aspects of the relationship between the press, public opinion and government policy. Yet his analysis suffers from at least two major weaknesses. First, he refers to the failure of the government's policy of intervention as linked, in part, to it being 'in terms of public opinion... ill-timed'2 or ill-timed 'in terms of public relations '.3 He supports this view by suggesting that 'the press, even when sympathetic, never clearly understood the purpose of the government's policy'4 and that even the newspapers 'advising caution',5 namely The Manchester Guardian and The Observer, would have lent the government support had action been taken 'on the spot'6 and immediately after Nasser's nationalization of the canal on 26 July 1956. This analysis raises several controversial issues. It goes without saying that it is not the media's duty or role to understand the purpose of government policy; in a liberal democracy, the duty of the media is to offer criticism. Certainly, the resistance of the BBC to government pressure to censor criticism of its policy towards