The Potential of the Soviet and Chinese Economic Experience Implication for Creation of Modern Russia Economic Allies’ Contour

This submission provides a critical analysis of the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – focusing in particular upon intellectual property and innovation policy.Recommendation 1 RCEP has a broad membership – even with the departure of India from the negotiations. Nonetheless, there remain outstanding tensions between participating nations – most notably, Australia and China. The re-emergence of United States into trade diplomacy will also complicate the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 2 The closed, secretive negotiations behind RCEP highlight the need for a reform of the treaty-making process in Australia, as well as the need for a greater supervisory role of the Australian Parliament.Recommendation 3 In terms of intellectual property principles and objectives, RCEP promotes foreign investment and trade, and intellectual property protection and enforcement. The agreement needs a stronger emphasis on public policy objectives – such as access to knowledge; the protection of public health; technology transfer; and sustainable development.Recommendation 4 RCEP establishes TRIPS-norms in respect of economic rights under copyright law.Recommendation 5 The agreement does not though enhance copyright flexibilities and defences – particularly in terms of boosting access to knowledge, education, innovation, and sustainable development.Recommendation 6 RCEP provides for a wide range of remedies for intellectual property enforcement – which include civil remedies, criminal offences and procedures, border measures, technological protection measures, and electronic rights management information. Such measures could be characterised as TRIPS+ obligations.Recommendation 7 The electronic commerce chapter of RCEP is outmoded and anachronistic. Its laissez-faire model for dealing with digital trade and electronic commerce is at odds with domestic pressures in Australia and elsewhere for stronger regulation of digital platforms.Recommendation 8 RCEP provides for protection in respect of trade mark law, unfair competition, designs protection, Internet Domain names, and country names.Recommendation 9 As well as providing safeguards against trade and investment action by tobacco companies and tobacco-friendly states, RCEP should do more to address the tobacco epidemic in the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 10 RCEP has a limited array text on geographical indications, taking a rather neutral position in the larger geopolitical debate on the topic between the European Union and the United States.Recommendation 11 RCEP has provisions on plant breeders’ rights and agricultural intellectual property. There is a debate over the impact of such measures upon farmers’ rights in the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 12 RCEP does not adequately respond to the issues in respect of patent law and access to essential medicines during the COVID-19 crisis. Likewise, RCEP is not well prepared for future epidemics, pandemics, and public health emergencies.Recommendation 13 RCEP provides limited protection of confidential information and trade secrets – even though there has been much litigation in this field in the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 14 RCEP is defective because it fails to consider the inter-relationship between trade, labor rights, and human rights.Recommendation 15 RCEP fails to provide substantive protection of the environment, biodiversity, or climate in the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 16 RCEP does little to reform intellectual property in line with the sustainable development goals.Recommendation 17 RCEP does not adequately consider Indigenous rights – including those in the Asia-Pacific.Recommendation 18 RCEP does not contain an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. However, the Investment Chapter does have a number of items, which are problematic.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) represents a new era of regionalism and offers a distinct paradigm for world trade law. When it is launched, the RCEP will be the world's largest free trade agreement (FTA) and a clear alternative to the extant neoliberal trade regime. Built upon the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) free trade areas, the 16-party RCEP covers half of the global population and 30 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). It also encompasses the world's most vigorous economies, such as China, India and Indonesia. These countries significantly contribute to the bloc's GDP growth rate of 4.6 percent, which is more than double that of the United States and the European Union (EU). The RCEP, which is double the economic scale of the now 11-member Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), will be a key milestone in trade agreements. Yet the RCEP is not simply the latest stage of evolving Asia-Pacific regionalism. It also exhibits the Global South's contemporary normative vision, which challenges the dominant neoliberal approach and the Indo-Pacific strategy of the Trump administration. Since the RCEP combines regional integration with a new perception of economic ordering, it is the harbinger of what I call a New Regional Economic Order (NREO). In this essay, “The RCEP in the Third Regionalism” analyzes the geopolitical backdrop of the RCEP by detailing the current wave of regionalism and the Global South's backlash against trade agreements based on the North-mandated neoliberalism. “Trade Policies of Emerging Powers” explains the economic priorities and FTA strategies of China, India and ASEAN to illustrate the converging policies of Asia's emerging powers on the RCEP. “Distinct Features of the RCEP” examines the selected arenas where the RCEP departs from Western-style regionalism and discusses the aspects of the RCEP's institutional design that may serve as the trade-development model for developing nations. “New Dynamics of Asia-Pacific Regionalism” sheds light on the role of the RCEP in expanding and accelerating regionalism in the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Finally, the conclusion offers legal and policy advice for policymakers and trade negotiators.

In the early years of the twenty-first century proposals reflecting two distinct “visions” of Asia-Pacific integration were being advanced for consolidating the regional trade architecture through the establishment of region-wide trade agreements. The rise of East Asian regionalism was reflected in proposals for an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA), envisaged as major elements in an agenda for building an economically integrated East Asian region. APEC’s “trans-Pacific vision”, of integrating economies on both sides of the Pacific through achievement of APEC’s Bogor goals of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region, was refreshed in modified form with the proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), conceived in principle as a free trade agreement embracing all APEC members.In 2006 APEC leaders sought to emphasise complementarity between the two “visions” by formally adopting a Regional Economic Integration agenda in which the FTAAP was recognized as a “long-term prospect”. At Yokohama in 2010 the leaders set out the way forward in more concrete terms, when they unambiguously endorsed the FTAAP as the end-point to be reached in the evolution of the Asia-Pacific regional trade architecture, while at the same time endorsing a “two-track” approach to its eventual achievement. The leaders stated that achievement of the FTAAP is to be based on progress made within both a “trans-Pacific track”, represented by the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), involving economies from both sides of the Pacific, and an “East Asian track”, now represented by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a successor initiative to the EAFTA and CEPEA, with participation at this stage limited to the sixteen “ASEAN Plus Six” economies on the western side of the Pacific. Six of the 21 APEC economies are currently participating in both “tracks”, while four are participating in neither track. Four of the RCEP participants are not members of APEC.The leaders left open the question of how the two “tracks” might evolve and eventually converge into the FTAAP. In the meantime, attention is focused on the substance of the TPP and RCEP agreements being negotiated within each “track”, and their implications both for the size and distribution of the prospective economic benefits of each agreement, and for the prospects of each agreement for gaining acceptance from other economies in the Asia-Pacific region as the “model” for the eventual FTAAP.Of the two agreements, the TPP at this stage appears to have the more ambitious and comprehensive agenda. After three years negotiations have advanced to the point where failure, while still possible, would be a major surprise, but there are many sensitive issues remaining to be resolved. In addition to the expected market access issues of particular sensitivity to individual participating economies, other highly sensitive issues involve rules of origin, intellectual property, pharmaceutical evaluation pricing and subsidy programmes, management of electronic data flows, labour and environment. These and other issues are discussed in detail in the paper. How these issues are eventually resolved will be important in determining both the extent to which the TPP lives up to its stated ambition of being a “high quality” agreement and also its prospects of being accepted as a “model” for an eventual FTAAP.The RCEP negotiations are only just beginning. It is correspondingly more difficult to evaluate its likely content and its potential as a basis for the eventual FTAAP. It appears likely that the most substantive provisions will be those on trade in goods, trade in services, and investment, prospects for which are analysed in detail in the paper. In these areas the RCEP faces formidable challenges in consolidating existing arrangements among the participating economies to a level that would mark an impressive step towards the eventual FTAAP. On the other hand the RCEP may be better placed than the TPP to develop rules of origin that foster deep integration among the production systems of participating economies. Provisions on intellectual property and competition policy are included in the proposed content of the RCEP, but it would be a surprise if these provisions approach the depth of commitment being sought in the TPP. Like the TPP before it, RCEP faces all the issues involved in establishing agenda priorities and modalities for negotiating an agreement among countries that in many cases are already linked by existing agreements, or in some cases by ongoing negotiations. The complexities and difficulties will be compounded by the likelihood that the participating economies will come to the negotiations with widely divergent levels of ambition. Especially under these conditions ASEAN’s determination that the RCEP should be an ASEAN-led process also means that RCEP negotiations could turn out to a defining test of ASEAN’s ability to maintain its leadership role in regional economic integration.

6 | International Union Rights | 27/4 FOCUS | TRADE UNION RIGHTS IN ASIA RegionalComprehensiveEconomic Partnership(RCEP)&workersinAsiaPacific The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the flaws of decades of neoliberal trade policy: from the shortages of essential medical supplies due to a lack of local manufacturing capacity, to the exportdependent supply chains in Asia that were brought to a standstill1, to the precarious workers at the bottom of global supply chains that bear the worst impacts of COVID-19, with limited or no access to social protection2. It is clear the COVID-19 crisis requires a rethink of the dominant neoliberal trade paradigm. We need a new model of trade that will enable governments the fiscal and policy space to deal with crises, and that prioritises the health and wellbeing of workers and communities over corporate interests. Instead, Governments in Asia Pacific have doubled down by signing the world’s largest trade agreement3, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), on 15 November 2020. The secret negotiations have been ongoing since 2012 between the ten ASEAN members (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea (India withdrew from the RCEP negotiations in 2019). The text of RCEP was finalised in 2019 and has not been updated to reflect the changed global circumstances and challenges presented by COVID19 . Indeed, many countries party to the RCEP agreement implemented response measures during the pandemic that could be in breach of RCEP rules, for example closing businesses in particular service sectors and classifying other businesses as essential, and governments taking control of private hospital facilities to treat COVID-19 patients. Despite this, the agreement was signed without changes or any assessment of the health, social, and economic impacts on RCEP countries. It is likely the commitments made in RCEP will constrain the ability of current and future governments to pursue a just and equal recovery from the COVID-19 crisis. The corporate agenda The negotiations for RCEP occurred in secret, without any consultation with unions or community groups. Meanwhile, at the request of RCEP country economic ministers, business representatives from ASEAN, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand formed an advisory group in 2013 to provide ongoing business input into the negotiations4. The final RCEP agreement, though less draconian than some other trade deals such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)5, is an agreement that benefits corporate interests at the expense of workers and communities in Asia Pacific. RCEP is part of the ‘new generation’ of trade agreements that extends beyond the traditional trade issues of tariffs and goods to cover services, investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement, the digital economy, and the movement of workers – all areas of policy that should be determined through democratic processes. The objective of these trade agreements is to shift power to corporations through deregulation, protecting corporate property rights, and expanding their access to markets and cheap labour. These trade agreements open up countries to foreign investment, with governments agreeing that their laws will not favour local businesses over foreign enterprises - tariffs, subsidies and the preferencing of local businesses in procurement are all barriers that must be removed. Moreover, other types of public regulation, including the regulation of services, are considered barriers to trade and so must be eliminated. Some trade agreements even give foreign investors the ability to sue governments in tribunals for millions of dollars if they argue that a change in domestic law or policy will harm their investment - known as Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). ISDS cases have been brought against governments for regulating in the area of public health, labour rights, and the environment. Free trade agreements also reinforce power and wealth inequalities between lower and high-income countries. These inequalities were at play in the RCEP negotiations, which included a highly diverse group of economies, with Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar the least developed countries, and Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and Singapore high-income economies. RCEP was touted as having a development focused agenda, but the lack of human rights, labour rights and environmental safeguards reinforces a destructive neoliberal development model based on deregulation...

INTRODUCTION In the past decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has evolved rapidly to become one of the key emerging regional institutions in the world. As one of its key agendas, ASEAN has promoted progressive regional integration alongside the reduction of the intra-regional development gap. The process of ASEAN integration has been wide-ranging and inclusive, leading to significant benefits to members, even the less-developed ones such as Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV). Although the “CLMV growth story is one ASEAN success story with lessons … on the potential benefits of economic integration” (ERIA 2014), maintaining the momentum for further improvement is essential. The idea of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is not new. The initiative actually represents a continuation of the “Concentric Circle Strategy”, which gradually builds on ASEAN integration in the form of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to be created by 2015 and ASEAN-plus integration with “ASEAN centrality”. The RCEP was initiated by ASEAN itself in 2011 with the Association's Framework for RCEP. In 2012, leaders of all sixteen economies — including ASEAN members, China, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India — supported and agreed to launch the RCEP negotiations. Fundamentally, the RCEP resembles the various efforts around the region for broader regional integration, such as the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) initiative by China and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA) proposal by Japan. Since the RCEP originates from ASEAN's aspirations, a couple of natural questions arise. The first is whether the RCEP arrangement can be really effective for sustaining growth and narrowing the development gap in the CLMV countries. The second question is whether the RCEP can benefit from the AEC framework. In answering these questions, one may need to start by identifying their possible impacts on these member economies. Complications introduced by the new context of Asia-Pacific integration — i.e., the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations — should also be considered carefully even though not all the CLMV countries participate directly in the process. These questions and issues constitute the main analytical focus of this chapter. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the main possible impacts of the RCEP on the CLMV countries.

PurposeThe regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP) is promising as per the claims and can be revolutionary for the Asia–Pacific Region. The member countries will get a boost in the post-pandemic world due to the RCEP. According to Brookings, the RCEP is going to be an agreement reshaping the global economics. This study aims to clarify the aspects related to the RCEP and how it can boost global economics.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs qualitative descriptive analysis to address the status of RCEP in the region and the consequences of such main transnational partnership. The study is based on economic reports, official documents and data directly related to the subject of the study.FindingsFindings show that the RCEP will be a significant driver of regional trade despite its faults. The RCEP's tariff benefits and rules of origin, notwithstanding their relatively restricted scope, will encourage enterprises to source products and services from RCEP members, and in combination, RCEP and Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) are anticipated to replace at least some competing US commodities, services and farm exports. For items that integrate parts and components from inside the area, such as from China, the RCEP is projected to reduce tax and trade facilitation costs, allowing enterprises to avoid US Section 301 tariffs.Originality/valueBy examining how the RCEP operates within the framework of domestic and international trade, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of RCEP and analyses its nature based on data and official reports.

ASEAN community and six ASEAN FTA partners' leaders have engaged in strengthening economic development within the region by establishing RCEP. ASEAN had signed trade agreements with all the other six FTA partners. The other six ASEAN trading partners within RCEP have no free trade agreements yet among them. Therefore, the RCEP is involved in tough negotiation among the six non-ASEAN member countries. RCEP commitment is established through ASEAN as a catalyst. This study will examine the total saving potential of free trade agreement by using ex-ante FTA analysis and the political implication of RCEP for non-ASEAN member countries, especially Japan and China. The impact of RCEP will be insignificant without China and Japan existence. These two countries are essential to be maintained in the RCEP initiatives. The six non-ASEAN members in RCEP are finding ways to exploit the balance benefit among them. China-Japan relations will be embedded in the RCEP association if RCEP is concluded. From an economic perspective, Japan and China seem to have strong economic interdependence. From a political perspective, both countries have long history relations, distrust, and mistrust. Therefore, economic interdependence could be the way forward for both countries to have a harmonious relationship. Japan and China need ASEAN and other RCEP members to tighten the economic and political relations among them.

In spite of the increased geopolitical tensions, recent years have witnessed a greater regional trade integration in East Asia, the heart of the Asia Pacific. The objective of the paper is to examine the dynamics of GDP, GDP per capita, population, merchandise trade of the member states of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Methodology. The data, taken from the UNCTAD Handbooks of Statistics and the UNCTADstat Data Centre, as well as various publications, served as the information source for using the methods of tabular and graphical representation, comparative analysis, logical generalization, historical analysis, etc. The results demonstrate the strengthening of China’s position within the RCEP: during 2015–2023, its share of the bloc rose from 54,44% to 60,27%. The PRC’s share of the world grew from 14,92% to 16,92%. In 2023, the regional nominal GDP of the RCEP amounted to $29’481 bln, or 28,07% of the global GDP making it the second among the integration blocs of the world after the USMCA ($31’262 bln, or 29,77% of the global economy). Over 2015-2023, GDP rose with different speeds throughout the RCEP: on the one hand, GDP of Viet Nam rocketed by 118,51%; of Cambodia – by 77,30%; Singapore – by 62,77%; GDP of the PRC increased by 59,27%; while, on the other hand, GDP of Myanmar grew by 14,25%; GDP of Japan – by merely 2,67%. Brunei Darussalam is the only member of the group which experienced GDP decline (by 3,84%). During the analyzed period, GDP per capita of the RCEP grew from $9’257 to $12’712.3, i.e. nearly in line with the world average, which increased from $10’173 to $12’985. In 2023, the RCEP’s population accounted for 28,66% of the world; between 2015 and 2023, all the RCEP member states registered population growth, with the exception of Japan (-1,74%). In 2023, the group provided 29,22% of global goods exports and consumed 24,9% of global goods imports. From 2015 to 2023, the RCEP merchandise trade surplus rose from $712 bln to $920 bln. In 2023, China had the largest goods trade surplus among the RCEP nations ($823 bln), while Japan ran the largest merchandise trade deficit ($69 bln). Practical implications. East Asia has always been one of the most contested regions of the world where the interests of the global players intersect; however, the prosperity at present requires not only the reconsideration of the lessons learned in the past, but primarily implies the transformation from competition to collaboration – the imperative for peaceful coexistence in future for all. Value/originality. The RCEP, located geographically in the centre of the Indo-Pacific, has shown itself a reliable platform, created for pushing forward a stable, attractive, and predictable multilateral trading environment for all interested in liberalization. China is playing its key role in the RCEP, where ASEAN countries are also welcoming new members, representing the other regions and civilizations, to their integration bloc.

The recently signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), considered of great significance, is not the first trade agreement signed by ASEAN member countries, or either any of their five (5) Free Trade Agreement (FTA) partners, China, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and South Korea. But what makes this newly signed trade agreement between its participating countries unique and different from all other trade agreements signed in the past? Of interest, RCEP is currently the second major trade agreement with pronounced emphasis on Asia. Respectively, RCEP is now perceived as the world’s largest trade alliance, and is envisioned to facilitate economic trade integration in the Asian region. Correspondingly, the participating member countries have all agreed to reduce or completely eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on imports and exports within the free trade zone. Deciphered to be a milestone, RCEP is intended to link about thirty (30%) percent of the world’s population and output, which is expected will generate meaningful benefits. Given the continued rapid development of digital technologies in this era, it is certainly unavoidable if companies want to move forward in the future. This, most likely is one reason, why RCEP members included a chapter in the trade agreement relating to e-commerce and trade. Without a doubt, the tremendous impact of technology on the way economic activities are conducted worldwide has been a catalyst, forcing companies to redirect their businesses, to lean more towards the inclusion of technology in every aspects of their daily operation.Thus, as part of the continued development of digital technologies, it means the fifteen (15) Asia-Pacific members of RCEP has the added responsibility to play a vital role in facilitating the smooth integration of digital technology in this trade agreement, which clearly will be beneficial for all. Therefore, on what basis can this be made possible? On a whole, it is anticipated that the prospect of trade digitalization will reduce the cost of engaging in international trade and create opportunities for businesses and consumers regionally and globally. Today, many activities are increasingly conducted by way of digital technology. For example: Nowadays, people rely greatly on computers and mobile phones with internet to conduct research and purchase goods and services, in effect transforming the way we acquire and spread information, communicate, and conduct business in this twenty first (21st) century. Nonetheless, in what way and how can RCEP facilitate the digitalization of trade and investment in goods and services to make it advantageous to the region? Accordingly, within this context, this paper intends to explore the specifics and relevance of RCEP, and whether it is destined to be the roadmap for the future of reshaping world trade. Equally, how can trade digitalization facilitate the expansion of trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region in this digital era?

During the current uncertain world economy, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was born. RCEP is the largest trade agreement in the world outside the World Trade Organization (WTO) from the perspective of its world coverage for the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI) population, and trade. However, this agreement also raises new challenges, especially for each country that has joined the RCEP Agreement, in preparing legal provisions for welcoming this RCEP. The recklessness in preparing legal foundations in trade and investment sectors can raise some new problems. This paper will discuss whether any impacts from the RCEP implementation? And specifically, how Indonesia's legal instrument readiness to protect their national interests, especially for the Small Medium Enterprises, faces the challenges that come up from RCEP? The method used in this paper will be descriptive. To obtain an overview of the situation and circumstances of the RCEP, by presenting the data obtained as it is, and through various analyses to draw several conclusions.From the discussion, we can conclude that RCEP positively impacts developing supply chains that have been disturbed due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the China-US decoupling. Secondly, RCEP has an enormous momentum in making a giant leap towards legal transformation in the economic sector, particularly for Indonesia. Thus far, in facing this RCEP challenge, Indonesia already has a new legal instrument enacted on October 5th, 2020. This law is known as the Job Creation Law or the Indonesia Omnibus Law. It has provided a significant shove for changes to the formation of the laws as a whole in the Indonesian economic sector, including the Small Medium Enterprises protection.

Deeper trade integration in East and Southeast Asia has contributed significantly in development of international production networks (IPN) in several key manufacturing products in the region. To secure a much wider Asia-Pacific trade integration, negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), involving six bilateral RTA partners of ASEAN, namely—Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea has been launched from 2013, with ASEAN at the core. The other mega-FTA, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) also involves a number of RCEP countries. The current analysis intends to compare the possible benefits for India through its association with RCEP and possible joining of TPP, with the help of select trade indices. The data revels that while from a pure trade balance perspective TPP offers India a better prospect, gains are expected in several RCEP countries in terms of trade complementarity, trade intensity and production integration dynamics. Because of geographical proximity, a number of RCEP countries have been able to deepen their presence in the Indian market and integrate with the value chains. It is expected that appropriate trade facilitation reforms, followed by conclusion of RCEP negotiations, would deepen intra-bloc trade flows further. The results reveal that RCEP holds an edge over TPP in India’s preference ordering on the basis of merchandise trade patterns. It is therefore concluded that India needs to focus on RCEP negotiations, at least in short run, before it can pitch for a TPP membership later, in line with its economic interests.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to calculate regional contents in the exports of the major regional blocs to the world, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), respectively, to find the backward trade linkages between them instead of normal forward linkages.Design/methodology/approachTo calculate “a region” content in intermediate and value-added exports, this paper uses OECD’s inter-country input-output table (ICIOT), and tries to decompose the contents of trade. Using the information of ICIOT, Koopman et al. (2014) and Wang et al. (2013) decompose gross exports of a country’s exports.FindingsTPP is a loosely tied bloc featured by openness to the Asia-Pacific region. Trade linkages between members are stronger in RCEP than those in TPP, particularly in the trade of intermediate goods. Trades in RCEP are closely connected to exports to TPP, but the opposite direction is not clear.Research limitations/implicationsFirst of all, the recent base year of the data on value added in trade is 2011, which can be regarded as a little bit out of date. Therefore, it should be cautious in interpreting the results in that it may not reflect the characteristics of current trade. Second, this paper uses ICOIT instead of world input-output table.Practical implicationsA large portion of trades in RCEP and TPP is triggered by a global production network (fragmentation, vertical specialization), different from traditional trade focusing on inter-industry trade or competition between countries. Thus, the formation of TPP or RCEP is predicted to stimulate trade of the other instead of discriminating nonmember countries.Social implicationsIn particular, the authors have special concern in the backward linkages between RCEP and TPP, the distinct characteristics of the two regional blocs and, finally, major countries’ preferences of the one over the other and industrial conflicts toward TPP or RCEP even in an economy.Originality/valueAlthough this paper uses the approach by Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez, this paper is the first research on the analysis of the export contents in major trading blocs in the Asia-Pacific region.

The purpose of the article was to investigate the criticality of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to the direction of the international trade regime of the textiles and clothing (T&C) sector. The reason for selecting this sector is because RCEP block exported 50% of the global share of T&C products in 2019. Besides, this industry has been quite important from an employment generation point of view and a leading earner of foreign exchange for many nations around the world. Given the free trade agreement and an ambitious approach towards removing the majority of tariff lines pertaining to this sector, RCEP can potentially alter the direction of T&C trade and have related spillover benefits and trade-off in the global supply chain. This study undertakes an evaluative investigation through computable general equilibrium modelling. The article tries to analyse the impact of a potential free trade agreement specific to the RCEP block on the member nation’s gross domestic product, exports, industrial production, employment and welfare. The impact on exports is reportedly a mixed bag where countries such as China and Vietnam stand out to gain enormously while a few others are expected to lose. On similar lines, production in this sector appears to rise for RCEP members such as Singapore, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, China and Cambodia while for other members the same is seen to decline. Also, T&C trade is noticed to divert away from non-RCEP members. An important policy implication for non-member RCEP nations is to ratify individual trade agreements pertaining to T&C trade. The study shows the mitigation of the trade diversion effect of RCEP by taking India’s example and incorporating its free trade agreements in T&C trade with RCEP non-member country like the UK and then with RCEP nation like Australia. The supposed trade agreements of India have been incorporated in the main model along with RCEP.

Asia accounted for 167.1 million tons of global fisheries and aquaculture production, 75 percent of the world’s total. Seafood, especially aquaculture products, is a dominant and growing sector and crucial in the Asia-Pacific region for ensuring global food security, supporting sustainable livelihoods, reducing poverty for small-scale fisheries, and promoting environmental sustainability. However, amidst the current backdrop of the World Trade Organization (WTO)‘s inefficiency and dysfunctional mechanism, coupled with a slowdown in global economic growth and the resurgence of trade unilateralism and protectionism, these challenges have created significant barriers to trade, limiting market access and hindering the sustainable growth of the seafood industry. The implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) offers Asia-Pacific economies a promising opportunity to expand trade and stimulate economic growth sustainably. In this study, we aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the potential effects of the RCEP on aquatic products trade among the parties. A key marginal contribution in our study is that we adjusted the existing tariff rates under other FTAs to the same period as tariff rates under RCEP and compared the concession rates between these different FTAs to clearly illustrate the potential tariff effects of RCEP. On the non-tariff side, we analyze specific provisions in the RCEP agreement that could potentially affect aquatic products trade and evaluate their possible impacts. The results showed that, as of 2022, in almost all RCEP parties, the average tariffs under the RCEP agreement are generally higher than those under other existing FTAs, which indicates that the tariff concession efforts under RCEP are limited for most parties. However, due to certain progressiveness compared to other FTAs in terms of its provisions on non-tariff measures, such as rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) regulations, etc., RCEP has the potential to benefit a broader range of countries and products, making market access more convenient and inclusive for the seafood industry.

Intra-industry trade plays an important role in the current international economics literature. In 2019, Indonesia's total exports to RCEP member countries reached 61.65% of Indonesia's total exports, and 44% of total exports to RCEP came from the agricultural sector. The purpose of this research is to examine the interdependence of Indonesia and its 14 trading partners in RCEP. This research uses secondary time series data from the trademap, namely the flow of Indonesian agricultural trade with RCEP countries from 2010-2019. The data analysis method in this study is the intra-industry trade index. The results of the study of trade patterns identified through the Indonesia-RCEP Trade Relations (IIT) show that the raw material with the highest average IIT value is processed flour (HS 19). This shows that Indonesia's RCEP trade in flour products (HS 19) is bilateral. In terms of country, Malaysia is a country with the strongest trade relations with Indonesia. The average score of 19.74 between IIT Indonesia and RCEP reflects that the relationship between Indonesian agricultural products and RCEP is still low and classified as inter-industry trade. The low IIT value may be due to the large one-way trade in RCEP, where Indonesia is still the dominant importer. Therefore, it is important for the government to further increase potential commodity exports by encouraging agricultural product processing industries with tax breaks within a certain period.