The Politics of the Zeitenwende in Historical Comparison

This book should command the attention of all Cold War historians. It is a book of prodigious research and immense erudition. Lorenz Lüthi has visited archives in the United States, England, Russia, China, Australia, India, Germany, France, Switzerland, and Austria, among other places. His aim is noteworthy: to “de-center” the Cold War. He argues that, for the most part, developments in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe had roots not in the global Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union but in “structural” changes in each of these regions that presaged the Cold War's end. He rejects the triumphalist narrative of some U.S. writers, minimizes the role of President Ronald Reagan, and claims that Mikhail Gorbachev, the leader of the Soviet Union, did not want to end the Cold War and instead yearned to win that conflict. Overall, Lüthi stresses the agency of local actors and regional dynamics and claims that the capacity of Moscow and Washington to shape events was circumscribed by “decolonization, Asian-African Internationalism, pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, Arab-Israeli hostility, and European economic developments” (p. 1).Despite the ambition and learning that inform every page of this tome, the book is beset with interpretive ambiguities and conceptual problems. Lüthi argues that the Cold War was not predetermined but was the collective result of “ideological clashes, unilateral decisions, political disagreements, and misperceptions” (p. 13). Its origins rest in the desires of the USSR to “overthrow the imperialist-capitalist world system and the establishment of a stateless and classless society across the globe” (p. 3). In contrast to Odd Arne Westad's The Cold War: A World History (New York; Basic Books, 2017), Lüthi pays scant attention to the economic contradictions within global capitalism in the late nineteenth century, the cyclical fluctuations of business cycles in the early twentieth century, the rise of the Left, the yearnings for structural change within capitalism, and the disillusionment spawned by two world wars and the Great Depression. Rather, Lüthi's focus is on imperial aspirations and ideological conflict. He elides geostrategic motivations, the underlying dynamics of global capitalism, and the legacy of World War II. He does not explain that controlling German power in Europe and harnessing Japanese power in Asia were key components of the global Cold War as well as the regional Cold Wars in Europe and Asia. He does not show how the perceived structural dynamics of global capitalism impelled policymakers in North American, Europe, and Japan to focus on integrating the core industrial areas of global capitalism with markets and raw materials in the “periphery”; that is, in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa. He does not illustrate how socioeconomic unrest and political turmoil stemming from the Great Depression and World War II created perceptions of threat and opportunity in Moscow and Washington that set the conditions for the Cold War.The great attribute of this volume is Lüthi's detailed description of developments in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Cold War historians will be surprised by his decision to place developments in the Middle East at the forefront of the volume (chapter two), even while he argues that the Cold War did not come to the Middle East until the Suez crisis (chapters 8–10). The Middle East commands initial attention because Lüthi focuses on the legacy of British imperialism and the desires of officials in London to remake their empire in the aftermath of World War II with the help of the Arab League. In this context, Lüthi luminously describes inter-Arab dynamics, Arab-Israeli hostilities, and the rise of pan-Islamism. He stresses Anwar el-Sadat's desire to expel Soviet influence from Egypt, the complex dynamics spawned by the Palestinian quest for statehood, and the repercussions of the Iranian revolution. By the early 1980s, he writes, “the Cold War ceased to be the critical structure that shaped the regional system in the Middle East” (p. 518). But it is not clear what he means by the “regional system,” or whether the Cold War had ever shaped it. It is also not clear what constituted the regional Cold War in the Middle East when so many of the wars were hot, not cold. The role of oil in shaping the local, regional, and international dynamics of the different versions of Cold War in the region goes totally unexamined.Lüthi's discussion of Asia is central to the overall thesis of his book. “Three countries,” he writes, “played major roles in Asia's Cold War. China, Vietnam, and India all were dynamic agents in the shaping of their own fates and not just passive battlegrounds in the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union” (p. 115). Lüthi shows how the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese rapprochement with the United States, the unification of revolutionary Vietnam, and “the collapse of communism as a unifying program for national liberation” (p. 537) reshaped the Asian Cold War during the 1970s. But here again it is not clear precisely what the Asian Cold War was, and why Japan is totally omitted from its discussion. Perhaps Lüthi would argue that Japan lacked agency, but even if that was the case the country was crucial to the trajectory of the Vietnam War and the U.S. role in it. Numerous historians—Howard Schonberger, Michael Schaller, Andrew Rotter, William Borden, and Robert Blum, among others—have shown in great detail how the goal of reconstructing and stabilizing Japan impelled U.S. officials to thwart Communist gains in Southeast Asia, create an independent South Vietnam, establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and support the rightwing military coup, crackdown, and massacres in Indonesia. While ignoring these dimensions of the Asian Cold War, Lüthi presents fascinating chapters on China, Vietnam, and India, on Asian-African internationalism, and on nonalignment. He shows that the Asian Cold War had many manifestations and permutations. At different times, in different ways, these trajectories affected the U.S.-Soviet global conflict and were influenced by that conflict. But Lüthi also acknowledges that “the end of the global Cold War primarily required a strategic rethinking in Moscow which would only come in March 1985 with Mikhail S. Gorbachev's ascent to power” (p. 537).Strategic rethinking was necessitated by developments in Europe. Lüthi incisively describes the successful integrationist initiatives in Western Europe and the concomitant failures in the Soviet-imposed Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. He emphasizes the ability of Western economies to recalibrate, innovate, and adjust to changing economic and monetary conditions, and he highlights the failures of centrally managed systems to do so. He minimizes the role of the United States in the reconstruction of Western Europe, mentioning that it “provided a stable and supportive framework” (p. 380). Ultimately, the failure of Communist economies to compete and modernize contributed to the flagging popular support for Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War. But Lüthi does not make much of an effort to analyze the basic shortcomings in Communist systems, nor does he examine why and how liberal capitalist and social-democratic market economies were able to adapt successfully. For example, he describes the impact of declining oil prices in the 1980s and the constraints that imposed on Moscow's ability to subsidize the economies of its East European satellites, but he rarely makes an attempt to analyze the dysfunctionality of Soviet agricultural policies or the flawed operations of central planning. He stresses the resilience of West European economies but barely mentions the creation of social welfare states and the role of governments in providing minimal social provision and expanding educational opportunity, access to medical care, and support for basic research.This volume is a monumental attempt to de-center the Cold War and restore agency to middle-level powers and local actors. What it does is de-center international politics. It illuminates that much was going on in the latter half of the twentieth century that was not the product of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War but at times intersected with it and contributed to its denouement. Small powers had their own agendas, and regional dynamics had their own logic. In complicated ways, developments in one region influenced those in another. Thanks to the prodigious research of an author with staggering linguistic skills and breathtaking knowledge of multiple literatures, one comes away much better informed about the complexities of international politics but not equally enlightened about the Cold War itself.

In this article, Erving Goffman's frame analysis, a perspective normally associated only with face-to-face interaction, is applied to the macro sphere of social life in the context of the cold war's end and its representation in American film. Two macro-level frames—the American superiority frame and the cold war frame—are examined through the lens of Hollywood film. The cold war's sudden and unexpected end is considered as a variation on the Goffmanian frame break or “negative experience.” A parallel crisis of identity occurs in the cold war film genre, and an articulation of each anomic situation illuminates the other. In keeping with a macro-level interpretation of frame analysis, it is suggested that such a disruption leads to potential emergent creativity and that a reasonably modified version of frame analysis might usefully be applied in understanding future geopolitical performance.

Reviewed by: The Other Cold War Suzy Kim The Other Cold War. By Heonik Kwon. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 232 pp. $50.00 (cloth). Reading Heonik Kwon's The Other Cold War during a recent trip to Korea made some of the points painfully obvious. For those in places like Korea or Vietnam—two ethnographic sites covered in the book—Kwon's point that the Cold War was not cold at all for the vast majority of people outside North America and Europe is palpable, both in the visual landscape of war memorials and mass graves and in the increasingly less visible generation that still remembers the experience of war, not to mention the subsequent generations that were affected by the bipolar allegiances required throughout the Cold War. Glancing at the title of the book, a South Korean muttered, "The other Cold War? [End Page 484] More like the still Cold War . . . ." Indeed, the Cold War continues on the Korean peninsula, divided as it still is two decades after the so-called end of the Cold War. Kwon, thus, appropriately opens the book with the observation that Cold War historiography today has "an open-ended beginning and a closed ending" (p. 1), noting that the question of the origins of the Cold War enables multiple perspectives about who is responsible whereas the significance placed on the year 1989 as the definitive victory of liberal capitalism over communism forecloses such multiple assessments of its impact. Accordingly, the questions driving the book are "When we say the cold war is over, whose cold war and which dimension of the cold war do we refer to? Did the cold war end the same way everywhere, or was the 'struggle for the world' the same everywhere?" (p. 6). Kwon's answer, in short, is that there was never a conflict called the Cold War in the singular because this period encompassed brutal civil wars and vicious forms of political violence in much of the postcolonial world. Challenging the dominant conceptualization of the Cold War as a time of "long peace" maintained through the balance of power between the two superpowers, Kwon highlights the "balance of terror" using Bruce Cumings's terminology (p. 17) that turned the Cold War hot in so many places, leading to some forty million human casualties throughout the world. Rather than concluding that the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, privileging states as historical actors, Kwon frames the end of the Cold War as a "participatory, ethnographic question" (p. 8) that involves shifting ideologies and cultures, affecting local communities, family relations, and individual identities. Using ethnographic examples from Jeju Island in South Korea, Danang in Vietnam, and Bali in Indonesia, Kwon's anthropological perspective shows just how Eurocentric the very terminology of the Cold War truly is by focusing on the memories that still haunt those who survived, the ghosts that still walk among the living, and the commemorative practices that attempt to bridge the bipolar history of the Cold War. Thus, he writes about the "decomposition" (using Stephen Whitfield's term) of the Cold War rather than its "end," caught in the "unsettling situation in which the lived reality is not really free from the immediate past and has not reintegrated the past into the time present as a past history" (p. 33). Such analysis, however, is not new, as the book readily admits. In my view, Kwon's most important contribution is his critique of postcolonial theorists for their failure to see the violence wrecked by the bipolarity of the Cold War mapped onto the process of decolonization. Indeed, Kwon questions the possibility of decolonization during the [End Page 485] American Century, highlighting the singularity of American orientalism in the twentieth century in its use of the language of plurality and equality to compete effectively against the Soviet Union both in ideological terms and to gain allies in practical terms. He incisively historicizes the Cold War roots of concepts such as cultural tolerance and pluralism that advocate cultural diversity while relegating political difference as morally irreconcilable, moving the "domain of essentialism from the cultural to the ideological" (p. 79). Theorizing American global...

One of the most enduring and prolific American authors of the latter half of the 20th century, Updike has long been recognized by critics for his importance as a social commentator. John Updike and the Cold examines how Updike's views grew out of the defining element of American society in his time - the Cold War. D. Quentin Miller argues that because Updike's career began as the Cold War was taking shape in the mid-1950s, the world he creates in his entire literary oeuvre - fiction, poetry and nonfiction prose - reflects the optimism and the anxiety of that decade. Miller asserts that Updike's frequent use of Cold War tension as a metaphor for domestic life and as a cultural reality that affects the psychological security of his characters reveals the inherent conflict of his own world. Consequently, this conflict helps explain some of the problematic relationships and aimless behaviour of Updike's characters, as well as their struggles to attain spiritual meaning. By examining Updike's entire career in light of the historical events that coincide with it, Miller shows how important the early Cold War mind-set was to Updike's writing after the 1950s confirm the early Cold War era's influence on his ideology and his celebrated style. By the Cold War's end in the late 1980s, Updike's characters look back fondly to the Eisenhower years, when their national identity seemed so easy to define in contrast to the Soviet Union. This nostalgia begins as early as his writings in the 1960s, when the breakdown of an American consensus disillusions Updike's characters and leaves them yearning for the less divisive 1950s. While underscoring how essential history is to the study of literature, Miller demonstrates that Updike's writing relies considerably on the growth of the global conflict that defined his time.

During the initial euphoria that accompanied the end of Cold War, serious thought was given to the idea that international relations no longer needed to be governed by a balance of power. For the previous 40 years, such a notion was widely regarded as heretical. It was often taken as axiomatic that it was neither possible nor desirable to move away from the nuclear balance that structured the international system. But the speed with which the nuclear balance collapsed, along with the failure to anticipate either the end of the Cold War or the demise of the Soviet Union, encouraged the belief that the balance of power and the associated realist approach provided an inaccurate or, at best, incomplete guide to world politics. Indeed, Fukuyama (1992, pp. 245–53) insisted that although it had been sensible to think in balance of power terms during the Cold War, such an approach was completely inappropriate in the emerging 'post-historical' world.

Southeast Asian states revised their strategic horizons during 1993 through an ASEAN-inspired initiative arising from the impact of the end of the Cold War. That development occurred, however, without a corresponding revision in eco nomic horizons; nor was there any evident reconsideration of domestic politi cal orders, which were in general strengthened. During the Cold War, Southeast Asia and Indochina in particular had been coupled to international contention, which was inherent in the global balance of power. It was for this reason that Southeast Asia was described at one time as the Balkans of the Orient in an analogy with the condition of southeast Eu rope before the outbreak of World War I. With the end of the Cold War, global rivalry has ceased to exist in the same way as a point of reference for regional relations. This has been demonstrated with the end of the Cambodian conflict as a major international problem. The states of Southeast Asia now inhabit a different strategic environment but not a fundamentally different international society, which is distinguished still by the absence of a common government able to enforce law and order. Furthermore, as a result of the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has begun to be called into question as a coherent category through which to address prob lems of regional security. A growing interdependence in security matters be tween Southeast and East Asia in particular has been perceived and registered by regional states. At issue, however, is the significance of a novel development in extended multilateral security dialogue joining Southeast and East Asia, in spired during the year by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Does that development indicate a genuine structural adjustment to a new stra tegic horizon or is it little more than a tinkering with the form of existing re gional security arrangements? Apart from involvement in vestigial security arrangements, which are both a legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, provision for either collective de fence or collective security has not been undertaken on an exclusive basis by regional states. ASEAN, which repudiated military pacts from the outset, has established a limited regional security system based on a formula of conflict

Gaddis claimed that international relations theory failed to predict the Gulf War, the Soviet Union's collapse, and the cold war's end. Subsequently, he acknowledged that the expected utility model captures the logic behind complex adaptive systems such as the cold war international system. That model correctly predicted two of the events to which Gaddis pointed. Here, that model is used to simulate alternative scenarios to determine whether the cold war's end could have been predicted based only on information available in 1948. The simulations show a 68% to 78% probability that the United States would win the cold war peacefully given the conditions in 1948 and plausible shifts in the attentiveness of each state to security concerns over time. The analysis demonstrates a rigorous method for testing counterfactual histories and shows that the pro-American end to the cold war was an emergent property of the initial post-World War II conditions.

The Role of Mongolia in Multilateral Security Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Northeast Asia:Relevance of the 'Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD)' Initiative Jaehyuk Jang (bio) and Kisun Kim (bio) Factors for geopolitical conflict and power balance still exist potently in intra-regional politics in Northeast Asia. The role of a third country that could increase the possibility of creating an international regime as an institution is important. In the past, Mongolia did not receive a lot of attention in intra-regional or regional political affairs, as its military and economy were weak compared to other countries in the region. However, despite being a landlocked country surrounded by both China and Russia, Mongolia has used its geographical position strategically as a neutral state that can contribute positively to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and proactively has proposed a constructive role and function for itself. As Mongolia aligns itself to the national interests of its regional neighbors and creates possibilities for regional cooperation, it is seeking a new role in Northeast Asia. Keywords Northeast Asia, multilateral security cooperation, Mongolia, Korean Peninsula, Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) Although almost 30 years has passed since the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asia, and especially the Korean Peninsula, is still virtually in a state of cold war. Confrontational rhetoric, intimidating war games, nuclear weapons, and missile tests add to rising historical and territorial disputes. There is no institutional mechanism and a weak multilateral tradition to address these regional security challenges (Enkhsaikhan 2016). The dictionary definition of East Asia is the eastern region of Asia and the countries within the region, particularly China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Mongolia (Dictionary.com). As this definition [End Page 377] implies, Northeast Asia is not a concept that is rigorously defined. At the end of the global Cold War in 1990, Northeast Asia was left without a clear path forward for at least two reasons. First, the four assertive great powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia—harbored clashing aspirations for the regional security order, especially with regard to the two intractable problems of divided nations—the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait—which stood little prospect of resolution without further exacerbation as the weaker side (North Korea and Taiwan) grew more important within the region as a result of the four great powers' clashing interests (Rozman 2004). Second, economic integration at breakneck pace not only came without answers for regional institutions and trust but actually fueled nationalism as some states turned confidence into pride while others found dependence tinged with anxiety (Rozman 2007). Over the last three decades, regionalism in Northeast Asia has been championed first by Japan, then by South Korea, and finally by China, with the United States often wary that this approach would become an exclusive framework. In 2005, opposition to East Asian regionalism reached its peak amid reports that the United States feared China would dominate any such grouping.1 Yet, after Southeast Asian states orchestrated the entries of India, Australia, and New Zealand into the new East Asia Summit (EAS), this danger seemed to fade. Recognition that the South Korean public was neither rife with anti-Americanism nor ready to sustain the South Korean government's assertive foreign policies also quieted the alarm regarding a strategic shift toward China. Missing, however, was a forward-looking regional strategy that made clear the US support for regionalism consistent with globalization and in equilibrium, without any dominator. The challenge of finding a balanced approach to national interests in the handling of the North Korean nuclear crisis overlapped with that of working first of all with China and Japan and then South Korea as well as Russia, and possibly some day North Korea, in making Northeast Asia the nucleus of regionalism (Rozman 2007). Another challenge in this connection is the lack of a regional security mechanism. The political, strategic, and military interests of the region's great powers and the two Koreas intersect with each one's economic interests. Bilateral alliances play a dominant role in diplomacy because multilateralism is weak. Hence, there is a high risk of strategic misunderstanding, especially in times of crisis. Establishing a Northeast Asian security mechanism would, like in...

End of the 'End of Cold War'. Is it a public declaration of the breaking out of the Third World War.? May be, it is a pessimistic view of what has happened on the social - economic theatre, and the mood of bitterness that refuses to subside. But signals emanating from different quarters are not very encouraging. These are close replica of what was seen in the earlier part of the twentieth century and again in the thirties of the same century. The Post WWII Cold War ended officially in 1991. The theatre of the world was little quite, except for a healthy struggle between nations to provide better living standard to their populace. The thaw ended when it was realized that market - oriented socio-cultural economic policies were only accentuating inequalities both among the nations and also within the nations. The consensus on growth broke down. The world has again given birth to war - hysteria. Will the dark clouds of the Second Cold War get thinner and finally vanish or would they engulf the globe in another bloody war. The things are a little different this time than they have ever been in past. Presently, nukes are not the exclusive preserve of one or two countries. Nukes are widespread; their stockpiles are under the control of many sovereign nations. The disbursed ownership is both a guarantee of peace as also forewarning of end of life on mother earth. Which way the world swings is not a matter of speculation or of astrology and astronomy. Share your judgement with us after reading the book. Note: T&F does not sell or distribute the Hardback in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

£24.50 and $40.00, £12.75 and $20.00 softback Paul Robert Magocsi Ukraine: A Historical Atlas 1986 University of Toronto Press Toronto 62

Conclusions * One cannot quarrel with those who seek ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, provided necessary preconditions are met ... those prerequisites do not exist today. * Public debate on nuclear arms control tends to focus on numbers of weapons ... most important criterion in assessing prospective arms control measures is whether or not they contribute to stability and security. * The United States and Russia have achieved many advances in arms control and strategic stability since end of Cold War. * Radical reductions in forces or wholesale removal of forces from alert may create situations which could be dangerously destabilizing in a crisis. * States with potential to threaten United States and its allies continue to seek nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. * The United States be prepared to pose unacceptable risks to any potential adversary ... at moment, nuclear weapons are an indispensable part of that capability. * In a way not always appreciated, America's nuclear forces also complement efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation by extending an important deterrent guarantee to our allies. * The important issue is not weapons with which one might fight next major war, but to ensure that such a war does not occur ... deterrence will continue to be an indispensable element of national strategy. The Role of Nuclear Weapons The role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy following Cold War has been subject of much public discussion recently. The issues are complex--much more so than headlines suggest. It's important that these issues be debated--it's essential that citizens in a free society understand them. The Cold War is over. It is important to recognize many advances in arms control and strategic stability achieved by United States and Russia in recent years. Following 1993 Bottom-Up Review of our overall defense requirements, Department of Defense embarked on a comprehensive review of Nation's Nuclear requirements. That Nuclear Posture Review-completed in September 1994--noted the reduced role nuclear weapons play in U.S. security and held out possibility of further arms control reductions. At same time, Review reaffirmed importance of a triad of strategic nuclear forces-land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers--and stressed that, long as nuclear weapons remain a factor in international life deterrence of attack on United States and our allies must be our objective. A common criticism of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review is that it appears to endorse status quo by affirming many of principles that existed in Cold War. What has often not been appreciated is extent to which America's nuclear posture has changed since end of Cold War. Consider, for example, following: * In September 1991, President George Bush took our strategic bombers off alert--up to that time, some 30% of those forces sat on strip alert, with weapons loaded on aircraft and crews ready. * Also in late 1991, President Bush announced that United States was no longer developing any new nuclear weapons. The United States has not tested a nuclear weapon since that time and has signed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). * President Bush also removed all nuclear weapons from America's ground forces, and put into storage remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons. Following recommendations of 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, President William Clinton directed Navy to abandon capability of even employing nuclear weapons from its surface fleet. Overall, United States has unilaterally reduced its non-strategic nuclear arsenal some 90% from Cold War levels. * In 1993, Presidents Clinton and Boris Yeltsin agreed not to target each other's nations with ballistic missiles, an arrangement that went into effect in May 1994. …

The ten years since the end of the Cold War have shown that 1990 was a turning point in societal-military relationships within the countries of Germany and Japan. In this decade, the relationship between the armed forces and society changed. These countries have broken out of their Cold War molds of indifference and distance, and have found common ground. No longer occupying separate corners, the new international focus of Germany and Japan's defense policies made possible by the end of the Cold War is breathing new life into societal-military relationships, which is critical for a full normalization of these two countries.

The future of European integration is inextricably linked with the continued anchoring of Germany to EU multilateral structures. The institutionalist faith that integration will continue to accommodate diverse perspectives and goals through incremental reform is questionable. Rather than the new agenda of expansion and constitutionalism, older issues of sovereignty and national identity most constrain further development. This analysis shows that European integration is at a crossroads, compelling governments to make ever more painful choices between national and European identities. Structuralist and constructivist insights lead to the conclusion that the greatest tensions facing Europe arise from the old problem of embedding Europe's most powerful actor, Germany. Integration may not be able to produce a new balance between the institutional developments necessary to embrace Germany and the national sovereignty states want to preserve. Yet for Germany to remain solidly anchored in Europe's multilateral institutions, integration must move towards greater Europeanization of the nation-state. The question is how much Europe everyone must accept in order to sustain a political order that effectively embraces Europe's most powerful state.

Many analysts believe that the end of the cold war will spark greater conflict between Congress and the president on foreign issues, thus further undermining the nation's political mythology that politics stops at the water's edge. The authors test that hypothesis using House of Representatives' support of presidents' foreign policy bids on prerogative power and defense budgeting issues during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Congresses (1983-1996). They also examine the votes of members of Congress whose careers bridged the cold war divide, asking whether the cold war's end shocked them into new forms of behavior. The authors conclude that conflict between Congress and the president has heightened in the post-cold war era, but the impact of the cold war's end is a less important explanation of executive-congressional contestation than members' role responsibilities and ideological preferences. Thus, the agenda of foreign policy issues may have changed with the end of the cold war, but the process of policy making has not.

Whither Realism at Cold War's End? - Kenneth W. Thompson: Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992. Pp xii, 353. $37.50.) - Volume 55 Issue 4