The Politics of Self–Restraint: FDI Subsidies and Japanese Mercantilism

Abstract

Home governments seek to enhance the international competitiveness of private enterprises not only through export credit, but also through preferential loans for foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, contrary to the common image of nation‐states resenting their loss of jurisdiction over the mobile transnational corporation, some governments have become active financiers of multinational investment to serve their industrial policy goals. The uneven use by industrialized states of preferential credit to further MNC expansion challenges the current characterization of home government policy as both homogenous and ineffective for the task of industrial promotion. The world's most active state in FDI finance, Japan, has enjoyed an inordinate degree of freedom to engage in subsidization of MNC investment since no international regime on FDI credit, similar to the OECD arrangement on government export finance, exists. Moreover, Japanese labor has not challenged the legitimacy of state FDI finance. In the absence of international or societal constraints on soft FDI credit, Japanese self‐restraint in FDI subsidization is better explained by the internal budgetary makeup of government financial institutions with a mandate to finance FDI. Treasury bureaucrats concerned with healthy public finances and politicians eager to reward core support groups, have repeatedly competed for control over the budgetary strings on soft FDI finance. This political contest is far from over. This paper, therefore, highlights the political agency behind rules of financial discipline that have so far inhibited Japanese rent‐seeking international economic behavior.