The Politics of Self-Determination: Internal Fractionalization and Bargaining

Abstract

Disputes over self-determination are some of the most common conflicts in the international system and are among the most difficult to resolve. However, the primary means of compromise over this issue, autonomy for sub-national groups, is difficult to achieve. Why can some pairs of states and self-determination groups implement agreement over autonomy while others are unable to do so. I argue that internal divisions within governments and separatist groups structure incentives and generate constraints for bargaining over autonomy. Divisions within self-determination movements create barriers to settlement when internal resistance cannot be overcome, but also generate incentives for governments to use autonomy strategically to divide and conquer highly fractionalized movements. Divisions within governments both hinder and help chances of settlement by creating internal hurdles for settlement but enhancing the credibility of government commitments to abide by new autonomy agreements. I test this theory on a set of dyads from 1960-2003.