Abstract
Central banks have been important yet underexplored actors in the fight against the Great Recession. In addition to ultra-low interest rates, they adopted large-scale bond-buying programmes known as quantitative easing (QE). Yet there is significant variation in QE programmes with important distributive consequences. Why has the Fed adopted multi-trillion-dollar bond-buying programmes in housing, while the ECB has not? This article argues that the Fed targeted the integrated housing finance market as a monetary transmission strategy to stimulate core elements of the US growth model: credit, demand, and consumption. In contrast, the ECB hardly stimulated housing given the eurozone’s fragmented housing finance markets and the macroeconomic frictions with some eurozone growth models, particularly export-oriented Germany. Analysing archival and interview data, this article traces the decisions of these central banks since the Great Recession, contributing to scholarship on the politics of central banking, economic policy in hard times, and the welfare state.
Published Version
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