The Politics of Climate Change in the Developing World

The United States is often identified as a global laggard on climate change policymaking and implementation. Although this reputation may be deserved by the US federal government, a look across all levels of the US federal political system and a multitude of political actors demonstrates the existence of a significant number of climate change and energy‐related activities. This brief review of US climate change politics covers climate change policy support and opposition across different governance levels, involving legal and political activities and interactions of a large number of public, private, and civil society sector actors. It examines US federal climate change legislation and politics, and how activities in Washington, DC are connected to both international politics and domestic conditions and debates. This discussion is linked to state and municipal level climate change action, followed by a discussion of how activities of firms and advocacy groups and aspects of US public opinion shape US climate change politics. The review ends with a few concluding remarks about the future of US climate change policymaking and implementation. WIREs Clim Change 2011 2 121–127 DOI: 10.1002/wcc.94This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > National Climate Change Policy

Review: The Politics of Climate Change By Anthony Giddens Reviewed by Yves Laberge Universite Laval, Canada Giddens, Anthony. The Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009. viii, 264pp. ISBN 9780745646930. US$22.95, paper. Professor Anthony Giddens is arguably the most famous contemporary sociologist living in Great Britain, with perhaps his colleague Ulrich Beck. At this moment, I cannot think of a more influential living author in this field, at least in Western Europe, with his many works on social theory, intimacy and modernity. Giddens’s most recent book, Politics of Climate Change, is his first work entirely related to environmental studies, and it is a timely reflection: “not a book about climate change, but about the politics of climate change” (p.16). This whole issue is critical for citizens, societies and governments because as the author puts it, “we have no politics of climate change” (p.4). In Politics of Climate Change Anthony Giddens reviews the main issues related to emissions control with a welcome dose of sociological thinking; he begins by revisiting the types of sceptics who challenge the idea of climate change (pp.22-28) and he analyzes the attitudes of the groups that predict “the end of the world” (p.29). However, there are optimistic observers as well. Right from the start, in order to understand why nothing seems to change in terms of environmental policies, the author defines his concept of the “Giddens Paradox”: “since the dangers posed by global warming aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear, many will sit on their hands and do nothing of a concrete nature about them” (p.2). All nine chapters abound with recommendations about what to do, at least in terms of policies, in order to reduce emissions globally: “Incentives must take precedence over all other interventions, including those which are tax-based” (p.106). Topics are varied and countless: the public perceptions of risk  which “are often at odds with reality” (p.32), the energy efficiency, the “Greens,” the Carbon Markets. Of course, many chapters (like Chapter 4) focus on policies in Great Britain, but most readers will probably be able to compare the UK with other regions (p.80). While it would be difficult to agree with everything and every idea brought in this work, most readers will appreciate the vivid discussions and the ideas that are debated. Perhaps some passages about the evolution of diesel consumption in Australia and Canada would need quotes or sources, not just numbers and data (p.182). The last chapter which predicts military conflicts as potential results of the future scarcities of energy is only hypothetical and somewhat misguiding (p.203). In sum, while Politics of Climate Change is not Giddens’s best work, it is definitely a thought-provoking work that should not be read only by sociologists or undergraduates in environmental studies; I believe policymakers and scholars in political science would benefit from its reading as well. We find efficient formulas, clear demonstrations, and useful examples. Here, Giddens’ style is always clear and straightforward, without jargon. Like any essay, the author freely uses the first person and expresses frankly his own opinions and beliefs: “I do not want in any sense to downplay such risks; like many others, I am a reluctant convert to nuclear power, at least in so far as some of the industrial and developing countries are concerned” (p.133). On a lighter tone, as an unpredicted challenge for the readers of this journal, Anthony Giddens also expresses (in a minor remark) his reluctance for some words related to nature; he writes: “the word ‘green’ is in such widespread use that I have no hope of dislodging it” (p.6). One last thing: I felt uncomfortable with the author bringing right from the start his “own” concept of the “Giddens Paradox.” Why in the world did Professor Giddens need to label this idea with his own name? For posterity? Yves Laberge, PhD. , Departement de sociologie, Universite Laval, Quebec City, Canada G1V 0A6. TEL: 418-656-2131. Electronic Green Journal, Issue 30, Spring 2010, ISSN:1076-7975

Climate change is a defining issue in contemporary life. Since the Industrial Revolution, heavy reliance on carbon-based sources for energy in industry and society has contributed to substantial changes in the climate, indicated by increases in temperature and sea level rise. In the last three decades, concerns regarding human contributions to climate change have moved from obscure scientific inquiries to the fore of science, politics, policy and practices at many levels. From local adaptation strategies to international treaty negotiation, ‘the politics of climate change’ is as pervasive, vital and contested as it has ever been. On the cusp of a new commitment to international co-operation to rein in greenhouse gas emissions, this essential book intervenes to help understand and engage with the dynamic and compelling ‘Politics of Climate Change’. This edited collection draws on a vast array of experience, expertise and perspectives, with authors with backgrounds in climate science, geography, environmental studies, biology, sociology, political science, psychology and philosophy. This reflects the contemporary conditions where the politics of climate change permeates and penetrates all facets of our shared lives and livelihoods. Chapters include the Politics of Climate Science, History of Climate Policy, the Cultural Politics of Climate Change: Interactions in the Spaces of Everyday, the Politics of Interstate Climate Negotiations, the Politics of the Carbon Economy, and Addressing Inequality. An A – Z glossary of key terms offers additional information in dictionary format, with entries on topics including Carbon tax, Stabilization, Renewable technologies and the World Meteorological Organization. A section of Maps offers a visual overview of the effects of environmental change.

Facilitating Climate-Smart Investments

There is a wide range of researches on climate change policy and politics at the European and global level. However, the existing studies ignore the importance of understanding climate change discourses and politics in the UK particularly during the General Election. The General Election in 2015 will influence the post-2015 climate change politics and policy in the UK. Further, the UK’s potential withdrawal from the EU poses a threat to the existing arrangement of climate change politics. This paper argues how different climate change discourses among main political parties influence climate policy options in the UK.

A life course epidemiology approach to climate extremes and human health

This third edition has been comprehensively updated to reflect the large changes in scientific knowledge and policy debates on climate change since the previous edition in 2009. It provides a concise but thorough overview of the science, technology, economics, policy, and politics of climate change in a single volume. It explains how scientific and policy debates work, outlines the scientific evidence for the reality and seriousness of climate change and the basic atmospheric science that supports it, and discusses policy options and the current state of the policy debate. By pulling these elements together, the book explains why the issue can be so confusing and provides guidance on practical routes forward. Anyone interested in climate change, the global environment, or how science is used in policy debates should read this book. It is the ideal textbook for undergraduate or graduate courses in environmental policy and climate change.

Scholarly attention to oil reached its zenith in the late 1980s. Spirited debates on regime theory, neorealism and American hegemony dovetailed with the aftermath of the oil shocks, the ongoing Ira...

In this position paper, I speculate on what we might learn about the politics of climate change if we stay with the possibility that boredom might be part of how subjects encounter and make sense of climate change. I argue that boredom enacts an ethically and politically ambivalent detachment from the demand to act that accompanies urgency-imbued vocabularies of crisis and emergency. Whether boredom is a refusal to face climate change, or a way of coping with and inhabiting the overwhelming, being bored with climate change allows existing attachments to fossil-fuelled lives and futures to continue. The event of climate change is ‘suspended’, in the sense that it is no longer affectively present. I distinguish this relation of ‘climate change suspension’ from two other ways of detaching from the event of climate change – ‘climate change denial’ and ‘climate change delay’. Unlike in denial or delay, in suspension the demand of climate change is held in abeyance, not ended. It returns in ways that blur the line between boredom and other affects. In conclusion, I reflect on the affective politics of climate change, and wonder about how boredom could become part of a progressive politics of climate change.

This article is an invitation to Talanoa (story, telling, conversation) around the politics of climate change. I seek not to debate whether climate change is natural or caused and accelerated by human conducts and our carbon civilization, nor to suggest excuses or cures for the ecological crises that devastate and drown people daily, the world over. Rather, my concern circles around two overlapping questions, under the shadow of which lurk the politics of climate change: whose interests benefit from climate change and whose interests benefit from talking about climate change? I invite Talanoa around those questions, with the lot of the islands and islanders in Oceania as my starting point. I am of course guilty of that which I will critique, for I too talk herein about climate change, thus I am contributing to the politics of climate change.

From fatal heat waves and cruel droughts to devastating floods and fast depleting water tables, climate change is the greatest destructor in the current time creating a threat to all living organisms including human being. Teachers being the agents of social change have an important role to play in moulding the behaviour of children to cope with the climate change stress. The present study was carried out with 462 (222 pre-service and 240 in-service) elementary school teachers taking a Likert type five point attitude scale with 30 items having six dimensions viz., science of climate change, causes of climate change, impacts of climate change, mitigation, national initiatives and policies and politics of climate change.
 From the study, it was noted that though both pre-service and in-service teachers had favourable attitude towards climate change issues, pre-service teachers had higher level of concern than in-service teachers as reflected from their attitude scores. Dimension wise pre-service and in-service teachers had favourable attitude towards science of climate change, causes of climate change, impacts of climate change and mitigation, and negative attitude towards national initiatives and policies and politics of climate change. Urban teachers were more favourable than rural teachers in first four dimensions studied.
 However, among in-service teachers rural teachers were more concerned on issues such as impacts of climate change and causes of climate change than on science of climate change, mitigation, national initiatives, policies and politics of climate change. Among pre-service teachers, there was no significant difference in the attitude scores between science and arts teachers, and male and female teachers. However, urban teachers had more favourable attitude than rural teachers. Among in-service teachers, there was significant difference in the attitude scores as far as subject (science/arts) and residence (urban/rural) are concerned. Rural in-service teachers had more favourable attitude than urban teachers.
 The correlation between knowledge and attitude showed a positive relationship which reflected that with increase in knowledge there was increase in concern. The relationship between age and attitude showed that with increase in teacher’s age concern for climate change increased.

Editor's Notes

This article analyses how central banks understand the financial risks thought to arise from climate change as uncertainty within complex systems rather than risk as something statistically measurable. In line with pragmatic sociology, I investigate what this uncertainty enables, instead of taking it to be an epistemological limit to knowledge. Analysing a 2020 publication by the Bank for International Settlements and Banque de France called ‘The green swan’, I show how ‘climate risk’ is framed as a ‘black swan’, a conceptualization taken from the field of complexity theory, meaning unlikely, extreme events that cannot be predicted, implying a critique of economic expertise. In the figure of the green swan, however, the statistically improbable climate crisis is additionally framed as a certainty. I argue that ‘the green swan’ through this tension works to include critique and value financial climate risk as a ‘good’ in order to provoke a precautionary response on this risk instead of proposing more explicit political measures on climate change. This demonstrates that while uncertainty challenges economic expertise, it also enables the linking together of the ‘good’ of the climate and the ‘good’ of the financial system, bringing them together in the politics of climate change.

This research investigates youth participation in climate change politics and policymaking in South Africa, responding to a notable lack of Global South-facing studies in the literature on youth climate activism. Guided by our lead author’s substantial engagement in South Africa’s youth climate movement from 2014–2024 and drawing upon semi-structured interviews with 12 young climate activists, we offer rich insights into young South Africans’ motivations to participate in climate politics and policymaking. We then draw upon these insights to offer a series of provocations for climate change education. On investigating why youth participate, we find that although they report similar intrinsic and extrinsic motivations for participation to their Global North counterparts, South African youth climate activists place far greater emphasis on situated awareness and lived experience. We further improve the understanding of how young people perceive meaningful participation and climate (in)justices and how this shapes and is shaped by their activism. We therefore emphasise the value of incorporating both local case studies and affective elements in climate change pedagogies to encourage participation in collective climate action. Ultimately, we call for an enhanced recognition and inclusion of youth as active contributors to, and educators within, climate change governance and for the reconceptualization of youth climate activism, and policy engagement as key sites of transformative learning.

ABSTRACTAll ecosystems are affected by climate change, but differences in the pace of change will render some areas more exposed than others. Such spatial patterns of risk are important when assessing the continued functionality of protected area (PA) networks or planning for their expansion. Europe is undertaking an expansion of the PA network to cover 30% of its land and sea surface by 2030, but this must account for climate risk. Here, we estimate four metrics of future climate risk across Europe: local velocity, analog velocity, magnitude, and residence time, and assess the level of climate exposure of European PAs vs. nonprotected control sites. We also evaluate the intensity of climate risks on > 1000 European species of conservation concern associated with Natura 2000 sites. Our results show large spatial differences in climate change exposure across Europe, with a faster pace and farther shifts in the Boreal, Steppic, and Pannonian regions but slower changes in the Mediterranean, Alpine, Arctic, and Macaronesia regions. The magnitude of climate change was higher for the Arctic, Alpine, and Mediterranean regions, implying large local differences between present and future climate. These spatial risk patterns were largely consistent across scenarios, but with up to three times higher risk under the most pessimistic vs. the most optimistic scenario. Large variation in climate exposure for species of conservation concern was revealed, including 11 species that are highly dependent on Natura 2000 sites and predicted to experience rapid climate change. Our results provide guidance for managing European PAs and expanding their coverage by pinpointing areas offering more stable climates. We emphasize the need for connectivity across the network to support species adaptation via range shifting. This is especially the case in areas facing high climate change magnitude but low velocity, implying that climate conditions similar to current ones will be found nearby.