The Political Theorist in the Public Realm: The Place of Theory in Arendt’s Pluralistic Politics of ‘Words and Deeds’

Taking Account

Editors’ Note

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, published in 1971 to wide critical acclaim and hailed as the most notable contribution to the Anglo-American tradition of political philosophy since Sidgwick and Mill, has revived interest in broad questions of legal and political theory and encouraged many philosophers to turn their attention to the problem of what constitutes a truly just society. Michael Walzer's book, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality, is part of the post-Rawlsian dialogue concerning “who gets what, when, and how.” Like Rawls and his critics and commentators, Walzer is concerned with distributive justice, and the subtitle of his book provocatively suggests that twentieth century liberalism is under siege. As a “defense” of pluralism and equality, Walzer's book is squarely within the contemporary liberal political debate. Walzer's book is important not only for its contribution to the post-Rawlsian dialogue, but also for its reflection of the revitalized interest in substantive philosophical inquiry. As commentators on Rawls have noted, A Theory of Justice was noteworthy because it marked a return to an older tradition of political philosophy, one that focused on issues of right and wrong, rather than on the linguistic puzzles posed by contemporary legal positivists. In addition, Rawls' work broke from the positivist school by borrowing from the social sciences — an approach that linked Rawls with “the English tradition of Hume and Adam Smith, of Bentham and of John Stuart Mill, which insists on relating its political speculations to fundamental research in moral psychology and political economy.” Spheres of Justice is part of this revival of philosophical interest in discussing moral and political issues. Walzer attempts not only to develop a theoretical construct for his idea of justice, but also to grapple with such troublesome contemporary political problems as affirmative action, school busing, and tuition voucher plans. In so doing, Walzer, more than Rawls, draws broadly on examples and anecdotes from many disciplines, including anthropology, economics, history, literature, political science, and sociology.Walzer's book is part of the revived substantive philosophical debate in yet another sense. A Theory of Justice, like the great works of Western political theory, is ideological in that it provides a defense and justification for liberal democracy. As commentators have noted, historically significant works of political philosophy — such as those of Hobbes, Locke, Marx, and Lenin — have generally looked to contemporary mores and institutions in formulating a theoretical foundation for civil society. The great works in political theory have often become rallying points for action, and A Theory of Justice is patterned on this tradition. For Walzer, Rawls' theory of just distribution is flawed because it is based on the hypothetical choices of ideally rational men and women. Walzer doubts that ordinary people as we know them, with particular ties to history, culture, and community, would have made the same choices as do Rawls' ideal actors. Walzer's book is intended to be political philosophy in the grand tradition. His point of departure is a criticism of Rawls and all those political philosophers who speculate about man and society in the abstract. At the outset, Walzer promises that this analysis will be “imminent and phenomenological” and will provide “a map and a plan appropriate to the people for whom it is drawn, whose common life it reflects”.Despite its shortcomings, Walzer's notion of “spheres of justice” is original and thought-provoking, and his criticisms of Rawls and other political theorists contribute to the continuing philosophical debate over what constitutes a just society. Ultimately, however, this is a disappointing book. First, the foundation of Walzer's theory — his notion of autonomous spheres — is, in the end, too weak to support the weight of much theorizing. Second, his belief in shared meanings and assumptions takes insufficient account of social diversity and provides no clear methodology for resolving conflict. Finally, Walzer's relativism robs his theory of whatever residual force it might have had. He does, in fact, offer occasional glimpses of his own political preferences — which he describes as “a decentralized democratic socialism” — but in the end he gives us no reason to prefer his own vision of the just society to anyone else's.

Public administration and political science: From monogamous marriage to professional partnership

T IS PERHAPS AN UNWONTED PARODY of Hegel aphorism about the owl of Minerva taking flight at dusk that the decline o political theory should be accompanied by a heightened interest in hom political theory should be studied. Having laid the tradition of substantive political philosophy to rest, we now find ourselves preoccupied with the problem of how to go about digging amongst the dusky remnants of the past. Methodological issues dominate the current literature of political science, since it is generally agreed that 'grand' political theory in the manner of Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, or Locke no longer springs forth from the heads of twentieth-century thinkers. Of course, I do not mean to imply that previous political philosophers were unconcerned with problems of methodology. They devoted considerable attention to the subject, and some of their recorded insights invariably find their way into any serious contemporary discussion of methodology. Nor do I mean to deny the importance of the question itself; that is, how and why we should make the effort to understand the 'classic' works of political theory. Nevertheless, in their treatment of those works, contributors to the current controversy have greatly overemphasized the problem of 'understanding' to the exclusion of other purposes underlying thle activity of theorizing. The effect of this upon our

Political theory in the research of professor Andrzej Czajowski Professor Andrzej Czajowski, an academic scholar and lecturer at the University of Wroclaw, conducted interdisciplinary scientific research in many fields of political science. His main field of interest was political theory. The subjects of his research were, inter alia, the nature of politics and political aspects of other social phenomena, the relations between political power, decisions, actions, agents and structures. Professor Czajowski conducted interdisciplinary research from the perspectives of political theory, political psychology and law. His main contribution to empirical and analytical political theory was the development of a new understanding of different academic concepts in political science, such as politics, power, political decisions and political activity. In the published books and research papers professor Czajowski has developed new meanings of key political science concepts, such as politics, power, political action, political decisions, political attitudes, political conflicts and political thought. His academic works have enriched the language of political science and political theory by adding new classifications and typologies, and contributed to a better understanding of the complexity of politics.

Green’s political theory in the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation is based upon his ethical theory in the Prologomena to Ethics. He was of course unaware of the defects in the latter theory. In the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation he started from what he had worked out in detail in the Prologomena to Ethics, and believed himself to have established. However, much of the substance of his political theory can be detached from his ethical theory and reformulated in terms of humanistic social ethics. This is worth doing because what emerges in the reformulation, while not without problems, provides a fruitful point of departure for fresh work in political theory. I shall therefore undertake a reformulation in the present chapter. In this section I shall briefly indicate how his ethical theory provides the moral foundation for his political theory. In subsequent sections I shall elucidate and reformulate some central themes. In the two final sections of the chapter I shall present a critical interpretation of his political theory. It will be recalled that in Chapter 1, I suggested that Green’s ethical theory is best thought of as ‘the spiritual morality of the true good’: spiritual because of its metaphysical foundation in the theory of the eternal consciousness, and the true good because of the central role of that idea in the third and culminating stage of his argument (see 1.1.5).

This thesis offers a positive reinterpretation of the relevance of Isaiah Berlin’s political thought. It re-examines his work hermeneutically with the double aim of claiming its intrinsic relevance as a work of political theory beyond what most critics have acknowledged, first; and second, with the intention of using it to draw conclusions that will address some of the most pressing discussions found in contemporary liberal political theory, such as the conflicting link between value pluralism and liberalism, or the recent confrontation between political moralism and political realism. This is achieved by reading Berlin hermeneutically, and thus transcending the categorical differentiation between historical and philosophical methods in his work. The argument is presented in three sections. The first one is a biographical introduction that acts as a methodological statement. In it, the dilemma on the nature of values that sits at the heart of Berlin’s work is defined by reference to his biographical context. The second section of the thesis is formed by three chapters that look at the central philosophical aspects of Berlin’s political thought: value pluralism and a neo-Kantian normative ethical theory that emerges in relation to it. By claiming a relationship between Berlin and Kant, and by presenting value pluralism as a meta-ethical theory, the thesis offers an alternative reading of Berlin’s work that deviates substantively from most existing scholarship. The third section of the thesis compares Berlin’s political interpretation of value pluralism with that of Bernard Williams and John Rawls, in order to claim that liberal theory demands a hermeneutic method in its justification. This will show the enduring relevance of Berlin’s contribution to political theory as one that expands beyond his own historical moment, against what many commentators have argued. It also raises a strong claim on the crucial implications of method in political theory, calling for a more hermeneutic approach.

While both many political scientists and political theorists are quite content with the distance between political theory and political science, my argument is unequivocally for reintegration, or at least great wat someer complementarity, as well as for a broader view of political science and social science as metapractices. Calling for a closer relationship between political theory and mainstream political science might seem to ally me with the spirit of the Foundations of Political Theory section of the American Political Science Association (APSA) that, in 2007, sent two letters of complaint to the department of political science at pennsylvania State University because of that department’s decision to eliminate political theory as a course of study in the graduate program. There was, however, no suggestion that political theory had any obligation to alter its character or even to specify exactly what constituted that character and its contribution to a graduate degree in political science. Political theory is a highly pluralistic field and tends to lack even the limited sense of identity that adheres to the other subfields that belong to the professional holding company of political science, and this raises the issue of exactly what was being excluded at Penn state. What constitutes the study of political theory differs widely among various departments, and political theory as a whole does not represent any particular approach or even subject matter.KeywordsPolitical SciencePolitical TheoryPolitical TheoristAcademic DiscourseAmerican ScholarThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought unprecedented challenges to higher education. This paper explores the challenges Indonesian female academics encountered during the pandemic in which the boundaries between home and work were further blurred. Accordingly, the gender gap was further widened as unpaid and unacknowledged academic and domestic work disproportionately affected women. This paper draws on data gathered from survey, diary studies and in-depth interviews with female academics in the social sciences and humanities. It examines how Indonesian female academics juggled domestic and professional work at home, caring duties both at home and work, and shouldering administrative workloads. In addition, findings reveal that female academics found new meanings in their academic work and the importance of caring and collective solidarity, especially in a crisis such as the pandemic.

F THERE IS A CORE to the intellectual process perhaps it may best be characterized as a search for order amidst diversity and chaos. The human mind appears to demand some systematic ordering of the bewildering array of objects and events which it confronts, to the end that reality may be comprehended in its essential aspects and that knowledge may effectively be utilized in pursuance of social ends. That sub-area of knowledge which we presently call political science has clearly not been exempted from this demand. Plato's search for the good state, Aristotle's classification of constitutional practices, Machiavelli's recipe for power, the Hobbsian Leviathan, the Utilitarian Calculus, even the Marxian dialectic differentiated though they may be in doctrinal and substantive content all represent efforts to organize political data within a unified and integrated of interpretive concepts. There seems to be a general belief, however, that until recent years American political analysis has been singularly unconcerned with comprehensive systematization.' Work in political theory is excoriated either for its excessive historicism or for over-preoccupation with values; empirically oriented research is criticized as disconnected, hyper-factual, pragmatic, and problem-oriented: in neither area, runs the complaint, has there been sufficient attention to the development of a unifying, descriptive theory.2 Response to these criticisms has produced in the past decade several tentative suggestions and a few positive efforts to construct such a theory. It will be the purpose of this paper to explore in an admittedly incomplete manner some elements common to these efforts, to assess certain of their consequences and implications, and to attempt an evaluation of the results as they have emerged thus far. It may prove helpful at the outset to summarize the central thesis which will be developed and defended, and to indicate certain areas of orthodox controversy which will be avoided. Current conceptualizations of a unified, theoretical system of political knowledge are mainly an outgrowth of our present focus on individual and social behavior as the primary data of political analysis;3 thus, the dominant motif of these systems is a logically integrated structure of empirically verifiable generalizations purporting to describe uniformities or patterns of political behavior and to facilitate prediction of future behavior.4 From this structure further verifiable

The field of political science has encountered a unique obstacle in its development. Contemporary political theory has diverged in opposite paths, becoming more conceptual and abstract as well as focused and concrete. The unfortunate result of this has been a lack of clarity in communicating political theory to a new generation of political science scholars. This article will seek to study the effects of multimedia technology, literacy, and innovations in the teaching and communication of foundational theories of political science. First, this article will ask why such ambiguity in modern political science theory still exists. Students, academics, and professionals alike still struggle to understand certain aspects of political theory including initial comprehension and retention of certain theories or paradigms. This article asks whether there is something inherently ambiguous about a certain field or if the issue is the communication and teaching of a field. Second, this article will examine multimedia tools and methods that have been recently developed and implemented in teaching and other areas. Third, focus will be given to cases in which multimedia innovations and methods have been put to use and what the results were of these instances. Finally, we will seek to form a conclusion on the effects of multimedia technology on the teaching and communication of political theory, eventually broadening the conclusion to fit various fields in the social sciences. The ultimate aim will be to determine whether or not academics and professionals stand to benefit from this study by using more up-to-date technologies and tools to more effectively communicate their fields of study and whether or not it has any effect on students' understanding and retention of information.

The historical specificity of Michel Foucault’s practice of critical genealogy offers a valuable model for political theory today. By bringing into focus its historical attention to detail, we can locate in Foucault’s genealogical philosophy an alternative to prominent assumptions in contemporary political theory. The work of political theory is often positioned in light of an assumed goal of staking political theory to certain political positions, judgments, or normative determinations that already populate the terrain of politics. This goal may be illusory; certainly it is not requisite. The alternative model of political theory in Foucault’s work involves resolutely refusing to take positions in politics so as to enact specific critical politicizations on the terrain of the political. Such a practice of ‘critique without judgment’ is dependent upon the historical attention to specificity brought to bear in genealogical work. This history-centered genealogical model is instructively exemplified in Foucault’s under-discussed introduction to his book Herculine Barbin. Foucault’s curation and discussion of the Barbin dossier offers a concise account of how Foucauldian genealogy engages with historical specificity in order to politicize its objects of inquiry without reducing its own work to the task of issuing a political judgment.

This article employs a holistic understanding of environmental, social, and economic sustainability to explore the interaction between neoliberalism, climate crisis, digitalization, and academic work with a focus on its everyday aspects. Drawing our experience of organizing an online conference during the Covid-19 pandemic and our dialogue with conference participants, we first problematize the presumed disembodiment of digital exchange and suggest a nuanced understanding of physicality’s role in knowledge production. We then explore the impact of the changing times and spaces of academic work on bodies and minds and the boundaries between private and public realms. Finally, we challenge the notion of digital solutionism by highlighting the implications of inhabiting digital platforms as spaces for knowledge production. While there is no simple solution to the problems around the digital shift in academic work and conferencing, we argue, downsizing can be a counteraction to platform capitalism in times of the climate crisis.

Benjamin Hertzberg, a Fellow of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University, has two stated purposes for writing this book. First, he aims to establish a new theoretical framework for examining religion in democracies. Second, the author seeks to make a case that Islam is more compatible with the functioning of a plural liberal democracy than Mormonism. Regarding the second goal, Hertzberg focuses upon these two prominent religious minorities in the United States and their claims to authority, openness to free public debate, and commitment to democratic traditions. In proposing a new theory for the inclusion of religion in political theory, the author rejects classical liberal thought that religion should be a private affair, best kept out of politics, while arguing that religion does influence democratic life in both positive and negative ways. His theory, what he calls a “way of life” approach, sees democracy as a way of life or regime. To political theorists who want to throw out religion as a category of analysis, the author argues that democracy provides an unexplored framework for evaluating religion in politics.In the introduction, Hertzberg situates himself in the context of the study. He states that he started his research as a “naïve” young Mormon studying political theory at Duke University. He notes that in the fall of 2014, the administration of Brigham Young University forbade the Political Science Department from considering him for a tenure-track position, prompting his move to the fellowship he currently holds. Hertzberg's studies led him to the question: What is the proper place of religion in liberal democratic politics? Citing previous studies, he argues that purely religious arguments (relying upon holy texts, revelation) are not broadly persuasive in debates in liberal democracies. By looking at Mormonism and Islam in the United States, Hertzberg proposes that a member of a religion can use religious arguments to begin a public debate, or a “chain of persuasion,” that can influence broader democratic decision-making, but this depends on their claims to authority and their openness to reconciling religious and civic mandates. He argues that his way of life conception of democracy can provide a contextualized view of what aspects of religion should be of public concern and when they should remain private.The book is heavy on theory. While it brings up intriguing cases of modern religious-political conflict, the text itself does not adequately prove its main assertions. This flows from its lack of in-depth historical analysis of either Mormon politics or Islam in the United States and abroad. Perhaps presenting more than theory was not the author's purpose. Throughout the book, Hertzberg details various political theories and theorists and their positions on religion in democratic politics. As he states, many modern theorists want to abandon religion as a category. He argues that religions should be central to analyses because it is too embedded in the practices of modern democracy in the United States. It is very similar to other concepts deemed vital to political theory—freedom, liberty, rights, justice, and legitimacy. In arguing for his way of life theory, Hertzberg makes good points in viewing both religion and politics as “regimes” that share relevant features, and as such, should be placed in the same category of analysis, when liberals and secularists have argued for separating the two. Both regimes share cognitive and value commitments, an understanding of their own nature and boundaries of their communities, institutional structures, and practices deemed necessary to achieve excellence.Looking at the intersection of politics and religion in America, Hertzberg argues that scholars of religion find that religious traditions derived from Protestantism have been deemed “good” religions in that they are constructed as egalitarian, corporate in structure, not hierarchical, based on texts rather than ritual and practice, and especially, because their ultimate aims are individual salvation not to shape or control political communities on earth. In this vein, he briefly examines how Americans in the past deemed Mormonism as a threat to their way of life and democratic traditions. Mormons in the nineteenth century, and Muslims today, have been singled out for exclusion, intolerance, and suppression. Hertzberg finds that the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ willingness to give up polygamy and political separatism resulted in Mormons now being viewed by the public as worthy of toleration, and in some cases, as model American citizens with values that comport well with American civic life and democratic traditions. In contrast, Islam is still viewed with suspicion, seen as an existential threat, and treated with intolerance. Polls indicate that most Americans fear Muslims as a danger to their way of life, democratic traditions, and their broad cultural agreement in support of gender, racial, and religious equality.Relevant to Mormon studies, Hertzberg concludes that “Muslim political action is far more compatible with crucial democratic norms and practices than is much of Mormon political action” (22). He presents short examples to illuminate these assertions. He argues that the Mormon hierarchy engages in practices that are inimical to open and free debate. He writes that church leaders forbid professors at Mormon universities from publishing in open forums such as Sunstone and Dialogue, and they use the tenure system, the temple recommend process, and local ostracism to police the boundary of who belongs in their community. Hertzberg concludes this system stifles open dialogue and debate (both faith-based and secular) among faithful members.The work would have been enriched with in-depth case studies. However, Hertzberg does bring up relevant recent cases to illustrate his assertions. He references a recent medical marijuana referendum in Utah that residents passed. After the church issued its opinion against many aspects of the initiative, the Mormon-dominated state legislature strictly curtailed its provisions. He references recent church positions against LGBTQ equality, particularly its stance against same-sex couples and their children's ability to participate in church rituals as examples of it opposing LGBTQ civil rights that are in ascendency in most of America. Hertzberg finds that the church plays an outsized role in dictating the voting of Utah state legislators, regardless of their party affiliation. He references the church's large role in Utah state politics, where an opinion on an issue such as medical marijuana, can thwart the will of the people expressed through the democratic process.The author challenges the propriety of Mormon Church participation in the democratic process based on several grounds, including members’ belief that the church hierarchy speaks for God and their belief in the church hierarchy's evolving interpretation of God's will. This leads Hertzberg to conclude that, although the institutionalized Mormon Church may support vital democratic values such as freedom of religion, how it supports it and how it teaches its followers to support it, reinforces a “particularly unaccountable form of religious authority” that should be more of a concern to Americans (22). In contrast, again only presenting brief examples, Hertzberg argues that Islamic traits, including not having one centralized church, its focus on religious scholars’ interpretation of texts and right behavior openly, and its tradition of open debate about laws and practices, makes Islam less of a threat to democratic traditions than Mormons, at least here in America.Chains of Persuasion is primarily a work of political theory. It should be of interest to serious students of political philosophy and theory.