Abstract
The paper by Perotti and Von Thadden [2006] presents an important contribution to the literature on the discrepancies between corporate governance structures across different countries. It also adds considerably to our understanding the changes in corporate governance structures known as the great reversals. The authors' integrating aspects of political economy into a formal model of corporate governance structures is of particular interest. There are three points I would like to comment on: first, the medianvoter theorem employed in the paper, secondly, the influence of banks versus markets in the presence of a controlling shareholder, and thirdly, how a dynamic version of the model could be constructed.
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