The political economy of civil wars and the future of UN peacekeeping

Sexual abuse is a very human stain that has marked many organizations that define themselves through virtue, including the church, schools, scouting organizations and other humanitarian organizations. The exposure of sexual abuse by United Nations (UN) peacekeepers reveals behaviour that is undoubtedly unconscionable, but surely not inconceivable. While the UN was constructed from plans to deliver peace, security, development and human rights, the organization was inescapably hewn from the crooked timber of humanity. The UN is ultimately a creature of the world upon which it seeks to act. The reality of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers has been destructive of the organization’s legitimacy, yet so is any fantasy about the imagined purity of the organization and its personnel. Scholarly attention to the development of an accountability framework for UN peacekeeping is critical so as to avoid not only overly romantic, but also overly cynical, readings of the nature of the organization. Rosa Freedman’s article calls for a ‘new approach to accountability’ in response to sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers. Her focus is on accountability as a process rather than a value. Freedman highlights the importance of a victim-centred approach, arguing for the need to place relevant aspects of criminal justice, truth and reconciliation mechanisms, human rights law and political processes at the heart of accountability responses. In this short article, my focus will be on the currency, rather than the metal, of the accountability coin, giving regard to the value or values we expect accountability to serve in this setting rather than to its processes. It is hoped that this will provide an interesting foundation to support, but also to critique, elements of Freedman’s discussion. History tells that the humanitarian nature of an institution or authority is no antidote to misdeed. Certainly for the countries in which the highest number of UN sexual abuse allegations has been recorded (Haiti, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan), the history of humanitarianism is also a history of paternalism. Both ‘isms’ involve ‘the act of interfering in the lives of others, often without their permission, on the grounds that such interventions are for their own good’.1 In order to avoid one sliding into the other, humanitarians must navigate a delicate balance between care and control. Michael Barnett has tracked the history of humanitarianism, drawing chilling comparisons between the ‘civilizing mission’ of empire and liberal humanitarianism.2 Of course, there is also a key normative distinction between these projects. To effectively distinguish itself from imperial governance, humanitarian governance must stake its legitimacy on purpose: to act for the benefit of the ruled rather than of the rulers. The legitimacy of humanitarian governance is dependent on the idea that humanitarian agencies act not out of self-interest but, rather, as a public trustee and for the benefit of the ruled. At the heart of the relationship, therefore, is trust. In the literature responding to the problem of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers, scholars have focused on ‘shame’, ‘danger’ and even ‘hope’.3 My argument is that ‘trust’, at least from an institutional perspective, is the key institutional value that is betrayed by reported (and unreported) cases of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers and is the value that accountability processes must seek to restore. Of course, the concept of trust is context specific and can have interpersonal, financial and political manifestations and implications.4 It also has legal relevance. I argue that trust is foundational to our understanding of the legal authority exercised by UN peacekeepers. In legal terms, we can classify the relationship between UN peacekeepers and the foreign populations over which they exercise authority in the nature of a fiduciary relationship. Because the fiduciary relationship is legal in nature, it generates legal duties, including the duty upon the UN to account to those over whom it exercises control.

United Nations (UN) peacekeepers tend to be deployed to ‘hard-to-resolve’ civil wars. Much less is known about where peacekeepers are deployedwithina country. However, to assess peacekeepers’ contribution to peace, it matters whether they are deployed to conflict or relatively safe areas. This article examines subnational UN peacekeeping deployment, contrasting an ‘instrumental’ logic of deployment versus a logic of ‘convenience’. These logics are evaluated using geographically and temporally disaggregated data on UN peacekeepers’ deployment in eight African countries between 1989 and 2006. The analysis demonstrates that peacekeepers are deployed on the frontline: they go where conflict occurs, but there is a notable delay in their deployment. Furthermore, peacekeepers tend to be deployed near major urban areas.

Contrary to the optimistic projections of some analysts, the end of the Cold War has not resulted diminished threats to world peace and security, but rather new and more complex ones.' In the post-Cold War decade, the international community has experienced violence and suffering a gross and indiscriminate manner, forcing a reevaluation of traditional conceptions of security and approaches toward conflict. This article examines how the UN is responding to these changes the global security agenda the context of the role of gender UN peacekeeping operations. More specifically, the article asks whether gender-mainstreaming strategies-as outlined by resolution 1325-are actually being implemented current UN peace operations, or whether this is merely another example of lip service paid to women's role international peace and security issues. Through an analysis of four gender mainstreaming strategies currently used UN peacekeeping operations, the data will illustrate that such strategies are, fact, being implemented, and that the role of women peacekeeping missions is gradually expanding. While the implementation process is far from ideal, it is significant not only for those directly involved but for those concerned with conceptions of security more broadly. I end by outlining some of the implications that the incorporation of gender might have on the way we approach international security and conflict resolution.GENDER MAINSTREAMING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONSIn October 2000, the security council adopted resolution 1325, a landmark step raising awareness of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls and acknowledging the vital role of women's agency conflict resolution and peace-building. For the first time the history of the UN, the security council formally decided on a gender issue, setting a new threshold of action for the security council, the UN system, and for governments.2 This watershed political framework, using the term gender mainstreaming, calls for and makes gender relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations, reconstructing war-torn societies, and ultimately making gender equality relevant to every single council action.This resolution is particularly salient given that UN peace operations have witnessed a revival the post-Cold War era. Not only has the UN been embroiled more operations than ever before, but these operations have become even more complex and wider scope. They involve providing humanitarian relief (Bosnia and the Kurdish areas of Iraq); separating combatants and protecting civilians civil wars (Croatia, Bosnia, and Somalia); creating new and different government structures (Afghanistan and Liberia); and, a few instances, actually running the country for a time (Cambodia and Haiti). Tasks assigned to UN peacekeepers are no longer limited to military activities, and peacekeeping efforts are not only directed at parties to a conflict. Peace missions have expanded to include institutionbuilding, economic development, the protection of human rights, humanitarian relief, and the monitoring of elections.3This apparent renaissance UN peace operations (both terms of frequency and changed mandates) makes the organization, structure, and implementation of such operations a subject of chief concern. As such, one persistent criticism of past and present approaches to conflict resolution general and to UN peace operations particular has been the exclusive nature of its structures and processes, both procedurally and substantively. Many argue that this closed nature has limited the capacity of the UN to deal effectively with the complexity of contemporary global problems.4 In response to this increasingly common criticism, the integration of gender perspectives areas of peace and security has become a central strategy for the United Nations and its member states, informed by the notion that in a world of continuing instability and violence. …

International peace operations have undergone significant transformation since their inception, evolving from basic ceasefire monitoring to addressing multifaceted global challenges. This research essay explores the contemporary landscape of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, emphasizing the growing importance of partnership peacekeeping in responding to complex conflicts. The study highlights the historical evolution of UN peacekeeping, from early missions like the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to modern multidimensional operations tasked with political processes, civilian protection, and post-conflict reconstruction. Despite its achievements, UN peacekeeping faces mounting challenges, including increased conflict zones, reduced funding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the rise of non-state actors such as private military companies and terrorist groups. Partnership peacekeeping emerges as a strategic necessity in addressing the complexities of modern conflicts. While it offers significant advantages, its success depends on clear communication, shared objectives, and coordinated efforts among all stakeholders.

We develop an original dataset of geocoded United Nations peacekeeping deployments and assess the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations at the local level. Drawing upon primary documents sourced directly from the UN covering 10 multidimensional peacekeeping operations from 1999-2018, we present comprehensive time-series data on UN peacekeeper deployment location by type, gender, and nationality. We show that although the UN responds dynamically to conflict events in the field, deployments outside of population centers tend to be fairly homogenous in regard to both nationality and gender. We then empirically investigate the oft-posited link between deployment of peacekeepers and reductions in violence against civilians at the local level. Our analysis suggests that the UN must match peacekeeping personnel type to sources of violence at the operational level in order to effectively prevent civilian victimization.

ABSTRACTIn the past two decades, regional organizations and coalitions of states have deployed more peace operations than the UN. Yet most quantitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness focus on UN peacekeeping exclusively, a decision owed to data availability more than to theories about the differential impact of UN and non-UN missions. As a result, we know little about the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping in mitigating violence. In this paper, we introduce and analyse monthly data on the approximate number of troops, police, and observers in both UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations between 1993 and 2016. Using these data, we show that when accounting for mission size and composition, UN and regional peacekeeping operations are equally effective in mitigating violence against civilians by governments, but only UN troops and police curb civilian targeting by non-state actors. We offer some theoretical reflections on these findings, but the main contribution of the article is the novel dataset on non-UN peacekeeping strength and personnel composition to overcome the near-exclusive focus on UN missions in the scholarship on peacekeeping effectiveness.

The article contributes to the research on local effects of United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) on conflict dynamics. Focusing on spatial effects we distinguish between effects of peacekeeping presence on conflict intensity in a given area (violence reduction) and effects on the levels of violence in surrounding locations (violence relocation). We expect that the effects of peacekeeping presence differ with force projection capabilities of troop deployments. Our analyses are based on data covering the two most recent UNPKOs and violent events in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2000 to 2014, allowing for a geographically and temporally disaggregated approach. The results show that PKOs reduce the local level of violence where they are stationed, particularly when better equipped. However, we find that PKO presence can also lead to shifts in the areas affected by conflict.

Counterinsurgency and peace operations

Millions have been killed in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Despite various mediation efforts and having one of the largest United Nations/African Union peacekeeping forces in the world, the carnage continues to claim more victims. What this paper argues is that the underlying war economy must be seen as the basis of the ongoing violence and only its eradication and replacement by a peace economy will there be any hope for sustainable peace both in the DRC and the broader Great Lakes Region. To this end, the paper provides a historical background to the conflict, and then proceeds to contextualize this economy within the war and peace economy literature. The intricacies in the war economy are then unravelled followed by certain policy recommendations to end the violence.

This chapter summarizes the book, highlighting the importance of a holistic assessment of UN peacekeeping’s effect on conflict dynamics. It discusses many of the potential detriments and weaknesses of peacekeeping. Though the book identifies a normatively positive relationship between increasingly large peacekeeping missions and the reduction of civil war violence, UN peacekeeping is not unconditionally valuable. Substantial missions also come with negative consequences discussed in this chapter. However, these same issues are exacerbated by enduring civil war violence. The positive influence of large peacekeeping deployments then becomes even more valuable, as reduced violence is likely to have positive downstream consequences in these same areas. Relying on additional existing research, the chapter presents informal analyses to provide a fuller picture of the violence reduction associated with UN peacekeeping. The chapter concludes by revisiting the complexity of civil conflict, the challenges of peacekeeping, and the potential for reduced violence.

ABSTRACTThis paper contributes to the debate on the recent ‘stabilization turn’ in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping by inquiring into a changing set of practices by which the UN intends to ‘strengthen the authority of the state.’ Drawing on Piiparinen’s notion of sovereignty-building as an emerging paradigm of conflict management, the study analyses the support for state authority and sovereignty in two modalities of contemporary UN peace operations – UNIFIL II and MINUSMA. While the two analysed missions significantly differ when it comes to the extent of their tasks, or the rules for the use of force, they both highlight the importance of local politics and agency in the implementations of their mandates and the need to strike a compromise between the contending visions on what form of sovereignty should be supported. By doing so, the paper points out the importance of ‘local’ and contextual emergence of the practices of sovereignty-building.

In the face of an unprecedented surge in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping activity over the past three years—with now almost 100,000 military, police and civilian personnel deployed on four continents in 18 operations—there is a need for the UN to develop a comprehensive doctrine that better defines what modern UN peacekeeping has become and that covers the full range of civilian peacebuilding activities that are now a standard feature of Security Council mandates. This paper serves as a primer and proposes an agenda for debate on such a doctrine. It summarises evolutions in thinking and practice over the past 15 years. It also highlights key conceptual challenges and political fault lines to be reconciled in order for a new comprehensive doctrine to enjoy broad support of the UN's 192 Member States, while still providing relevant guidance to thousands of personnel on the front-lines of the effort to help rebuild war-torn states.

Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied compared to other emerging powers. Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), there has been a major change in policy in the last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping. Jakarta has set itself the goal of becoming a top ten troop contributing country with 4,000 personnel deployed by 2019. Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional “blue helmet” missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent, impartiality and non-use of force, its views on peacekeeping are evolving. While Indonesia has concerns about aspects of the “new” peacekeeping agenda, such as Protection of Civilians and robust peace enforcement missions, in practice it has proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric might suggest. Third, although emerging powers are frequently portrayed as conservative, Indonesia has been an advocate for a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In sum, the Indonesian case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of this group of states.

Contrary to popular perceptions, United Nations (UN) peacekeepers engage in combat fairly frequently. A central challenge facing the UN is thus calibration between force and politics: ensuring the organization’s combat power is harnessed to viable political strategies for peace. However, the epistemic community on peacekeeping remains deeply divided between skeptics and proponents of “robust” operations, where peacekeepers are expected to use force to implement mission mandates. This article suggests that militarily effective, robust peacekeeping is most important for improving civilian protection and ensuring mission credibility in theaters where there is no peace to keep; proposes a novel framework and typology to assess combat effectiveness in UN peace operations; and compiles descriptive statistics for the 1948–2020 period. Finally, case studies of four battles involving UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo illuminate the conditions that are conducive to the UN’s combat effectiveness.

Wars within states remain by far the most common type of violent conflict, and they absorb almost all of the peace operations that the UN has deployed since the end of the Cold War. Comprising civilian and military personnel, multidimensional missions are tasked to implement complex peace agreements in an effort to build the foundations for a self-sustaining peace following the withdrawal of intervention forces. As outlined in Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace, these multidimensional peace operations are designed to address the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict, that is, to transform political, economy and security institutions in war-torn countries.1 Consequently, peacekeepers are assigned wide-ranging tasks that may include disarming combatants, resettling refugees, organizing and monitoring elections, promoting human rights, rehabilitating the economy, building institutions, supporting security sector reform, etc. The propagated long-term solution of conflicts has pushed peace operations far beyond the narrow confines of traditional peacekeeping that consisted of interposing forces to foster trust and security between belligerents. To all intents and purposes, UN peace operations are now in the business of peacebuilding and even state-building. Partly as a result, the number of missions and personnel has expanded dramatically over the past decade, suggesting that UN peacekeeping has become a growth industry, either due to expanding normative ambitions, successful performance, or both. However, a number of recent serious setbacks have triggered a ‘paradigmatic crisis’ of UN peacekeeping.2 Not only are its resources stretched to the limit, it also faces a crisis of legitimacy as its operations are often criticized for not delivering what their mandates seem to promise. This chapter examines whether allegations of failure and a general sense of pessimism are warranted. The effectiveness of UN peace operations since the end of the Cold War will be analysed in a broad comparative perspective. This analysis is informed by the extent to which UN peacekeeping has performed in light of two major challenges: ever more complex and exigent environments on the one hand and increasingly ambitious objectives on the other. Thus, interrogating the effectiveness of peacekeeping necessarily eludes clear-cut answers, not least becauseoutputs (mandate implementation) and outcomes (peace) are only two dimensions of peacekeeping performance. A balanced assessment needs to analyse effectiveness through the lens of organizational performance and learning; that is, whether the UN and its peace operations have increased their ability to keep the peace. This chapter therefore considers internal processes and constraints as important factors that influence organizational behaviour and performance, notably the growing ambitions and objectives of the UN peacekeeping machinery. As a consequence, organizational performance and effectiveness are contextualized by looking at the conditions under which peacekeeping is operating. The chapter is structured as follows: after briefly summarizing the major trends in UN peacekeeping over the past decade, I first discuss methodologies for evaluating peacekeeping as well as the empirical results that academic studies have produced. This is followed by explanations of organizational performance, including a discussion of conceptual and political issues revolving around contemporary peace operations. The unprecedented explosion of qualitative ambitions, laid down in mandates by the UN Security Council, receives particular attention. The third and final section of the chapter discusses the promise and limits of peacekeeping partnerships by looking specifically at the European Union and its cooperation with the UN in the field of peacekeeping.