The Playbook: A Story of Theater, Democracy, and the Making of a Culture War

Unpalatable truths

‘Culture Is Inseparable from Race’: Culture Wars from Pat Buchanan to Milo Yiannopoulos

The previous chapter questioned the binary approach — the view that culture, cultural strategies and cultural struggles were either top of the social transformation agenda, on the one hand, or a potentially harmful diversion, on the other hand. In place of such over-simplified polarities, it was suggested, the question was not so much whether, but how culture and cultural struggles were relevant, depending upon which definitions and which perspectives were being applied. This chapter raises a similar set of questions in relation to the analysis of Communities, Identities and Social Movements. The chapter starts by exploring the varying and contested meanings of the notion of ‘community’, whether ‘community’ has been defined in terms of geography or in terms of common interests and identities. This leads into some discussion of the concept of ‘identity’ itself, a concept which turns out to be no less problematic. The concluding sections of the chapter move on to explore varying perspectives on the New (and not-so-new) Social Movements in principle, and differing approaches to the role of social movements and community politics in practice.

‘Staying in the Nationalist Bubble’

It's the weekend – leisure time. It's the interlude when, Guy Debord contends, the proletarian is briefly free of the 'total contempt so clearly built into every aspect of the organization and management of production' in commodity capitalism; when workers are temporarily 'treated like grown-ups, with a great show of solicitude and politeness, in their new role as consumers.' But this patronising show turns out to be another form of subjection to the diktats of 'political economy': 'the totality of human existence falls under the regime of the 'perfected denial of man'.' (30). As Debord suggests, even the creation of leisure time and space is predicated upon a form of contempt: the 'perfected denial' of who we, as living people, really are in the eyes of those who presume the power to legislate our working practices and private identities.

The 'Culture Wars' have been a feature of American and Australian cultural life for well over a decade. The 'Culture Wars' of the USA have been described as a contest for 'American Civilization'. When imported into the Australian context by neo-conservative culture warriors they became more than a rehashing of tired American debates, coming to life as the 'History Wars'. In both the USA and Australia this struggle has been promoted by right-wing think tanks, and played out for the most part in the national press. One of its constant themes has been an attack on 'political correctness' in the academy, which it is claimed has been captured by 'radicals'. This paper argues that the debates have had the intended consequence of making academics more restrained in their public pronouncements (particularly outside their fields of expertise), and the unintended effect of amplifying broader social trends undermining the authority of expert knowledge in general, and universities in particular.

One might hope that philosophy could reconcile us to our social world and each other. To entertain this as plausible is to think there is some perspective one could reach via philosophical enquiry that shows our life and society to be as they are for good reason, allows us to see it all as in some sense rational. Hegel is no doubt the great exponent of this ideal, his system promising to trace history's patterns and conceptual development, while he is so optimistic as to believe that, at its end, we would achieve the perspective whereby every agent's own actions and situation can be made intelligible to themselves and others. This was meant to be true for us the readers, so we would be able to see for ourselves how what we do makes sense, given our circumstances, and is plausibly tending towards a good end. 1 Of course, the problem is that there may not be such a perspective. Perhaps to see the world aright is to recognize it as a jumbled mess, with no progressive tendency towards greater coherence, and no satisfaction to be had in achieving superior insight. Perhaps there is no good end we are collaboratively working towards, no possible reconciliation with each other; maybe we are perpetually on the brink of descending once more into a Hobbesian nightmare. Hegel hoped to reassure us that the existence of that clarificatory perspective is guaranteed; as free agents, once we achieve self-awareness we necessarily mutually recognize one another as engaged in a fundamentally cooperative project tending towards justified ends. 2 But, alas, not all of us have been convinced, and a kind of existential anomie can befall a thoughtful person who surveys our present socio-cultural situation. 3 What if there really just is no excuse for how things are, and no good reason for me to carry on?

When I returned to my home state of Kansas in the fall of 2004, there was palpable excitement among the state's small liberal community about the possibility of unseating the incumbent president, George W. Bush, in the then upcoming national election. Although few in number, the state's liberal activists had frequently found themselves on the front lines and even occasionally on the winning side of recent skirmishes in the 'culture wars', the battle over the regulation of sexuality, including abortion and gay marriage initiatives. For liberals in the US and, in particular, for feminists, the 'culture wars' have come to represent a high stakes battle over the appropriation of the language of 'moral values', a struggle that bears material consequences in the form of regulatory policies and laws, the brunt of which fall on women's bodies. Liberal activists in Kansas, by virtue of their minority status, clearly understood the power accorded to those who set the terms of debate. Now they hoped their hard work would pay off with a political and ideological shift in the White House, if not in Kansas.

Across nineteenth-century Europe, the emergence of constitutional and democratic nation-states was accompanied by intense conflict between Catholics and anticlerical forces. At its peak, this conflict touched virtually every sphere of social life: schools, universities, the press, marriage and gender relations, burial rites, associational culture, the control of public space, folk memory and the symbols of nationhood. In short, these conflicts were 'culture wars', in which the values and collective practices of modern life were at stake. These 'culture wars' have generally been seen as a chapter in the history of specific nation-states. Yet it has recently become increasingly clear that the Europe of the mid- and later nineteenth century should also be seen as a common politico-cultural space. This book breaks with the conventional approach by setting developments in specific states within an all-European and comparative context, offering a fresh and revealing perspective on one of modernity's formative conflicts.

Explores the intersection of the world of opera, literature, and partisan politics to show how Italian opera was put to use in the 'culture wars' of the day. This last of a trilogy of books on opera and politics in Britain examines the cultural politics of opera during the ministerial reign of Sir Robert Walpole from 1720 to 1742. The book explores the intersection of the world of opera, literature, and partisan politics to show how Italian opera - with its associations with the court, ministry and Britain's social-political elite - was put to use in the 'culture wars' of the day: how Italian opera was used for partisan political advantage; how political work could be accomplished by means of opera. It shows that attacks on opera had ulterior targets. The book surveys a range of often overlooked verse and prints to show how critique or satire of opera were a means for oppositional writers to delegitimize the Walpole ministry. Polemicists framed opera as a consequence of the corruption, luxury and False Taste generated by Walpole's ministry. It closes in the watershed year 1742: Handel had produced the last of his Italian operas the previous year, Walpole fell from power, and Alexander Pope published the last book of his Dunciad project.

Mentality is the result of social processes and is shaped by life experiences, as well as values and norms passed on during socialization. In the case of Russia, history, literature, art, and spirituality play a significant role in shaping the national identity and, consequently, the perception of war. The image of war is often presented in a selective or idealized way. In Russian historical discourse, the positive aspects of one’s history are often emphasized, while, simultaneously, controversial or negative factors are often ignored or minimized. The methodology employed in the paper involves a qualitative comparative method, which involves analyzing the concept of war in Russian culture, describing the characteristics of a nation’s mentality through various aspects of an ethnic group’s spiritual life, and understanding the ideology underlying Russia’s foreign policy. The article concludes that analyzing the concept of war within the Russian nation’s culture is not possible without understanding the general mentality of the entire society. The Russians are less willing to take up the problem of crimes committed in that period by soldiers of the Red Army, which is also the case during the occupation of Ukraine.

This article puts forward an analysis of contemporary ‘culture wars’ in the UK, engaging with these ‘wars’ as fundamentally political and material power struggles which are largely enacted on the bodies and lives of young people (among others). Refusing to be drawn in by a widespread scholarly inclination to treat culture wars as simply ideological disagreements, or as tactical froth and distraction, or as rhetoric to be endlessly debated, this article takes its cue from acts of resistance by children who find themselves at the sharp end of the punitive discipline, disempowerment and erasure which is a fundamental outcome of the culture war’s performative struggles. By engaging with three specific case studies of youth-led resistance, we identify and apply the analysis implicit in these acts. Tethering this to the theoretical resources of cultural studies and a historical perspective on the disciplining functions of educational institutions, we suggest that understanding the current culture wars as an actual war—on young people and the futurity they represent and on ‘others’—is a useful analytic for understanding their cultural and political significance and for developing a political, cultural and analytical response. We conclude by recognising the coalitional politics that young people manifest, and sometimes literally articulate, to resist the embodied control and erasure enacted on them. We set this alongside a recognition of the ongoing trauma that the culture wars impose on them and society at large.

Some have argued that we are seeing a ‘homosexual turn’ in Southeast Asia. Decriminalization of sodomy, legal recognition of same-sex marriage, and discussions regarding trans rights have all taken place in the last decade. However, a backlash has emerged as well. Governmental censure of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender issues has escalated, with politicians espousing anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender rhetoric and warning against importing ‘cultural wars’ from the West into Asia. The lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender rights debate is becoming the new cultural battleground in Asia, with ‘Asian’ and ‘family’ centered values being pitted against ‘Western hegemony’ and ‘moral corruption’. As lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender activists advocate for more recognition, the ‘traditional’ heteronormative family is further institutionalized and valorized. This article aims to interrogate the ‘cultural wars’ in Asia as reflected in the tension between burgeoning lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender activism and the enduring privilege of heteronormative families. It will explore this cultural clash through the following three dimensions: (1) rights framing, (2) competition over resources, and (3) political backlash. Ultimately, though, the article argues that as opposed to seeing this tension as a ‘cultural war’, instead we should see this conflict as developmental growing pains, as the region continues to evolve, and nation-states begin to grapple with the burgeoning rights and an irrepressible recognition of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender identities that had been buried under layers of ideologies, from political to moral.

Daryle Williams' Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime, 1930-1945 offers a clear picture of the conflict between culture and politics during the Vargas era. Williams begins by placing the term "culture wars" in a Brazilian context, noting that in comparison to the United States, Brazilian culture wars are held on a much smaller scale, mainly restricted to the cultural elite. Within the first few pages of the text, Williams qualifies his use of the term suggesting that, during the Vargas era, culture wars occur in Brazil when there is a dispute over who controls images of national identity. For Williams, the term culture wars embraces a myriad of genres including, but not limited to, fine art, museums, expositions, architecture, literature, radio and film. Under Vargas, these areas become pawns for political players who each want the right to define a modern Brazil. Williams' key argument is that state-sponsored culture took on a new and very complex meaning during the Vargas regime.

We stand at a key juncture: a Western political crisis arose in 2016-17 to match the deep economic crisis of the preceding decade. Events and new social movements of recent years seem to hail the collapse of the project of liberal democracy, though it is hard to see what will replace it. Among the conceptual and analytic tools bequeathed by Marx are those necessary to better understand and anticipate the direction of this key historical moment – from Donald Trump, Brexit and the so-called ‘culture wars’ to the horizon of liberal democracy itself. In this reflection, I suggest some ways in which Marx’s early thoughts on the liberal state and civil society can and should help us to better understand and explain our present predicament. To say that the Young Marx can help us today with what he called ‘the ruthless critique of everything existing’ is not to say that he can do so alone. It is precisely the issues overlooked or ‘fudged’ by Marx and Marxism – gender, sexuality, and race/racism for example – that now sit at the centre of our ‘culture wars’, alongside but never reducible to the contradictions and crises of capitalism. I conclude that it is only with the help of other writers of the 20th and 21st centuries, from Antonio Gramsci to Frantz Fanon and bell hooks, that we can usefully mobilise the Young Marx today, to critique the world as we find it and especially – the very ‘point’ of theory according to Marx – to change it.