The Place and Function of Doubt in the Philosophies of Descartes and Al-Ghazali

Abstract

Two OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS of philosophy are the manner in which knowledge is acquired and the method or methods by which such knowledge is ultimately justified. The former inquires into forms of cognition such as sense perception, logical inference, and immediate intuition; whereas the latter raises the question of the validity of believing and accepting as true what is so variously disclosed to the mind. This cluster of problems is the core of what is referred to as the quest for certainty, a quest which originates because knowledge seems to be beset by doubt, deficiency, and error. The solution of the problem, then, often turns out to be the starting point which determines, or at least significantly influences, the formulation of a philosophical system. The following discussion will attempt to expound the ways in which the problem of doubt is tackled and to suggest their ramifications in two rather divergent philosophies. The answer to the problem of doubt is one of the underlying motives of the thinking of al-Djazdli and of Descartes. The distance which separates alGazdli (1058-1111) from Descartes (1596-1650) is not merely temporal; it is cultural and perhaps temperamental as well. Although each of them encountered the problem of skepticism, they differed in the uses which they