The phenomenon of the falsification of World War II history based on the example of Western political discourse in 2023–2025: an integral historical-philosophical study.

Notes on Contributors

Notes on Contributors

P ublic support for U.S. federal expenditures for basic research gained momentum with the science and technology breakthroughs that contributed to the Allies' victory in World War II. After World War II, the Korean and Cold Wars concentrated research appropriations in the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD research expenditures were massive from 1950 to 1990. They included not only direct investments in weapons and intelligence systems but support of the underlying science, centered in physical sciences and engineering. What is less well remembered today is that DOD's basic research investments were broadly based, ranging far beyond the physical sciences and engineering into the life and social sciences. Through its service research offices and the Advanced Research Projects agencies, DOD also fostered interdisciplinary research in promising new areas, such as computation, and developed new modes for the performance of research, as in university materials research laboratories. The large investment in the physical sciences also contributed indirectly to medical science and health care, giving rise to many technologies used today. The life sciences now account for more than 50 percent of U.S. federal investment in basic research. Biomedical research funding has followed a pattern of steady significant growth over four decades, and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have slowly come to dominate that funding. Today's strong federal support for the life sciences is warranted, because biomedical research is on the cusp of a revolution in preventative medicine and treatment. Nevertheless, today's overall research budget is increasingly out of balance. Federal funding of many fields in the physical sciences and engineering is down substantially since 1993 (9 to 36% in real terms in fields such as chemistry, physics, and electrical and chemical engineering). This loss, if continued, will imperil advances in these disciplines and endanger the continued flow of valuable discoveries and technologies that have been important to biomedical research and health care. National science and technology (S&T) policy over the past four decades has largely been led by physical scientists who first gained national experience in World War II. They crafted policies for broad investment in basic research and infrastructure, including the life sciences. As we enter the 21st century, biological scientists must assume broader leadership responsibilities in S&T policy, and they must speak out about the importance of support for all disciplines, including the physical sciences and engineering. NIH's Harold Varmus and the National Science Foundation's Rita Colwell recognize the imbalance in the current federal research portfolio and have begun advocating increased investment in all areas of research. Their leadership is to be commended, but it is not enough. Government, organizations, institutions, and industry can and should do more to bolster all basic research. NIH must set the example by much more broadly supporting innovative interdisciplinary research embracing all science, just as DOD did when it was the prime funder of R&D. Some of this has already begun in NIH's cross-institute bioengineering initiative and in prospective increased NIH support of information technology for biocomputation. Similar initiatives should be launched in other areas of the physical sciences and in the social and behavioral sciences. Funding for these initiatives should become a much larger percentage of NIH's overall expenditures. The life science professional societies must speak broadly for basic research and not just argue their own disciplinary cases. Disease advocacy groups must also articulate the case for the physical sciences in their work with the public and before Congress. University leaders and corporate executives must make the case for investment in all research disciplines. Most of all, biologists in the laboratory—working scientists and their students—need to appreciate that their research rests on the legacy not only of the life sciences but also the physical and other sciences. Today's life scientists and the next generation they are training must be the national leaders of the future who will increasingly guide all of U.S. basic research policy in the 21st century.

<i>Notes on Contributors</i>

史政組織為近代軍事參謀組織下之重要一環，各國藉由史政組織研究歷次戰爭，總結戰史經驗，減少或避免再度發生之前錯誤，做為日後作戰之鑑戒。德國是最早設置近代軍事參謀組織之國家，19世紀初期德國開始重視研究戰史，19世紀中後期，世界列強如美、日、俄、法等國之軍事參謀組織開始成立相關單位編纂戰史。 中國自古以來雖有史官負責紀錄正史，但並無專門記錄有關軍事史之組織，有關軍事之記載則分散於浩瀚史書群或個人著作中，直到清末設置近代軍事參謀組織「軍咨府」，中國開始有專門負責編纂戰史之單位。國民政府成立後，設立軍事委員會，該會下設參謀團（或名參謀部、參謀廳），其職掌有負編纂戰史之責，民國17年改為參謀本部，該部總務廳負責編纂戰史，同時也設置「戰史編纂組」，27年改編為軍令部，第一廳負責蒐編戰史，第二廳負責蒐編敵軍戰史，同時亦設置戰史編纂委員會負責蒐編中日戰史。 戰後，軍事委員會改組國防部，成立國防部史料局負責蒐編戰史之責，施行一陣後更名為史政局，民國38年因為國共內戰配合戰鬥內閣縮編人員，史政局縮編為史政處。史政處員額較之前少，但史政處時期處於「反共抗俄、反攻大陸」剛開始的階段，需要編輯大量與「共匪」、登陸與反登陸、對國民政府有正面宣傳等類的軍事史書，因編制人員不足及蔣中正先生等軍事高層逐漸重視史政的教育、借鑑等功能之因，希望藉由史政，強化軍方及一般民眾精神上的戰力，因此在民國46年7月，史政處再度擴編為史政局，史政局時期，繼續推行史政處時期業務，人員亦有增減，相較於史政處仍是較多；同時因為史政推行已久，累積之檔案極多，因此建立「國軍檔案室」，作為永久保存國軍檔案之單位。後來因應國軍需求實施精簡案，民國62年5月1日，史政局與編譯局合併為史政編譯局。 本文主要研究時間為民國35年國防部史料局成立62年5月1日國防部史政局與編譯局合併為止，亦會稍加敘述戰前國軍史政組織與部分列強史政組織。本文研究可分為三部分，首先國軍各時期史政組織名稱說法不一，本文試圖釐清戰前國軍史政組織之名稱、職掌、編制等。第二，試圖釐清戰後史政組織演變經由擴編、縮編與再擴編之原因，並描述戰後國軍史政組織之組織規模、人員編制、行政制度、訓練制度等制度；第三，試圖重建戰前、戰後國軍史政組織編纂史書之過程、方法。

Military Institutions, Weapons, and Social Change: Toward a New History ofMilitary Technology BARTON C. HACKER Why have we studied the history of military technology? The answer, I think, will do much to explain the current state of the field. Justifying study of the history of technology hardly seems necessary to readers of Technology and Culture, but why military technology? To that question my answer depends on a critical discussion of the traditional history of military technology, the first part of this essay. It will address what many have assumed to be the heart of military technological history— hardware studies. Not only do these go back a long way, they also in a real sense continue to define the field. But they have also long been contested, and I shall briefly discuss alternative approaches that pointed toward a new kind of military technological history before the Second World War. Although without immediate issue, they survived to inspire a later generation. I think another question—Why should we study the history of military technology?—is not only distinct but perhaps also more important. I will use it as the touchstone for my remarks on new developments and needed research, but first a word about the transformed study of history proper. In recent decades new approaches, new methods, new evidence have allowed historians to reclaim a broader range ofhuman experience than the older political-military history could encompass, to open new areas of study within, as well as outside, the Western tradition. Tradi­ tionalists remain skeptical, but the changes since World War II have been both profound and widespread.1 Military history and the history of technology also experienced a renaissance. The new history of military Dr. Hacker is historian at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. An earlier version of this article was prepared for the 1991 Madison, Wisconsin, SHOT/HSS Conference on Critical Problems and Research Frontiers in History of Technology and History of Science. 'See esp. Theodore S. Hamerow et al., “AHR Forum: The Old History and the New,” American Historical Review 94 (1989): 654-98. See also Peter Novick, That Noble. Dream: The “Objectivity Question’and theAmerican Historical Profession (NewYork, 1988); Eric Foner, ed., The New American History (Philadelphia, 1990).© 1994 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-l65X/94/3504-0005$01.00 768 Toward a New History ofMilitary Technology 769 technology drew on these vital changes, as it did on corresponding (and perhaps related) innovations in the social sciences and anthropology; these changes are the subject of the essay’s second section. In the final section I evaluate the achievements of this new history, discuss some recent trends, and offer a few suggestions about what still needs doing. Needless to say, I cannot hope to address every nuance of the field or cite every important study, but I will try to provide a framework for understanding the field’s current status and forjudging the directions it should take. Traditional Approaches Traditionally, the history of military technology shared the internalist viewpoint, the nuts-and-bolts approach favored by historians of technol­ ogy in general. Focused on the technology itself—weapons, accoutre­ ments, machinery, fortifications, all the physical relics of war making— the products range from the narrowest monographs to the broadest surveys. Such studies have a long history and still appear regularly without much reference to alternative approaches. Military technology seems persistendy to have fascinated Western minds since the Middle Ages, a curious preoccupation reflected in the long line of technical treatises devoted to, or prominently featuring, the tools of war, old and new, mundane and exotic.2 Intriguing hints suggest a parallel (though perhaps less fully developed) tradition in the Islamic world growing from the same roots. “Military engineering,” Donald Hill explained in 2For the narrowly military technological tradition, see E. A. Thompson, A Roman Reformer and Inventor (Oxford, 1952); A. Rupert Hall, “Guido’s Texaurus: 1335,” in On Pre-modem Technology and Science: A Volume ofStudies in Honor ofLynn White, jr., ed. Bert S. Hall and Delno C. West (Malibu, Calif., 1976), pp. 11-52; BertS. Hall, The Technological Illustrations ofthe So-called “Anonymous of the Hussite Wars’: Codex Latinus Monacensis, Part 1...

Wending Through the Way of War James Jay Carafano (bio) For starters, we ought to be speaking of "ways of wars." There is an underlying premise to this viewpoint for military history. How both state and non-state actors fight reflects their national character. Combatants enter conflict with assumptions, perceptions, and preferences that shape the way they intend to engage in warfare. These are shaped before the battle. They are unique to the competitor. They change over time. The three papers here argue for the utility of thinking about "ways of wars," though they all find problems with past efforts at mastering this approach. To me, weighing the good and the bad suggests at least three principles for applying the ways of wars perspective to the study of conflict. A first principle of war ways should be: think big and broadly. As Rob Citino points out, it would be too much to speak of the study of the ways of wars as a historiographical school. That said, what often purports to serve as the guiding idea for determining how militaries wage warfare looks mostly at doctrine and tradition. The more I study military history the more I have come to believe that that perspective is far too narrow. Click for larger view View full resolution From Berthold Laufer, Chinese Clay Figures: Prolegomena on the History of Defensive Armor, Part 1 (Field Museum of Natural History, 1914). The dynamic relationships between the civilian and military spheres of society can dramatically affect ways of going to war. This is not to suggest that New Military History is a good idea. In fact, I think that approach has turned into a historian's dead end. In 1991 Peter Paret heralded its arrival. "The New Military History," he wrote, "stands for an effort to integrate the study of military institutions and their actions more closely with other kinds of history." He saw it as a potent weapon that military historians could use to "fight the indifference or hostility of their colleagues on the one hand, and against the narrowness of much of military history on the other."1 Unfortunately, rather than enriching our understanding of warfare by studying issues of gender, culture, and social structures, it has for the most part done anything but. University departments continue to push military studies to the margin. Meanwhile, New Military History cranks out monographs that only tangentially inform our understanding of the conduct of warfare. New Military History's first cousin is national identity theory, which claims that cultural traits influence how nations act.2 Political scientists mimicked historians with their promises. The results, however, have generally been similar, with studies that tell us more about the authors' cultural assumptions and political and social axes to grind than how and why enemies confront one another. My favorite example is Natalie Bormann's National Missile Defense and the Politics of U.S. Identity: A Poststructural Critique (Manchester University Press, 2008). She starts out assuming that the desire for missile defenses is irrational. She dismisses all the feasibility and cost issues in two pages, citing only the opinions of outspoken missile defense critics. She then spends one hundred plus pages "creating" a national identity that explains why Americans would try doing something so stupid as to protect themselves from nuclear attack. If the study of ways of wars is going to better it will have to integrate the study of military operations [End Page 25] and activities with the wider world—not push them to the sidelines. This story can only be told by bringing together disparate brands of history that hardly ever get mentioned in the same breath: military history, the story of battle, blood, and bugles; the history of science and technology; and social, economic, business, cultural, and intellectual history, the exploration of how changes in beliefs and relationships among individuals and communities shape the way humans respond to the world around them. A second principle could be: don't think deterministically. No right thinking person would axiomatically assume that an economic historian would be the best person to give advice on a good 401K or predict the next move in the Dow Jones. Yet many, including...

: Military victories are the stuff of history. Since Homer's account of the fall of Troy, the acts of war assaults, tactics, heroic deeds, great battles won, and armies defeated have captured the Western world's imagination. Even military historians, who should know better, have focused their attention on the conduct of war and left its aftermath for others to account. Yet, as Clausewitz aptly pointed out nearly two centuries ago, is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.1 Military success by itself is irrelevant. Allied victory in World War I proved hollow indeed, because it failed to remove the danger of another German effort to achieve European hegemony. Throughout history, the military, political, economic, and social efforts of the victorious powers in the period after conventional hostilities have proven essential to achieving the political goals for which wars have fought. Where postconflict operations have failed, the result has inevitably been to seize defeat from the jaws of victory.

Previous articleNext article FreeJason Sean Ridler. Maestro of Science: Omond McKillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939–1956. xv + 350 pp., figs., tables, bibl., index. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015. $55 (cloth).Eric L. MillsEric L. Mills Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreAt the outset, Jason Ridler tells us that “the history of government science in Britain and Canada could not be told without the legacy of Omond Solandt” (p. 19). This is not hyperbole, for Solandt, although little known now, was an increasingly important figure in the development of defense science in Britain and Canada from the beginning of World War II through the Cold War period. Later he took on a series of varied and important tasks for industry and government in Canada, with less visibility but significant importance, such as research for Canadian National Railways and consulting with the committee investigating the Ocean Ranger oil rig disaster of 1982. Maestro of Science gives us a detailed and meticulously researched view of an administrative virtuoso at work and provides background to the state of science in Britain, Canada, and the United States that is relevant to present-day science policy.Omond Solandt (1909–1983) was born in Manitoba but raised mainly in Toronto in a Congregationalist family. His university career, aimed at medicine, involved training in physiology at the University of Toronto, eventually under the influence of the eminent Charles Best. Best directed Solandt to Cambridge, where he appeared to be destined for a career in clinical medicine and teaching. But World War II intervened, and, like many other academics, Solandt threw himself into the war effort, first as the director of a blood transfusion clinic in the London area; then, as his extraordinary talents for getting results were recognized, as leader of a group studying the operational aspects of tank warfare; and ultimately as superintendent of the British Army’s Operational Research Group, involved in many other aspects of defense research. As the war ended, Solandt, the only Canadian, joined a group designated by the British War Office to visit Japan and report on the effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. In 1945, when the Canadian government looked for a leader of its prospective defense research establishment, he returned to Canada, becoming chairman of the Defence Research Board of Canada (DRB) when it was formally established in 1947. Until his retirement from the DRB in 1956, Solandt was involved in developing and administering nearly all aspects of Canada’s defense research, including the potential outcomes of atomic warfare, radar detection of incoming Soviet bombers and, later, ICBMs, the use of chemical and biological weapons, and the development of Canadian guided missiles and supersonic aircraft. His influence within the Canadian government was considerable, and he developed and maintained important links with Britain and the United States, capitalizing on his long-established contacts in Britain as well as making new ones in the United States.In a comprehensive and insightful introduction, Ridler explores the advantages and disadvantages of a biographical approach to a career as complex and unusual as Solandt’s, making the case that the combination of his intellect, training, and practical abilities outweighs the consequent de-emphasis of attention to organizations and broader events. In this case, I think that Ridler has made the right choice in his approach to such a noteworthy—and exceptionally effective—figure, giving us a very clear view of the successes and failures of a talented scientist-administrator. This is not to say that some disadvantages do not accrue to his approach. Organizations and people do tend to appear abruptly, only to disappear without a trace. The significance of some scientific organizations and many political events is sometimes not clear. Some technical problems, although minor, could have been corrected by the usually impeccable University of Toronto Press during the reviewing and proof stages of production. Among these flaws, many of Solandt’s associates appear without first names or initials. Acronyms are rife, and not all are listed in an otherwise helpful guide. A few organizations are misnamed. The index is woefully short and totally unsatisfactory.Technical flaws aside, this book is an important contribution to our knowledge of how some branches of science—notably defense science—developed during and after World War II in the hands of a master administrator. This period does not lack its literature, but Ridler’s approach, examining in detail the career of one important player, Omond Solandt, a Canadian whose career spanned the Atlantic and came to take in the United States as well, provides fascinating insight into a fine-grained history—the experiences of a scientist-administrator balancing the demands of research and the political imperatives of the wartime and postwar worlds. Notes Eric L. Mills is Professor Emeritus of History of Science, Dalhousie University, and Inglis Professor, University of King’s College, Halifax. He works on the history of oceanography and on the history of marine sciences in Canada. Previous articleNext article DetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Isis Volume 108, Number 1March 2017 Publication of the History of Science Society Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/690778 © 2017 by The History of Science Society. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Reviewed by: Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia William M. Donnelly Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia. Three volumes. Edited by Stanley Sandler. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, 2002. ISBN 1-57607- 344-0. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Glossary. Selected bibliography. Index. Pp. xxxviii, 1065. $295.00. To distinguish itself from general encyclopedias of military history, a work entitled Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia should provide readers with articles focused on aspects of ground warfare from across human history. The promise of the title is only partly fulfilled: while these three volumes do range beyond the western military experience, they do not provide a level of detail on aspects of ground warfare above that found in general encyclopedias of military history. The attention to key topics in the history of ground warfare is disappointing. A three-volume work should have an article of more than twelve paragraphs on "Infantry" or sixteen paragraphs on "Artillery." The article on "Nuclear and Atomic Weapons" spends most of its length discussing the development of these weapons and their strategic implications, but does not discuss at all how armies changed their doctrine and equipment to adapt to these new weapons. To summarize the evolution of tactics and weapons in World War I by stating parenthetically "the German High Command seemed to be the only belligerents to have learned anything from the deadlock of trench warfare" (p. 963) is to leave readers far behind the current scholarship on this topic. There is no article on that most important topic of ground warfare, combat motivation. There also is no article on the lesser but still important topic of ground air defense. Some editorial choices are inexplicable: there is an article on Meriwether Lewis, but not one on S. L. A. Marshall. Some editorial choices would have been better suited to a work of general military history: there is an article on the atomic bombing of Japan, but not one on the U.S. Army's Pentomic Era. Some editorial choices are debatable: there is an article on Gen. [End Page 945] H. Norman Schwarzkopf, but not one on Gen. William E. DePuy, a man whose influence on the U.S. Army was far more important than Schwarzkopf's generalship in the Persian Gulf War. The usefulness of this work to students seeking a guide to other sources is badly compromised by the curious choices made in the references placed at the end of articles and in the selected bibliography. The article on the U.S. Army does not refer readers to the work of Russell E. Weigley. The article on infantry does not refer readers to the work of John A. English. S. L. A. Marshall's Men Against Fire, John Keegan's The Face of Battle, and Richard Holmes's Acts of War are not in the selected bibliography (Weigley's History of the United States Army and Towards an American Army also are missing from the bibliography.) Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia was "written and edited with a broad public in mind" (p. xxv). That public will find these volumes to be a generally well-written work that is, in effect, a general encyclopedia of military history with the naval and air portions removed. William M. Donnelly Beltsville, Maryland Copyright © 2004 Society for Military History

This provocative examination of major controversies in military history enables readers to learn how scholars approach controversial topics and provides a model for students in the study and discussion of other historical events. Why did Alexander the Great's empire fall apart so soon after his death? How did France win the Hundred Years War despite England winning its major battles? Was slavery the primary cause of the American Civil War? Would it have benefited the Allies militarily to have gone to war against Germany in 1938 rather than in 1939? Should women be allowed to serve in combat positions in the U.S. military? All of these questions and many other historical controversies are addressed in this thought-provoking reference book. By exploring every angle of some of the most contentious debates involving military history, this book builds students' critical thinking skills by supplying a complete background of the controversial topic to provide context, and also by providing multiple perspective essays written by top scholars in the field. The perspective essays present arguments for different positions on the controversy. Readers will consider the cases for and against whether Hannibal should have marched on Rome after his momentous victory at Cannae, whether the United States was justified in using the atomic bomb in Japan, whether Adolf Hitler was primarily responsible for the Holocaust, and whether torturing prisoners during the War on Terror is warranted, among many other historical military debates.

On July 1, 1946, less than a year after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the United States resumed nuclear testing in the Pacific. In March, 1954 the US forced the 166 inhabitants of Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands, part of the United Nations Trust Territory that was among the spoils of victory in world War II, to leave their home island. On July 1, 1954 it conducted the first full-scale test of a Hydrogen Bomb at Bikini. The blast is estimated at 15 megatons, that is the equivalent of 15 million tons of TNT, one thousand times as powerful as the bomb exploded at Hiroshima. The Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon No. 5, sailing well beyond the zone demarcated by US authorities for the test, was covered with white ashes, later recognized as radioactive coral dust. The next day all 23 crew members suffered from headache, nausea, diarrhea and other symptoms from exposure to radioactivity. The symptoms were more acute among inhabitants of Longelap Atoll, 180 kilometers East of Bikini and other atolls. On September 23, the Lucky Dragon's chief radio operator died of jaundice, diagnosed as having been complicated by radioactivity. In Japan, the incident sparked a national petition campaign to ban nuclear weapons led by a women's group in Suginami Ward, Tokyo. The twenty million signatures that it collected within months provided a springboard for a national and international anti-nuclear movement. In August 1955 the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs convened in Hiroshima, the first in a series of annual meetings that became the center of the antinuclear movement. This series of articles, on the fiftieth anniversary of the Bikini test, records the fate of the crew members, the fishing communities that were their homes, and their impact on the subsequent treatment of atomic victims in Japan.

The article is devoted to the analysis of the historical memory of the Second World War in modern France. The focus is on issues related to the reaction of the French media and authorities to the 80th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad, the 80th anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy and the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. On the basis of the leading French media publications and statements by French politicians analysis, the author of the article concludes that the events related to the commemorations of World War II have long been transformed in the West as a whole and in France, in particular, into a political tool that is used to rewrite the results of World War II in accordance with the current geopolitical situation. The main goal of this policy is to downplay the role of the Soviet Union and the Red Army and to exaggerate the role of Western powers, primarily the United States, in winning World War II. In addition, the author notes that the very concept of «victory» over Nazi Germany is being replaced by the term «surrender» of Nazi Germany. Thus, the problem of German Nazism is neutralized and at the same time equal responsibility for the outbreak of World War II is placed on the Soviet Union along with Nazi Germany. The non-invitation of Russia to solemn ceremonies is a clear manifestation of this political line. All this seems very dangerous, since such rhetoric and actions lead to camouflage and disregard for the resurgent neo-Nazism, and the reformatted past provides historical grounds for creating the “necessary” present.

Imagine, for a moment, three history lessons, all taught in England. In one, 14year-olds analyse a document by Henry Stimson, the US Secretary for war, about the dropping of the atomic bomb. In another, a class of 11-year-olds collectively explore the interior of a medieval castle through the medium of an interactive CD-ROM. In the final lesson 17-year-olds debate religious threats to Elizabeth I. These three lessons represent considerable professional achievements. The teachers have transformed history into a form accessible to their students; they have crafted learning opportunities that take account of their goals for learning and their understanding of their students; they have engaged and motivated their students to generate a variety of cognitive and affective outcomes from the study of history in their school. It is easy to take all this for granted: it can appear effortless. However, if we want to go further than describing, admiring or even evaluating what sort of professional achievement they represent, then our existing research-based knowledge about understanding what happens in history classrooms in the UK is remarkably limited. We would be on the most secure ground if we looked to research to help us make sense of the students’ achievements. Both the individual and collective work of Shemilt, Lee, Ashby and Dickinson would enable us to recognize the ways in which many of the 14-year-olds have grasped sophisticated ideas about the nature of historical evidence and the complexities of constructing accounts about the past.1 The CHATA project would remind us that advanced thinking displayed by some pupils may not be shared by all.2 Pupils’ understandings of second-order concepts, and progression in their thinking, have been subjected to detailed analysis and discussion through this extensive research project. A very different body of research, in the US, has explored the social and cultural contexts that shape pupils’ thinking in history and the work of Barton, Levstik and Weinberg could be instructive.3 Barton’s investigation of pupils’ ideas about historical significance might help us to make sense of the diverse responses to the idea of religion as a real threat to monarchy, whilst Wineburg’s work on the influences shaping historical understanding might illuminate the 11-year-olds’ varied experiences of castles.

Just as the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan acted as the immediate stimulus for the disarmament movement after the war, the US thermonuclear weapon test at Bikini atoll on 1st March 1954 re-ignited global fear. The device, fuelled by lithium and an isotope of hydrogen, was at least one thousand times more powerful than the fission bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Its yield was also three times bigger than the Americans expected, because the scientists who developed it at Los Alamos had overlooked an important nuclear fusion reaction. The underwater explosion vaporized much of the atoll and caked the crew of the Japanese fishing boat, Lucky Dragon, with radioactive fallout though they were 80 miles away, outside the exclusion zone. The test had been preceded by the announcement of a new strategic policy of ‘massive retaliation’ by the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in January.