The Perils of Counterinsurgency: Russia's War in Chechnya

Abstract

years, Russian troops have been embroiled in a counterinsurgency war in Chechnya, the second war they have fought in that small Caucasus republic since the mid-1990s. The arst war, from December 1994 to August 1996, ended when Russian and Chechen ofacials signed a peace agreement at Khasavyurt in the neighboring Republic of Dagestan. The Khasavyurt accord, which led to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechen territory and three years of quasi independence for the republic, stipulated that the two parties would resolve the anal status of Chechnya by the end of 2001. Before any negotiations about this matter could be held, however, a series of events beginning with deadly incursions by Islamic extremists from Chechnya into Dagestan in August 1999 culminated in a large-scale resumption of aghting between Russian federal forces and Chechen guerrillas—aghting that has continued ever since. This article assesses Russia’s counterinsurgency operations during the latest war in Chechnya. The article begins by looking brieoy at the geographic and military context of the war, the events that precipitated the renewed aghting, and the early results of the conoict. It then examines the tactics used by Chechen guerrillas and the responses by Russian soldiers and security forces. The article considers why Russian troops and police, who outnumber the rebels by more than afty to one, have been unable to eliminate armed resistance in an area as small as Chechnya. It also highlights the growing emphasis the Chechens have placed on terrorist attacks both inside and outside the North Caucasus. The anal section provides a net evaluation of Russian efforts. The Perils of Counterinsurgency