The Ottoman Struggle for Authority and Succession: From Absolute Rule to Dynastic Stability in the Reigns of Murad IV and Mehmed IV

Coping with stress in relation to chronic illness remains a central issue in health psychology. Ulcerative colitis (UC) and Crohn’s disease (CD) are two forms of chronic intestinal malfunction known collectively as inflammatory bowel disease (IBD). Recent estimates indicate that more than 80,000 individuals are affected by IBD in Australia and 1,500,000 in North America. Its prevalence is increasing, particularly in industrialized nations and the disease appears to affect females and males equally. Since Lazarus’ pioneering work on coping strategies, psychologists have been interested in how people adapt to chronic health issues, and in turn, how their coping efforts affect psychological wellbeing. Many recent reports have suggested that personal characteristics including personality dispositions and coping strategies affect adjustment to illness in general and IBD in particular. The majority of studies reviewed by the researcher are nonetheless of questionable design, lack a theoretical framework, and fail to incorporate matched comparison groups. The present dissertation is unique in several ways. Specifically, predictions for the current study were based on a logically deduced theoretical framework and included a pool of common, psychometrically validated measures of both positively and negatively worded questionnaires. All major hypotheses generated from the model were systematically tested using groups balanced for IBD type, severity of illness, age, sex and, importantly, a comparison group. Objective: To construct a cohesive framework which investigates how individuals deal with stress, what personality and coping measures influence their wellbeing and whether these factors differ between individuals with or without chronic illness, specifically IBD. It was predicted that IBD volunteers, compared to non-IBD volunteers would exhibit lower scores on the measures of wellbeing. Personality and coping-control mechanisms were also expected to differ between the comparison groups. It was predicted that personal dispositions would provide a stronger influence on wellbeing, compared to the more transitory coping-control measures. Coping-control mechanisms were also assessed as to whether they would significantly contribute to wellbeing, over and above the personality domains. Method: This cross-sectional investigation systematically compared the responses of a group of IBD outpatients (n=95) to a matched non-IBD ethesis-submission.doc May 2009; reviewed December 2011; updated November 2012 3 group (n=87) on a battery of self-report questionnaires tapping measures of personality, coping and wellbeing. Participants were assigned to one of eight groups according to whether they were representative of the following comparison subgroups: illness (IBD vs. non-IBD), type of illness (UC vs. CD), severity of illness (severe vs. mild) and sex (female vs. male). Results: As predicted, IBD participants, compared to non-IBD participants, scored significantly lower on all wellbeing measures; that is, increased general health complaints, perceived stress and depression. The comparison groups were indistinguishable on the majority of measures pertaining to personality and coping-control mechanisms. Regression analyses identified that negative affect (NA) was the strongest personality predictor; and perceived control of internal states (PCOIS) was the best coping- control predictor of wellbeing. As expected, personal dispositions were stronger predictors of wellbeing than the group of coping-control mechanisms. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses illustrated that coping-control mechanisms only negligibly added to the prediction of wellbeing beyond that accounted for by the personal disposition measures. Conclusion: Results failed to provide evidence of an IBD-prone personality as the measures of personal dispositions and coping-control mechanisms were essentially the same for the IBD and non-IBD comparison groups. Although the IBD group, compared to the non-IBD group, scored significantly lower on the selected wellbeing measures, it is emphasized that neither group scored low enough to warrant classification within the clinical range. It was demonstrated that coping-control mechanisms play an important role in influencing wellbeing, but the innate and stable nature of personality dispositions override these more transient influences. The thesis concludes with the argument that between-group designs are not very helpful in identifying differences in predicting psychological wellbeing between the “well” and the “sick”. This method evaluates group trends, but but in doing so failed to identify individual differences. It is suggested that idiographic or n=1 studies, in combination with between-group designs, would prove a more fruitful method of understanding relations between chronic illness and wellbeing.

In this thesis, the research subject is the strategic thought of He Bo Shi Bei Lun writing by He qufei, which based on the “document analysis” research methods and adopts military strategy and political strategy as its research approach. For investigate the value of strategic thought of He Bo Shi Bei Lun, this thesis uses the case of U.S. War on Counter-Terrorism in Afghanistan (2001-2014) to examine the applicability and limitation of strategic thought in the war of today. The first chapter in this thesis, it discusses internal strategic environment and external strategic environment of the Northern Song Dynasty. The research concludes that both of the strategic environment are interacting and influencing each other. Because of the interaction, the prevailing custom of scholar discussing military science was been formed in the intermediate stage of Northern Song Dynasty and He Bo Shi Bei Lun can be published in the China’s history. The second chapter in this thesis, which uses military strategy research approach to analyze He Bo Shi Bei Lun in three parts: buildup, governance, and use of military force. In this analysis, first, buildup of military force has three points: doctrine of elite troops, brain-trust, and army comprised of national. Second, the opinion of governance of military force includes generalship and commanding soldiers, in this chapter our discuss tend to emphasize on generalship. The former contains leadership and civil–military relations; the latter focuses on the principle of commanding soldiers by law. Finally, the ideas of use of military force are discussing the importance of circumstances and flexibility of using military force. The third chapter in this thesis, which uses political strategy research approach to analyze He Bo Shi Bei Lun by four indicators: the government’s organizational force, the people’s centripetal force, the society’s stable force, and the international supporting force. In the first indicator about government’s organizational force, leader should keep its power certainly and use it to keep government stable. Second, the part of the people’s centripetal force, which indicates popular sentiment can influence the result of war and the transition of regime. So, the authorities should hold the heart of people. Third, the idea of society’s stable force, which is decision- maker, needs to carry out the policy that separate different ethnic groups to prevent ethnic conflict. The last anatomy in this chapter, international supporting force, it point out the importance of diplomacy, and then think that government should use diplomacy method to increase the possibility to win a war. After the second and third chapter, which uses military strategy and politics strategy to analyze He qufei’s strategic thought. The forth chapter uses the Case of U.S. War on Counter-Terrorism in Afghanistan (2001-2014) to examine the value of strategic thought in modern. In sum, He qufei’s strategic thought still has merit in modern, but some part of his thought also has limitation because it is limited by the factor of space and time.

The article examines the legal support for state and public control over the activities of arbitration managers in conditions of martial law and emergency situations. The main directions of control implemented by the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine and its territorial bodies are identified. Among the key shortcomings of the current legal regulation, the unclear definition of the boundaries of the competence of the arbitration manager in crisis conditions is highlighted, which creates risks of violation of the rights of creditors and debtors and creates opportunities for the misuse of powers. In addition, limited mechanisms for operational control in cases of loss of access to the debtor’s property or documentation as a result of military actions or force majeure circumstances complicate timely response to violations. The insufficient level of digitalization of control procedures, in particular the lack of effective electronic tools for monitoring and checking the reporting of arbitration managers in real time, reduces the transparency of bankruptcy procedures. Weak regulation of interaction between judicial supervision and state control, as well as inconsistency of disciplinary and anti-corruption mechanisms can lead to duplication of powers, gaps in control or formal application of sanctions. To solve the above problems, it is proposed to legislatively clarify the boundaries of the competence of the arbitration manager in emergency conditions, in particular by determining the algorithms of actions in case of limited access to property or documents. It is advisable to expand the use of electronic control systems in order to ensure remote monitoring and prompt response to violations. It is also necessary to improve the mechanisms of interaction between state and public control and judicial supervision in order to eliminate legal conflicts and ensure comprehensive protection of the rights of participants in bankruptcy procedures. Strengthening standards of professional ethics and anti-corruption requirements, introducing mandatory training and regular certification of arbitration managers, as well as introducing flexible disciplinary procedures are identified as important conditions for increasing the efficiency of both state and public control.

Indonesia provides a fruitful case study of differences between radicalization processes in liberal and authoritarian regimes. Political Science hereby tends to emphasize regime type as the determinant of Islamist political strategy (radical, militant or moderate) and therefore as the main explanatory factor for radicalization processes. Although this is true of the role of Islamists in various Middle Eastern countries, where electoral participation has moderated political programs and strategies, it is of little relevance to Indonesia. The democratic opening in 1998 provided Islamists with new opportunities to participate in electoral politics, and even become co-opted by formally “secular” forces, but at the same time opened up spaces for militant, radical Islamist groups. Whereas radical Islam faced severe state repression under Suharto’s New Order, we now find a highly ambiguous relationship between the state and radical Islamists, expressed in operational terms as a parallelism of repression and cooptation. This article tries to make sense of the relationship between the post-authoritarian state and radical Islam in Indonesia by transcending the institution-centered understanding of the role of Islam through an examination of the configurations of social forces that have determined the shape, scope, and practices of radical Islam within Indonesia’s new experiment with democracy.

This chapter largely focuses on the ‘official’ ulema in the Muslim world in the modern period. It argues that given the status of the official ulema vis-avis political authority, these ulema are not often in a position to provide any substantial degree of religious legitimacy to a modern nation state. It focuses on the ulema within the Sunni Islam and does not attempt to cover shi‘a ulema. The discussion is not related to a particular country or region but attempts to look at countries with a Muslim majority. Despite the shortcomings inherent in such an approach, I believe, it is possible to make meaningful comments on the institution of the ulema that would be valid for many Muslim majority countries. This is due to the similarities associated with the institution and the social and political roles of the ulema in these countries.

Islamic societies have traditionally assigned dreams a high epistemic value, firmly rooted in the Tradition. Of special importance were dreams in which the Prophet Muḥammad appeared, the authenticity of which was assured by hadith. Consequently, dreams became a common tool of political, social and religious legitimization. Yet, Sunni jurists held that dreams are irrelevant as legal evidence. This article examines the juristsʼ approach to the epistemic value of dreams: First, I review the legal arguments raised against the use of dreams in the juridic discourse; then I ask why dreams were marginalized in this discourse. Finally, by comparing the attitudes of the fuqahāʾ to dreams with those of the Jewish and Christian scholars, I argue that the three traditions experienced a similar dynamic regarding both the high value ascribed to dreams, and the consequent need to restrain their authority.

As US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) assumes responsibility within the Department of Defense for the homeland security and homeland defense missions, it does so with few assigned forces. While the For apportionment to NORTHCOM is still being finalized, they will in any case be meager in comparison to the scope of the task and the assigned area of responsibility. The paucity of forces available to NORTHCOM will require more economical approaches to force-building for contingency operations in support of homeland security missions. While the National Guard is ideally positioned and suited for homeland security, it may not always be available in adequate numbers if called to active federal duty in support of military operations overseas. In addition to the forces the National Guard may provide, State Defense Forces (1)--military forces created, funded, and controlled solely by the individual states, and already integrated into the emergency management operations of more than 20 states--are a potential force-provider for homeland security operations. NORTHCOM finds itself in a position familiar to the other regional combatant commands in that it must interact with the numerous sovereign nations in its area of responsibility and develop appropriate Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). The NORTHCOM area of responsibility encompasses Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean nations, and the European possessions in the Caribbean. NORTHCOM also has responsibility for the territories of Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands, and for the 49 US states on the North American continent. In this respect, the individual states are somewhat like the sovereign nations, in that each state or territorial government controls certain military forces and other pertinent manpower resources within its boundaries. (2) Just as NORTHCOM must develop a TSCP for the sovereign nations in its area of responsibility, so must it develop security cooperation plans for homeland security contingency operations with each of the US states and territories in its area. Friendly forces available to NORTHCOM to conduct its homeland security mission--principally the National Guard elements--largely belong to the state governors, with the military components under the control of the state's Adjutant General (AG). (3) In 28 states, the AGs are also the directors of the state's emergency management agency or directorate, with control over all emergency management components, both civilian and military. (4) Within the military departments of 23 states and the Territory of Puerto Rico are the additional State Defense Forces (SDFs), which, like the state or territorial National Guard, are under the command of the governor through the Adjutant General. Thus SDFs constitute a third tier of military forces (the first two are federal forces, both active and reserve, and the dual-status National Guard forces, which may be either under federal or state control). State Defense Forces, controlled and funded by the state or territory, are composed of volunteers who are paid only when called to state active duty by the governor. Nearly half of the governors have standing SDFs, while all the remaining states have the authority to raise such forces. It is therefore important for the NORTHCOM staff to understand State Defense Force capabilities and limitations, and to keep in mind appropriate roles and missions for these forces as they work through the state AGs to develop contingency plans for the next terrorist attack or disaster. According to the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, such an attack is most likely to occur when the United States is involved in a conflict overseas, in which the National Guard units of a state may be employed, making the potential contributions of the State Defense Forces all the more significant. (5) State Defense Forces include both land and naval elements and are state-controlled military forces that may not be called to federal service. …

<scp>Al‐Azhar</scp> and the Salafis in Egypt: Contestation of two traditions

This chapter examines the political, economic, and religious context of the Covid-19 pandemic in Saudi Arabia. Although outsiders sometimes see the kingdom as inward-looking, it is deeply enmeshed in global contexts: economically as a rentier state dependent on external revenue flows, and religiously as an Islamic state that derives its legitimacy, not just domestically but in the wider Muslim world, from its assumed role as protector of religion. Covid-19 impacted these foundations of the state in two ways: it weakened the state through low revenues from oil exports, and it challenged the state politically because public health measures contradicted religious duties. Compared to some larger and less authoritarian Muslim states, where opposition and even resistance to public health measures have flared up, the Saudi state has so far been able to navigate the problematic area between religious sentiments and public health concerns without much turbulence. However, its solutions are probably not sustainable in the longer term. Minimizing the economic impact of Covid-19 for citizens with a long-nurtured sense of entitlement, while letting the foreign labor force bear the brunt of the crisis, is costly in the face of declining state revenues. Uncertainty hangs over state control over religious establishment and non-establishment Islamist voices, some of which have already challenged its religious legitimacy from outside the country.

This chapter argues that Myanmar’s developmental stagnation is fundamentally rooted in a socio-political culture that reveres centralised authority. Examining the country’s authoritarian political history and Buddhist cosmology, we show how state control is both institutional and sociologically embedded. Historical episodes such as Ne Win’s socialist command economy and the 2021 military coup reflect long-standing cultural norms that prize hierarchy, obedience, and paternalism. The chapter traces how colonial trauma, religious legitimation, and monastic education reinforced these authoritarian tendencies, cultivating a national psyche steeped in submission to strong rulers. Despite brief democratic openings, political institutions have remained structurally dominated by the military, with cultural values often enabling their return. Sociological evidence confirms that Myanmar exhibits some of the lowest support for liberal democracy in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We argue that genuine economic liberalisation must be accompanied by a transformation of deep-seated social norms, beginning with reforms in education, family life, and political culture.

Here we represent our interview with renowned expert and analytics Prof. Yevgeny Satanovsky, Ph.D. (Economics), President of the Institute for Middle East Studies. The main question to discuss was contemporary Middle East realities: geopolitical processes, the alignment of forces, and controversies in Greater Middle East and surrounding it. According to Dr. Satanovsky, in the early 21st century, this region is characterized by the rapid emergence of short-term situational alliances that pursue short-term goals and serve the personal interests of political leaders and elites. Such chaotic arising and collapsing “free for all between all” alliances, sometimes even irrespective of Sunni and Shiite (which used to be completely uncharacteristic for the Arab World) or even more (this previously impossible alliance is Israel’s military, military-technical and defense cooperation with the Arab monarchs of the Gulf or with Maghreb Countries), testify not only to the weakening of the old geopolitical powers, which were in full control of the region as far back as the 20th century. This indicates fundamental change in the entire format of international relations, regardless of the emergence of new or even ‘partially new’ key players (for example, China’s return to the Middle East after several centuries of self-isolation and also after medieval Great Silk Road lost its geopolitical status). In this new world order, now no one plays by any rules, everyone acts as they want in order to get what they want. State institutions are declining, instead of them, states increasingly use unconstitutional means, from private military companies to inviting terrorists as mercenaries to restore order among its kind (such as France invited Chechen rebel fighters to control migrants from Africa). The political establishment is less and less interested in state-building, but it is extremely interested in the money that can be obtained for the project to build a state (such as in the case of Palestine in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict) and as a result of controlling hydrocarbons (such as in the case of the Iraqi Sunnis, who developed ISIS project), or, finally, at the expense of the diplomatic support of the chronic negotiation process (as UN officials and diplomacy of all countries participating settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and now also the Syrian one). Dr. Satanovsky concludes that today, the world is rapidly returning to the world order, i.e. allocation of economic, military and political forces that were characteristic of it in the 17th century, but without any European powers (such as Spain and Portugal were still in the 16th–17th centuries). In this situation, the greatest problem is the unreadiness of both the political establishment and the mass consciousness as a whole (in Russia, in Europe and perhaps even in the US) to the very fact that long gone is the time of the classical political and geopolitical rules.

The 2024 legislative election in Jakarta is an important moment in the dynamics of Indonesian politics, especially for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which won a significant victory. This study aims to analyze the winning strategy of Abdul Aziz, the PKS legislative candidate in the 10th DKI Jakarta Electoral District (Dapil), as well as the factors that contributed to its success.. Using a descriptive qualitative approach, this study examines the effectiveness of political and marketing strategies applied, including community-based approaches, the use of social media, and political communication strategies. The results showed that the strategy carried out by Abdul Aziz focused on the utilization of a loyal mass base, campaigns based on social welfare issues, as well as direct involvement in social and religious activities. In addition, digital communication strategies through social media and the involvement of local leaders also play an important role in improving its electability. This research provides insight into the dynamics of political campaign strategies in the digital age as well as their implications for voter trends in metropolitan areas. The PKS as a moderate Islam-based party also has challenges in extending support beyond its loyal voters. Therefore, the campaign strategy applied is not only based on religious issues, but also emphasizes concrete programs that are relevant to urban problems such as education, health, and infrastructure, which of course is in line with the theory used in this study, namely the theory of political strategy by Peter Schroder, which specifically discusses 3 types of political strategies.

This study scrutinizes a case of adaptive globalisation at the interface of colonized India and post-war colonial Europe. It examines Muslim missionaries who, after World War I, made missionary efforts in Germany. Originating from British India, the missionaries’ determination was firmly rooted in the Indian colonial past. They saw their mission as a further step in the process of adaptive globalisation, that is, the drive to adapt to and to reverse Western domination. The paper retraces missionary competition in Weimar Berlin, revealing an amalgam of pan-Islamic ideas, political strategies, and reformist religious imagery. These attempts at winning Western converts were a knife that cut both ways: Missionaries approached German ‘moderns’ in their own symbolic language, while the latter steered between the different mission offers and adapted Islam to their own needs. Making use of fresh sources, the contribution offers three perspectives: (1) the Sunnī mission with its revolutionary tinge; (2) the Ahmadiyya mission, and (3) the interface.

China's Nuclear and Political Strategy. Edited by S. K. Ghosh and Sreedhar. [New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1975. 298 pp. Rs. 64.] - The United States, China and Arms Control. By Ralph N. Clough, A. Doak Barnett, Morton H. Halperin and Jerome H. Kahan, with Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman. [Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975. 153 pp. $8.95.] - Volume 68

The 1920s have a unique fascination in twentieth century British cultural and literary history. They were bounded as a decade by the cataclysms of the First World War (and its settlement) and the Great Depression. The decade has been vilified from a post-Depression perspective as a period of hedonistic irresponsibility. More recently literary historians have studied its behavioural politics and conspicuously modernist styles. Interpretations of its history, though, have been documented primarily by the records and literature of men and of conspicuously modernist women writers. This thesis seeks to redress a bias in historical interpretation by examining the work of three female writers who used more traditional styles and who enjoyed a considerable reputation and comfortable middle-brow popularity during the 1920s: May Sinclair, Rose Macaulay and Rebecca West.I argue that their experiences of the First World War and the suffrage campaign and its aftermath, experiences determined by their sex, coalesced, challenged or sharpened their deepest personal values and ideological commitments. Those values and commitments differed in emphasis but focussed centrally in the 1920s on the moral bankruptcy of bourgeois and conservative cultural, political and intellectual leadership; the corruption of individuals and culture by unsound values; responsible self-realisation; and the plight and roles of women. These were momentous cultural issues of the period; the responses of these women to contemporary cultural malaise and intellectual movements were sensitive, responsible and forthright.I examine how embattled personal ideologies informed the fiction and criticism written by Sinclair, Macaulay and West in the 1920s. The light thrown on their work by that examination leads to significant revaluations of its aims, 'methods and achievements. In particular I examine the strength and purpose of the melodramatic impulse in each writer, showing how that impulse may be linked with a tradition of social melodramatic writing which includes Honore de Balzac, Henry James, Marcel Proust and D.H. Lawrence. I also show that that impulse may, in combination with other factors, weaken or strengthen a work of art, and in my conclusion I indicate how that analysis points to possible directions for study of a question vexing feminist criticism: the critical reception and valuation of texts perceived to be ideologically committed or propagandist.I examine the versions of pastoral proposed by Sinclair, Macaulay and West, linking their pastoral visions to their embattled ideologies and fictional strategies, and demonstrating the centrality of recognition of the codes of pastoral to interpretations of individual works.The portrait of the 1920s which emerges through my argument is, I believe, an engaging one and one rare in its tracing of currents of feminism and anti-bourgeois feeling and in its examination of the impact of psychology on fictional interpretations of behaviour in the period. I indicate, too, the centrality of the embattled ideologies of Sinclair, Macaulay and West in the intellectual life of the 1920s.