The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia , and: Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism , and: Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov': Sovremennoe sostoianie i aktual'nye problemy [The Russian Orthodox Church: Contemporary Condition and Current Problems] (review)

The subject of this article is the impact of Orthodox Church upon the development of civil society in Russia. The goal is to reveal the role of the Orthodox Church within the structure of Russian civil society, analyze the evolution of civil society in Russia, shed light on interaction between the government and civil society, and demonstrate what unites the Orthodox Church and civil society in Russia. The article leans on the “Fundamentals of Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church”, data of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, public chamber of St. Petersburg, “Center for the Development of Nonprofit Organizations”, etc. The scientific novelty lies in disclosure of the role of Orthodox Church within the structure of Russian civil society; analysis of the evolution of civil society in Russia; clarification of the peculiarities of interaction between the government and civil society, as well as what unites the Orthodox Church and civil society in Russia. The conclusion is drawn that the role of Orthodox Church as the civil institution in political relations is defined by the following factors: 1) as the guardian of the highest religious values, the Church is the “sense of conscience” of the civil society; Church is the civil institution for defending the public interest; 3) Church is the interlink between the private and common interests, as well as ensures social integration; 4) Church is the guardian of not only personal faith, but collective identity as well. The religious majority tends to view their faith as a social “ethics”, while the religious minorities rather view it as ethnic affiliation.

The article deals with the features of sociological analysis of religion in Russia during the imperial period of its history. The national sociological tradition of study of religion as a socio-cultural phenomenon and a social institution, which was developed during this period, had its own unique and peculiar appearance and was just begun to revive again in post-Soviet Russia, is sharply different from the tradition that took place in the West. In this context, the appeal to the works of classics of Russian religious, socio-political thought, unfortunately undeservedly forgotten, is a very promising area of modern sociological research. When studying this issue, the author emphasizes the peculiarities of the historical development of Russian society and the state and the events that had a significant impact on the formation and development of scientific understanding of religion in Russia: reforms of Peter I, the elimination of patriarchy, the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church, its transformation into part of the bureaucratic state system created by Peter I, the beginning of a large-scale process of secularization of Russian society, the emergence of Westernism (the direction of the Russian social thought and political ideology focused on values of the Western European culture, which is negative to the idea of originality, an originality, uniqueness of ways of development of the Russian culture, combined with the aspiration of representatives of this trend to impose to the Russian nation of a form of the western culture, social practice and political system, rejecting the system of values and traditional foundations of activity of the Russian society), the imperial nature of the Russian statehood and official imperial ideology. The author analyzes the content of the Uvarov’s triad formula, which underlies the official imperial ideology, as well as the discussions that took place between representatives of Slavophilism and Westernism about understanding the historical path and fate of Russia, the historical role of Orthodoxy, the Russian Orthodox Church in the fate of the Russian people, Russian society and the state, as well as the whole world. In his opinion, this problem has remained relevant to the present, including in the framework of a sociological analysis of religion in post-Soviet Russia.

Throughout the 1990s, new possibilities of participation have triggered the emergence and development of a civil society or third sector in post-Soviet Russia. At the turn of the millennium, assessments were made not only as this marked the end of the first decade of development, but also the onset of a new era of government with Vladimir Putin assuming the presidency in 2000. By then, many scholars responded with rather optimistic prospects to the frequently asked question whether Russia would be ‘on its way towards civil society’ (see for instance the contributions in Gorzka and Schulze 2000; Schrader et al. 2000; vanden Heuvel 2000). Yet some remained more cautious regarding this new political era, envisaging that all the crucial societal achievements of the last few years might be put to test (Schulze 2000, p. 151). Recently, increasing international awareness of Russia’s deviance from the path of democratization and the government’s imposition of restrictive regulations on civil society have spurred renewed attention to the issue. Current assessments are overly pessimistic, while recent attempts at drawing a balance have been confusing at best. Many have argued that Russian civil society remains weak, internally fragmented, underdeveloped, co-opted, repressed, or even non-existent. Other accounts have taken the rather different view that civil society does exist in Russia, and is building on longstanding traditions. Others have emphasized novel incentives and forms of mobilization. Consensus has emerged, at least, that it is problematic to compare Russian civil society with Western standards.1

Unlike other books on civil society in Russia which argue that Russia’s civil society is relatively weak, and that democratisation in Russia went into reverse following Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, this book contends that civil society in Russia is developing in a distinctive way. It shows that government and elite-led drives to encourage civil society have indeed been limited, and that the impact of external promotion of civil society has also not been very successful. It demonstrates, however, that independent domestic grassroots movements are beginning to flourish, despite difficulties and adverse circumstances, and that this development fits well into the changing nature of contemporary Russian society.

This article examines the development of civil society in Russia. We argue that cultural and societal norms, which developed during the Soviet period, have continued to shape civil society arrangements in the post-Soviet period. We examine how parallel to recent changes in Russia’s economic, political and legal environment, shifts in Russia’s contemporary civil society arrangements have occurred. We argue that, similar to a Russian-style democracy and market economy, Russian-style civil society arrangements are clearly emerging. These changes are explained by the cultural–historic legacies of both the Soviet Union and the subsequent peculiarities of Russia’s economic, social and political transformations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this Russian variant of civil society, its agents have developed and continue to maintain strong and dependent relationships on the state.

The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia by Wallace L. Daniel. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006, 251 pp. Daniel's approach to the Russian Orthodox Church's search for a role...

A few apocalyptic predictions of a post‐communist ‘maelstrom’ notwithstanding,1 the break‐up of the USSR was initially greeted by optimistic assessments of the prospects for democracy in the ‘new R...

The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia. By Wallace L. Daniel. Eugenia and Hugh M. Stewart '26 Series on Eastern Europe. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006. xvi, 251 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. $29.95, hard bound. - Volume 66 Issue 4

In the void left by the fall of Communism in Russia during the late twentieth century, can that country establish a true civil society? Many scholars have analyzed the political landscape to answer this question, but in The Orthodox Church and Civil Society in Russia, Wallace L. Daniel offers a unique perspective: within the church are individuals who hold the values and institutional models that can be vital in determining the direction of Russia in the twenty-first century. Daniel tells the stories of a teacher and controversial parish priest, the leader of Russia's most famous women's monastery, a newspaper editor, and a parish priest at Moscow University to explore thoroughly and with a human voice the transformation from Communist country to a new social order. Daniel explores specific religious communities and the way they operate, their efforts to rebuild parish life, and the individuals who have devoted themselves to such goals. This is the level, Daniel shows, at which the reconstruction of Russia and the revitalization of Russian society is taking place. This book is written for general readers interested in the intersection between politics, religion, and society, as well as for scholars.

In recent years a flurry of works analysing liberalism and civil society in pre-revolutionary Russia have been published in English. Perhaps this trend can be attributed to a search on the part of ...

The state of civil society in post-socialist Russia and other former socialist countries is of great interest to social scientists, policy makers, and development-oriented practitioners. Numerous theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches have been used by researchers to describe, analyze, and assess the state of civil society in Russia, for example. One of the key issues addressed has been the influences on citizens’ civic and social activities and the historical conditions and cultural environments that have generated – and continue to generate – these activities. This critique focuses on the concept of “communist legacies” which has been applied at the individual level to explain people’s preferences, attitudes, and forms of behavior in Russia and other post-socialist countries. The concept is influential, in large part, because it has been supported by empirical research, especially the highly influential empirical research of Marc Howard. This paper takes a critical look at this research, including its theoretical frame and the methodology associated with the frame.

This book is a study of the impact of liberal academic ideas on the concept of civil society in Russia in the years following the revolution of 1905. The changes that resulted from the revolution were in the direction of greater autonomy for the individual and a lessening of arbitrary rule. The book shows how, in its efforts to further the cause of civil society, the academic community combined liberal notions of the individual and the citizen with their own professional claim to cultural leadership. Throughout an era when Russia hovered on the brink of a new revolution, academics embarked on various new enterprises — such as people's universities and private or semi-public institutions of higher education — aimed at reaching out to a wider section of the population and offering opportunities for peaceful and progressive reform.

This book is a study of the impact of liberal academic ideas on the concept of civil society in Russia in the years following the revolution of 1905. The changes that resulted from the revolution were in the direction of greater autonomy for the individual and a lessening of arbitrary rule. The book shows how, in its efforts to further the cause of civil society, the academic community combined liberal notions of the individual and the citizen with their own professional claim to cultural leadership. Throughout an era when Russia hovered on the brink of a new revolution, academics embarked on various new enterprises — such as people's universities and private or semi-public institutions of higher education — aimed at reaching out to a wider section of the population and offering opportunities for peaceful and progressive reform.

NGOs have been seen as an integral part of civil society and a necessary feature of democratic transition. It has been argued that depoliticised NGOs in China ‘embedded’ in existing political structures would eventually bring about democratic changes through incremental actions, as they did in post-Soviet Russia. Both countries, however, recently witnessed the shrinking of political and legal space for public participation, especially for foreign-funded civil society organisations. This article analyses the impact of the NGO laws on civil society in Russia and China to update the embedded activism hypothesis. It draws on empirical data to describe the strategies that the NGOs use to adapt and how the future of the sector is perceived by young people in both countries.

In Russia, “fundamentalism” in the Russian Orthodox Church has been on the rise since the early 1990's. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” stand for restoration of autocracy, restriction against the Jews and the confessions other than the Orthodox one, the imperial principle of state structure, the Russian Orthodox Church status as the state church, for complete rejection of the concepts of democracy and human rights (in particular, as concerns the freedom of conscience), opposition to any forms of Western influence within the country and struggle against it beyond its borders, and compulsory imposition of “Orthodox values” in every-day life, culture and even economy. Their worldview is based on extremely mythologized notions about the pre-revolutionary Orthodox monarchy.Inside the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, Metropolitan of Saint Petersburg and Ladoga Ioann, a person of a greatest authority among the conservatives, prodused the most convincing arguments in favor of a “fundamentalist” position. Many Orthodox “fundamentalist” leaders including an activist Konstantin Dushenov, Editor-in-Chief of “Orthodox Rus” newspaper, have followed Ioann. Some church bishops and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad and of the True Orthodox Church have represented “fundamentalist” circles in these churches. A number of Orthodox brotherhoods, such as the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union, the Union of Orthodox Citizens, ideologically hold extremely nationalist positions. Same as the similar extra-Church groups, such brotherhoods are not supported by the bishops, but it is impossible to expel anybody from the Church for political views and the nationalist brotherhoods continue working actively. Moreover, right-wing extremist organizations, such as “Pamyat”, “Black Hundred”, “Russian National Unity” actively cooperate in many regions with Russian Orthodox Church clerics. These persons and organizations can be classified into “fundamentalism” and “quasi-fundamentalism” for the moment. The clerics in the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox church Abroad, the True Orthodox Church are the former. The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, the Christian Regeneration Union are included in it. The Union of Orthodox Citizens and the right-wing extremist organizations are the latter.“Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” fight back to defend their national and religious identity and worldview, fight with fundamentals of “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality”, and fight against their enemy. such as Western Europe, globalization under the name of God. “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalism” is similar to Russian Right-wing Extremism, and both of them are violent and aren't tolerant. “Russian Orthodox Fndamentalists” base their core identity on religion and they try to construct structual violence. Russian Right-wing Extremists emphasise race, nationality, state in their identity and they resort to physical violence. In addition, Russian New Right-wing Extremism borrow various ideologies othar than Russian Orthodox Christianity.In 2002, conflict between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Church has come to the surface. It seems that since the early 1990's the unstable balance between “fundamentalists” and the Patriarchate has been gradually shifting in favor of “fundamentalists”. It is impossible to ignore the influence of “Russian Orthodox Fundamentalists” at the aspects of politics, society, and public opinion in Russia today.