The origins and meaning of Nigeria’s ‘godfatherism’ phenomenon

Abstract

Nigeria’s godfathers represent a phenomenon that is funda mentally distinct from the typical patterns of ‘big man’ and then ‘strong man’ pol itics dominant inmany parts of Africa since inde pend ence. Nigeria’s godfathers grew out of a framework sim ilar to those that produced, and were then influenced by, ‘big men’ like Charles Njonjo in Kenya. But on the basis of research conducted in Nigeria during the past two years, the fol low ing pages argue that Nigeria’s present­ day godfathers are funda mentally different creatures even from the ‘strong men’ who dominate gov ern ment institutions in other con texts. Their rising power and influence have also increasingly pushed Nigeria’s polity in uncharted new directions. Since 1999, the pub lic institutions of Nigeria’s Fourth Repub lic have become increasingly dominated by patterns of uncontrolled criminal activity that have subsumed many of the legitimate aims of gov ern ment.1 The result is an undemo­ cratic and often violent perversion of the coun try’s federal ideals.2 Nigeria’s polit ical sys tem is not author it arian in the traditional sense of the word. It more closely re sembles an ‘elect oral autocracy’ (Schedler 2006) where a formal emphasis on elections purports to mask the absence of real account abil­ ity and the continuing im port ance of elite­ centered patronage pol itics. Federal­ ism remains the intellectual core of Nigeria’s polit ical sys tem. But on the ground Nigerian fed eral ism has degen er ated into a structure that simply accommodates a multiplicity of decentralized and lawless polit ical spaces – its 36 states and 774 local gov ern ments, along with smaller patches of polit ical turf that are not for­ mally delineated.3 The funda mental character of Nigeria’s current polit ical configuration has both created and is reflected in the power, the actions and the proliferation of polit ical godfathers within the coun try. These godfather’s ‘pol itics’ focus nar­ rowly around personalized control and enjoyment of some portion of the ‘national cake’ – that is, straight forward access to Nigeria’s oil rev enues rather than any broader attempt at estab lishing polit ical hegemony. While the typical conception of polit ical clientelism implies that the more power ful of two actors provides the lesser power ful with mater ial rewards in exchange for polit ical power (Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981), the godfatherprotege relationship postulates the oppos ite. Nigeria’s polit ical godfathers have no inter est in occupying the pub lic offices: they work to dominate these by proxy by filling them with proteges who would be in cap able of winning office on their own. Their behavior reflects a perception that gov ern ment institutions mat ter only as investments that can yield greater personal wealth and power; it is also as sumed that the institutions concerned can be effect ively dominated from the outside. Godfathers demand regu lar fin an cial ‘returns’ from those they install into positions of pub lic confidence. Those returns take the form of money stolen from pub lic coffers by polit ical officeholders – gen erally either directly or through the awarding of phantom or grossly inflated gov ern ment contracts – and handed over to the godfathers. Godfathers also typ ic ally demand the power to control appointments to gov ern ment positions that fall within formal remit of their pro­ teges and to ensure that many lucrative contracts are awarded to indi viduals of their choosing. In effect, godfathers appropriate their sponsored officeholders’abil ity to dispense patronage as their own and in doing so create still more pro­ teges who are each sources of additional fin an cial returns to the godfather. The phenomenon is perhaps most pronounced at the state and local levels in Niger­ ia’s three­ tiered sys tem of federalism. Godfathers in Nigeria are also unique in that their relev ance and power derives entirely from their proficiency in criminal activity. Godfathers finance gangs of polit ical thugs to rig elections and bribe gov ern ment and police officials who could stand in the way of their proteges’ success. By doing this they place the politicians they sponsor in a permanent state of debt, and ensure that those debts are repaid with the cred ible threat of unleashing viol ence or other forms of criminal retribu­ tion against recalcitrant debtor politicians. That gov ern ment rev enues are lucrative enough to be worth fighting for in such brutal fashion is testament to the scale of Nigeria’s centralized stream of gov ern ment oil rev enues and to the weakness of all other sectors of its eco nomy (Lewis 2004; Rotberg 2004).