Abstract
Abstract In recent years, several proposals by states to reform or displace investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) have gained prominence. While many factors shape which reform proposals states support, here we focus on one important, but often overlooked, factor: the ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status of the government officials who formulate states’ proposals. Based on five years of para-ethnographic observation and interviews with officials involved in ISDS reform, and informed by the interdisciplinary innovation literature, we explore how individuals who have not spent their careers within the field of investment arbitration (and are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by those within that field) have developed more disruptive reform proposals while arbitral insiders have typically proposed sustaining reforms. We illuminate these dynamics in the ISDS reform debates with case studies of four actors: the USA, the European Union, Bahrain and Brazil.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
