The Operational Level of War

Abstract

I It is a peculiarity of Anglo-Saxon military terminology that it knows of tactics (unit, branch, and mixed) and of theater strategy as well as of grand strategy, but includes no adequate term for the operational level of warfare-precisely the level that is most salient in the modern tradition of military thought in continental Europe. The gap has not gone unnoticed, and Basil Liddell-Hart for example attempted to give currency to the term ”grand tactics” as a substitute (already by his day the specialized usage of the directly translated term “operationalfunctioning machine/unit,” was too well established to be redeemed.) The operational level of war, as opposed to the tactical and strategic levels, is or ought to be of greatest concern to the analyst. In theater strategy, political goals and constraints on one hand and available resources on the other determine projected outcomes. At a much lower level, tactics deal with specific techniques. In the operational dimension, by contrast, schemes of warfare such as blitzkrieg or defense in depth evolve or are exploited. Such schemes seek to attain the goals set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics. It is not surprising that the major works of military literature tend to focus on the operational level, as evidenced by the writings of Clausewitz. What makes this gap in Anglo-Saxon military terminology important for practical purposes is that the absence of the term referring to the operational level reflects an inadvertence towards the whole conception of war associated with it, and this in turn reflects a major eccentricity in the modern AngloSaxon experience of war. It is not merely that officers do not speak the word but rather that they do not think or practice war in operational terms, or do so only in vague or ephemeral ways. The causes of this state of affairs are to be found in the historic circumstances of Anglo-Saxon warfare during this century. In the First World War, American troops were only employed late, and then under French direction; their sphere of planning and action was essentially limited to the tactical level. As for the British, who did have to endure the full five years and more of that conflict, they mostly did not I am greatly indebted to my partner, Steven L. Canby, for many key ideas developed in this essay.