The Ontic Status of The Laws of Nature

Abstract

While most of us have accepted that our theories are human constructs and approximations of the truth, many of us still think of ‘natural laws’ as things that exist ‘out there’, and that the work of science is thus the discovery or uncovering of these laws and their expression in mathematical formulae. This notion has serious implications for the science-theology debate. This article challenges the notion that ‘natural laws’ adequately describe or prescribe nature. It argues that law statements are idealised abstractions that only weakly explain and describe reality, and that mathematics, the ‘language’ of science, is not immutable. It challenges the prescriptive nature of law statements by arguing that we are limited beings who cannot know reality in itself. Our meta-scientific commitments co-determine what and how we think of laws, and the complexity of reality defies human analysis and explanations. Far from having ontic status or being complete and accurate descriptions of reality, natural laws at best mimic the key structures and relationships of the reality they refer to. We would do better to think of reality as an open system of inseparable, interacting and ever-moving components, with the observer an integral part of the system.It is an illusion to believe that these incredibly rich representations of the phenomena are unconstructed isomorphisms we merely discover in the real world. Instead they are constructed - painstakingly so - and there is no evidence that they are isomorphic with structures in the real world.