The once and future world order: why global civilization will survive the decline of the West

The Once and Future World Order: Why Global Civilization Will Survive the Decline of the West

The Future World Order —A Review Article

The future of international law is uncertain. The long-hoped-for revitalization of international law and its institutional structures following the end of the Cold War now seems at risk from an increasing deformalization of, and neo-liberal disregard for, international law. Meanwhile European international lawyers are responding by reasserting a Kantian project for a global constitution under an international rule of law. In this article I attempt to position these recent claims that the international legal order is undergoing a process of constitutional transformation in the context of a long-standing connection, since at least the post-revolutionary nineteenth century, between the idea of a positive international law and the emerging structures of the European constitutional nation-state. If one can trace a cosmopolitan or constitutional project to the influence of domestic public law from this time, one can also trace the inherent tension between international law's promise of a substantive ‘good life’, or sense of justice, and its purported legitimacy in a commitment to a voluntarist, or contractarian, form of obligation. These simultaneous commitments seem incompatible, but are inseparable from international law's embedded liberalism, which requires interplay between them to make sense of progress in the absence of any explicit underlying philosophy. In tracing similarities in concerns from the nineteenth century to the twenty-first, as well as repetitions in legal arguments, I suggest that the alternatives of American empire and a (European) vision of global constitutionalism are merely necessary oppositions, reflecting this broader tension underlying the discipline. Because lawyers avoid clarity on what is taken for granted in a leap from (selective) empirical realism towards assertive normative ambition, I argue that it is a mainstream, liberal-juridical consciousness – rather than any explicit legal theory – which continues to sustain shared assumptions about international law's past, as well as a promise of a future liberal world order. The apparently opposing visions of future world order are merely different sides of the same coin: each reflecting back, but each ultimately sustained by the other.

In the practice of international relations, states can pursue different combinations of foreign policy strategies at different systemic levels. The positions of Southern regional powers such as Brazil, on the one hand, between the centre and periphery of the current world system and, on the other hand, at the nexus of international and regional politics, demand particularly complex foreign policy strategies. Strategic approaches have to consider at least three contextual factors: firstly, the continuing superiority of established (the United States) and emerging (China) global actors in terms of material power; secondly, the fact that regional and global affairs are increasingly interrelated; and thirdly, the fact that foreign policy strategies are mapped out against the background of an international system moving from a unipolar to a multipolar order. I argue that Southern regions and their leaders will play a pivotal part in the course of that global transformation as well as in the future world order. The purpose of this paper is to discuss Brazil's strategic foreign policy options after unipolarity. To approach this task, a top-down approach starting at the global level seems most promising. First, I will discuss the potential transformation of the international system and the middle-power role of Brazil in the course of that process, especially with regard to its role in the G3, or India, Brazil and South Africa. Second, I will locate Brazil in its region, analyse its relations with secondary power Venezuela, and ask for strategic options at the regional level. Third, the conclusion will stress the increasing interrelatedness of global and regional affairs, pointing out strategies applied by Brazil in order to become a decision maker in a future multipolar world.

Civilizations and World Order: Geopolitics and Cultural Difference. Edited by Fred Dallmayr, M. Akif Kayapinar, Ismail Yaylaci. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2014. 276 pp., $90 hardcover (ISBN-13: 978-0739186060). Civilizations and World Order contributes to the literature on cross-cultural international relations and geopolitics in the post–Cold War era. It raises interesting and timely questions on the role of various civilizations in the current and future world order, and challenges the reader to leave the mono-civilizational EuroWestcentric view and think in terms of a multicivilizational perspective. The authors of the book argue that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, a unipolar world system has emerged, and the Western powers, convinced of their civilizational superiority, embraced a hegemonic approach to establishing a new world order by imposing the Western civilization onto other civilizations. They further assert that, in the absence of a balance of power, certain political camps were quick to declare a civilizational victory for the West (Fukuyama ⇓) or else they embarked on finding new enemies to replace the Soviet Union (Huntington ⇓). They suggest that these approaches cannot sustain a peaceful world order without paying due respect to different civilizations, and the way forward is a multicultural world system in which each civilization participates equally. This book has three parts, each of which features four essays. Part I, “Geopolitics and World Order,” is centered around the geopolitical and power-political context of civilizations. In Chapter 1, Richard Falk argues that the modern era has been shaped by Eurocentrism/Westcentrism that is hegemonic to other civilizations, and this leads to the EuroWestcentric denial of civilizational equality. In Chapter 2, Hans Kochler argues that, in the twenty-first century, in the absence of a balance of power, the world order is defined by the self-proclaimed architects' conviction of civilizational supremacy and their hegemonic ambitions. In Chapter 3, Raymond Duvall and Cigdem …

Digitization of records has become a global trend. For historians, this trend brings many advantages over the past, but also a quantitative expansion of information that a historian cannot cope with. Especially with regard to historical archives, digitization must invest more time and effort in food than it provides for comfort. This study presents a digital methodology that enables historical materials to be found and identified efficiently when information floods are caused by digitization, and focuses largely on methodological and historical topics. In the methodological field the processing of historical materials is described by Python, in the thematic field the ethnic understanding of the Nazis is recorded in the German before 1938-1938. First, a combination of certain words was created with the help of Pi-lines and the production time and the producers of the material that has drastically changed the locations and the combined combination This confirmed that the combination of words was possible in a certain period of time. to investigate departments and persons connected with the beginning of a document. The search revealed that the person who interpreted Japan as an Aryan race or an equivalent people, Walter Gross, was active in the German socialist racist state policy (RSDAP). The interpretation of Japan as an Aryan race cannot be confirmed until the end of 1937. It is also believed that Walther Gross's activities for the ethnic reinterpretation of Japan reflect the world order envisaged by Hitler, since it was a foreign and not a racist office. The cultural agreement between Japan and Germany of 1938 was therefore a step, To recognize ethnic and cultural similarities in the process of strategic expansion of the anti-communist agreement between the two countries of 1936 The ethnic interpretation of the Nazi government in Japan was part of the world order proposed by Hitler. Hitler considered the future world order just before World War II as an ethnic order and stressed that after the end of the war the world would again be transformed into a new, superior, culturally superior, superior race. Hitler reinterpreted the world order, especially by linking ethnic order with culture.

This analytical essay addresses authoritarian communitarianism as the normative and ideological underpinnings of the current Chinese foreign policy. In recent years, China has exhibited its ambition in bidding for its preferred world order, through both its rhetoric and behavior. Being well aware of this new development, people are debating about what is exactly China’s world vision and its approach to a future world order. Driven by the puzzle in contemporary global affairs, this chapter focuses on the philosophical and ideological roots of China’s world vision, rather than investigating its foreign policies directly. It is argued that China’s world view today and its ensuing policy approach are substantially informed by the authoritarian version of communitarianism, deriving largely from the traditional Chinese thoughts of Confucianism. Inspired by authoritarian communitarianism as the main international ideology, China is envisaging a world order, based on values of international stability and communal harmony, emphasizing the role of nation states and vertical hierarchical order. This argument is further assessed with China’s role and policy in the crisis of the on-going Covid-19 pandemic. Through this specific case, strength and limitation of China’s world vision are better illuminated, with reference to global governance. It is concluded that the ideological struggle between China and mostly the West tends to generate substantial policy implications in contemporary global affairs.

In the struggle for the future world order, various concepts of a just global order collide. Russia’s foreign policy documents emphasize the importance of establishing a world order that is multipolar and based on the dialogue of civilizations, respect for national sovereignty and mutual security. These principles are only partially shared by other participants in international relations, among which the United States and China stand out in terms of their ideological and power potential. Due to the importance of these powers and the growing contradictions between them, the danger of the formation of a new bipolar system of international relations is increasing in the world. The experience of the Yalta-Potsdam system shows the tendency of the bipolar system to ideological and value confrontation and the use of force to resolve conflicts. The emergence of such a system of international relations was the result of fundamental differences in the understanding of the principles of a fair world order by the two sides with the existing parity of military and political capabilities of the parties. The basis of the fragile peace in the conditions of the bipolar system of international relations became the danger of mutual destruction of the parties with nuclear weapons. International rules and institutions, including the UN Charter, proved incapable of guaranteeing peace. Therefore, the main lesson of the Cold War should be considered the need to prevent the very emergence of bipolarity, which could bring the world on the brink of war and even total destruction. This article analyzes the threats of the formation of a new bipolarity in connection with the escalation of the conflict between the United States and China in international relations. Today, these countries have the most powerful material and force capabilities, as well as fundamentally different visions of a fair world. Since the Cold War, the United States has been guided by the universality of its democratic ideals, while China offers a concept of global “harmony” in accordance with the ideals of economic development and the recognition of civilizational differences. The election of Donald Trump as president implies a revision of democratic priorities in favor of confirming the military-economic dominance of the United States in the world. Russia could play a special role in the formation of a multipolar and multilateral order in Eurasia as a prototype of the future world order. The conditions for progress in this direction are associated with strengthening the military-political balance in the region, developing inter-civilizational dialogue, economic openness, and multilateral institutions.

Populism has begun to make surprising inroads in many parts of the world and anti-globalization is a rising tide in world politics, at least to some degree. A world order based on multilateralism in its more realistic sense in fact has been the most appropriate way forward, while a rules-based approach to global governance has constituted the best practice for an improved world. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new world order based on “hegemonic institutionalism.” most members of international society share the view that multilateralism is the most important principle of the world order. The process of globalization, continuously widening and deepening, has been accompanied by a dramatic spurt of growth in world wealth in general and in high-performing, emerging economies in particular. The world will have an order based primarily on multilateralism and will rely on multilateral institutions as its main governing mechanisms.

ABSTRACTThis article explores India’s view of the world order and its role in it. As the world’s largest democracy and emerging power India is seen as a key actor and partner for the West in the global order. The article argues that India does not want to be merely co-opted into the existing liberal order and join the Western international community but pursue its own world-order policy. This policy is informed by the conviction that the future world order will be polycentric, in which multiple powerful actors with different political systems, cultural traditions and interests are interlocked in interdependent relations. Therefore, India must pursue a policy of multi-alignment and seek partnerships with all the relevant actors in the world, while avoiding overly close or one-sided relations with particular countries or groupings. India’s priorities are its foreign policy autonomy, socio-economic development and the overcoming of political and economic discrimination in the world order.

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 and the enmity that has ensued between the West and Russia, the position of the Global South in this war and its implications for the current and future world order has been the object of ample and sometimes acrimonious debate. This study makes a contribution through an analysis of the voting behaviours of the G77 countries, the largest representative organisation of the Global South at the United Nations (UN) on the first six resolutions of the UN General Assembly Special Emergency Session on the war. It shows that the character of a state, liberal or illiberal, is a strong predictor of its voting attitude, with liberal countries mostly supporting Ukraine and authoritarian countries backing Russia – even stronger than its identity as a country of the Global South. Also, Southern democratic countries are more supportive of peace negotiations and less dogmatic in their voting posture, leading to a more qualified support of the West. Conversely, authoritarian support for other authoritarian countries appears to be less qualified, arguably due to their preoccupation with regime survival. This evinces the centrality of the democratic question in countries’ ability to act cohesively.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine, initiated on February 24, 2022, is among the most—if not the most—significant shocks to the global order since World War II. This piece assesses the stakes of the invasion for the core principles that lie at the heart of contemporary international law and the world order that it has helped to create. We argue, relying in part on the other contributions to the October 2022 agora on Ukraine in the American Journal of International Law, that however this war ends, it will reshape, in ways large and small, the world we all inhabit.

During World War II, the colonial issue was at the forefront of both the fight of the anti-Hitler coalition against the Axis powers and the inter-allied discussion of the prospects for the post-war world order. In this context, the perspectives of the U.S. experts affiliated with the Council on Foreign Relations deserve special attention. Having brought together government officials, bankers, industrialists, Wall Street lawyers, and Ivy League professors, the Council turned into a unique expert platform that exerted a significant influence not only on the course of public discussions about the future world order, but also on the foreign policy decision-making in the United States itself. This article identifies the specific features of experts’ perspectives on the prospects of the development and transformation of the colonial system after World War II. The first section profiles the Council’s members who actively participated in the discussion of these issues. The second section outlines the two main approaches of the Council’s experts to resolving the colonial issue, which involved either reforming the existing colonial system or significantly revising it. At the same time, as the author notes, all experts recognized that the positions of the European colonial powers would be inevitably weakened by the end of World War II and emphasized the need for the U.S. to play a more active role in the colonial issue, not least to counter a possible threat from the USSR. That said, some experts also voiced certain concerns that the inflow of American capital into the former European colonies would be fraught with economic risks that could exceed potential benefits. The author concludes that although most of the forecasts and recommendations considered were fairly general and vague, the Council in general was able to correctly predict the decolonization trend and during the war years reaffirmed its status as one of the most authoritative expert platforms on international relations.

China, Europe, and the United States constitute a very important trilateral relationship in China’s diplomacy. This trilateral relationship is incomparable to that of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War not only in that “polar” is no longer a valid concept to describe major-power relations today, but also in that China-U.S.-Europe relations are not deliberately constructed for the three parties to balance each other or oppose any party. To be more specific, China’s deliberations on Europe’s role in the world have gone beyond the logic of balance of power. Especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, China has taken ever more efforts to strengthen its ties with European nations, both to meet its growing economic demands, and because it seeks to learn from the post-modern social governance experience in Europe. In comparison, China’s relationship with the United States is far more complex as the two countries have been engaged in increasing divergence and competition not only on specific issues, but more importantly, in trends of the world order. As three giants that have the potential to lead the world to a better future, China, Europe, and the United States need to deepen their mutual understanding and foster greater consensus about the future world order through closer communication and exchange, as well as enhanced cooperation on global governance.

Three types of thought approach the question of future world order: the naturalrational, positivist-evolutionary, and historicist-dialectical. The normative criterion in the natural-rational approach has, in recent times, most commonly been bound up with the view that liberal pluralism in polities is the condition for a just world order. This view has, however, succumbed both under the critique of positivist-evolutionary political science which argues that authoritarianism is characteristic of early stages of political development, and to the manipulation of “pluralism” in poor countries by powerful external forces (investment, trade union, and intelligence). The positivist-evolutionary approach has two main currents. One is functionalism, of which the transnational and transgovernmental relations versions are currently fashionable. The other is the notion of a global ecological system. Both versions take existing structures of power and social relations as implicit givens from which future trends are extrapolated; they provide no basis for considering the possibility of changes in these structures. The historicist-dialectical approach offers the possibility of understanding change in these basic structures of power and social relations by searching out points of emerging conflict and the alternative conceptions of order which the forces in conflict express.