The Not-So-Silent "Majority'': An Automated Content Analysis of Anti-Government Online Communities

Previous research has found that individuals harboring hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support the use of political violence. In this study, we examine this relationship further. We theorize that the impact of hostile sexism on support for political violence is mediated through two mutually reinforcing factors: social dominance orientation and political illiberalism. We test this argument using an original survey we administered to over 1,400 subjects in the United States. We employ two operationalizations of individuals’ support for political violence: support in the abstract and support for specific acts of political violence. We find that individuals who exhibit hostile sexism are substantially more likely to support political violence, both abstract and specific. Moreover, we find that both social dominance orientation and political illiberalism together mediate 64.9% of the effect of hostile sexism on support for political violence in the abstract and 80.5% of the effect on support for specific acts of political violence. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

Little is known about support for and willingness to engage in political violence in the United States. Such violence would likely involve firearms. To evaluate whether firearm owners' and nonowners' support for political violence differs and whether support among owners varies by type of firearms owned, recency of purchase, and frequency of carrying a loaded firearm in public. This cross-sectional nationally representative survey study was conducted from May 13 to June 2, 2022, among US adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, including an oversample of firearm owners. Firearm ownership vs nonownership. Main outcomes concern (1) support for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; (2) personal willingness to engage in political violence, by severity of violence and target population; and (3) perceived likelihood of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted proportions and adjusted prevalence differences, with P values adjusted for the false-discovery rate and reported as q values. The analytic sample comprised 12 851 respondents: 5820 (45.3%) firearm owners, 6132 (47.7%) nonowners without firearms at home, and 899 (7.0%) nonowners with firearms at home. After weighting, 51.0% (95% CI, 49.9%-52.1%) were female, 8.5% (95% CI, 7.5%-9.5%) Hispanic, 9.1% (95% CI, 8.1%-10.2%) non-Hispanic Black, and 62.6% (95% CI, 61.5%-63.8%) non-Hispanic White; the mean (SD) age was 48.5 (18.0) years. Owners were more likely than nonowners without firearms at home to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (owners: 38.8%; 95% CI, 37.3%-40.4%; nonowners: 29.8%; 95% CI, 28.5%-31.2%; adjusted difference, 6.5 percentage points; 95% CI, 4.5-9.3 percentage points; q < .001) but were not more willing to engage in political violence. Recent purchasers, owners who always or nearly always carry loaded firearms in public, and to a lesser extent, owners of assault-type rifles were more supportive of and willing to engage in political violence than other subgroups of firearm owners. In this study of support for political violence in the United States, differences between firearm owners and nonowners without firearms at home were small to moderate when present. Differences were greater among subsets of owners than between owners and nonowners. These findings can guide risk-based prevention efforts.

As populist parties and politicians have grown in prominence in democracies, scholars have turned their attention to the causes, and consequences, of populist attitudes among citizens. Some preliminary research indicates that individuals with populist attitudes are more likely to express support or tolerance for the use of violence to achieve political objectives. In this study, I examine this relationship further by investigating factors that mediate the effect of populism on endorsement of political violence. Using an original survey of more than 1300 subjects in the United States, I evaluate four elements that theoretically mediate the relationship between populism and support for political violence: economic grievances; distrust of political institutions; perception that social and demographic changes in the United States are threatening; and preferences for politically illiberal or nondemocratic rule. I find that the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through fear of social/demographic change and preference for illiberal rule but not through economic grievances or distrust of political institutions. Taken together, over 50% of the effect of populism on support for political violence is mediated through heightened anxiety about social and demographic changes in the U.S. and illiberal attitudes.

In the first prospective study, to our knowledge, of the impact of ongoing terrorism and political violence, we analyzed nationally representative data from 560 Jews and 182 Arabs in Israel over a 6-month period. Based on Conservation of Resources (COR) theory (Hobfoll, 1989, 1998), we predicted that exposure to terrorism and political violence would result in psychosocial and economic resource loss and resource lack, which in turn, would be primary predictors of increases in symptoms of posttraumatic stress (PTS) and depression. We also predicted that trauma exposure and PTS symptoms, in particular, would be related to ethnocentrism and support for political violence. Furthermore, based on theory and prior research, we predicted that posttraumatic growth (PTG) would be related to a worsening of symptoms of distress and that distress would be related to increased ethnocentrism and support for extreme political violence for their “cause.” Women, older individuals, and Arabs (compared with Jews) were more likely to have continued psychological distress over time. In addition, using simultaneous equation modeling, we found good fit for a structural model that partially supported our hypotheses. Psychosocial resource loss, PTG, and social support had direct and indirect effects on psychological distress. Political attitudes tended to harden over time but were not prospectively related to PTS or depressive symptoms.

Individuals in the United States appear increasingly willing to support and justify political violence. This paper therefore examines whether making partisan identities salient increases support for political violence. We embed priming manipulations in a sample of roughly 850 U.S. adults to investigate whether activating positive partisan identity, negative partisan identity, instrumental partisan identity, and American national identity might lead to differences in reported support for political violence. While we uncover no effects of priming various identities on support for political violence, we replicate and extend previous research on its correlates. Specifically, we demonstrate how various measures of partisan identity strength as well as negative personality traits are correlated with acceptance of political violence.

Are partisans more likely to endorse political violence when politicians accuse their rivals of election improprieties? I theorize that for Republican partisans in the United States, the answer to this question is yes. Republican partisans are primed to believe allegations of cheating by Democrats and view election improprieties through the lens of racial and xenophobic resentments. Allegations of Democratic election fraud prompt them to eschew nonviolent norms of political behavior and endorse political violence. I test these propositions using an original, online survey experiment involving 140 self-identified Republican subjects. I find that exposure to allegations by politicians that Democrats engage in election fraud prompts Republican partisans to increase their support for political violence. Furthermore, using mediation tests, I find that exposing Republicans to allegations of electoral fraud by Democrats reduces their trust of people of different races and religions which, in turn, increases their support for political violence.

Concerns about political violence have intensified across the United States. We conducted two pre-registered studies (N=408 and N=906) examining how Americans perceive support for political violence within their own and opposing political parties. In Study 1, Democrats estimated that 29.60% of Republicans report supporting political violence, but only 1.83% of Republicans actually report support, representing a 1,517% overestimation. In contrast, Republicans estimated that 19.48% of Democrats report supporting political violence, but only 3.54 % of Democrats actually did—a 450% overestimation. Thus, while both groups overestimated the prevalence of outparty members’ political violence support, we find that Democrats are significantly more pessimistic. In Study 2, we replicated this finding with a larger, nationally representative sample. We also explored the limits of this asymmetry and found no evidence of asymmetric perceptions for non-political crime support or ingroup members’ political violence support, suggesting a unique asymmetry in perceived outgroup political violence support.

BackgroundIn recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a rise in political violence. Prior research has found that an individual’s social network is associated with their likelihood of engaging in various forms of violence, but research on social networks and political violence in the US context is limited. This study examined associations between social network size and endorsement of political violence in a recent nationally representative survey and explored how the relationship varied by use of social media as a major news source, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and membership in a marginalized or privileged racial or ethnic group.MethodsThis was a nationally representative cross-sectional survey study of adults aged 18 and older in the US, administered from May 13-June 2, 2022. The exposure was social network size, defined by the number of strong social connections. We examined three violence-related outcomes: support for non-political violence, support for political violence, and personal willingness to engage in political violence. We estimated prevalence ratios for associations using survey-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, adjusting for hypothesized confounders and including interaction terms to examine effect measure modification.ResultsThe sample included 8,620 respondents. Median age was 48.4 years (95% CI = 47.9–48.8), 51.5% were female (95% CI = 50.4–52.7%), and 62.7% self-identified as non-Hispanic White (95% CI = 61.4–65.9%). In adjusted models, those with zero strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in general (PR = 2.43, 95% CI = 1.47–4.01). Those with 50 + strong connections were more likely than those with 1–4 strong social connections to consider political violence usually/always justified in at least one situation (PR = 1.19, 95% CI = 1.03–1.37) and were more likely to report being willing to personally use political violence (PR = 1.52, 95% CI = 1.13–2.04). Associations varied somewhat by social media use, perceptions of the government as an enemy, and racialized identity.ConclusionsIndividuals who reported very few and very many strong social connections were more likely than others to support political violence or be personally willing to engage in it in one form or another. Findings point toward potential intervention and prevention opportunities.

Is approval of Donald J. Trump associated with support for political violence? If so, what explains the link between Trump approval and political violence? Using an original, nationally representative survey of over 1,500 adults in the United States we produce two findings. First, individuals who express approval for Trump are also significantly more likely to endorse positive descriptors for the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and are more likely express support for the use of political violence more broadly. Second, the effects of Trump approval on support for the use of political violence are mediated through racist and xenophobic attitudes. Trump supporters in the study disproportionately exhibit racist and xenophobic/anti-foreigner attitudes, and these attitudes are associated with a positive endorsement of both January 6 and the use of political violence.

BackgroundCurrent conditions in the USA suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about the prevalence of beliefs that might lead to political violence, about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, and about how those measures vary with individual characteristics, lethality of violence, political objectives that violence might advance, or specific populations as targets.MethodsThis cross-sectional US nationally representative survey was conducted on May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Outcomes are weighted, population-representative proportions of respondents endorsing selected beliefs about American democracy and society and violence to advance political objectives.ResultsThe analytic sample included 8620 respondents; 50.5% (95% confidence interval (CI) 49.3%, 51.7%) were female; and weighted mean (± standard deviation) age was 48.4 (± 18.0) years. Nearly 1 in 5 (18.9%, 95% CI 18.0%, 19.9%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy”; 16.2% (95% CI 15.3%, 17.1%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants,” and 13.7% (95% CI 12.9%, 14.6%) agreed strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.” One-third of respondents (32.8%, 95% CI 31.7%, 33.9%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Among all respondents, 7.7% (95% CI 7.0%, 8.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that within the next few years, in a situation where they believe political violence is justified, “I will be armed with a gun”; 1.1% (95% CI 0.9%, 1.4%) thought it very or extremely likely that “I will shoot someone with a gun.” Support for political violence and for the use of firearms in such violence frequently declined with increasing age, education, and income.ConclusionsSmall but concerning proportions of the population consider violence, including lethal violence, to be usually or always justified to advance political objectives. Prevention efforts should proceed urgently based on the best evidence available.

Research has linked the authoritarian personality with support for political violence, including violence against the government. However, support for political violence is simultaneously a measure of and an outcome of the authoritarian personality, and one key component (submission to authority) is the antithesis of one key measure of political violence (violence against authority). This article makes three contributions. First, we accentuate the importance of using exogenous measures of the authoritarian personality when estimating its effect on support for political violence. Second, leveraging data from an original survey and the American National Election Studies, we find that the relationship between authoritarianism and support for violence is conditional: it can be positive, negative, or null, depending on who is in control of government and the specificity of political-violence measures. Third, we argue that another concept—the securitarian personality—might better predict support for violence. Access to firearms—which we argue is downstream from securitarianism—consistently predicts support for political violence.

Is political violence and support for political violence more prevalent in democratic societies with high levels of affective polarization? This study argues that affective partisan political polarization fosters dehumanization of opposing partisans, lends a moralistic and zero-sum nature to political life, and facilitates group mobilization. These all produce an environment in which political violence is both more socially acceptable and more frequent. The study tests this assertion using two sets of empirical tests: an original survey of 1,899 US residents and a cross-national time-series analysis of eighty-three democracies. It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, whereas Republicans who express aversion toward Democrats are 18% more likely to endorse political violence. Furthermore, in the cross-national analysis, democracies characterized by higher levels of affective partisan political polarization are 34% more likely to experience frequent political violence.

Fear, loathing, and support for political violence in the United States: findings from a nationally representative survey.

Identifying groups at increased risk for political violence can support prevention efforts. We determine whether "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, are potentially such a group. Nationwide survey conducted May 13-June 2, 2022 of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. MAGA Republicans are defined as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election and deny the results of that election. Principal outcomes are weighted proportions of respondents who endorse political violence, are willing to engage in it, and consider it likely to occur. The analytic sample (n = 7,255) included 1,128 (15.0%) MAGA Republicans, 640 (8.3%) strong Republicans, 1,571 (21.3%) other Republicans, and 3,916 (55.3%) non-Republicans. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than others to agree strongly/very strongly that "in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States" (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) and to consider violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001). They were not more willing to engage personally in political violence. MAGA Republicans, as defined, are more likely than others to endorse political violence. They are not more willing to engage in such violence themselves; their endorsement may increase the risk that it will occur.

Understanding the activities and preferences of visitors is crucial for managing protected areas and planning conservation strategies. Conservation culturomics promotes the use of user-generated online content in conservation science. Geotagged social media content is a unique source of in situ information on human presence and activities in nature. Photographs posted on social media platforms are a promising source of information, but analyzing large volumes of photographs manually remains laborious. We examined the application of state-of-the-art computer-vision methods to studying human-nature interactions. We used semantic clustering, scene classification, and object detection to automatically analyze photographs taken in Finnish national parks by domestic and international visitors. Our results showed that human-nature interactions can be extracted from user-generated photographs with computer vision. The different methods complemented each other by revealing broad visual themes related to level of the data set, landscape photogeneity, and human activities. Geotagged photographs revealed distinct regional profiles for national parks (e.g., preferences in landscapes and activities), which are potentially useful in park management. Photographic content differed between domestic and international visitors, which indicates differences in activities and preferences. Information extracted automatically from photographs can help identify preferences among diverse visitor groups, which can be used to create profiles of national parks for conservation marketing and to support conservation strategies that rely on public acceptance. The application of computer-vision methods to automatic content analysis of photographs should be explored further in conservation culturomics, particularly in combination with rich metadata available on social media platforms.