Abstract
In a differentiated oligopoly with quantity as the strategic variable, an optimal tariff can lead to a welfare gain. When a quantity restraint is used instead, this gain can be offset, since the quota induces anticompetitive effects. However, alternative quantity restraints, such as import quotas or voluntary export restraints, whether specified in volume or ratio form, will influence the strength of the anticompetitive effect. In this paper, the authors evaluate empirically the degree of nonequivalence between alternative trade instruments and the factors that likely influence it.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
