Abstract
In the philosophy of modality there are three positions concerning the relation between the set of metaphysically necessary truths and the set of logically necessary truths. Modal Monism (MM), states that the set of metaphysically necessary truths is identical to the set of logically necessary truths. (MM) has been advocated by Chalmers (1999). Modal Pluralism (MP), states that the set of metaphysically necessary truths is a proper subset of the set of logically necessary truths. (MP) has been advocated by Salmon (1989). Metaphysical Determinism (MD), states that the set of logically necessary truths is in part determined by metaphysical truths and necessities. (MD) has recently been gestured at by Lowe (1998), and Shalkowski (2004). In what follows, I want to offer an argument and some considerations in favor of the conclusion that logically necessity is in part determined by metaphysical truths and necessities. The argument below concerns what can be appealed to in judging or choosing which formalization of logic is correct.
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