The Maritime Silk Road and India: The Challenge of Overcoming Cognitive Divergence

In recent years, China has expanded its relations with other nations through the Belt and Road Initiative. This initiative was formally introduced after it was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. It comprises two components, namely, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, both of which aim to stimulate the acceleration of economic growth in Asia, Africa and Europe. This research attempts to provide a detailed review of the execution of this initiative through empirical studies based on qualitative analysis, which are closely related to BRI implementation in Malaysia. The focus of this research, however, is not limited to studying the viewpoints of leaders and scholars on the initiative; rather, it will also attempt to discuss theBRI’s progress and the obstacles encountered to date from the political aspects of both China and Malaysia. By identifying the potential challenges to come, this research will prove to be significant, as it proposes some comprehensive measures to address and forestall any setbacks that may arise, which may affect the implementation of the BRI between the two nations. Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative (BRI); Malaysia–China relations; Silk Road; China–ASEAN relations; Maritime Silk Road A

Introduction Nadège Rolland (bio) In recent years the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously known as the "One Belt, One Road" strategy, has emerged as the cornerstone of China's foreign policy under Xi Jinping. Presented as a cooperative endeavor motivated by China's willingness to bring economic prosperity, growth, and stability to its wider periphery, BRI nevertheless has more than one purpose. As part of its New Silk Road project launched in 2015, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) has been studying BRI in detail over the last several years. We have unpacked its drivers, ambitions, and strategic implications.1 We have analyzed its possible impact on the Eurasian continental and maritime energy environment,2 described and assessed regional responses,3 underlined the challenges and uncertainties it faces,4 and participated in policymaking assessments of the initiative.5 This Asia Policy roundtable follows in the footsteps of these groundbreaking research activities, this time with the intention to shed light on BRI's military and security implications in South Asia. The roundtable has been made possible by the generous support of the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security, which partnered with NBR on a new project launched in 2018 dedicated to examining how China's expanding interests along the belt and road affect its military and security calculations and shape its external security behavior. [End Page 2] As China's economic and political footprint expands along the continental Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, an increasing number of Chinese diplomats, businessmen, and workers are venturing into areas that were until now largely outside China's traditional reach. Along the belt and road, the security situation is often volatile due to insurgency and destabilizing spillovers from regional conflicts. How the Chinese military and security elite are trying to protect and secure China's interests along the new Silk Roads is one of the issues critical to BRI's sustainability and success. Nowhere is China's tentative response to BRI's security challenges more apparent than in South Asia. The significance of this geographic space is self-evident, as this subregion is where the continental "belt" meets the maritime "road" and connects three continents—Europe, Africa, and Asia—via land and the Indian Ocean, a crucial artery for international commerce and energy supplies. But it is also where BRI faces a whole gamut of serious security challenges, from traditional conflicts centered on territorial and border disputes, to potential naval competition with India, to nontraditional terrorist and religious insurgencies, to energy security challenges. Pakistan epitomizes most of the security challenges BRI faces. Using the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as a test case to assess how China attempts to secure its assets, Filippo Boni finds that the responsibility to protect Chinese citizens and assets is delegated to the Pakistani military and police forces, who have benefited from increased cooperation with their Chinese counterparts. Pakistan is also the only example of a South Asian country where Chinese private security companies operate so far. Meia Nouwens notes that the lack of either international or domestic regulations, combined with these companies' relative inexperience with operating in hostile environments, increases risks of miscalculation. Widening the geographic focus to the entire Indian Ocean, Nilanthi Samaranayake looks at China's first attempts in securing the Maritime Silk Road. Although Beijing's efforts still seem limited in scope and constricted by local and regional counterbalancing, the situation could change in the long run. It is precisely against the possibility of losing their strategic edge in the Indian Ocean to an expanded Chinese naval presence that both India and the United States should strengthen their countervailing response, argue Gurpreet Khurana and Arzan Tarapore. Considering the national security risks posed by China's expanded influence on its traditional periphery, India should promote military and geoeconomic [End Page 3] solutions, argues Khurana. Viewing BRI as an essential element of China's grand strategy, Tarapore advocates enhanced U.S. partnerships with regional states, with India at the core, and a comprehensive U.S. strategy that blurs the traditional economic and security fault lines (not unlike BRI itself). Taken together, the essays presented in this roundtable offer a...

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) In 2013, China's president Xi Jinping announced an initiative that would set the course for much of China's foreign policy toward its Eurasian neighbors. Consisting of two parts—an overland "belt" connecting China with Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Europe and a maritime "road" linking Chinese ports with those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisions a vast network of railways, highways, ports, pipelines, and communication infrastructure spanning the Eurasian continent and facilitating trade, investment, and people-to-people exchange (see Figure 1). In 2015, Beijing announced a plan to develop six economic corridors to advance this initiative (see Figure 2). China's leadership has rallied behind BRI, pledging substantial investment, creating new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Silk Road Fund, and making diplomatic commitments to countries along the proposed routes. To many observers, BRI appears to be an outline of China's ambitious new grand strategy, 1 but what do states in the region think of this initiative? The seven contributors to this Asia Policy roundtable seek to answer this question by examining how Asian states along this new Silk Road view BRI and its potential implications. Michael Clarke begins the roundtable with an essay that analyzes China's motivations and objectives. He concludes that BRI is motivated by Beijing's desire to resolve long-term domestic, economic, and geopolitical challenges by strengthening states in China's frontier regions, exporting Chinese capital and labor, and establishing an alternative to the current international order. BRI integrates these objectives into a strategy that furthers China's goal of returning to great-power status without provoking strong counterreactions. Andrew Small seeks to understand Pakistan's role in BRI through an examination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite Pakistan and China's long history of an "all-weather friendship," previous joint infrastructure and economic projects have generally failed to deliver [End Page 66] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. China's Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Source: "West China Seeks Fortune on Modern Silk Road," Xinhua, May 15, 2016 ≈ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/15/c_135360904.htm. Originally published in Chinese in Xinhua, 2014. Reprinted with minor changes from Nadège Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 49. [End Page 67] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 2. The Six Economic Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council Head Office, "The Belt and Road Initiative," January 21, 2016 ≈ http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-More-Information/obor/en/1/1X3CGF6L/1X0A36H1.htm. Reprinted from Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? 73. [End Page 68] on their rhetoric. Although both sides clearly stand to gain from CPEC and some progress has been made, long-standing challenges in Pakistan provide reason for skepticism that the project will in fact meet Beijing's goals. While not on board with BRI, India is closely watching the initiative, particularly CPEC. Harsh Pant and Ritika Passi argue in their essay that pressure is mounting on New Delhi to decide whether to remain on the sidelines. India is wary of the security implications of BRI, particularly for the contested area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and for Indian Ocean ports and sea lanes; however, China's infrastructure development projects could be a boon that increases the region's economic interdependence and gives India leverage to shape the initiative from within. India thus faces challenging decisions as BRI unfolds. Russia, by contrast, has moved from caution to an embrace of BRI, at least for now. The initiative will expand China's presence not only in Central Asia, Russia's traditional sphere of influence, but also further westward in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. While Moscow recognizes this dilution of its own influence, Sebastien Peyrouse argues that Russia's economic crisis and the effects of Western sanctions have left...

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a signature foreign policy initiative by China’s President Xi Jinping, is the largest global infrastructure undertaking, surpassing the Marshall Plan. Chinese banks and companies have invested billions in funding and building infrastructure in numerous countries. Two significant initiatives are related to and referred to the BRI. One is the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). However, with the commencement, the initiative has attracted enormous global attention. Background information about SREB and the MSR and its implementation have been discussed in this article. This article highlights China’s strategic considerations for the BRI and its significance to the country. This article additionally concentrates on the progress of BRI and how the West and China’s neighbours view it and offers insight into the recently unfolding criticisms. Keywords Belt and Road Initiative, Silk Road Economic Belt, Maritime Silk Road, Xi Jinping

Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road in 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Belt and Road). The paper aims to analyze the background and the significance of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”. And it finds out that the “Belt and Road Initiative” has profound international and domestic background and it has strategic significance to China’s geopolitical and economic security, energy security, RMB internationalization, economic transformation and upgrading, etc.

China's Belt and Road Initiative and Its Implications for Southeast Asia Hong Yu (bio) During state visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, Xi Jinping announced the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea-based 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, respectively. Shortly after that, these two initiatives were combined to form one unified concept, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This grand initiative, comprising various routes by sea and land, is intended to connect China with Southeast and South Asia, Central Asia, Pacific Oceania, Africa, and Europe. BRI is centered on both soft and hard infrastructure connectivity, aiming to forge an integrated and extensive network of regional infrastructure with China at its hub. BRI has gradually emerged as a top Chinese national strategy. Given China's emergence as a global power through industrial redeployment and outward investment, this initiative could reshape the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape of Asia and beyond. BRI signals a shift in China's foreign policy and a departure from its long-held low-profile approach. Since Xi came to power in 2012, the Chinese government has adopted a far more proactive foreign policy stance, driven by global thinking.1 BRI serves as the key driver to advance China's interests overseas and demonstrates China's growing confidence and aspirations to be a rule-shaper in the economic governance of the region and beyond. Meanwhile, the demise of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), following the withdrawal of the United States, offers China further leeway to promote its New Silk Road agenda. The TPP's failure will increase the international momentum behind BRI to accelerate regional economic cooperation and integration through forging infrastructure, trade, and investment linkages. For the Southeast Asian countries, regional economic integration plays a very important role in mitigating external uncertainties and global economic vulnerabilities. The collapse of the TPP hit certain participating countries within Southeast Asia very hard, particularly Singapore. Being a tiny nation without an economic hinterland, Singapore has developed as the [End Page 117] most open and trade-dependent economy in the region. China's realization of BRI depends on the support and participation of other countries; in particular, the neighboring Southeast Asian countries are vital to the success of this grand initiative. The Southeast Asian countries, particularly developing countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, have largely welcomed BRI, which aims to promote close regional trade and investment linkage based on the improvement of interregional physical connectivity. Southeast Asia needs to focus consistently on constructing infrastructure in order to unleash the region's economic growth potential. The Southeast Asian countries consider that participating in BRI will help address their serious infrastructure deficits and accelerate industrial and economic growth. China has offered much-needed investment for connectivity-related infrastructure construction.2 This essay will first examine the opportunities for Southeast Asian countries to participate in BRI and then consider their perspectives on the challenges for the initiative. Opportunities for Southeast Asia Arising from BRI China's rise to become the world's second-largest economy and the largest trading nation has exerted a very powerful pull on the Southeast Asian economies. China has become the largest trading partner for all Southeast Asian countries except for the Philippines. The region, for its part, has benefited enormously from China's economic growth. It has taken advantage of the Sinocentric regional production network created since China's admission to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s to export raw materials, intermediate goods, and mineral resources to China for final manufacturing into industrial goods before their export to the major consumption markets in the West. Setting aside for the moment the underlying geostrategic and geopolitical considerations, the potential benefits from BRI for Southeast Asia could be enormous. China has committed enormous financial resources to build a number of large-scale transportation projects aiming to improve interregional connectivity. For example, construction has already started on the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia and on a railway linking Mohan, on the Chinese border, with Vientiane, the capital of Laos. These two projects, both largely financed by Chinese banks and being [End Page 118] built by Chinese companies, mark Beijing's efforts to...

Afghanistan and the Belt and Road Initiative:Hope, Scope, and Challenges Meena Singh Roy (bio) In September and October 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia, where he announced an initiative to jointly build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. From the Chinese perspective, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious economic vision aimed at "cooperation among the countries along the Belt and Road" whereby they "work in concert and move towards the objectives of mutual benefit and common security."1 The BRI vision document emphasizes the great potential and space for cooperation among regional countries by promoting policy coordination and facilitating connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds. These have been identified as the initiative's five major goals. Since being announced in 2013, BRI has become the centerpiece of Xi's foreign policy. In May 2017, representatives from over 100 countries, including Afghanistan, attended the Belt and Road Forum, at which 68 countries and international organizations signed cooperation agreements with China. Xi explained that China hopes to "find new driving forces for growth, create a new platform for global development, and re-balance economic globalization."2 This essay examines Afghanistan's high expectations for BRI and Chinese perceptions of the country's potential role in the initiative. The essay concludes by discussing the challenges that Kabul faces in realizing the benefits of participation in this ambitious connectivity project. Afghanistan's Expectations for BRI From Afghanistan's perspective, BRI is a welcome project. The Afghan government has shown interest and already confirmed its participation [End Page 103] in the initiative. Highlighting the importance of this megaproject, Deputy Foreign Minister Hekmat Khalil Karzai said that the "economic development process along the Silk Road will reshape the international development order that has been centered in our region and carries great significance for human development in the 21st century."3 For Afghans, this initiative is a very important step toward improving regional cooperation and regional and interregional connectivity, which complements Kabul's long-standing policy of promoting regional integration and economic cooperation. With an aim to advance transnational projects, Kabul initiated the Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan in 2005, and in 2011 the Regional Cooperation Directorate was established in the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In March 2017, Finance Minister Eklil Hakimi stated that Afghanistan has already aligned most of its domestic plans with BRI.4 The government believes that the initiative will provide an opportunity for Afghanistan to once again become an "Asian transit and trade roundabout" connecting South Asia to Central Asia and East Asia to West Asia, thus bringing economic benefits not only to Afghanistan but to the entire region. Specifically, Afghan leaders argue that the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, the Five Nations Railway, and several gas pipeline projects can be linked to other projects under China's grand connectivity initiative.5 In addition, since October 2016, Afghanistan has expressed interest in joining the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and its ambassador to Pakistan, Omar Zakhilwal, has already extended Afghan support for CPEC. Both Pakistan and China seem open to this possibility, but the logistical question of how to extend CPEC into Afghanistan remains unanswered. The proponents of Afghanistan joining CPEC in particular and BRI in general have argued that participating in this megaproject will bring the following benefits to the country. First, the new infrastructure within Pakistan could give Afghan businesses and investors access to the consumer market in South Asia, thus reducing the cost of imports and increasing exports to the region. This could help Afghanistan enhance its [End Page 104] trade with regional countries, thereby stabilizing its economy. In 2015, Pakistan was the top export destination for Afghanistan ($392 million), followed by India ($277 million). Similarly, Pakistan emerged as the top origin for imports, with trade amounting to $1.95 billion, followed by China ($587 million) and India ($560 million). So far Afghanistan has been exporting goods like carpets, rugs, dried fruits, and medical plants but not copper, iron ore, and other natural resources. BRI is expected to offer the opportunity for Afghanistan to export these and other valuable resources to...

Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt component of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative at Kazakhstan in 2013. OBOR is a development strategy and framework that focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries primarily in Eurasia. It consists of two main components, the land-based 'Silk Road Economic Belt' (SREB) and ocean-going 'Maritime Silk Road' (MSR). This book studies the equilibrium or balance between overland and maritime trade routes of OBOR.This book has two major sections. The interpretive section examines contemporary media narratives related to the OBOR initiative and how contemporary commentators appropriate narratives about historical events related to the maritime Silk Road to interpret current policy agendas and legitimize diplomatic or economic exchanges. In terms of institutional studies, the chapters related to Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) will look at the issues facing the Bank in its quest in forming a new world platform for multilateral development financing.The other section, the empirical case study of the publication highlights the fact that Euro-China High Speed Rail (HSR) and Central Asia-China HSR are not viable at the moment as passenger volume is not sufficient to justify the HSR line. This section examines the overland route of the OBOR and looks at recent Chinese HSR history and conventional sub-high speed rail technology development, and identifies technical & economic criteria determining the appropriate technology for a certain line. The chapter in this section will use the developed criteria to analyze the various rail linkage projects currently under study in the OBOR framework, highlight the economic, bureaucratic and geo-political challenges that these projects likely face and lay down conditions that will determine the outcome of these projects.

Chinese government has developed transport infrastructure rapidly under Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy. The BRI strategy is China's economic development strategies for expanding trade and cultural influence towards countries in western and eastern regions, including ASEAN. The development of BRI strategy is consists of two main components i.e., (i) the Silk Road Economic Belt, follows the historical overland Silk Road through Central Asia, Iran, Turkey and eventually to Europe, and (ii) the Maritime Silk Road, originates in the South China Sea, passing through the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea and extending into the Mediterranean Sea (Chris & Elizabeth, 2015). Due to the BRI strategy, more than 6000 trains made the journey from China to Europe in 2018, which is an increase of 72% compared to 2017. China has sent more than 11,000 freight trains to Europe and back since the BRI strategy was announced in 2013. Railway networks have been constructed under the BRI strategy for connecting 48 Chinese cities with 42 cities in Europe through Asia. There are many railway infrastructures under the BRI strategy. The China – Laos railway (Vientiane–Boten railway) is one of project under the Silk Road Economic Belt that has been developed for serving as a key infrastructure for the economic corridor between the two countries. In nearly future, this railway will be helped to boost trade, investment and tourism for Lao PDR. and south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The Vientiane–Boten railway, especially transportation time will attract both travelers and Logistics Service Providers (LSP), which can be reduced time of journey compared with road mode. In this paper, modal shift potential of travelers and freight on Kunming-Bangkok Highway (R3A), AH2, AH8, AH9, AH10, AH12, AH13, and AH18 have been investigated by considering behavioral aspects of long distance travel. Keywords: Mode Split Model, Modal Shift, Vientiane–Boten railway, Travel Behaviour

The Belt and Road (BR) Initiative (BRI) is usually examined in geopolitics perspectives, while the studies ignored the consistency of the BRI with the world economy and China’s historical international business. This study developed a maritime big data system to analyze global interactions upon the global maritime network generated from the system. The BR is coupled with Chinese overseas construction projects (COCPs) in the context of the global maritime network by data-driven analytics methods. A network is developed by extracting the spatial interactions among maritime ports, and time and spatial analyzing methods are used for vessel flows among maritime ports. Then, nine analytical experiments are conducted to examine the relations between COCP and BRI. The figure of the BR emerges from COCP and the maritime network. The BR region and especially the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) had emerged as a definite shape ten years ago. The BRI creates additional opportunities in developing the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the connectivity between BR and the world. The policy implications considering China, regions, and global communities are further be studied. The BR is investigated by using the big data coupled with the COCP other than just depicting from geographical and economic views.

“一带一路”伟大倡议，尤其是21世纪海上丝绸之路，为中欧海洋合作开启了伟大历史机遇。中欧在海洋观、海洋政策和维护海上安全等方面具有广泛的共通性、共同性与共同利益，海洋合作完全可以成为中欧合作的新亮点。中欧将各自海洋发展战略对接，共同致力于维护海上通道安全,将“中欧合作2020战略规划”予以落实；条件成熟时可共同创立“海上合作组织”，致力海上秩序的共同维护，打造亚非欧合作的新版本。双边与多边协调推进,政策与理念相得益彰，有效管控分歧，成为中欧海上丝路合作的可行途径。 The new Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (OBOR) is a historic opportunity for further Sino-EU maritime cooperation, as both sides have much to share and more to build in terms of vision, policies, and security, making it possible for a new line in the already-thriving exchanges across the continent. The two sides will carry on the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation with fusion of maritime strategies and joint efforts for safer sea passage, and may proceed to a Maritime Cooperative Organization (MCO) when needed to build not only a participative maritime order, but also next-gen cooperation between Asia, Africa, and Europe. Yet this still needs a well-assorted toolset of bi- and multilateral cooperation backed by strong policy and theory, to boost consensus and action by management of differences.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was first proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 with a view to promoting regional economic and infrastructural cooperation in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. The BRI is a two-faceted cross-border economic strategy, consisting of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” It engages the joint effort and participation of six-five countries in the world. As outlined by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) in its report dated March 28, 2015, the BRI has five major goals: enhancing policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, removing trade barriers, facilitating financial integration, and building people-to-people bonds. With the dual boost to land and maritime trade and business within the Belt and Road Nations, the BRI fosters market integration in the Asian region and forges new economic ties between China and the global economy. With increasingly robust cross-border trade, commercial disputes would inevitably arise. A solid legal framework is required for resolving increasingly sophisticated commercial disputes. A well-functioning dispute resolution mechanism serves two purposes: First, it is crucial to have an effective and reliable legal framework for ensuring investors’ confidence. Second, in the context of the geographically wide-spanning proposal, a legal framework which is compatible across the Belt and Road countries is of paramount importance to enhance certainty and coherence of the application of laws. This report aims to discuss the impacts of the BRI on dispute resolution, namely (1) arbitration and; (2) the courts. In Part II, it is argued that the BRI provides a unique opportunity to harmonize the private international laws in Asia and in particular, to reconciliate the notoriously indeterminate “public policy exception” to arbitral enforcement. Part III introduces the China International Commercial Courts (CICC), and explores its features and challenges.

This article is a conceptual review of identifying the factors of the successful implementation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on small-medium enterprises (SMEs) in Malaysia. China’s president Xi Jin Ping has launched the China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR) initiative or BRI in 2013. BRI focusses on the connectivity and cooperation between Asian, European and African continents economically and strategically through massive infrastructure developments, trades and investments. BRI is specified to two international trade connections: land-based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and sea-based ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. Malaysia is one of the Southeast Asia countries that actively participated in BRI. According to the World Bank, SMEs are almost 98.5 per cent of business establishments in Malaysia, which undoubtedly indicates how important SMEs are in Malaysia. As such, that is the question to ponder of how BRI could connect and associate with the enhancement and development of Malaysia’s SMEs. Therefore, the objective of the study is to identify the factors of the successful implementation of BRI on SMEs in Malaysia. Based on this study’s literature reviews, it would be suggested that new business and investment opportunity creations, connectivity and cooperation enhancement, trade and export boosting, geographic location and enhancement of e-commerce were the most critical factors in the successful implementation of BRI on SMEs in Malaysia.

Securing the Maritime Silk Road in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Nilanthi Samaranayake (bio) For roughly fifteen years, China's commercial and military activities in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean have caused increasing concern about its intentions in the region. China specialists have examined the country's energy interests and naval planning along its sea lines of communication.1 The proliferation of commercial infrastructure projects now branded under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has heightened these concerns about China's presence in the Indian Ocean region. Prominent infrastructure efforts include port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, while lower-profile efforts include tunnel and bridge construction in Bangladesh and Maldives. These developments have raised questions about how China is attempting to secure the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—the waterway "road" component of BRI—in South Asia and across the Indian Ocean region more broadly. Because Pakistan will be examined by another essay in this roundtable and the China-Pakistan relationship is long-standing and predates BRI activities, this essay focuses on what China's activities look like elsewhere in maritime South Asia and out to critical Indian Ocean chokepoints. Despite notable changes in the country's presence in the Indian Ocean over the last decade, to what extent is China securing its commercial interests using naval and maritime forces? If it indeed aims to do this in a comprehensive way, then the results are modest at present. The first section of this essay examines the evidence that China is working to secure its interests in the region. The next section describes challenges to China's efforts to do so and the galvanizing effects of its activities thus far. The essay will conclude by emphasizing the importance of monitoring potential indicators of a substantive shift in the Indian Ocean and South Asian order, [End Page 21] despite the limited scope of China's activities to secure the MSR to date, and by considering the implications for U.S. interests in the region. Is China Securing the MSR? The clearest examples of China acting to secure the MSR are the counterpiracy and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the establishment of a base in the far fringes of the Indian Ocean at the chokepoint in Djibouti. Since 2008, Beijing has sent a PLA Navy task force to the Gulf of Aden. Originating out of UN resolutions to combat piracy,2 China's military vessels have transited the Indian Ocean for the past decade, providing escort activity that aims to secure the safe passage of shipping, including for Chinese commercial vessels. China has used this mission to justify the deployment of submarines. These were clearly not in support of counterpiracy but instead appeared to be aimed at gaining operational experience far from home for this platform.3 As Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt observes, at any given time the PLA Navy has four to five surface ships and two support ships transiting the Indian Ocean, plus occasionally a submarine.4 India's chief of naval staff Admiral Sunil Lanba estimates a similar number (six to eight ships).5 Second, China conducted NEOs in response to domestic instability in Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. In total, roughly 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya using Chinese civilian and military aircraft and ships,6 and nearly 1,000 Chinese and foreign nationals were evacuated from Yemen.7 Through such operations, China secured an important MSR asset—its citizens working in these countries. [End Page 22] Third, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Although China had stated for decades that it had no intention of developing overseas bases, its counterpiracy operations as well as NEOs pointed to the potential benefits of having logistical support in place.8 The base leverages Djibouti's location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. China's presence at this far corner of the Indian Ocean shows the expanse of its operational reach across the region. Challenges to China Securing the MSR Through conducting counterpiracy operations and NEOs and establishing a base...

The Maritime Silk Road, which began in China, connects Asia, Africa, and Europe through commercial trade. Historically, the Maritime Silk Road, with its core goals of equality and mutual benefit, cooperation, and win-win scenarios, has promoted the exchange and development of politics, economy, and culture between the East and West. In September and October 2013, during a state visit to Central Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Chinese President Xi Jinping made a speech in which he proposed building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. The marine environment has a significant impact on ocean construction, the maintenance of maritime rights and interests, and so on. To serve the construction of the Maritime Silk Road, we systematically presented information on the marine environment, important routes and port features, geographical features, climatic profiles, marine resources, and the utilization status of the Maritime Silk Road. To make a better contribution to the construction of the Maritime Silk Road, legal escort is essential. Legal escort is helpful to protect the rights, interests, and enthusiasm of countries and regions that participate in the construction of the Maritime Silk Road. This chapter discusses the legitimacy and rationality of development and construction in the South China Sea and the Maritime Silk Road according to the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea, and the China–ASEAN Agreements in the hope of providing a reference for the legal protection of the Maritime Silk Road.