Abstract
Abstract In the wake of the financial crisis, central banks in developed countries performed unconventional operations that are fiscal in nature. On one hand, we support the view that such operations, which are not fully democratic, might lead to loss of central bank operational independence and discuss some difficulties that central banks might face when reversing quantitative easing. On the other hand, we show that, in the middle of a financial crisis, such operations are best performed by central banks. To avoid this potential conflict, the society needs to identify the best means by which the responsibility for quasi-fiscal operations implemented by the central bank is transferred to a democratic structure
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Annals of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University - Economics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
