The Legal Framework for Arbitration in Saudi Public–Private Partnership and Privatization Contracts

With the rapid social and economic development, a great deal of expenditure is crucial for the nation's infrastructure development. Nevertheless, the governments of many developing nations have been experienced with the limited budget and technical inability to deliver effective public infrastructures. Public-private partnership (PPP) has been adopted as an alternative collaboration arrangement between the government and the private sector in many nations to overcome these challenges. PPP can be defined as a long-term contract between a public agency and a private entity for rendering public facilities, including design, construct, finance, operate, and manage the project. The PPP contract types can be classified by various factors. Different PPP options imply different levels of responsibility and risks to be assumed by the private operator. Deciding an appropriate PPP contact type is always a risk-taking task for the government. This decision-making depends upon several criteria, which directly contribute to project success. This thesis proposes a multi-criteria decision-making model based on analytical network process (ANP). The proposed model can be employed to choose a PPP contract type that optimizes important criteria. The main input of the model is the priorities (weights) of the PPP contracts selection criteria, which are obtained from a series of questionnaire surveys. The model is applied to four case studies. One case study is an ongoing project and in-depth interview with a group of PPP experts. The three case studies are done via online interviews. The outcome of this research is a decision-analysis model that is structured by an analytical network process, which can determine the best type of PPP contract depending on decision-maker’s objectives. This research can assist the stakeholders such as political decision-makers, private investors, and strategic consultants who are responsible for proposing and selecting the various types of available PPP options that will suit their PPP projects. Moreover, using this supported optimal decision model can minimize the time-consuming of adopting the best form of PPP contract type, and it leads to project success. Although this proposed model is an innovative approach, due to the limitation of the legal system in Thailand, the proposed model needs to be modified to apply in practice.

This article attempts to answer two questions. The first is whether Public-Private Partnership (PPP) contracts can be easily implemented for national road preservation projects. The second is how the PPP contracts can increase the value for money (VfM) of the national road preservation budget. The institutional environment of national road sector is discussed first in order to highlight the particular role of road preservation contracts between the Government and the business sectors in that environment. Then, the discussion continued with types of contracts that have been used in this sector, historically. At the time of this writing, PPP contract has not been used in this sector. To approach this matter the next discussion is about PPP and VfM definition in the current regulation as well as their features in literature. Based on this discussion, characteristics comparison of the available types of contract is developed, including how these types of contracts, especially KPBU contracts, can be used to achieve VfM. The following section presents a simple simulation method to assess VfM achievement based on comparison of present value cost of public service comparator and PPP. The simulation is used to understand how the variables that determine VfM interact with each other in determining the final result. Finally, the last section contains the conclusions on how PPP contracts can increase the VfM of national road preservation project. Value for Money can be achieved using PPP contract if risks transferred from the Government to business / private entity is significant enough so that the combination of both incentives and the entity’s capability can reduce the total cost of risks more than to compensate the difference between the entity’s cost of capital and the Government cost of capital. In this case, the scale of the project is also important, given the complexity of PPP contract resulted in relatively higher transaction costs compare to other types of contracts. This article does not discuss the design of performance-based incentive-oriented contract for national road preservation projects. In addition, the risks analysis done in the numerical simulation is simplified and, thus, requires further data collection for more detailed application. The externalities come from the construction phase to the operational and maintenance phase have not yet based on empirical evidence in this sector. This article also does not address issues on how to create level of competition in the procurement stage as well as in the operational stage that can promote value for money. Lastly, the risks discussed in the types of contracts only limited to supply risks. The use of PPP contracts to replace conventional procurement contracts will not automatically reduce primary balance deficit. Assessments and steps to ensure the achievement of value for money from the PPP contract must be done and planned in advance. This is the first article discussing value for money from PPP contract for Indonesian national road preservation projects.

How Brexit Might Pave the Way for a PPP Directive in the EU in a Value for Money Perspective

The trust-control nexus in public private partnership (PPP) contracts

Universally, many countries have been utilizing Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) for exploiting infrastructure developments. Transactions in PPP, in such situations, are established on an association of complicated legitimate contracts. Conversely, in such transactions, a PPP contract is usually drawn up between the public authority (the “Contracting Authority”) and private company (the “Private Partner”) in the outline of a franchise contract or similar document. When drawing up and confirming PPP transactions, extensive time and investments are entailed due to the intricacy, difficulty, as well as the reality that the attributes of the infrastructure developments are often deeply consulted as to be reflected in such contracts. As a result, observers have questioned whether time and cost reduction in such procedures is viable, in which the provisions established in the franchise arrangements and other PPP indentures between the public and private sectors are systematized. Various regions have attempted to establish PPP indentures that are completely systematized in numerous types of infrastructure developments, such as road and railway networks, harbors or power generators. Thus far, for PPP transactions, no attempt has been made to develop a globally conventional linguistic on an international basis. Public–Private Partnership contracts can be categorized into various types, which are often known as PPP’s or P3’s. In this paper, six types of contracts will be discussed, namely Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Design-Build (D/B), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), O&M (Operation and Maintenance), and their effectiveness will be ranked according to the selected parameters. This paper is aimed at establishing a fuzzy-based multicriteria decision-making model for determining which of the PPP contracts is the most suited for infrastructure projects.

The article seeks to provide insights into contemporary research in public-private partnership development in the road transport market. The study reviews a range of world public-private partnership best practices which demonstrate that effective interaction between government and business at different levels (national, subnational and regional) allows to attract and allocate investment resources more effectively, thus contributing to creating new jobs, promoting better infrastructure development and enhancing the overall quality of life in the country. It is argued that among the key factors boosting the public-private partnership market development the most significant is the level of institutionalization. It is also asserted that this factor, in combination with the relevant political environment and the capital market specifics, facilitates building successful partnerships. Moreover, government initiatives together with legal and regulatory interaction frameworks shape solid foundation to encourage further public-private partnership development by gaining positive effects from successful implementation of such partnerships, designing roadmaps and unified standard procedures and processes aimed at simplifying the relationships between the private sector and the government. Apart from the above, it is highlighted that the institutional factor aligned with the government strategic goals affects the formation and legitimation of public-private partnership markets. The study also provides argument that through the models of public-private partnerships the public sector can benefit, in the first place by utilizing resources of private companies, thus fostering further infrastructure development and raising the effectiveness and efficiency of road transport services market. The findings reveal that the purpose of public-private partnership programs institutionalization in the sector of road transport services is to enhance government motivation to attract private investment and offer new road network services based on public-private partnership contracts which will contribute to ensure the quality of road services.

This article gives a description of the significance of public -private partnership (PPP) in Poland both across sectors and partners involved in this type of projects. In this context, Author is also interested in the evolution of PPP in Poland, in particular from 2009 (after coming into force of the new regulations) and during recent financial crisis. PPP market in Poland is relatively young and conditioned by changes in the legal, economic, and political scene. Between 2009 and 2011 most PPP contracts were announced by the authorities of cities and municipalities. They concerned sport and recreation sector, urban infrastructure and health sector, while there are needs for transport investments, municipal construction, revitalization, waste management, education or energetics. PPP can present a number of advantages (provide additional capital, management and skills, improve efficiency and quality of services, share of risks), therefore the European Commission promotes combining PPP with EU funds in new financial perspective to diversify sources of financing for development.

Public-private partnership (PPP) contract is a special type of governance. Under a PPP contract, a central-government agency or a local authority and a private agent bargain a long-term contractual agreement to build a public infrastructure or the providence of a public service, such that risks, returns and resources are optimally shared among partners. The health sector has applied such PPP schemes in the recent decades for two primary reasons: 1 lack of government budgetary support for the health sector and the search for an alternative source of funding 2 the emergence of privatisation in the health sector. However such schemes of contracts are fully related to issues of asymmetric information such as the problems of moral hazard, adverse selection and market for lemons. These problems undermine the shared optimal results of PPPs contracts. Jordanian Health sector has witnessed some healthcare cuts. The sector also endeavoured on such PPP contracts to lessen the deteriorating consequences of the health sector. This paper exposes the Jordanian experience of PPPs in the health sector. Related issues of asymmetric information are treated and some remedy propositions are advanced.

Construction projects can be delivered through various approaches; nevertheless, all practitioners and involved parties have a mutual goal, which is completing the project within the original scope, defined budget, and schedule. Reviewing the literature on public–private partnerships (PPPs) showed that many efforts have been made to cover different research areas, including policies, risks, roles and responsibilities, and finance. The existing literature lacks studies involving the comprehensive process of preparing and implementing PPP contracts associated with highway projects in the US. This research, therefore, fills this noticeable gap in the body of knowledge on the PPP delivery method. The main objective of this research was to develop a framework for PPP contracts focusing on highway projects. To meet this objective, the authors conducted a Delphi study with highway professionals to identify the major issues that they should carefully deal with during contract document preparation, contract procurement, and contract implementation phases to make PPP highway projects successful. The Delphi study consisted of two rounds, with 25 open-ended interview questions over three phases. The study found that highway agencies must fix the scope of a project before a PPP project starts. They should also choose a lump sum contract type and a design-build-finance-operate-maintenance PPP type with a 35 to 40-year concession period for highway projects. Contracts should consist of incentive and disincentive clauses along with availability payments as the mode of compensating concessioners for their work. Before initiating a PPP contract, agencies should make sure that their state legislation allows this type of contract. The study also found that during the contract procurement phase, owners should use the best-value selection method to choose a PPP contractor; the competition should be fair and transparent, and the owner must have expertise in order to successfully procure PPP contracts. The experts recommended setting performance standards for PPP concessioners, performing inspections using independent third parties, and handing over condition data to maintenance personnel at the end of construction. The primary contribution of this research to the body of knowledge was to highlight the fact that each country, with the help of professional expertise and key stakeholders, background, and/or lessons learned, needs to develop a framework that lists the main issues and processes to be considered in implementing PPP highway contracts. This study presents a framework that can work nationwide, something that is missing in previous research studies. This framework can guide professionals in the transportation industry toward effective contract document preparation, procurement, and implementation of PPP highway projects in addition to giving academicians better insights to understand PPP highway projects in the US.

Public provision of water and wastewater services in urban India has been a noteworthy failure, often providing service that ranges from non-existent to unreliable. Over the past decade, a number of reforms were undertaken that focused on infrastructure construction and urban governance, including broader use of public–private partnerships (PPPs). We examine a new data set of 163 water and wastewater PPP contracts initiated during 1999-2012 to study the determinants of a city’s decision to invite varying amounts of private participation though a PPP agreement. Cities with larger populations, better PPP regulatory environments, regional party rule, and lower sanitation scores are associated with higher levels of private participation through PPPs. Indian municipalities have often failed to engage the public before and during contract discussions, sometimes resulting in lukewarm public support for PPPs. Our findings highlight the role of cities’ socioeconomic indicators in determining the type of PPP contract undertaken.

The contractual and administrative regulation of public-private partnership

Part I: General Introduction to Public-Private Partnerships 1. Introduction (Etienne B. Yehoue and Piet de Vries) 2. The Modern Public-Private Demarcation: History of and Trends in PPP (Piet de Vries) Part II: Law and Public-Private Partnerships 3. Legal Framework for Successful Public-Private Partnerships (Cesar Queiroz and Alejandro Lopez Martinez) 4. National Institutional Setting, Macroeconomic Stability and Public-Private Partnerships (Etienne B. Yehoue) 5. The Institutional Environment for Public-Private Partnerships: The case of Mexico and Brazil (David Bloomgarden and Dennis A. Blumenfeld) Part III: Institutional Economics and Public-Private Partnerships 6. Risk Allocation, Transaction Cost Economics and PPP (Xiao-Hua Jin) 7. Incomplete Contracts and Public-Private Partnerships (Gordon Rausser and Holly Ameden) 8. Is Public-Private Partnerships Obsolete? Assessing the Obstacles and Shortcomings of PPP (Claude Menard) 9. Game Theory and PPP (S. Ping Ho) 10. Corruption and Public- Private Partnerships (Elisabetta Iossa) Part IV: Financing and Public-Private Partnerships 11. PPPs and Project Finance (E.R Yescombe) Part V: Public Sector Economics and Public-Private Partnerships 12. Risk Allocation Model (RA Model): The Critical Success Factor for Public- Private Partnerships (G. Girmscheid) 13. Public Budget Norms and PPP: An anomaly (Piet de Vries) Part VI: Recent Financial Crisis and Public-Private Partnerships 14. Weathering the Financial Crisis: Public-Private Partnerships and the Government Response (Philippe Burger, Justin Tyson, Izabella Karpowicz and Maria Coelho) 15. Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises and PPP Market Structure (Etienne B. Yehoue) Part VII: Governance of Public-Private Partnerships 16. Partnerships Arrangements in Public-Private Partnerships: Insights from Irish Road Public-Private Partnerships (Istemi Demirag and Richard Burke) 17. On the Perception and Management of Legal Risks in Public-Private Partnerships for Infrastructure (Yiannis Xenidis) Part VIII: Accountability, Auditing and Assessment of Public-Private Partnerships 18. Accountability and Accounting for PPPs (Ron Hodges) 19. Accountability and Public-Private Partnership Contracts: Un Mariage de Convenance? (Istemi Demirag and Iqbal Kharadoo) 20. Public-Private Partnerships: International Auditing Findings (Ineke Boers, Freek Hoek, Cor van Montfort and Jan Wieles)

Public Private Partnership (PPP) contracts have drawn considerable media interest due to a number of problems such as cost overruns, mismanagement and failure. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyse media discourse relating to the failure of a PPP contract between the South African Department of Labour (DOL) and Siemens Information Services (SIS). The contract pertained to the provision and implementation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) services for the DOL. The theoretical foundation for this research is Habermas' theory of communicative action which focuses on normative standards for communication and implications of public speech. Our research builds on a growing literature on critical discourse analysis (CDA) that systematically applies Habermas' validity claims to empirical research on public communication focused on revealing distortions concerning claims of truth, sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility. Our study contributes to understanding issues of public accountability of PPP contracts and extends the reach of critical research into PPP contracting for information systems (IS) services and highlights key challenges of the lack of public sector management competences in securing the public interest in PPP engagements.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to establish a conceptual framework to assist decision makers in identifying an appropriate decision-supporting method (DSM) to evaluate public-private partnership (PPP) contract types in a disciplined and systematic manner.Design/methodology/approachA systematic literature review was conducted to compare and analyse DSMs in construction procurement processes, and explore the benefits and limitations of using DSMs. A conceptual framework is then developed to accommodate client characteristics when selecting DSM in a PPP context. An example was obtained to illustrate the implementation of the proposed framework.FindingsDSMs employed in the procurement method selection are identified by using a systemic literature review. The benefits and limitations of each DSM are established and comparisons of DSMs are provided to fit the client characteristics and a conceptual framework is developed to assist decision makers in choosing DSM for contract selection.Originality/valueThis paper demonstrates a link between DSMs and PPP contracts which adds value at the stage of PPP contract evaluation. Also, the proposed framework sheds some light on an important aspect of the public sector to consider the improvement of current policies (PPP framework/guideline).

Public-private partnership (PPP) contracts in Indonesia are designed to accelerate infrastructure development by mobilizing private financing and expertise. However, they often raise concerns regarding fairness when private profits outweigh public interests. This study examines the implementation of the principle of proportionality as a legal safeguard to balance rights, obligations, risks, and benefits within PPP contracts. Using a normative-empirical approach, the research analyzes statutory frameworks such as Presidential Regulation No. 38 of 2015, doctrinal insights from proportionality and contractual balance theories, and qualitative data from interviews with government officials, state-owned enterprises, legal experts, and community representatives. Case studies of projects such as Palapa Ring, Umbulan Water Supply, Kertajati Airport, Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railways (Whoosh), Cisumdawu Toll Road, and the Balikpapan–Samarinda Toll Road illustrate how proportionality operates in practice through mechanisms such as risk allocation, Viability Gap Fund, and Availability Payment schemes. The findings indicate that Indonesia has institutionalized proportionality to some extent—particularly through standardized risk-sharing and government support—yet significant challenges remain, including tariff fairness, demand risk, and regulatory clarity. The study concludes that proportionality is not merely a doctrinal principle but a practical requirement for achieving equitable PPP contracts. Ensuring proportionality enhances public trust, protects vulnerable groups, and sustains investor confidence, ultimately reconciling private profit with public welfare in infrastructure partnerships.