The Legal and Political Aspects of Population Control in the United States

Liberalism and Married Women’s Property Rights in Nineteenth-Century Latin America

The subject of this commentary is the complex interrelationship between abortion and contraceptive use in the control of fertility. While both are interventions designed to manage unwanted pregnancy, there are significant differences between the 'preventive' and 'curative' approaches. The significance stems from abortion being a procedure that provokes fundamental and contentious questions about human life, such as when life begins, as well as highlighting the rights of the mother versus the rights of the foetus, and the obligation of governments to protect the unborn child (1).There is sufficient historical evidence to conclude that no societies have achieved low fertility without recourse to use of some form of contraception together with abortion. So, an important and topical question that arises from this inter-relationship is whether the provision of high-quality contraceptive services can reduce or substitute for abortion. A recent Lancet article based on data from the ICDDR,B fieldsite in Matlab supports the substitution argument, at least in the context of Bangladesh (2). These findings are discussed below.A broader related issue here is whether all societies passing through the demographic transition follow a similar pattern. Such a pattern might hypothetically involve an initial stage where growing awareness of the concept of fertility regulation results in increasing contraceptive use and increasing use of abortion simultaneously, and fertility levels decline from high to intermediate levels. In the second stage of the fertility transition, contraceptive practice becomes more widespread and more efficient (reflected in fewer contraceptive failures), and the resort to abortion decreases, although it may never be completely eliminated.This hypothesis assumes that the majority of couples would prefer to prevent unwanted pregnancies through contraceptive use rather than through abortion. An alternative hypothesis might be that if abortion is freely accessible, couples would have little incentive to practise responsible contraception. This raises the question of whether the balance between use of abortion and use of contraception depends on the availability of these two interventions.It is instructive to review what the experiences of developed countries-both European and Asian-reveal about this issue of the balance between these two interventions. In fact, several patterns have been described by Potts et al. in their classic text (3). In periods of economic hardship in the late 19th and early to mid- 20th centuries, a number of Western and Northern European countries, the United States, and Australia, experienced fertility declines nearly to replacement level well before effective modern contraception was available. The mechanism included resort to illegal abortion and remarkably effective use of inherentlyinefficient contraceptive methods, such as withdrawal (coitus interruptus), in a social context of nuclear families and late marriage.In the more eastern countries of Western Europe, such as Romania and Bulgaria, the effective practice of withdrawal had never been widespread, and abortion played the dominant role. In the former USSR-the first country to permit legal abortion (in 1920)-up to 3 of 4 pregnancies were being aborted, at least in Moscow. However, this pattern was not confined to the period prior to the availability of modern contraceptives. In the early 1960s, there were 14 abortions for every delivery in the largest obstetric hospital in Romania. As occurred earlier in the former USSR, the Romanian government restricted the liberal abortion law in 1966. Unfortunately, they also simultaneously restricted access to modern contraception. Consequently, the birth rate tripled from 13 to 40 per 1,000 in less than one year. As is often the case, the restrictive law was bypassed, and skyrocketing resort to illegal abortion brought the birth rate back to 20 within two years.In Asia, the experience was more similar to that in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. …

There is no official population policy in Peru. The countrys health programs concentrate on morbidity and mortality control and ignore natality. Despite this and the fact that the Catholic Church is forceful and influential in this predominantly Catholic country there are indications that Peruvian families are trying to limit their size. As this information is essential for the planning and adoption of a national population policy a study was initiated to learn the attitudes and practices of the population regarding family planning. An area-cluster sampling method was used and a sample of 500 Peruvian women living in Lima and ranging from 20-39 in age were interviewed in their homes by 12 qualified social workers. The questionnaire used covered general characteristics of the women interviewed and her family and housing conditions menstrual history current and former contraceptive history social and economic level and opinion on family limitation. It was found that abortions are a means of fertility control in Lima and that they are resorted to particularly by women who are of the upper and middle social and economic classes who are over 30 and who already have 3 or 4 children. Results also revealed that women of these same classes use contraception. At the time they were interviewed the proportion of women who were sexually active and who were using contraception was 68% in the upper class 54% in the middle class and 38% in the lower class. Of all methods the condom and rhythm were the 2 most used among all classes. In addition to the condom the upper and middle classes used the rhythm method while the lower class also douched and used coitus interruptus. 78% of the women who gave their religion as Catholic were using a method other than rhythm and coitus interruptus which have the Churchs approval. A majority of women among all classes approved of family planning.

Black Catholicism

The use of fracking is a tremendously important technology for the recovery of oil and gas, but the advantages and costs of fracking remain controversial. This book examines the issues and social, economic, political, and legal aspects of fracking in the United States. Hydraulic fracturing of oil and gas wells—known commonly as “fracking”—has been in use in the United States for more than half a century. In recent years, however, massive expansion of shale gas fracturing across the nation has put fracking in the public eye. Is fracking a “win win” like its proponents say, or are there significant costs and dangers associated with the use of this energy production technology? This book examines fracking from all angles, addressing the promise of the United States becoming energy independent through the use of the process to tap the massive amounts of natural gas and oil available as well as the host of problems associated with fracking—groundwater contamination and increased seismic activity, just to mention two—that raise questions about the long-term feasibility of the process as a source of natural gas. The first part of the book provides a historical background of the topic; a review of technical information about fracking; and a detailed discussion of the social, economic, political, legal, and other aspects of the current fracking controversy. The second part of the book provides a host of resources for readers seeking to learn even more in-depth information about the topic, supplying a chronology, glossary, annotated bibliography, and profiles of important individuals and organizations. Written specifically for students and young adults, the content is accessible to readers with little or no previous knowledge regarding fracking.

Coitus Interruptus: Considerations as a Method of Birth Control

Jim livingston’s essay on “Why the Left Needs America” in this issue of Tikkun is a classic expression of American liberalism, which holds that America has no need for a Left since it is already radical, free, democratic, participatory, self-correcting, and so forth. The Left needs America but America does not need a Left, he argues. Madison, Jefferson, and the Founding Fathers are terrific; Marx is irrelevant.Having written Why America Needs a Left — the book that provoked Livingston’s response — to dispel these all-too- familiar bromides, I am happy to have the opportunity to rebut his claims and explain why liberalism, as we see it today, without a Left is spineless, and why the country desperately needs an ongoing, self-aware Left.My conception of the Left is a stringent one. It has nothing to do with alliances between workers and intellectuals, Leninist cadres, political party organizations, and Livingston’s other flights of fancy. I called my book “Why America needs a Left,” not “Why America needs the Left,” because I do not believe America has a self-aware Left at present, and because I do not pretend to prescribe what form any future Left should take. Whatever its form, moreover, my view is that a Left represents but one element of a solution to the nation’s structural problems, not the solution as such. After all, the history of the American Left is episodic and discontinuous, flaring up only during thirty or forty years of the country’s existence, and it was only in 1926 that the term “Left” in its political sense even appeared in a book title. Nonetheless, the rebirth of a Left will prove indispensable to any reversal of America’s palpable present-day unwinding.To understand my core argument, think of American history as a suspension bridge that rests on three pillars. These pillars are not stable concrete pylons, however, but rather the three great long-term crises of American history — those concerning slavery, industry, and finance. Just as there have been three crises, so there have been three Lefts: the abolitionists, the Popular Front (an anti-fascist alliance of socialists, liberal Democrats, and union activists in the 1930s), and the New Left of the 1960s and ’70s. Each of the first two crises ended with a structural reform: the abolition of slavery and the creation of the welfare state. In those cases, the role of the Left was to bend structural reform toward the goal of equality. The third case is somewhat more complicated, as we shall see. But taken together, the three Lefts constitute a tradition, one that we need to revive today.The broad differences between Livingston’s view and mine stem from the fact that he is primarily concerned with extending liberal values to those who are excluded from them, whereas my analysis derives from Marx, who argued that progress is blocked by the same internal capitalist dynamic that created progress in the first place. Livingston takes a progressive, linear view of U.S. history, whereas my view stresses discontinuity, conflict, and regression. According to Livingston, the revolutions that launched the modern world were about self-government and the consent of the governed. Capitalism, he informs us, was not even an issue. I argue, by contrast, that there were two revolutions in mid-seventeenth-century England — one that succeeded and one that failed. The revolution that succeeded removed all impediments previously suffered by men of property. The attempted revolution that failed to win its goals had promised communal property, a wide democracy, and the disestablishment of the state church. The conflict between democratic, lower-class radicals and people of property was intrinsic to the democratic revolutions, even though this did not take the form of capitalists vs. workers until the nineteenth century.A proper conception of capitalism is critical to the idea of a Left. Capitalism cannot be reduced to the market because it also comprises the exploitative social system that organizes social labor into two classes, one of which appropriates a surplus from the labor of the other. The exploitative, deceptive, and dual character of capitalism — market and class — installs ambivalence at the center of liberalism. On the one hand, liberalism’s formal or procedural understanding of equality serves to disguise exploitation. On the other, it can serve as the departure point for struggles to build a deeper, more substantive equality. The latter requires a Left. To be sure, there are thinkers, such as Ronald Dworkin or Michael Walzer, who hold that a consistent, vigorous liberalism can itself resolve this ambivalence. But they make their arguments on hypothetical grounds whereas my argument is historical and can only be refuted by a historical counter-argument.Just as capitalism has a dual structure, one dimension of which is formal equality, the other exploitation, so the history of the United States has a dual structure. On the one side, the Revolution established national independence and enshrined the ideal of freedom, as Livingston well states. But with the abolition of slavery, America had a second birth. One national story begins in 1776 and stands for national independence and individual freedom, including the freedom of the slaveholder to own slaves, or the freedom of the property owner to exploit the property-less. The second national story begins with Emancipation and stands for equality, without which freedom devolves into tyranny. Like a double helix, the two strands — liberal and leftist — became entwined with one another in our history. Although neither stands alone, it is only during periods of crisis that their interdependence becomes fully clear. A sequence of three long-term or secular crises provides the best lens for grasping the internal conflicts that drive American history.The first American crisis was over slavery. Indeed, the whole Madisonian apparatus of factions, horse trading, and pluralism was created to keep the slavery issue out of politics because it was seen as “too divisive.” It took the first American Left to disrupt the pluralist, “democratic” framework, and to put not just slavery but also racial discrimination against “free Negroes” on the political agenda. In the course of doing so, the abolitionists invented much of the repertoire of the subsequent American Left, including nonviolent resistance, democratic agitation, cultural and sexual experimentation, and unremitting attempts to shame the liberal, hypocritical majority. Most importantly, and this is the main reason I call them the first American Left, they went beyond the abolition of slavery to racial equality. They cultivated Black leadership, actively incorporated escaped slaves and ex-slaves into their organizations, and developed interracial friendships, sexual relations, and marriages. No comparable sensitivity to the problems of equality between individuals across racial lines can be found anywhere in the Founding Fathers’ many weighty tomes. The idea of racial equality is a unique contribution of the first American Left.The Civil War was a crisis that arose from a tectonic shift in the organization of capitalism from slave labor to free labor, and could be resolved only by a structural transformation: the abolition of slavery. But abolition had a built-in ambivalence: Pursued in one way, it could justify exploitation in its market capitalist form, while in another it could serve as a spur toward greater equality. America needed a Left to resolve the ambivalence of abolition in favor of equality. But the Civil War was also a crisis in U.S. identity. Abolitionists made it impossible for Americans to respond to slavery with equanimity and indifference, inspiring them to center their national story on the pursuit of equality, not just independence.An analogous dynamic played out in America’s second crisis, during the Great Depression and World War II. This was the crisis of industrial capitalism, manifested in a series of depressions that had begun in the 1850s and were recognized as systemic in the 1890s, when such terms as “overproduction” and “glut” entered the language. Not economic problems per se, these depressions were taken as social and political crises that could only be resolved through a structural transformation, in this case the building of a modern state. The Great Depression of the 1930s, then, was the turning point in a long-term crisis just as the Civil War had been a turning point in a long-term crisis.Just as slavery would have ended without the abolitionists, so a modern, administrative state would have been created without the socialists. Such a state was necessary to reform capitalism, but capitalism could have been reformed without advancing social equality. What the socialists and Communists added was a broad-based series of social democratic movements, including those among industrial workers, African Americans, immigrants, and women, which infused the New Deal with egalitarian goals. Thus, if the first American Left helped insure that the abolition of slavery would be imprinted with the ideal of racial equality, the second stamped the ideal of social equality on the welfare state.It was only during the thirties that the idea of the Left as a permanent, ongoing radical presence was invented. To be sure, the idea had existed in Europe, which had a parliamentary system, and placed “ideological” conflict — left, center, right — at the core of its politics. But American radicals reformulated the European idea to fit the two-party system. They connected union movements, movements of the unemployed, and civil rights struggles of their day with abolitionists, early feminists, and Debsian socialists of the past in an effort to create a tradition. Inseparable from the then-new idea of a Left was the idea of crisis. The counterpart to the idea of crisis was the idea of an organized working class, i.e., an agent capable of transforming capitalism. While twentieth-century American reformers inspired by John Dewey stood for democratic participation and dialogue, they had not before attempted to organize a counterweight to capitalist power. This is why C. Wright Mills, asked to define his politics on the eve of the New Left, called them “to the left of Dewey.”In addition, the New Deal launched a social and cultural revolution, which spelled the end of an older, status-bound, WASP-dominated America. The Popular Front — the anti-fascist alliance of liberals and the Left — embodied everything that “offended the pieties . . . of Middle America,” according to Steve Fraser: gaudy cosmopolitanism, “Jewishness,” flirtations with radicalism, elevation of the new immigrant, intellectual arrogance, and racial egalitarianism. The seeds of the sixties were sown there.The success of the New Deal in creating a modern, democratic state and in unblocking capitalist productive forces established the context in which the New Left emerged. Of the three Lefts I have discussed, the New Left was at once the most short-lived and the most enduring. If it seemed like an explosive burst of rebellious energy that burnt out by the early seventies, it also set the contours for what remains the Left of our day. Unlike the first two Lefts, which flourished at the point when an ongoing crisis was being resolved, the New Left emerged during the opening stages of a crisis whose resolution has not yet been achieved. Let us look at the New Left from that perspective.The starting point for understanding the structural crisis confronted by the New Left lies in the huge wave of democratization released by the New Deal and World War II. This wave unfolded both at the level of the economy and at the level of society and culture. At the level of the economy, the New Deal’s elevation of the working class made the shift from industrial manufacturing to a high-tech, knowledge-based consumer society possible, which in turn involved a change in the dynamics of capitalism. Industrial capitalism, based on the accumulation of labor-time, began to give way to post-industrial capitalism, based on the release of labor-time. Whereas accumulation encouraged collective action and state coordination, post-industrialism was centrifugal, dispersive, and even “post-economic,” as suggested by the appearance of such terms as “affluence” and “automation” in the 1950s and “the triple revolution” in the following decade.The shift to high-tech, market-based consumerism did not occur in a linear fashion. The depth of the blockages that had to be overcome is suggested by the explosive burst of McCarthyism, which followed the war. McCarthyism’s intense, all-consuming anti-communism was supported not only by reactionary upholders of middle-class, small-town values, but also by globally oriented capitalists. The Cold War liberals extolled by Livingston created the liberal paradigm of the late twentieth century — the politics of fear and the politics of growth — as a response to McCarthyism.The politics of fear reflected the danger of atomic weapons and held that foreign policy was too important to be left to democratic discussion, which could easily be captured by mass hysteria. Drawing on such precedents as the U.S. invasion of the Philippines, liberals endorsed surveillance, the security state, militarization, and the fetish of secrecy. Madisonian pluralists all, they turned their backs not just on Communism but also on civil liberties and individual freedoms. Throughout this period, there was no Dreyfus case in America, no widespread protest against persecution.The politics of growth complemented the politics of fear. The core idea was that economic growth, as measured by GDP, would allow the country to bypass the divisiveness and conflict that had accompanied New Deal reforms, such as unionization. Economics, so the theory went, was “trans-political.” Rejecting the very term “capitalism,” pluralists argued that business was simply one interest group among many. Works such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr.’s The Vital Center (1949) defined a new politics cleansed of “ideology” and “class struggle,” which were “too divisive.” Defining liberalism as a practical program requiring compromise and technocratic skills, they condemned a politics that served as “an outlet for private grievances and frustrations,” which is how Schlesinger characterized the Left.The Cold War era strengthened U.S. civil rights efforts, as the Russians publicized lynching, Jim Crow statutes, and anti-Semitic discriminations. The popularity of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique (1963) and the founding of the National Organization for Women (NOW) (1966) demonstrated the new political power of women. Thus, liberals were poised to launch an overall set of structural reforms that would bring America into the postwar world: an activist foreign policy including immigration reform, a knowledge economy, the end of Jim Crow, and the end of the family wage.In the 1960s, accordingly, the United States was poised on the cusp of a profound structural transformation. Aimed at freeing the country from backward forms of authority, old-boy networks, short-sighted businessmen, and tradition-bound opponents of change, this transformation was analogous to the previous two moments of structural transformation: the Civil War and the New Deal. As in the preceding moments, however, the transformation was ambiguous in its implications. Would it lead to meritocracy or to equality, to a two-tier society or to social justice, to antinomian consumerism or egalitarian self-organization? The New Left arose to answer this question.The New Left of the sixties — known at the time as “the movement” — is one of the great success stories of American history, although this is little understood today. Its success lay in challenging long-established codes of protest, which had long diverted radical voices into harmless and counter productive channels. Thus, the radical or left wing of the Civil Rights Movement (SNCC) confronted the vilest forms of racial segregation on an existential basis. The radical or left wing of the antiwar movement (originally SDS) forced the American people to confront their odious war, and the imperialist presuppositions that fostered it. The radical or left wing of the liberal women’s movement (“women’s liberation”) forced both men and women to confront the ties between heterosexuality and misogyny.If the New Left was struggling to shape the meaning of the great structural reforms of the sixties, such as civil rights for African Americans and for women, and a shift toward a gentler, more humane foreign policy, it was also shaping the meaning of the cultural revolution. One did not need the Left to see that the sixties marked the first full–scale emergence of mass consumer culture. One did need the Left, however, to expose the alliance between Democratic Party liberals and Mississippi segregationists; to grasp the corporate and military control of the universities; to acknowledge the almost incalculable extent to which the government lies to its people, especially concerning war; to grasp the continuity between racism, colonialism, and the war in Vietnam; to see that schools, prisons, and doctors’ offices were sites of power; to develop critical subfields in every academic discipline; to see sexism as a deep structure of human history, not simply a form of discrimination; and to build ties of solidarity with the poorest people on the planet, and with homosexuals, women, and racial minorities. Like its predecessors, then, the New Left sought to bend a major economic and cultural transformation in the direction of equality.The effects of the New Left on American society and culture have been almost incalculable. An entirely new consciousness of race, gender, and sexuality has transformed language, lifestyle, and institutions. Skepticism meets every proposed American intervention abroad. Academic life has been transformed, not only by the entry of minorities and women, but also by the creation of whole new subfields and by the transformation of canonical knowledge. The press owes whatever willingness it has to challenge authority to the New Left. A host of new political issues including abortion, gay marriage, and ecology occupy center stage. A moral revolution in the treatment of prisoners, the mentally ill, patients, and immigrants occurred. The churches, perhaps especially the Catholic Church, developed liberation theologies. The election of a black president in 2008, whatever his politics, testifies to the impact of the Civil Rights Movement. We are only at the beginning of understanding the full of the on and on and of the of that up in the early its many however, the New Left is a today. To answer that we first two of In one sense the Left will because it stands for that cannot be in the In another however, the New Left failed in that it did not build a radical In my neither this the turn that followed the sixties was have argued that if John had not been he would have taken the country out of including those of and also played a In any the goal of shaping the creation of a post-industrial world in an egalitarian direction became even war in was the turning the late sixties, to the war had the American economy, and in the was by the of and In was forced to take the United States the which to the creation of a national and market by U.S. and As in a century capitalists became as to who to in manufacturing were to labor for with the of to more New terms entered our language, including and Although the country between Left and the seventies, by the end of the the idea of a radical presence in American life had been we the American liberal against the of this shift to the its liberals had already on to the of the — the politics of growth as to structural or reform, and the of anti-communism — they were to a of the an of and In however, the into one of the great periods in American history for those with or i.e., claims on including and Such individuals turned to every out of and a of that of and and At the same of both through and other forms of i.e., The was the series of and crises, which began with the and and the American crises of the and which has in the a huge of to the which the market without my analysis to this story is how the of the Left has been to it. After all, the is to the issue of and of — “class — into the the time of the when to he an on for the left, especially among who in Democratic the The Revolution was and the political Left equality was while and meritocracy were in The the of and . . . was a new more the out of people in what were seen as their by the of the free The was the two-tier society we see today. Livingston this as the of the Left, because we much about racism, and gay But this is because we about these problems in to and not years the that America is in a long-term crisis, requiring a new has the United States has three to itself After the of in the free to the new world with U.S. After when are all the United States launched the invasion of In was to for but failed to change a based on fear and the for civil a to a like is the best of its state. The United States by a invasion and to the of its the Left has not its the of in and in The left wing of the Democratic Party the in 2008, not only because of the involved in an African American but even more because of his that the country needed a new not just new the of class and social into American and the the it needed for To be sure, both of these can be seen as in that they created no reforms, or but that is why we need not just inspired moments but also an ongoing Left. If we do not create such a Left, the will as they have both for be Livingston’s idea of a happy but it is not that of a of Livingston, I the American of individual rights and freedom, which has only a in the Unlike Livingston, however, I also the Left that out of that tradition. of the American Left make it on the of world history. The first is its of racial equality, extending into the of The second is its of a form of social that liberal values, including many of the The third is its profound of and If we to build a politics on a liberal of these great moments, we build on

THE LANDS WERE NOT EMPTY

Ethical Principles and Health Care Reform

The 1964 report of the US Surgeon General on smoking and health made an authoritative case that tobacco smoking was a cause of premature deaths from lung cancer and chronic bronchitis. It justified the practice of drawing causal inferences from epidemiological studies, specified influential criteria for doing so, and made use of an early form of meta-analysis.

Readers Respond: Letters from Summer 2011

Many individuals and organizations have had a part in the making of this book. They have described influences and forces whose interaction has resulted in the present pattern of our hospital services, and documented their interpretations. The result is a source book of basic information which should be valuable for all students of hospital problems. The Commission was appointed by the American Hospital Association, and chosen to represent a wide range of those providing hospital, health and welfare services, as well as the consuming public.

A visitor from outer space, considering our planet today, might well conclude that the most important recent development of man's activities on earth was his control of deaths and his control of births. These two interrelated phenomena between them determine man's numbers and in many ways affect his quality. On anything like their present scale, they are of very recent origin. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, an average length of life of thirty-five to forty years may have been common in various localities among civilized nations. By I901, expectation of life in Massachusetts had risen to over forty-six years for men and forty-nine years for women. Today in the United States, it is over sixty-seven years for men and over seventy-two years for women.' The first widespread practice of fertility control took place in France in the early part of the nineteenth century, but it was not until the Bradlaugh-Besant trials in England in i8772 that antifertility practices became widely used and began to gain public acceptance. Today in the United States, according to the most recent studies, over eighty-five per cent of married women practice some form of fertility control, and births have fallen to 2.3 per woman of completed fertility in I958, as compared to five per woman at the turn of the century.3 Similar changes have more recently taken place in the Soviet Union and even more recently in Japan.4 But in the rest of the world, the picture is very different. By the use of serums, antibiotics, and insecticides, death rates can now be dramatically reduced, as they have been in Ceylon, Malaya, the Caribbean area, Venezuela, and Chile. These countries experienced in less than a decade a decline in death rates that it took the western world half a century to achieve. But while death rates are going down

Foreign policy is an integral part of international relations. This study examines the United States (US) foreign policy towards Jordan from 1990 to 2017 since the period witnessed important regional and international political events that significantly impacted the US foreign policy. These events have the greatest impact on the development of relations between the two countries in terms of political and security aspects. The study looks at four political events and their impacts on Jordanian-American relations from the political and security aspects. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to examine the US foreign policy towards Jordan from the political and security aspects. This study adopted the qualitative approach. The primary data were collected from interviews while the secondary data were obtained from books, journals, theses, newspapers, seminar papers, articles and other documents. In this study, 16 respondents from political, economic and security experts in Jordan and the US were selected for semi-structured interviews. The study employed Thematic Analysis in analysing the data obtained. This study adopted the neo-realism theory as a theoretical framework. This study found that the US foreign policy recognizes Jordan as a close ally and considers its stability very important. The US foreign policy was seen slightly negative towards Jordan during the Iraqi War on Kuwait in 1990. However, the Wadi Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994 had promoted positive US foreign policy towards Jordan. This policy was slightly weakened in 2017 due to the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem. Certain political events play an important role in the US foreign policy regarding security aid towards Jordan. The study found that the US foreign policy provides security support to Jordan to protect Israel, spread American ideology and fight against its enemy. This research also found that Jordan has a suitable location to defend Israel because the country is surrounded by important Arab countries. The US links its aids to Jordan due to political events. Accordingly, the study recommends the necessity for the Jordanian state to increase its influential economic alliances at the international level. In addition, Jordanian policy must be redrawn in line with international realities to pressure the US to make Jordan play an active role in the region and international arena. Jordan should better use its geographical location to achieve international cooperation and enhance Arab security as a barrier against Israel.

Nearer, My God, to Thee