The Last Interpreter

In this article, we attempt to explore Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its relation to the world. Our focus is on the question of whether Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity can be seen as transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ in response to critical examinations made by philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Patočka, and Biemel. While their critiques have complex implications and are subject to debate, they contribute to our understanding of the intricate relationship between transcendental subjectivity and the world. It is important to clarify that this article aims to defend Husserl’s perspective rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of the critiques. We argue that, according to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, transcendental subjectivity is, in fact, integrated within the world’s transcendental structure. This argument is supported by three main points. Firstly, Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity and its internal consciousness are not secluded but remain open and intentionally related to the external world. Secondly, Husserl clarifies the sense of transcendental ‘being-in-the-world,’ with subjective constitution revealing its sense. Lastly, Husserl proposes the notion of transcendental person as an attempt to address how transcendental subjectivity exists concretely in the life-world. This holistic perspective sought to provide a comprehensive understanding of transcendentally grounded subjectivity and its embodied existence in the world with the essential state of ‘being-in-the world.’

Three piano pieces of Liudmila Shukailo in the context of genre paradigm

The article presents Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies with reference to Hartmann’s understanding of irrationality. In Hartmann’s metaphysics of cognition, irrationality, which corresponds with partial unknowability of being, appears to be an argument against idealism that assumes a complete rationality of our knowledge and its object. In this article the author shows that it is possible to indicate similarities between Kant’s idea of the unknowability of the transcendental object, Husserl’s conception of the transcendental constitution of the world, and Hartmann’s concept of gnoseological irrationality. In Kant’s transcendentalism, irrationality implies an asymmetry between the conditions of the possibility of experience and the conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, because the unknowability of a transcendental object and a thing in itself indicates that not all conditions of the objects are at the same time conditions of the possibility of experience. According to Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is not a sufficient reason for the world in its Dasein and Sosein , because the fact of the constitution of the world is an irrational one and it cannot be derived from the essence of subjectivity. The author tries to demonstrate that this analogy between Husserl and Hartmann, in the question of the irrationality, opens new interpretational possibilities for the relation between transcendental phenomenology and Hartmann’s philosophy.

In speaking of the concept of passive constitution and passive synthesis, we raise the central problem in the interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. It is with the introduction of this concept that transcendental phenomenology distinguishes itself from traditional transcendental philosophies which, since Kant, have considered all syntheses as the “spontaneity of an act of understanding.” Yet it is not only the relationship of phenomenology to this tradition but also its own character as a theory of transcendental constitution which is still controversial. Twenty years ago Eugene Fink already pointed out that Husserl’s use of the term “constitution” fluctuates “between sense-formation and creation.”1 Instead of “sense-formation” one can also use the term “apperception” which means the apprehending and determining of something as something. Husserl’s most important and basic operative concepts lack precision, particularly in the case of his concept of “transcendental life.” And yet it is only after we have made these basic concepts precise that we can answer the question: who or what really is the “transcendental subjectivity”? In response to this question we do not have, as is well known, a general consensus.

Two views have characterized the mainstream reception of Husserl’s work based on his lifetime’s publications. One considers his method and philosophy as primarily theoretical and dependent on the Cartesian paradigm. The other regards his eidetic method as caught in a “logicism of essences.” Both endured after Husserl’s 1936 Crisis and the later publications of his Nachlass. Thus the view has prevailed that his work was unable to address questions concerning concrete existence, historical facticity, ethical life, and metaphysical problems. Offsetting this view, this paper examines the origin and underlying arguments of these two interpretations and attempts to shed new light on both. In doing so, the paper accomplishes two tasks. First, it uncovers the eminently practical nature of Husserl’s transcendental subjectivity as a functioning active (constitutive) ego. Second, it reveals the existential roots of his transcendental ego. Both approaches stand together, and their upshot is a non-conventional, “unitary,” interpretation of Husserl’s work.KeywordsHusserl’s transcendental phenomenology and its receptionPractical philosophyActive egoFactual existenceUnifying vision

Reviewed by: Medieval and Early Modern Murder: Literary and Historical Contexts ed. by Larissa Tracy Samaya Borom Tracy, Larissa, ed., Medieval and Early Modern Murder: Literary and Historical Contexts, Woodbridge, The Boydell Press, 2018; hardback; pp. 500; 1 b/w illustration; R.R.P. £60.00; ISBN 9781783273119. Historical accounts tell us that murder has always been present, from Sumerian codes of Ur-Nammu in 1900 bce through to contemporary societies’ fascination with most things crime related. Whilst the modus operandi of murder is somewhat consistent, there had been a change within society in understanding and prosecuting the matter, and this is where Medieval and Early Modern Murder: Literary and Historical Contexts makes for fascinating reading. In introducing Medieval and Early Modern Murder: Literary and Historical Contexts, Larissa Tracy argues that there is a long historical tradition around criminal justice; however, the ways in which society understands murder, manslaughter and justified or unjustified homicide has been shaped by both use of legal terminology as well as how law in society has been disseminated and understood. The book is broken into three parts, with essays thematically grouped to illustrate the ways in which murder was conceptualized and impacted upon communities and society in the Middle Ages. The first part, ‘Murder on Trial; Justice, Law and Society’, focuses on historical and legal frameworks for the prosecution of murder, such as Bridgette Slavin analysing the ninth-century Irish text Cáin Adamnáin (Law of Adomnán) and murder by magic. The second part of the book, with the theme ‘The Public Hermeneutics of Murder: Interpretation and Context’, looks closely at the ways in which murder and the assassination of political heads and influential figures is contextualized by the state and how this played out in public imaginings around power, religion, and society, in essays such as Matthew Lubin’s ‘Poisoning as a Means of State Assassination in Early Modern Venice’. The final part of the book presents chapters around ‘Murder in the Community: Gender, Youth and Family’, analysing how murder was defined and understood within families and communities and the impact this had on them, such as Ben Parsons’s discussion on entertainment in ‘Imps of Hell: Young People, Murder and the Early English Press’. Early Modern Murder: Literary and Historical Contexts sets a new discourse around the Middle Ages and how we might conceive of the evolution of the criminal justice system. Its carefully chosen chapters illustrate the various ways in which the concept of murder has changed over time and how this jurisdictional understanding has impacted upon communities not only from the Middle Ages, but potentially through to modern times. [End Page 269] Samaya Borom Monash University Copyright © 2020 Samaya Borom

With the rapid development of social economy and the continuous improvement of people's living standard, the protection and continuation of historical context have been involved in the urban construction. In this case, the urban population increases constantly, and the cities develop towards the large scale, modernization and economization, encroaching on the protection and continuation of historical context, so many historic context with important historical value have also been disappearing. Therefore, we should attach importance to the inheritance and continuation of the historical context, and further enhance the urban construction. China has long historical tradition with rich cultural relics and historical and cultural ancient towns all over the country. These historical and cultural ancient towns are characterized by beautiful environment, ecological harmony and numerous traditional architectures, which is the most important landscape resource for tourism. But with the rapid development of social economy and continuous improvement of people's living standards, each city has started the mass-demolishing and mass-construction in order to quickly build the "modern city", so a lot of traditional cultural buildings are the first to be affected and nibbled by the urbanization. In this regard, the continuation and protection of historical context in China has been in the difficult period.

In the past several decades, feminist historians of religious traditions have challenged settled assumptions about women's roles in historical societies. Feminist histories of religious traditions investigate a complex usually neglected even by women's histories, namely, the intricately imbricated effects of religion, gender, and culture. Indeed, attention to the gendered discourses of historical societies alters the questions historians ask and the evidence they seek, as well as their reconstruction of those societies Feminist history developed rapidly in the last decades of the twentieth century. It began with exposing the inadequacies and distortions of historical accounts that uncritically study males, the organizers and administrators of public life in their societies. Historians of women's experience added invaluable detailed studies of women's roles, writings, and activities. But the larger task of reconstructing inclusive histories remains to be done. This roundtable discussion focuses a conversation among feminist historians of several religious traditions on the topic of how inclusive histories of these traditions can best be achieved. It raises several fundamental questions about terms and methods. To mention just one example: in the text that follows, I use the terms feminist history, women's history, and inclusive history in slightly nuanced ways in relation to Christian traditions. These (and perhaps other) terms need to be defined more precisely in the context of different religious traditions Historians routinely read the writings of other historians working in different historical contexts for methodological suggestions. Some of these suggestions may indeed be detachable from the contexts in which they have been applied and may be usable in quite other inquiries; some may not. The conversation that follows will help to identify the advantages and problems entailed in [End Page 45] adopting and adapting methodological suggestions for feminist interpretations of religious traditions My contribution to the discussion takes as its starting point my own recent effort to construct an inclusive history of Christian thought. Writing The Word Made Flesh: A History of Christian Thought (Blackwell, 2005), I quickly learned that simply adding interesting and influential women was not sufficient to convey the complexity of the history I set out to develop. Rather, basic assumptions about historiography needed to be questioned. If women's experiences in Christian communities are taken seriously, for example, a triumphal narrative of Christianity's emergence from a small local cult within Judaism to a world religion and empire does not provide an adequate or accurate framework. In the past twenty-five years, many scholars have discussed Christian (male) leaders' ambivalence in regard to women. On the one hand, Christian women who acted on their commitment to their faith were considered exemplary and admired, and the few extant writings written by women testify that some women experienced authorization and empowerment in Christian movements. On the other hand, there is no dearth of evidence of hostility toward women, along with (largely successful) efforts by male leaders to control and constrain women's activities and to speak for them. At the very least, evidence from the first centuries of the Common Era demonstrates the existence of a vivid and complex debate over women's roles in Christian movements Feminist historians have usually found it impossible to claim exclusively either that women in these early Christian communities were helpless victims of a pervasive misogyny or that their faith provided new roles and opportunities; rather, both must be acknowledged and described. A feminist historian's task is further complicated by the ultimate impossibility of generalizations across geographical locations and centuries. Gillian Clark's Women in Late Antiquity (Oxford, 1993) exposes the bewildering and irreducibly local variations of legal, medical, and religious attitudes toward women in the Roman Empire. We do not yet have similarly detailed studies for women in societies outside the Roman world Thus notions of "progress" and "development," the traditional interpretive lenses of historical theology, elide the fundamental ambiguity of Christian women's experience. In fact, once the inadequacy of ideas of progress...

This research explores the differences in approaches to Qur'anic studies between the East and the West, focusing on the impact of historical contexts on the development of methodologies in both regions. In the East, Qur'anic studies are generally normative and rooted in established Islamic traditions, emphasizing spirituality and Islamic law. In contrast, Western approaches are more critical and analytical, employing historical, hermeneutic, and philological methodologies to understand the Qur'an within historical, sociological, and linguistic contexts. This study utilizes a historical analysis method to identify how historical, cultural, and academic traditions influence these differences. Data were collected through literature reviews from various relevant sources, including books, journals, and scholarly articles. The findings indicate that the historical contexts between the East and the West play a significant role in shaping the methods and understanding of Qur'anic studies. In the West, the focus on critical approaches often overlooks spiritual aspects, while in the East, the emphasis on tradition and religious authority tends to limit critical analysis. The research concludes that these different approaches have their respective strengths and weaknesses and that dialogue between these two traditions can enrich global understanding of the Qur'an. This study highlights the importance of considering historical and cultural backgrounds when developing more comprehensive and inclusive methodologies for Qur'anic studies.

Husserl’s “transcendental phenomenology and history” is not a new subject, but it is a young one. Only in the last decade have Husserl scholars given it greater attention. For a long time it may have seemed that Husserl’s philosophy had nothing to do with history, that history could not be its subject, since his transcendental phenomenology was concerned primarily with insights into general structures and ultimately into the essential structures of transcendental subjectivity and its world- constituting achievements.

According to Marx, revolutions do not bring about justice; they redefine it. A society sets out the possibilities for identifying and redressing injustice, and thus for imagining the scope and requirements of justice. In bourgeois society, the extraction of surplus value, whether at two or two thousand percent of the wages paid to the worker, is entirely just, as is making profit off of life-saving drugs and care for the elderly. Those who criticize such practices are called “utopian,” which is simply a way of saying that their demands lay outside the realm of the possible as it is structured by current law. Revolutionaries strive to expand the realm of the possible and, in this way, create the conditions for new values and new forms of justice. It is relatively easy to see how the Foucauldian critique of objective values could follow from this. Since there is no concept of justice that remains constant across revolutionary alterations in either what Marx called modes of production or what Foucault called “discursive regimes,” it makes no sense to appeal to an objective account of justice: every “justice” is internal to a discourse. 1 Although this conclusion is plausible, it is not a deductive argument: an absolute relativism on value does not follow necessarily from a historicist account about how values are either generated or justified. Neither their source nor their manner of justification determine whether value claims can refer; nor do they proscribe what value claims can refer to. Still, it is a complex project to show this, and Satya Mohanty has taken on the unenviable task of trying to spell out how an alternative, objective account of value is consistent with the view that historical context and political conditions are constitutive of moral and even aesthetic values. It is his substantial agreement with the historicist tradition, of which Marx is arguably the ablest theorist, that makes Mohanty’s chore all the more difficult. My own work has been more in epistemology and metaphysics than in moral philosophy, and so this paper will explore the epistemological dimensions of Mohanty’s claims as well as the plausibility of his metaphysics. The concept of objectivity, which is the focus of his arguments here, concerns both: it is a thesis about how we can know as well as what can be known. Although Mohanty at times makes use of pragmatic

Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) ranks among the leading thinkers of the twentieth century. His philosophical treatises developed and defended an original picture of human nature. He also wrote successful novels and plays that dramatized his important philosophical insights. While editing a leading popular journal of ideas, he addressed many contested political issues of his era with acumen and commitment. In addition, he published several literary biographies (and a partial autobiography) to demonstrate his approach to comprehending individuals in their historical contexts. His works stimulated responses from many of his most important contemporaries, for example, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, de Beauvoir and Camus. Being and Nothingness is subtitled An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Phenomenology is the systematic study of types of consciousness (or structures of human being) and their relationships to their objects. Sartre is an existential phenomenologist; he believes that lived experience can be described directly in a way that will yield important philosophical results. His approach is opposed to Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, the aim of which is to produce certain truths by withdrawing from the existential commitments of pre-reflective, lived experience. Husserl believed that all mental states emanate from an indubitable ego. Sartre argues that this ego appears only in the self-observational, reflective attitude Husserl presupposed and claims that no such ego exists in pre-reflective life. To the extent that people experience a continuant self, it derives from the defining gaze of others.

In my paper, I want to reflect on the validity of Husserl’s claim to have renewed the idea of transcendental philosophy, by identifying a new transcendental “Arbeitsfeld”: constitution of reality by absolute, intentional consciousness. I will do this on the basis of his project to found the “Geisteswissenschaften”. In anti-naturalist vein, Husserl argued convincingly for the necessity of the human sciences on the basis of a regional ontology of the human lifeworld, which demands a proper approach, founded on a specific so-called personalistic attitude. Furthermore, a “geisteswissenschaftliche” psychology must uncover the constitution of culture by fundamental intentional processes, which are embedded in a social and historical context. I will present this analysis in the first part. In the second part, I will argue that this mundane “Geisteswissenschaft” is problematical for Husserl’s transcendental project, which basically claims that the “geistige Welt” is a correlate of transcendental consciousness. If it is possible to study the constitution of human reality in the natural attitude by studying the intentional activity of the human person in phenomenological psychology, which applies a non-transcendental phenomenological reduction, what extra knowledge can transcendental phenomenology impart? Husserl continued to struggle with this question, which is essentially the problem of the psychological version of the reduction, and which is highlighted by his remarks that there is no intrinsic difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology, with respect to the analysis of constitutive intentionality. The reason is that transcendental consciousness necessarily objectifies itself as factual human person, in order to perform its transcendental function.

Classical literature can provide a unique insight into health, disease, andthe practice of the healing arts in another time and place. Recent reportshave discussed medical and psychiatric disorders in celebrated writings,including a discussion of cardiovascular disease in The Adventures ofSherlockHolmes1 and aproposal of a personality disorder in the biblical figureSamson.2 Theanalysis of instances in which literature and medicine converge is of interestboth in itself and because it allows our current understanding of diseaseprocesses to be placed into historical context. On the premise that artimitates life, in this essay, I focus on a literary figure who meets all seven(numbered below) diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder: theGreek warrior Achilles. The Iliad ofHomer,3 based on theAchaean (Greek) siege of Troy in the 12th century BCE, is essentially thestory of the anger of Achilles and its repercussions. His irritability andaggressiveness (criterion 1) and reckless disregard for safety (criterion 2)during battle are notable features of his character that enabled the earlysuccess of the Greek forces. Indeed, Achilles “hastes to murder, with asavage joy,/Invades around, and breathes but todestroy.”3(24.54-55)However, Achilles becomes enraged and displays impulsivity and failure to planahead (criterion 3) when he threatens to attack the Grecian commanderAgamemnon during a trivial quarrel over a captive maiden: “His heartswell'd high, and labored in his breast;/Distracting thoughts... prompt hishand to draw his deadly sword,/Force through the Greeks, and pierce theirhaughtylord.”3(1.252-256)His hand is stayed by the goddess Athena, but Achilles impulsively vows“... thy blood, when next thou darest invade,/Shall stream in vengeanceon my reekingblade.”3(1.398-399)Indulging his wrath, Achilles then withdraws himself and his potent Myrmidonwarriors from battle. This demonstrates irresponsibility and a failure tohonor his obligations (criterion 4), giving to “passion what to Greeceheowes.”3(11.899)He is deceitful (criterion 5) and appeals to his mother (the sea nymph Thetis)to conjure a monsterto3(1.530-537) drive the Grecian train, To hurl them headlong to their fleet and main, To heap the shores with copious death, and bring The Greeks to know the curse of such a king: Let Agamemnon lift his haughty head O'er all his wide dominion of the dead, And mourn in blood that e'er he durst disgrace The boldest warrior of the Grecian race. In Achilles' absence, the Trojan forcesrally3(5.981-984): Once from the walls your timorous foes engaged While fierce in war divine Achilles raged. Now issuing fearless they possess the plain, Now win the shores, and scarce the seas remain. Achilles clearly lacks remorse for his actions (criterion 6), as“calm he looks on, and every deathenjoys,”3(11.813) With what disdainful eye Achilles sees his country's forces fly; Blind, impious man! Whose anger is his guide, Who glories in unutterablepride.3(14.159-162) Achilles is offered generous gifts to “check [his] anger and be trulybrave”3(9.339)and return to battle. However, the “sons of Greece [... cannot] excitecompassion in Achilles'mind,”3(11.800-801)and he spurns honorable reconciliation. Valuing his pride above the plight ofhis countrymen, the selfish Achilles continues to sulk: “my wrongs, mywrongs, my constant thoughtsengage.”3(16.72)Achilles' behavior is starkly contrasted by that of Hector, the champion ofTroy, who shows great empathy and courtesy toward his opposition: “Butlet us on this memorable day exchange some gift that Greece and Troy maysay,/Not hate, but glory, made these chiefs contend;/And each brave foe was inhis soul afriend.”3(7.362-365) Later, Achilles allows his friend Patroclus to lead the Myrmidons back intobattle in his stead. Patroclus drives the Trojans back but is struck down byHector. Achilles mourns the death of his friend and returns to war forretribution. He routs the Trojans and, after chasing him three times aroundthe city walls, deals Hector a fatal blow. With his dying breath, Hectorentreats Achilles: “Ah, leave me not for Grecian dogs to tear... thecommon rites of sepulturebestow.”3(22.344-345)Achilles refuses, then “his fell soul a thought of vengeance bred,(unworthy of himself and of thedead).”3(22.495-496)Showing an abject failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawfulbehavior (criterion 7), Achilles drags Hector's corpse behind his chariot inview of the mourningTrojans3(24.83-86): Lo, how his rage dishonest drags along Hector's dead earth, insensible of wrong! Brave though he be, yet by no reason awed, He violates the laws of man and god. Interestingly, Achilles also easily meets criteria for narcissisticpersonality disorder. His arrogance, lack of empathy, and sense of entitlementare clear from the discussion above. In addition, he states that “Jovehonors me and favors mydesigns”3(9.717)and believes he is owed “honor and fame atleast.”3(1.464)Achilles also shows strong traits of obsessive-compulsive personality disorder(fixation on honor and revenge as well as excessive mourning of Patroclus) andschizotypal personality disorder (a curious tendency to speak in iambicpentameter.) It is instructive to surmise psychiatric disease in history and rewardingto study the confluence of medicine and the humanities. This particular caseof psychopathologic disorder, the root of a tragic hero's fatal flaw, may havehad a profound effect on both historical tradition and literature. Althoughthe Greek forces eventually prevailed, the war was lengthened, and its tollwas greatly magnified by Achilles' behavior. Of course, a speedy victory wouldlikely have obviated the invention of the Trojan horse and may, indeed, haveeliminated the subject matter for Homer's subsequent Odyssey.

The Enigma of Isaac Babel: Biography, History, Context, edited by Gregory Freidin. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009. 288 pp. $60.00. The Enigma of Isaac Babel is infused with a sense of loss: Babel's manuscripts and correspondence were arrested with him, presumed lost in the wake of his execution at the age of forty-five. Laments of a life cut short, stories never written, and papers presumed gone forever contribute to a sense that there is much more to know about Babel, whose early fame with the publication of Red Cavalry in 1926 seemed to foretell a long and fruitful career. In the absence of an archive, Gregory Freidin in his introduction compares Babel to the hackneyed Russian riddle inside an enigma, hence the title of this interdisciplinary volume. Comprising mainly essays presented at the Isaac Babel Workshop at Stanford University in 2004, the book is divided into three unequal parts: a short first section on Babel's biography, a rich middle part on his works in their historical context, and a crowded third section on his stories in the context of world literature. Highlighting the complexities of what it meant for Babel to be a Jew from Odessa who wrote in Russian in the Soviet Union, the volume successfully demonstrates his centrality to European, Soviet, and Jewish literary and historical traditions. In Part One are essays by Patricia Blake and Freidin, both of whom are completing book-length biographies of Babel. Seeking evidence about Babel's life in his own writing, their essays are by turns autobiographical as well. Blake tells a captivating story about her start as a Babel scholar in Moscow in 1962, when she was a journalist casting around for biographical sources while being tailed by a KGB motorcade. Freidin's contribution is an account of the writer's early influences and reference points, concluding with a reading of the play Maria, the last major new work published in Babel's lifetime. Freidin, who organized the 2004 Babel Workshop, also invited theater director Carl Weber to stage a production of Babel's Maria for the conference participants, and Weber's statement about adapting the play for a contemporary American audience concludes the volume as a whole. Freidin and Weber's essays stand on either side of the collection like bookends, reminders both of the value of reinterpretation and also of the event that occasioned the publication of the book itself. Parts Two and Three exceed expectations by providing a sustained and layered analysis of Babel as both a Jew and as a Soviet man participating in the creation of a new revolutionary culture. Reading Red Cavalry and Babel's civil war diary for evidence of the Red Army's attitudes toward the Jews, Oleg Budnitskii also examines press clippings and archival material to confirm that the antisemitism Babel documented as an embedded war reporter reached the highest levels of party, state, and army leadership. …