The Kızlar Ağası in the Early Modern Period: Reconstructing Perceptions of the Chief Harem Eunuch of the Ottoman Empire through Contemporary Narratives

The Late Modern Origins of Early Modern Governance Antonis Hadjikyriacou (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Governance, Historiography, Ottoman Empire The conceptual tools associated with the historiography of early modernity have received scant attention.1 The lexicon for the study of this period currently includes concepts such as fluidity, ambiguity, adaptability, permeability, malleability, flexibility, accommodation, elasticity, pragmatism, exchange, or encounter. I will here discuss the context within which this trend emerged, and then shift attention to a recently popular term used to describe imperial rule: governance. The idea of early modernity as an explanatory, analytical or heuristic tool—different those purposes as they may be—gained traction in Ottomanist historiography sometime in the 1990s. The timing was not by chance. Firstly, as more than one contributor to this volume has pointed out, this was the result of the historiographical quest to offer a valid alternative to the orientalist decline paradigm. Early modernity implied that the Ottoman Empire was not inherently different from its European counterparts and experienced similar or identical historical processes. One of the pioneers of early modernity in the Ottoman context, Rifa‘at Abou-El-Haj, insisted on a social history agenda— interestingly, something that was gradually abandoned by later proponents of the approach. The early modern perspective opened new vistas for comparative studies, something that radically changed the field. However, the development of this perspective proved unable to account for historical questions at the explanatory level—unless one assumes that the Ottoman Empire failed to transition from early modernity to modernity proper, thereby adopting a developmentalist stage-theory approach of national state building. [End Page 37] This brings us to the second reason why the concept of early modernity appeared in the 1990s: That modernization theory had by then reached its explanatory capacity. The quest for a teleological path to the modern nation-state had restricted historians for too long. Scholars no longer accept long-standing binaries such as institutionalized/informal practices, centralization/decentralization, consolidated/fluid identities, or market/moral economy. Rather, the current consensus understands these processes as coexisting in non-mutually exclusive ways. This lack of consistency with modernization theory and its foundational assumptions did not preclude the development of modern structures. On a different level, the waning of area studies was another associated development, giving room for global, connected or entangled history.2 Equally important is the political/ideological context of this conjuncture. The end of the Cold War heralded the victory of liberal democracy and its values. The notion of multiculturalism rose in prominence both as ideology and policy in order to provide answers to questions of cultural and religious diversity or integration in the face of waves of migrants and refugees in the western world. Influenced by this intellectual climate, which concurrently included a temporary (if superficial) receding of nationalist ideology and historiography, historians turned to multiethnic and multireligious empires for answers and inspiration. The Ottoman Empire was a particularly fertile ground to elaborate on and document what an early modern multicultural polity looked like and how it administered and managed its populations. Despite the value and usefulness (if not necessity) of abandoning the rigid categories of modernization theory, there are various problems with the way early modernity has been conceptualized. I will limit my comments here to the lexicon of early modernity that I have referred to in my introductory paragraph. To name one implication that has escaped attention, the ease with which such concepts are employed renders early modernity a reflection of the current condition of late modernity. In other words, the language of the present globalized condition is projected back to a romanticized primordial pre-modern past. Such a linear periodization means that the flexibility and fluidity of early and late modernity were interrupted by a modern “digression,” which temporarily consolidated the human condition. Thus, it reifies modernity itself as the central and defining element of the preceding and subsequent era. The sense conveyed by most studies celebrating the multi-ethnic and multi-religious nature of Ottoman rule is that of a paradise lost, a cosmopolitan milieu that [End Page 38] twentieth-century nationalist modernity may have obliterated, but is coming back with a vengeance. Click for larger view View...

Teaching & Learning Guide for: ‘Nowhere is a Place’: Travel Writing in Sixteenth‐Century England

In an Ottoman Holy Land: The Hajj and the Road from Damascus, 1500–1800

On Ottoman Early Modernity: Scattered Thoughts Pretending to be a Position Statement Boğaç Ergene (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Modernity, Ottoman Empire, Periodization Ottoman historians who are inclined to use “early modern” as a periodizing label tend to justify this choice with reference to a number of developments between the late sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In the realm of politics, for example, they cite the transformation of the state into a centralized, bureaucratic organization; appearance of oligarchic networks in the government; limitations imposed upon royal authority; and expansion of the political realm to include more segments of the society. In the economic sphere, they point to the monetization of transactions; unification of Ottoman monetary zones; rise of an increasingly integrated market economy; and processes of capital accumulation. In the legal realm, some have argued, such economic changes led to the decline of the kanun, associated with the feudal origins of the Ottoman socio-economic order, and the emergence of quasi-private land ownership. In the military realm, the Ottomans’ ability to adopt new tactics and technologies kept them among the most advanced European polities, at least until the end of the seventeenth century. Other examples from these and other realms (most recently, science and religion) abound. I am not convinced, however, that these observations are responsible for the popularization of the notion of the empire as an early modern polity. In fact, I suspect that the appeal of the label pre-dates such findings and is based, rather, on recent historiographical developments. For one, the overwhelming rejection of the once-dominant decline paradigm since the early 1990s forced the field to seek alternative models of periodization. Edward Said’s critique of orientalism in Western research on Islam and Muslims and the growing popularity of comparative historical approaches since the 1980s have also motivated Ottomanists to seek new conceptual tools in order both to avoid assumptions [End Page 24] of Western superiority and make their work accessible to non-specialist colleagues. Thus, historians’ current interest in Ottoman early modernity has been largely instrumental in nature: this periodization both accommodates (the possibility of) positive, transformative changes in Ottoman lands in the post-Süleymanic era and also enables comparisons between the Ottoman Empire and its European and Asian counterparts. Yet, Ottomanists resorting to the label entails at least one methodological problem. In fact, those of us who use it liberally in our work rarely, if ever, define what we mean by “modernity.” As Jack Goldstone has argued, the suggestion of early modernity presupposes a definition of modernity, one that the “early modern” condition is assumed to have foreshadowed. And there are multiple, not necessarily consistent, definitions of modernity. For example, Goldstone identifies two different conceptualizations. According to the “functionalist” definition (associated with Talcott Parsons’ sociology), modernity refers to the circumstances in which religion is a lifestyle choice … and in which belief in science has largely supplanted belief in spirits and miracles. It is one in which most consumer goods are produced by mass-production facilities powered … by fossil fuels or electricity, and in which transportation is powered by engines. In this state government is designed by men to meet their needs, rather than accepted as sanctified by immemorial tradition. Parliamentary bodies and constitutions are entities common in this state.1 In the “Marxist” definition, however, modernity is associated with capitalism and the emergence of wage labor as a means of surplus extraction. The transition from feudalism to capitalism involved the emergence of “merchant capitalism and the growth of proto-industrial production.” “Early modern,” was then “a form of society in which markets were an active source of profits to merchants, who ordered their affairs rationally in order to pursue profits. . . Moreover, governance … (if still not fully modern) was centralized and partly bureaucratized, albeit under the direction of traditionally-sanctified monarchies and their noble ministers and officers.”2 I do not think that all features of Ottoman early modernity as identified in the literature are consistent with all extant conceptualizations of modernity. For example, while state consolidation might better fit the Marxist model, the emergence of oligarchic networks and the expansion of the political field, which is supposed to have limited...

Early Modernity: An Idea in Need of Greater Depth James Grehan (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Ottoman Empire, Social History, Urbanization One common complaint leveled against the term “early modernity” is that it carries too much baggage. Historians who try to apply it to Ottoman history, or any other part of the “non-Western” world, will immediately have to fend off the accusation that they are, unwittingly or not, smuggling a “Eurocentric” framework into places where it does not belong. If we are to use this term outside European history, then, the fundamental task will be to fashion a definition which is suitable for the entire globe. Yet sensitivity to Eurocentrism, fueled by debates about orientalism, will not be enough for the job. A more insidious problem within conventional narratives about early modernity is a preoccupation with social elites. Receiving nearly exclusive stress are trends at the “top” of society, e.g., the diffusion of firearms, the subsequent creation of “gunpowder empires,” the growth of long-distance trade, the huge expansion in the worldwide stock of bullion, the resulting impulse towards commercialization, etc. All these observations are undoubtedly part of the story, but leave out far too much. It is a way of writing history which returns, again and again (like much of Ottoman historiography itself), to the state, its army and bureaucracy, and well-to-do merchants. The rest of society appears as idle bystanders, at best marginal to the discussion and distant from the real motors of historical change. The path to a more suitable definition therefore lies squarely (though not exclusively, of course) within social history. In no other way can we bring the question of “early modernity” down to street level. Indeed, if we cannot find signs of it here, then it will always seem like a cheap knock-off from European historiography, and worse still, have almost nothing to say about the experiences of the vast majority of Ottoman subjects (and people elsewhere). Thus, social history will supply the sternest test for any “early modern” periodization. [End Page 34] It will commit us to a search for “deep structures.” Without this requisite social depth, any notion of “early modernity” will forever totter over narrow and shaky foundations. How should such a social history proceed? One theme which ought to be at the forefront is urbanization. Nearly everywhere from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, towns grew larger and more numerous. This shift towards a relatively more urban population has to be one of the decisive boundaries between the early modern and medieval eras. If we look at the Ottoman experience, we immediately find intriguing parallels. Most dramatic, especially during the sixteenth century, was the sprouting of new towns and the revival of old ones across Anatolia and the Balkans. In the Arab provinces, too, the urban population grew substantially (in the range of sixty to eighty percent for the biggest Arab towns between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries). The conversion of villagers into townspeople and the creation of self-consciously urban social zones have to rank as achievements of the first order. We have hardly come to grips with all this far-reaching upheaval, which was hardly unique to the Ottoman Empire. Early modern societies throughout Eurasia were nurseries for towns and fostered the dim beginnings of what would later, under more favorable circumstances, mature into modern bourgeois culture. A more urban population necessarily generates greater social dynamism. By their nature, towns accelerate social mobility and innovation. One result of Ottoman urbanization was the formation of a more articulated social hierarchy whose various ranks, manners, and status symbols have yet to be analyzed in detail. A more obvious departure from medieval times was the rise of a more sophisticated material culture. Most famous are the early modern recreational drugs, coffee and tobacco (joined by tea, chocolate, and sugar in other parts of the world). We might imagine that these commodities conquered new markets by virtue of their chemical charms alone. Their diffusion, though, is inconceivable without the growth of towns, which accounted for the greatest “market share” and were most active in fostering a new leisure culture—most notably in the invention of the coffeehouse...

Османи на трьох континентах, пер. з турецьк. О. Кульчинського

The Disenchantment of Sufism, the Rationalization of Sunni Islam, and Early Modernity Baki Tezcan (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Ottoman Empire, Sufism Many an Ottoman thought that a new age had started in the late sixteenth century with the Islamic Millennium—if not before. Some of them dared writing books with titles that proclaimed this age ripe for a New Report as prophetic reports failed to explain its findings. Others even called for the need to learn Latin rather than Arabic as Western Europeans had surpassed the Ottomans in sciences for they were not restricted by religion. Thus, questioning the received traditions of the past and a belief in the superiority of the present, which are modern attitudes, were features of this new era for some Ottomans. There were, however, also many, who argued that every passing year was taking them further away from the perfection of the golden age of Islam, which they should do their best to revert to. The latter, though, were as modern as the former for they, too, were questioning the received traditions of their medieval past. The Muslim revivalists who aimed at eradicating innovations from socio-religious practices in the early modern era were engaged in an attempt to rationalize their faith by disenchanting it. I suggest “enchantment” as a term to describe the transformation of Sufism from ascetic practices in order to discipline the self to an experiential quest that aims at unveiling the divide between the believer and the divine in this world. Very roughly speaking, while the medieval period witnessed the enchantment of Sufism and the acceptance of this development by Sunni Islam, the early modern era is marked by its disenchantment. The medieval transformation of Sufism from asceticism to an experiential quest for the divine had been noted and criticized by Muslim thinkers like Ibn Taymiyya. Even though often portrayed as a vehement critic of Sufism, Ibn Taymiyya could well have been a Sufi himself in the Qadiri order and yet understood Sufism quite [End Page 67] differently than Ibn Arabi, whose writings produced the idea of the “unity of existence” that theorized the blurred boundaries between the Creator and the creature, making the former more accessible in this world. This kind of Sufism that aimed at unveiling was also criticized by Ibn Khaldun, who declared it not to be Sufism. Yet the Ottoman political enterprise grew in Anatolia, arguably the most enchanted land of the medieval Islamic world where Ibn Arabi taught Sadreddin Konevi, Rumi was joined by Shams Tabrizi, and the first historians of the Ottomans made Edebali, a Sufi sheikh, promise a world empire to Osman, the founder of the dynasty. Several studies demonstrate that enchanted Sufism was quite well integrated into the social experience of Sunni Islam in the feudal period of Ottoman history (ca. 1300–1453) and also facilitated the conversion of many a local Christian. The early Ottoman structures of Muslim worship accommodated Sunni canonical rituals as well as Sufi ceremonies with singing and dancing. The first professors of Ottoman colleges of law and the early muftis of Ottoman capital cities were scholars of jurisprudence and ardent readers of Ibn Arabi at the same time. Akşemseddin, the Bayrami sheikh who was close to Mehmed II and took part in the siege of Constantinople, was a similar scholar- Sufi. Soon after the conquest, however, he left the new imperial capital. The First Ottoman Empire (ca. 1453–1580) that was marked by the political domination of the dynasty through its military slaves of local Christian origin witnessed a growing emphasis on the legal institutions of Islam that was paralleled by the gradual exclusion of Sufi practices from places of worship, the architecture of which reflected this change by discontinuing the T-shaped mosques. Sünbül Sinan had a hard time arguing the legitimacy of Sufi rituals that involved singing and dancing, which had to move away from mosques to convents. While the transformation of the Safavis from a Sufi order to a political enterprise that challenged the Ottomans in eastern Anatolia definitely had a role in this development, a more significant and less obvious factor was the question of authority. In an empire governed...

Madeline Zilfi, ed., Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era, The Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage: Politics, Society and Economy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997). Pp. 339. - Volume 31 Issue 2

Ottoman Early Modern Ali Yaycıoğlu (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Ottoman Empire, Periodization It would not be wrong to suggest that we have been undergoing a “global turn” in Ottoman studies for some time. Historians increasingly tend to situate the Ottoman experience in a world historical context in a comparative and connected fashion. Rather than an isolated imperial trajectory of Ottoman history, which could only be explained through internal realities and meanings, some Ottomanists increasingly tend to link the Ottoman experience with certain large-scale (e.g., global, Afro-Eurasian, European, Mediterranean, Indian Ocean) movements, transformations, and events. The “early modern” seems to be the key notion facilitating the Ottoman “global turn.” It helps scholars of the Ottoman world to “synchronize” Ottoman realities with structural changes in other parts of the world, particularly Europe, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, during which we see increasing (and asymmetrical) interactions at a global scale. However, both the “global” and “early modern” turns come with certain limits and costs, which we should take into consideration and problematize. “Early modern” was first coined by British and North American historians in the 1960s and 70s. These historians intended to shift the focus from national historical narratives, history of elites and high-culture to large scale and longue durée structural transformations in societies, economic and political orders, cultural life, technological developments, and environment roughly between 1450 and 1800.1 This is the long period prior to the “modern” (“middle or late modern?”) or contemporary era (or simply “our” or contemporary time) roughly nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during which there were unprecedented radical shifts in human experience and as well as in human-nature [End Page 70] relations. We are currently living in a time shaped by these radical changes in technology, knowledge, economic and political institutions, and human-nature relations, art and meaning of history. The term “early modern” implies that these radical changes in “our time”—the time of the “Great Acceleration”— were not to be understood within a separate chronological rubric, in its own rights. But they rather are to be situated in a greater transformation, which started much earlier. Therefore, we have to see modernity not within the radicality of the last two centuries but within a larger “time zone” so that we can appreciate deeper structural transformations. In many ways, the “early modern” challenged the centrality of “current time” and situates “us” (the moderns or, at the moment, post-moderns) in a deeper, larger, and longer context. To this end, several historians sharing this global early modern agenda participated in different projects which can resonate in different parts of the world in this era: Trajectories of state-building as a territorial organization with effective mechanisms to radically change demographic, political, institutional, and cultural landscapes; new forms of imperial and colonial expansions, different knowledge projects developed with these expansions, and different forms of resistance to imperial or colonial consolidations; formation of industrious developments and science cultures which were more and more in interaction with each other; increasing global connections which fostered mobility of people, commodities, styles, and ideas; new awareness about space and time—an awareness about the connectedness of the world in a common time; emergence of new meanings concerning nature, life and death coming with different forms of “disenchantments.” In many ways, “early modern” provides us with a ground for such questions, which are beyond the scopes of national, continental, and civilizational boundaries. As Ottoman history is becoming an accepted and appreciated field in history departments and journals, especially in Anglo-American academia, Ottoman historians have come to engage in dialogues with their colleagues of different fields over such comparative and connected questions. In Europe, several Ottoman historians became part of massive early modern Europe or early modern world projects financed by the European Union. In the early twenty-first century, the global early modern became a sort of a “common program” for historians for a dialogue within a universal knowledge project across a larger time zone of several centuries of which we can also be a part. The global early modern, therefore, connects spatial and temporal experiences of different people to the experiences of others, as...

Political Initiatives: “From the Bottom Up” in the Ottoman Empire

This thesis consists of separate papers that examine markets, prices, and consumption in the Ottoman Empire between the late seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. Recent scholarship has posited that market development, new consumption patterns, and productivity gains in non-agricultural sectors that were marked by changing price-product structures are among the structural alterations that paved the way for industrialisation at the turn of the nineteenth century. This research investigates whether these phenomena were particular to the West or can be expanded to other parts of the world. As such, the study contributes to the literature seeking to understand where the “distinctive advantage” of Northwestern Europe lay. The findings reveal that on the eve of the first wave of globalisation, domestic wheat markets in the Ottoman Empire were no better integrated than they were two centuries previously. Nevertheless, Europe and the Ottoman Empire shared several characteristics of early-modern consumerism. This research demonstrated that the interiors of Ottoman houses grew richer and more varied throughout this period. From the second half of the eighteenth century onwards, Ottomans who were not richer and who were not better-positioned in the social hierarchy than their counterparts in 1700 owned a greater quantity and variety of domestic goods. In both regions, a decline in the real prices of consumer goods was a major factor, if not the only one, that triggered this change. Moreover, the analysis on prices and inventory valuations refutes the argument that the decline in prices of non-food items was a distinctive pattern in Northwestern Europe in the pre-industrial era; instead, this was mirrored in the Ottoman Empire. Overall, the findings of this research point to long-term market development (and its absence), rather than changing consumption patterns, as well as productivity gains in non-agricultural sectors as a major source of divergence prior to the Industrial Revolution between parts of Europe and the Ottoman Empire.

Géza Pálffy. <i>Hungary between Two Empires 1526–1711</i>.

Who counts? Ottomans, Early Modernity, and Trans-Imperial Subjecthood E. Natalie Rothman (bio) Keywords Early Modern, Ottoman Empire, Subjecthood Tucked deep into volume six of Hammer-Purgstall’s magnum opus, the Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches, is an anecdote we can summarize as follows: in the summer of 1678, while the Ottoman army, waging campaign against the Tsardom of Russia, laid a second siege on Chyhyryn (central Ukraine), the grand chamberlain intercepted a bag containing twelve Russian letters. Marcantonio Mamuca della Torre, serving as the kaymakam’s dragoman, was charged with translating them but, not knowing Russian, he recruited a slave of the Polish legation to aid him, dragging him into the reis efendi’s tent for that purpose. The slave turned out to be a Jesuit in disguise, who was able therefore to translate the letters into Latin, allowing Mamuca della Torre to then finish translating the Latin into Ottoman within twenty-four hours, as instructed.1 Several aspects of this brief anecdote are worth dwelling on: The interpersonal, distributed, and embodied dimensions of translation, its centrality to inter-imperial interactions, and the multilateral nature of diplomacy (the anecdote then continues with the Polish ambassador’s nephew being required to join the Ottoman military campaign). It underscores the role of serendipity in history (thank goodness for Jesuits in unexpected places!) and, especially, the instability of ethnolinguistic and political fault lines in this borderland (as in the imperial court). An Istanbulite by birth, Marcantonio Mamuca della Torre was the descendent of multiple Catholic Ottoman elite families and a relative by marriage of several Phanariot Orthodox dynasties as well. Shortly after his adventures in the Ukraine he would relocate to Vienna, become a member of the Habsburg War Council, and eventually secure noble title, landed property, and advantageous marriages for his children that would firmly entrench [End Page 58] the family’s place in the Austrian and Hungarian landed aristocracy. His figure may be enigmatic and exceptional, but also emblematic of early modern Ottoman subjecthood. Indeed, his hyper-connected, trans-imperial trajectories raise fundamental questions about the very nature of subjecthood and subjectivity in the early modern Ottoman Empire. It brings into sharper relief the challenge of deciding who “counts” as an early modern Ottoman, from what vantage point, and to what analytical ends. The ontological crisis of “early modernity,” in both its Europeanist, Ottomanist, and “global” iterations now seems to have been lain to rest. Whereas scholars are perhaps more mindful than ever that, conceptually, “early modernity” originates in decidedly Eurocentric epistemologies, the processes that define the period analytically are no longer seen as exclusively, or even primarily, limited to Europe. As newer generations of scholars have come to view Europe as emergent through its manifold interactions with a wider world, fewer scholars wonder whether “early modernity” existed. Clearly, this periodization, like any other, entails a fair degree of arbitrariness, a certain erasure of both internal heterogeneity and significant continuities with an elusive “pre” modern. The contested nature of “modernity” itself, and the teleological assumptions embedded in the “early” designation are all legitimate concerns, even if their elaboration has sometimes led to caricaturizing accounts of what came in its wake. At the current historiographical moment, the temporal boundaries of early modernity, forever porous and contentious, seem to require less policing. Within the field of Ottoman studies, the success of “early modernity” in establishing itself as a standard periodization seems to have been salutary on at least two levels: First, it has allowed the field finally to overcome the long Gibbonian shadow of “Golden Age” and “Decline,” to pay attention not simply to the continuities between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (and beyond), but to the myriad ways in which the latter was pivotal in shaping our perspectives on the former. Secondly, it has provided the idiom for an important, and still unfolding conversation about the deep embedding of the Ottomans in a Eurasian system of circulation and meaning-making. This has allowed Ottomanists to pay closer attention to the empire’s global connectivities. Even more importantly, it has facilitated precautious efforts by non-Ottomanists to integrate the Ottomans more fully into broader accounts of early modernity, less in the vein...

In the early sixteenth century, the political landscape of West Asia was completely transformed: of the previous four major powers, only one - the Ottoman Empire - continued to exist. Ottoman survival was, in part, predicated on transition to a new mode of kingship, enabling its transformation from regional dynastic sultanate to empire of global stature. In this book, Christopher Markiewicz uses as a departure point the life and thought of Idris Bidlisi (1457–1520), one of the most dynamic scholars and statesmen of the period. Through this examination, he highlights the series of ideological and administrative crises in the fifteenth-century sultanates of Islamic lands that gave rise to this new conception of kingship and became the basis for sovereign authority not only within the Ottoman Empire but also across other Muslim empires in the early modern period.

1. Dependence, servility and coerced labor in time and space David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman Part I. Slavery in Africa and Asia Minor: 2. Slavery in the Ottoman Empire in the early modern era Ehud R. Toledano 3. Slavery in Islamic Africa Rudolph T. Ware III 4. Slavery in non-Islamic West Africa, 1420-1820 G. Ugo Nwokeji 5. Slaving and resistance to slaving in west central Africa Roquinaldo Ferreira 6. White slavery in the early modern era William G. Clarence-Smith and David Eltis Part II. Slavery in Asia: 7. Slavery in Southeast Asia, 1420-1804 Kerry Ward 8. Slavery in early modern China Pamela Kyle Crossley Part III. Slavery among the Indigenous Americans: 9. Slavery in indigenous North America Leland Donald 10. Indigenous slavery in South America, 1492-1820 Neil L. Whitehead Part IV. Slavery and Serfdom in Eastern Europe: 11. Slavery and the rise of serfdom in Russia Richard Hellie 12. Manorialism and rural subjection in east central Europe, 1500-1800 Edgar Melton Part V. Slavery in the Americas: 13. Slavery in the Atlantic islands and the early modern Spanish Atlantic world William D. Phillips, Jr 14. Slavery and politics in colonial Portuguese America: the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries Joao Fragoso and Ana Rios 15. Slavery in the British Caribbean Philip D. Morgan 16. Slavery on the colonial North American mainland Lorena S. Walsh 17. Slavery in the French Caribbean, 1635-1804 Laurent Dubois 18. Slavery and the slave trade of the minor Atlantic powers Pieter Emmer Part VI. Cultural and Demographic Patterns in the Americas: 19. Demography and family structures B. W. Higman 20. The concept of creolization Richard Price 21. Black women in the early Americas Betty Wood Part VII. Legal Structures, Economics and the Movement of Coerced Peoples in the Atlantic World: 22. Involuntary migration in the early modern world, 1500-1800 David Richardson 23. Slavery, freedom and the law in the Atlantic world, 1420-1807 Sue Peabody 24. European forced labor in the early modern era Timothy Coates 25. Transatlantic slavery and economic development in the Atlantic world: West Africa, 1450-1850 Joseph E. Inikori Part VIII. Slavery and Resistance: 26. Slave worker rebellions and revolution in the Americas to 1804 Mary Turner 27. Runaways and quilombolas in the Americas Manolo Florentino and Marcia Amantino.