The Kurdish Question

Abstract

IN view of the number of post-war problems which demand an almost immediate solution if the peace of the world is not again to be endangered, the statesmen of the United Nations are unlikely to give high priority to the Kurdish problem. Nevertheless if the principles of the Atlantic Charter are to be applied, the Kurds have as much right as any other people to share in the Four Freedoms. At the present time one is told that in Turkey a Kurd, living as a Kurd, speaking his own language and following the traditions of his ancestors, is never entirely free from fear. In Iraq recent investigations have shown that unless important administrative reforms are carried out in the Kurdish areas, the Kurds are unlikely to enjoy freedom from want. The freedom which the Kurdish Nationalists most desire is freedom to educate their children in their own language and traditions. This they cannot do in Turkey; in Iraq adequate facilities are lacking, and in Persia it is still more difficult. The Kurdish Nationalists are not unreasonable. They simply desire to be allowed to live as Kurds, speak the Kurdish language, read and publish books and newspapers in that language and not to be assimilated as Arabs, Persians or Turks. The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey started as a revolt of the feudal leaders against Sultan Mahmud's attempt in 1826 to break their power and instal local governors, but its growth after the Young Turk Revolt and the rise to power of Mustapha Kemal was due to the latter's policy of assimilation. It was natural that a world wide upheaval, such as the second world war, should have encouraged Kurdish Nationalists to think that they should take advantage of disturbed conditions to press their claims, which had been recognized after the last war in Articles 62 and 64 of the abortive Treaty of S6vres.' Some argued that if Turkey could be brought into the war against the United Nations, the victory of the latter, of which the Kurds seemed confident even in the blackest days,2 might lead to Kurdish independence. Nothing might have been more likely to influence the Turks to declare war against the Allies than a Kurdish revolt in Turkey which could have been attributed to British support of Kurdish ambitions. This danger was foreseen in 1939, when General Weygand is believed to have obtained a promise from the Kurdish National Leaders in Syria to refrain from any action that might irritate or antagonize the Turks. This