Abstract

This article explains how judicial review influences intergovernmental political dynamics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain. The argument is developed in light of two questions: how supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for settling vertical intergovernmental disputes, and how national and subnational politicians use judicial review in order to enhance their own interests. A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia provides an answer to these questions. Accounting for the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government among these countries, the article assesses the patterns of judicial review originating from the subnational level. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases, but through different patterns of judicialization of territorial politics.

Highlights

  • Since the enactment of their most recent constitutions, Brazil, Colombia and Spain have undergone important processes of constitutional judicial review

  • In order to show the growing role of the judiciary in territorial politics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain, this article proceeds in three steps

  • How can judicial review be considered a process of constitutional change? What is the link between constitutional judicial review and intergovernmental relations? In this article, judicial review is interpreted as an instrument of law enforcement and of lawmaking

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Summary

Helder Ferreira do Vale

This article explains how judicial review influences intergovernmental political dynamics in Brazil, Colombia and Spain. The argument is developed in light of two questions: how supreme courts have established themselves as pivotal institutions for settling vertical intergovernmental disputes, and how national and subnational politicians use judicial review in order to enhance their own interests. A comparison between the judicial review processes in federal Brazil, quasi-federal Spain, and unitary Colombia provides an answer to these questions. Accounting for the differences in the territorial organization and systems of government among these countries, the article assesses the patterns of judicial review originating from the subnational level. Findings suggest that courts affect the interaction between national and subnational politicians in the three country-cases, but through different patterns of judicialization of territorial politics

Introduction
Assessing Constitutional Judicial Review and Intergovernmental Relations
Degree of rulings in favor of the plaintiff
Discussion
Level of government favored by the ruling
Findings
Final Remarks and Extensions

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