The Italian Post War Fiscal Constitution: Reasons of a Failure

Abstract

If the Italian Constitution shall be changed, to transform Italy in a semi-Presidential Republic-as in the project of constitutional revision recently approved by the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Reforms-the President of the Republic, elected by the people, shall become the natural guardian of the fiscal constitution, under direct control of the public opinion (17). He should, then, be staffed with an office, to check the conformity of laws to the fiscal constitutional rules and claims might be addressed by a qualified number of Parliamentarians, in addition to the Court of Accounts, to him. The chain connecting the President of the Republic to the Parliament, in this new constitutional model, will be broken. And hardly the President could stand still, in case of open violation of the rules of the fiscal constitution by the Government on the Parliament, because of the risk of loss of reputation. If he were to overlook negative checks by the Court of Accounts, his behaviour would greatly damage his credibility among the electors. Thus, it seems that the difference in the model of State, whether is a parliamentary system or a system where the President of the Republic is elected by the people, has much to do with the workability of a fiscal constitution aiming to monetary and fiscal soundness.