The Israeli Crisis of 1969: Henry Kissinger and Nuclear Nonproliferation Reassessed

Introduction: Global Order, Cooperation between the Superpowers, and Alliance Politics in the Making of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

This article analyzes Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and the characteristics of the environment in which the program is nested. These characteristics include Pakistan’s history of internal and external instability; nuclear saber-rattling during crises; support for Islamic terrorism in order to advance state goals; indigenous production of many elements of its nuclear forces; possession of delivery and command and control systems with destabilizing characteristics; and, finally, nuclear doctrine that appears to advocate first use of nuclear weapons. The article argues that the characteristics of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program generate threats to US national security interests. The article examines six interrelated and synergistic challenges for US national security: first, Pakistan is engaged in an arms race in Southwest Asia that has negative implications for Pakistan’s stability; second, the threat of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan continues; third, Pakistan’s arsenal characteristics make accidental and/or unauthorized nuclear war more likely; fourth, there is an ongoing possibility of war with India; fifth, Islamist influence is spreading through key sectors of Pakistani society; and, finally, there is an increasing danger of state failure in Pakistan.

Gaurav Kampani provides a compelling account of the evolution of India's nuclear weapons program from 1989 to 1999 and rightly highlights how the need for secrecy “stymied India's operational advances.”1 “Secrecy concerns,” he argues, “prevented decisionmakers and policy planners from decomposing problem sets and parceling them out simultaneously for resolution to multiple bureaucratic actors, including the military” (p. 82). In his eagerness to argue this point, however, Kampani is too quick to dismiss other explanations for India's slow pace of operationalization. In this letter, I argue that a more complete account of “New Delhi's long nuclear journey” should incorporate civil-military relations as another influential factor.Most accounts of India's nuclear weapons program agree that India's political establishment largely excluded the military from shaping the program's pace, direction, and progress. According to Verghese Koithara, “[K]eeping the military at arm's length and sidelining military competencies the way India has done has no parallel in global nuclear weapons development history.”2 He attributes this situation to the “barren relationship that developed between the political leadership and the armed forces of the country soon after independence.”3 Ashley Tellis blames India's nonoperationalization of nuclear weapons on its “peculiar organization of civil-military relations.”4 Raj Chengappa claims that “despite the Indian Army providing all the logistics support [for both of India's nuclear tests] … it was rarely privy to India's nuclear secrets. … All this was part of a deliberate design by successive governments to rein in the armed forces.”5 More recently, Vipin Narang has written that “a distrust of India's armed forces … [produced] a civil-military relationship in which India's political leadership is patently unwilling to entrust any dedicated nuclear subcomponents to the armed forces.”6 Kampani presents little concrete evidence to undermine these views.Kampani makes four points to support his contention that “the distrust that pervades India's civil-military institutions” was not a factor in the development of India's nuclear weapons program (p. 108). None supports his claim.First, Kampani asserts that “[i]f civil-military institutional tensions were the cause [of India's slow nuclear operationalization], … one would [have] see[n] greater aggregation of information among civilians” (ibid.). He does not explain, however, what he means by a “greater aggregation of information among civilians.” What kind of information and about what? The nuclear weapons program, delivery options, nuclear targeting philosophy? If he means all of these, then there was a designated civilian official who possessed this “aggregated” knowledge: the scientific adviser to the defense minister. In the period under discussion, two individuals held this post—V.S. Arunachalam from 1982 to 1992 and Abdul Kalam from 1992 to 1999. Another key official was former Defense Secretary Naresh Chandra, who, as Kampani notes, was brought in as a “specially designated coordinator” (p. 89). In addition, members of the scientific-technocratic enclave such as K. Santhanam and R. Chidambaram would have had information far in excess of that of any member of the military.7 Still, one can argue that none of these officials would have had “aggregated information” if the military aspects of the nuclear weapons program were included—that is, the operational details and capabilities of designated aircraft and delivery options, the military's standard operating procedures, and so on. But the argument would then be tautological: if the military was deliberately kept “at the margins,” as Kampani states, then how could civilian officials stay informed about its capabilities (p. 94)? Such an arrangement would have structurally prevented the “greater aggregation of information” among civilians, as predicted by the author.Second, Kampani quotes an unnamed senior Indian defense official who justified keeping the military out the loop “because of the danger of secrecy being compromised.” The official added, “[T]he military's complaints have more to [do] with a sense of privilege and pride. Why should they be told? The cabinet ministers weren't told, the defense minister, their political boss was not told. So why should the armed services chiefs be told” (ibid.)? Kampani's use of this quote as evidence of a lack of civil-military distrust is problematic on several counts. To begin, it contradicts his earlier assertion that “the regime of information scarcity operated with nearly equal severity on both the civilian and military sides of the nuclear equation” (ibid.). Information scarcity, however, could not have been of “nearly equal severity” if, according to this interviewee, a deliberate decision had been made to keep the military away from the program. More important, Kampani accepts uncritically what he was being told. If he had challenged the logic of the interviewee, he would have found several inconsistencies. For instance, if one were to analyze the period from the time the decision for nuclearization was made—Kampani argues it was in 1989–90—to the 1998 nuclear tests, the prime minister also held the defense minister's portfolio for more than half that duration.8 It is inconceivable that information about the nuclear weapons program was withheld from such a senior official. Moreover, according to some accounts, knowledge about the nuclear program was shared with India's two defense ministers—Sharad Pawar and Mulayam Singh Yadav—who held this post for a considerable period during this time.9 Additionally, if the logic offered by the interviewee is correct, then no secret—on any subject—should ever be shared with the military. Perhaps the biggest inconsistency, however, is how the interviewee could justify keeping the military uninformed when it was responsible for delivering India's nuclear weapons.Third, Kampani argues that civil-military distrust would have manifested itself in other ways, citing examples where this seemingly has not occurred. He argues that two facts—that the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating India's conventional war plans and that it engages extensively in countering domestic insurgencies—reflect civilian trust in the institution. This is a spurious argument, because neither observation necessarily suggests a lack of civil-military distrust. As is well known, the predominant narrative emerging from the 1962 Sino-Indian War blamed the collapse of the Indian army on ill-informed civilian intervention. Since then, India's civil-military relationship has been “informed by the notion that civilians should eschew involvement in operational matters.”10 That the military enjoys considerable autonomy in formulating conventional war plans should therefore not be surprising, because this function is considered to be within the military's “domain.”11 In this context, the military also enjoys considerable autonomy in other fields, including specifying weapons systems, doctrine, training, defense planning, and service promotions (up to the rank of brigadier).Similarly, the military's extensive involvement in counterinsurgency operations does not necessarily suggest harmonious civil-military relations. Instead, India's civilian and military leaders have agreed to an arrangement wherein the military enjoys considerable legal immunity when engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Tellingly, civil-military tensions have escalated when civilians have tried to alter this arrangement—for instance, when trying to amend or even overturn the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which provides legal immunity to the military.12 Rightly or wrongly, however, nuclear weapons were not considered to be in the military's domain, and hence civilians were able to keep the military away from the program.Kampani's assertion that there is no civil-military distrust in India not only challenges the conventional wisdom but does not comport with contemporary events. India's problem is not a possible loss of civilian control but problematic civil-military relations, a constant theme in the literature.13 Tensions between civilians and the military were even acknowledged in two official committee reports written in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war.14 Most recently, the controversial tenure of Chief of Army Staff Gen. V.K. Singh “saw civil-military relations reach their lowest ever in the history of independent India.”15Fourth, Kampani argues that “India's civilian leaders have shown little hesitation in institutionalizing the military's role in nuclear planning post-1998. … This change has occurred without any fundamental rewrite in the DNA of India's civil-military relations” (p. 109). Kampani's claim oversimplifies a complex civil-military dynamic surrounding the development of India's nuclear arsenal. Moreover, it contradicts the available evidence. To be sure, the government established the Strategic Forces Command in 2003 to administer all of India's nuclear and strategic forces, and it has given the military unprecedented access to nuclear weapons. At the same time, civil-military integration has not been as smooth as Kampani would have us believe. According to one school of thought, most prominently associated with Verghese Koithara, civilians have resisted incorporating the military fully into the nuclear command and control chain.16 Supporters of this claim point to the fact that the “operational controller” of the Strategic Forces Command is not a military officer but the national security adviser.17 Elsewhere, Kampani notes this strange arrangement, observing that the Strategic Forces Command essentially functions “directly under the Prime Minister's Office through the national security advisor, bypassing the defense ministry and the military's normal chain of command.”18 Adm. Arun Prakash, chief of India's naval staff from 2004 to 2006, complained about the “complete exclusion of the armed forces from all aspects of planning and structuring of strategic programmes.”19In a rare speech on nuclear deterrence on April 24, 2013, however, former Foreign Secretary Shyam Sharan dismissed the “perception that India's armed forces are not fully part of the strategic decision-making process.” He curiously added, however, that “one cannot accept that the credibility of India's nuclear deterrence demands management by its military.” Although his definition of “management” is unclear, later in the speech he acknowledged the need to “encourage better civil-military relations and coordination.” He went on to say that “the military's inputs into strategic planning and execution should be enhanced to make India's nuclear deterrent more effective.”20 Writing a few months after Saran's speech, former Army Chief Gen. V.P. Malik argued that “weaknesses” existed because the military “is not consulted adequately or given political directions and resources … for an assured and effective operationalization of nuclear capability.”21 According to a former chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), who wishes to remain unnamed: “[A]lthough the strategic target list is decided by the COSC, the Chairman is never consulted about vital issues relating to the effectiveness of the deterrent. For example: missile ranges and CEP [circular error probable] of nuclear warhead yields and reliability or development of PALs. … [A]ll these are decided ‘in-house’ by DAE & DRDO scientists. … [T]he ‘user’ [i.e., the military] is well out of the loop.”22India stands as an outlier for the manner in which it kept its military away from its nuclear weapons program. According to an unnamed former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, “[T]he Indian program never took the army into [its] confidence. We didn't discuss details with them. It wasn't a military program.”23 Moreover, the scientists wanted to prevent an “untoward build-up of the deterrent and its use, which they believed would accrue were the military to be brought into the decision-making and weapon handling loop.”24 Although the custodians of the nuclear program—scientists, technocrats, and selected bureaucrats—may have held such seemingly noble beliefs, it can also be argued that they were afraid that bringing the military into the loop might curtail their near-total operational autonomy.25 Indeed, one of the fears of the scientific-technocratic community that controlled the program was that the military might make a bid for greater involvement, ownership, and perhaps even control.26 An episode from early 1998 illustrates this point. In a meeting with Prime Minister I.K. Gujral, General Malik reported that the service chiefs jointly conveyed the need for a nuclear doctrine. Abdul Kalam, then scientific adviser to the defense minister, who was present at the meeting, claimed that there was one but that it was not to be shared with the armed forces. Expressing his incredulity, General Malik claims that this was part of “a nexus that kept the armed forces away from the nuclear weapons program.”27When talking about a civil-military gap in India's nuclear program, the custodians of the bomb will of course deny that one existed and will justify exclusion of the military from the program on the grounds of secrecy (as they did in interviews with Kampani). The civil-military divide would have been evident, however, if the author had focused on the decisionmakers at the time. Hence, on a number of occasions Kampani alleges failure on the part of Indian defense and policy “planners” (see p. 82, 88, 92, 99, and 100). But who were these “planners?” As far as we know, they were mostly scientists, technocrats, and a few select bureaucrats, such as Naresh Chandra. They did not include any military representatives.The main problem with Kampani's otherwise excellent article is his rejection of alternative explanations for the slow pace of India's nuclear program. Civil-military relations and the decision to keep the military on the margins played an important role in the program's delayed operationalization. One could similarly argue that the military was excluded because nuclear weapons were not considered weapons of war. Or perhaps the strategic culture argument explains the failure of Indian politicians to oversee the coordination of the scientific and military aspects of the program. To be fair, the need to maintain secrecy could still be the primary factor explaining this slow pace, but it was not the only one.—Anit MukherjeeSingaporeKudos to Gaurav Kampani for his deeply researched narration of the “excruciatingly long” course India has taken “to develop an operational nuclear capability.”1 “New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey” corrects some mistaken details of earlier treatments of this history, including my own in India's Nuclear Bomb.2 Anyone wanting details on the material and institutional evolution of India's nuclear capabilities should value Kampani's contribution.The article is less persuasive in explaining the history it uncovers. The central flaw is Kampani's attempt to ascribe India's nuclear muddling to one factor—secrecy born of “fear of the nonproliferation regime” (p. 81). Here one perceives the tyranny of academic theorizing and its diktat of “parsimony,” which an aspiring academic political scientist dare not reject. The problem is twofold: no single driver can explain most of the Indian nuclear story; second, secrecy is an effect of other causes, and therefore a weak cornerstone for a compelling theory of how the nonproliferation regime affected India's (or anyone else's?) development of operational nuclear forces.Kampani duly explores other candidate causes of India's irresolute nuclear course: “the normative beliefs of decisionmakers who pitted their moral aversion of nuclear weapons against more prosaic realist national security concerns”; decisionmaker preferences for “existential deterrence out of normative concerns for strategic stability in South Asia”; “a unique Indian strategic culture of restraint”; and “the dysfunctional nature of Indian civil-military institutions” (pp. 82–83). He offers evidence of Indian actions that can be interpreted to conclude that each alternative fails to explain key developments in India.Yet, the failure of any of these single explanations to cover all or most of the relevant developments in a decade of nuclear history does not mean that their sum is invalid or without utility. In fact, the four explanations that Kampani considers do help significantly to illuminate India's nuclear history from 1989 to 1999. The quest for a single decisive independent variable is unnecessary and misleading.Secrecy's inadequacy as a central causal explanation in the Indian case is evident in several Most important, one to why India's nuclear capabilities and have been so Kampani Indian officials who that secrecy from of “the of the he it is also that and have been (p. against makes of do officials in a ever to any other for If national defense is the for but the effect of secrecy is to national decisionmakers should not it too to more One wishes Kampani had into domestic why Indian political leaders have (or secrecy for so notes that prime ministers in the were in India's nuclear (p. 100). same could have been for several earlier prime He also reports that after Indian scientists and the challenges of political leaders from the weapons within and that would them operational in the military sense of the (p. 81). more than an in secrecy to keep in the these to the nuclear weapon program. and that of that these prime ministers were and about the and of nuclear weapons for nuclear weapons was not that important among the other and security India to In of the secrecy and in the Indian program prevented the military from being able to and the civilian weapons establishment and the political This on secrecy the among Indian political and that the with its and in Indian nuclear policy would to of the of nuclear weapons and to on as occurred in the and the theory is by the fact that the operationalization of India's nuclear weapons found in the defense policy and in the civilian nuclear The in all of these bureaucratic and political including of the at the of the defense and nuclear have secrecy and to and their from within as India's nuclear weapons scientists and long to the military from involvement in their the that Kampani has not been a Indian leaders have been privy to at four or among other India's nuclear and operationalization. Prime Minister V.P. Singh in one K. Gen. K. and Arun in 1999 the Kargil by K. was by the Arun Singh on Defense in The Naresh Committee on national security a in The in each of these reports were in the policy They all to India's defense including in the nuclear no prime minister has to the central of these For the Kargil and the Singh both of an defense staff chief would then have a role in nuclear planning and operations. however, among the armed forces and among political leaders have this still the that Kampani so and the 1989 to 1999 period he causes are and more than any theory can Still, they can be as Kampani's narrative to and rejection of my that secrecy was the cause of India's slow nuclear operationalization in the because it prevented successive Indian governments from a institutional within the has given for after their alternative explanations and them against the of the available I their claims his with the claim that my is a of the of academic and the of that an aspiring political scientist dare not One could similarly of on when there is He with the that I secrecy as the independent variable in my I maintain that secrecy was an variable and its cause in India's case in the to from the nonproliferation the not the nonproliferation regime as my He my argument on both his of a explanation for India's slow pace of and lack of operational planning in the political moral their in India's culture of strategic and the Indian domestic asserts that each of the alternative explanations I dismiss might not adequately explain India's their sum is greater than their The however, is that each of these explanations under the of which their into a explanation leaders by moral do not An deterrence does not into deterrence and of deterrence within a decade Strategic are not of India's of “existential to its for strategic stability with the factor in India's nuclear If deterrence and strategic stability were the of India's nuclear in the then Indian leaders could have that with to 1998 or in the after the nuclear Indian however, did not this More important, the domestic in India's to nuclear have the did not prevent India from a nuclear in but the to India's nuclear capabilities in the two and to India's and were in in Delhi's nuclear at several of all who has this history in can deny this Indeed, one of the of India's 1998 nuclear was the of a strategic with the to have central made in the early that India's from the and political of its political is that India was not It was India tried to develop a operational deterrent in the as as it but secrecy from fears of the that 1989 India the to nuclear weapons and this time, Indian defense and development to make for this which makes Indian the of moral prime ministers India's nuclear policy on because they could do little a from they on operational given the policy the with the from the that would India's and India's nuclear operationalization program therefore the of a and The secrecy surrounding it to the of The in knowledge between the scientists and the on the one who the challenges of operationalization and and their political on the who were of operational and the This is a of a to that leaders make with to them. however, is with prosaic examples of decided by Indian prime ministers the development of operational because of concerns that they could the nuclear to the as In the only of the the service with nuclear were privy to India's nuclear secrets. the government operational planning, the army and would have excluded from the was little for the civilians to the loss of control the policy The key for not through with the operational planning was to policy and that could of India's of a key Indeed, after India claimed nuclear and nuclear with the of the civilians remain in of the nuclear The among both in India and is that civilian defense scientists remain in the of the nuclear weapons program. the from the decade and the decade it do not support also makes the claim that is to India's defense and nuclear As the that India's nuclear program in the was part of the same that government operations more The problem with this argument is that can have can but need not a cause or That on India's nuclear program has the of of the lack of institutional and on the means to my explanation is to an and India's nuclear operationalization during the and the decade the in the program's pace, its during the and its in the decade the In this to the failure of successive Indian prime ministers to the of to a chief of defense staff to to the government on defense and nuclear is to the argument at is of explanations for India's slow secrecy can the of explaining the during this of India's nuclear But explanation on the logic of my rejection of India's problematic civil-military relations as a to the secrecy The problem with however, is that the of he Verghese Koithara, Ashley and Vipin does little to help his his from the is and that from the decade is an of not the for the he or the that at the my argument and India's civil-military as the cause of its slow nuclear makes a to the Indian in the to This observation is both and because the was the service of for the of nuclear delivery and operations in the more offers a of Indian nuclear policy It largely from academic and is of evidence from the of its The of written was to the of India's emerging deterrent. Tellis the main of his argument by all of the for India's to 1998 without them or their concerns how and civil-military nuclear among nuclear is of my rejection of civil-military tensions as a in the slow pace of Indian nuclear operationalization in the but he these and presents no evidence to my He is if my claim about defense ministers out of the nuclear loop is We can to this point when he greater on this He points out that Indian prime ministers held the defense portfolio for half of the decade and have about the nuclear program. I never argue that prime ministers were out of the He it that civilians in India would to keep the military out of nuclear Indeed, civilian scientists who with the in the they were to operational planning with their military a from the political argument is not that civil-military tensions in India were or are I argue that civil-military tensions were not to slow the pace of and operational planning in the For all the that pervades civil-military in the operational autonomy by the military as well as the lack of hesitation in its in with extensive domestic India's are evidence of a have an to for of claims to the that civilian have the military a role in India's nuclear and planning nuclear operations. point, is that the of civil-military nuclear is with that nuclear operations. This is and my own to however, the in India's civil-military institutional development and in the details of institutional to for had argued that civil-military tensions India from an operational nuclear Instead, the civilians have the role of the military in with civilian defense scientists under the leadership of the national security adviser in the prime minister's all of the claims made to 1998 about in the way of India an operational of its political strategic culture and the lack domestic and civil-military by the and its in successive Indian governments from a institutional is the explanation for India's long nuclear during the

The metaphor "New Pearl Harbor" and its variant "Russian Pearl Harbor" is an important element of US foreign policy discourse and contemporary research. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it is used both for "internal consumption" (political discourse) and for external. And in the XXI century. this metaphor very often arises in the coverage and analysis of contemporary Russian-American relations. The study of this metaphor in the United States is carried out in several directions. The authors come to the conclusion that in 2001 the “New Pearl Harbor” metaphor was transformed from the American media into the US foreign policy discourse. This attention to cyber threats was quickly reflected in official US strategic documents. Thus, the US National Security Strategy states: “Today, cyberspace enables state and non-state actors to campaign and attack against American politics, economics and security.” When analyzing and commenting on this provision of the US National Security Strategy, the American media unequivocally interpreted this threat as Cyber Pearl Harbor. Therefore, studying the specifics of understanding and using the concept of "Cyber Pearl Harbor" is an important and relevant research task, due to the provisions of the US National Security Strategy, which helps to highlight in more detail the specifics of constructing the image of foreign policy threats.

Following the systemic change which affected Eastern and Central Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Western experts considered that individual countries had different chances of catching up to the West. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former US National Security Adviser, the Central European countries would take at least ten years to become pluralistic, free-market democracies. Five countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia) were thought to have better chances of transforming themselves into successful liberal democracies, and so to come near to Western standards in the foreseeable future.

Nixon, Kissinger, and U.S. Foreign Policy Making examines for the first time the important role of crisis management in the making of U.S. foreign policy during the Nixon-Kissinger years. The book offers a critical account of the manner in which the president and his national security advisor - notorious for their tight grip on the machinery of US foreign policy - dominated the structures and processes of foreign policy making. By drawing on a wealth of previously classified documents, Asaf Siniver reveals the story of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), which managed foreign policy crises in the Nixon administration. In this thoroughly researched account of the performance of Nixon, Kissinger and the WSAG in four international crises, Siniver provides a fresh analysis of the important relationship among structures, processes and personalities in the making of U.S. foreign policy during international crises.

This study analyzes findings from a national survey of 2,490 randomly selected members of the US public conducted between September 30 and November 14, 1995. It provides an over time comparison of public perceptions about nuclear weapons risks and benefits and key nuclear policy issues between 1993 and 1995. Other areas of investigation include policy preferences regarding nuclear proliferation, terrorism, US/Russian nuclear cooperation, and personal security. Public perceptions of post-cold war security were found to be evolving in unexpected ways. The perceived threat of nuclear conflict involving the US had not declined, and the threat of nuclear conflict between other countries and fears of nuclear proliferation and terrorism had increased. Perceived risks associated with managing the US nuclear arsenal were also higher. Perceptions of external and domestic benefits from US nuclear weapons were not declining. Support was found for increasing funding for nuclear weapons safety, training, and maintenance, but most respondents favored decreasing funding for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. Strong support was evident for programs and funding to prevent nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Though skeptical that nuclear weapons can be eliminated, most respondents supported reducing the US nuclear arsenal, banning nuclear test explosions, and ending production of fissile materials to make nuclear weapons. Statistically significant relationships were found between perceptions of nuclear weapons risks and benefits and policy and spending preferences. Demographic variables and basic social and political beliefs were systematically related both to risk and benefit perceptions and policy and spending options.

Developments in US policy towards Africa since 9/11, as shown by the establishment of the Africa Command, has been described as marked departures from what existed in the immediate post-Cold War era when Africa was ‘neglected’. Africa has been dc-marginalized in the US strategic and national security policy because it has become critical to the strategic interest of the US. This paper provides an alternative interpretation of the US national security policy as translated into activities in Africa in the post 9/1 1 period. It argues that Africa has never been marginalized nor neglected by the US in its foreign or security policy after the Cold War, although there has been a change in strategy. This becomes obvious when security is not separated from the economy in the analysis of the US national security policy agency towards Africa.

The National Security threats that we face today and, in turn, the National Security . requirements, are more diverse and complex than they were during the Cold-War from 1945-1990. During that period, and bolstered by the experiences of World Wars I and II, US National Security policy was focused on the stabilization of post WW II country boundaries and containment of the Soviet block and China. The result was the bipolar world in which the nuclear and conventional forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies ensured a measure of political stability through a military stalemate of world wide proportions. The practical result was that large scale changes in national borders were unlikely, but internal conflict within countries, and local conflicts between neighboring countries could still occur, albeit with participation from one or both of the Superpower camps. US National Security Policy was designed primarily for stabilization of the bipolar world on the military front and for competition with the Soviet Union and China on economic and political fronts. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the global picture. The bipolar world and its military stalemate appear to be gone for the moment and the threatmore » which was the foundation for US National Security policy has changed significantly. Some will argue that China has intentions of replacing the Soviet Union as a military superpower and thus recreate the bipolar world. Furthermore, Russia still has significant nuclear forces and has recently talked of lowering the nuclear threshold in an apparent attempt to make up for its weakened conventional forces. Clearly the threat of large scale nuclear war is much reduced, but not gone entirely. Having acknowledged the Chinese and Russian threats, what does the global picture look like today? The boundaries of most countries are secure but there are significant frictions, that have, or could lead, to armed conflict. Most of these are today's manifestations of long standing problems with no easy solution in sight. It can be argued that most local conflicts will be of no direct threat to US interests. However there are situations where local conflict can have significant international impact if left unchecked, For example localized conflict in the Middle East could affect oil supplies world wide, open conflict between China and Taiwan could draw in Japan and the United States, India and Pakistan have armed conflict over Kashmir threatening a nuclear exchange, and North Korea continues to be a concern with its long range missile and nuclear and CBW, development programs. There is also the problem of state sponsored or sanctioned terrorism against the US and its allies. As with Korea, a number of countries have been identified as having had, or still having active chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs along with strategic missile programs that would enable them to deliver warheads to the US mainland or similarly threaten US allies. Furthermore the problem of the clandestine delivery of a weapon of mass destruction designed to target US civilian population centers is very real. Such threats designed to deter US policy initiatives abroad, have been termed ''asymmetric'' warfare and appear to be an emerging capability in a number of countries.« less

This article analyzes the role of historical memories of Henry Kissinger, former US national security advisor and secretary of state in the Nixon and Ford administrations, in post-9/11 foreign policy debates in the United States. It argues that the Kissinger of the Cold War has become a historical icon and an important point of reference for many in the twenty-first century who seek to shape popular American understandings of contemporary international affairs. Furthermore, it argues that an analysis of Kissinger is useful in understanding how historical figures can utilize their own celebrity to steer the popular remembrance and deployment of memories of themselves.

The object of this research is the declassified transcript of the US National Security Council Meeting of July 9, 1981, dedicated to introduction of the economic and political restrictions on building of the Soviet gas main pipeline. The subject of this research is the analysis information-bearing capabilities of the office documentation of the US National Security Council Meetings for conducting the scientific assessment of sanctions policy of the US government against the Soviet Union in the 1980s as part of directives on restricting the access of the Soviet Union to foreign markets. The article examines the published protocol the US National Security Council Meeting and related documents that contain information on creating the regime to impede the construction of the gas main pipeline to Europe. The novelty of lies in the fact that this article is first within the framework of historiographical analysis to study the plans of the US President R. Reagan on interruption of the active efforts of the Soviet Union to supply Western Europe with energy. Publication of the document clearly demonstrates that the ideas of restarting the trade-economic development of the Soviet Union were later implemented in other countries in the XXI century, when the Russian Nord Stream pipeline became one of the crucial vanguards within the system of control of the US national security interests in Europe. Based on the newly introduced documents from the foreign archives of the CIA, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, materials of the US periodical press, and memoirs, the author explores the options prepared by the US agencies aimed at complete shutdown, and restriction of access of the participants of the Soviet-German gas pipeline deal to foreign markets and resources, as well as the response of business community to trade embargo with the USSR.

This qualitative article employs an Afrocentric perspective as an alternative theoretical and/or contextual lens to provide an overview of the national security challenges facing the United States of America (US) within the context of its engagement in Africa. It also demonstrates the reactions of the US to African security threats (real or imagined) to its national well-being. At the centre of the discussion of this article is the articulation of the main issues about the US National Security Strategy in relation to Africa. The objective is to unravel the myth that Africa is a threat to the US national security and the reality about its dismissed importance to US within the context of the current global discourse on security. In order to provide a wider context for understanding the security dimension of the US foreign policy as it relates to Africa and to foster epistemic justice, it is important to address this subject from the viewpoint of Africans and others whose fate is tied to this continent. Â

A guerrilla war is an intimate affair, fought not merely with weapons but fought in the minds of the men who live in the villages and hills. --W. W. Rostow, US National Security Advisor, 1962 (1) We are without allies amongst the Iraqi populace, including those who have benefited from the ouster of Saddam.... Across Baghdad, Latifiyah, Mahmudiyah, Salman Pak, Baqubah, Balad, Taji, Baiji, Ramadi, and just about everywhere else you can name, the people absolutely hate us.... Iraqi people have not bought into what the Americans are selling, and no amount of military activity is going to change this fact. --Special Forces Veteran in Iraq (2) Operation Iraqi Freedom was predicated partially on a presumption of widespread popular support among the Iraqi people for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. theory held that a relatively small military force could topple the Ba'athist regime with swift attacks aimed at key targets. Then, using momentum secured by liberating an oppressed people, a temporary government comprised of expatriate technocrats could step in to rule the country until a government could be elected. Shortly thereafter, the reasoning held, the country would achieve stability and the United States could dramatically reduce troop levels. This vision was largely deflated shortly after coalition troops dashed north, securing vast swaths of Iraq and quickly destroying remnant military forces. Despite stunning military success, the victory failed to simultaneously produce the anticipated wellspring of Within three months of the fall of Baghdad, this notion was completely discredited as Iraq found itself in the grip of a nationwide wave of violence. violence has continued, remaining remarkably consistent despite periodic surges and depressions of attacks. During this time, the coalition flooded the country with hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of dollars in reconstruction aid. (3) Despite significant troop numbers, large sums of money, and a great deal of personal commitment by all forces over the past two years, one thing has remained predictably constant: the population's neutrality. recent national elections in January present the most marked aberration from the population's general ambivalence; yet it remains to be seen whether this represents the genesis of a paradigm shift. Using Iraq as a model, this article seeks to examine the relationship between the people and the insurgency, with the ultimate questions being: What role does the civilian population play in the insurgency, and how can this situation be influenced to achieve success? article examines the traditional military doctrines of insurgency and finds that: (1) though unique, the Iraqi insurgency is following a predictable pattern of development; (2) the civilian population plays a determinative role in the success or failure of the insurgency; and (3) the civilian population can be more effectively influenced though a more selective and efficient application of civil-military (4) Mao Tse-tung famously noted, Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. (5) Army doctrine reflects this philosophy: The basic factor affecting the birth, survival, and ultimate success of guerrilla movements is the support of an adequate portion of the civilian population in an area of operations. (6) Popular support is equally important in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies: Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support. (7) It is worth highlighting the distinction between insurgencies and guerrilla warfare, as the terms are often used interchangeably. (8) An insurgency is an internal uprising against a ruling power (domestic or foreign) with its foundation rooted in a desire for political or social change. …

The article presents the state of the Russia Group (Russia specialist’s panel) of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff in the Donald Trump Administration term. The point at issue is officer’s group in charge of US-Russian relations. The article chronological framework - from January 2017 to January 2021. The essay’s focus on the personalities who held the Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs incumbency in the NSC office. Fiona Hill, Timothy Morrison, Andrew Peek, Tom Williams and Ryan Tully held it position the period under review. The article consciously thinks the NSC Russia Ring main functionality and its role in the Donald Trump Administration foreign policy priorities. The special attention had given to the NSC Russian Directorate personnel changes under the Donald Trump Cabinet. Their main reasons are considered. The research paper also analyzes the US National Security Advisors and Senior Directors for European and Russian Affairs relationship system under the Donald Trump presidency. The article considered the National Security Advisor John Bolton influential role on the NSC Russia Group political mood and professional activities.

Significance O’Brien succeeds John Bolton, who left the post on September 10. His candidacy was supported by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and senior presidential advisor Jared Kushner. O’Brien’s selection is a win for Pompeo and elevates Pompeo’s influence over national security policy, especially as a new permanent Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has not yet been confirmed. Impacts North Korea will welcome Bolton’s departure but still be concerned since Pompeo remains; this may slow US-North Korea rapprochement. O’Brien is likely to be a more low-key NSA than Bolton, reserving any policy disagreements for private meetings. Trump will still be the primary foreign policy decisionmaker.