Abstract
Abstract The pragmatist rejects the possibility that we can step outside our conceptual scheme in order to assess its correspondence to an unconceptualized reality. Consequently, it seems, she can describe a certain sort of conceptual change, namely, inter-vocabulary change, as rational only retrospectively. In a recent paper, Matthew Shields attempts to show otherwise. He argues that the speaker of such change ought to be understood as performing the speech act of metalinguistic proposal, supposition, or stipulation, and that, thus understood, her utterance is amenable to rational analysis. In this paper, I argue that Shields’ attempt fails. My aim is to show not that we pragmatists remain in search of a solution to this problem but rather that we do not need one.
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