The Irony of U.S. policy towards North Korea

Abstract

Many recent developments in North Korea have no doubt caused renewed consternation among critics of U.S. foreign policy. Periodic border episodes, occasional civil‐military rifts, and persistent demands for food aid as an apparent precondition for peace talks all provide opponents of the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea with fodder for the cries of “appeasement” or “Munich” that have peppered editorial pages since the October 1994 U.S.‐North‐Korean nuclear energy agreement. Unless North Korea immediately agrees to institute liberal economic reforms, democratic elections, unilateral disarmament and unification with South Korea, the hyperbole will likely continue. But have the harsh criticisms of the Clinton Administration's policy of North Korean “engagement” been justified? We believe the answer is no. While some of North Korea's apparent “opening” has resulted from the country's own partially self‐inflicted economic and humanitarian woes, U.S. policy also accounts for some of the notable moderation in North Korean behavior over the last several years. Despite the seminal failure of British policy in the 1930s, appeasement can sometimes produce positive results. The irony of U.S. policy towards North Korea is that appeasement is working! This shows in the substantial progress made since the Agreed Framework was signed in areas such as: North Korean diplomacy (particularly in relations with the U.S., Japan, China and Russia); North Korean economic liberalization; North‐South Korean relations; and in the Framework's implementation in the first place. Naturally, considerable debate surrounds the exact meaning of these developments and the U.S.’s role in bringing them about. Even so, these significant developments would have been far fewer without a credible and well‐timed U.S. appeasement policy.