The Intersection of International Criminal Law and Human Rights Law: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Paradox of Justice by Calistus Abang, PhD

The Nuremberg tribunal was the expression and the beginning of states' recognition of their duty to prosecute genocide and other gross human rights violations. It was a first step towards fulfillin...

Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations

Regional human rights courts like the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), and the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACtHPR) have become popular sites of mobilization for victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home. Besides being platforms for individual remedy, human rights courts increasingly shape social norms and state policy within countries, making them attractive avenues for rights advocates to develop new norms or to push domestic authorities to reform legislation. The judges of these courts can decide, for example, whether same-sex couples have a right to be married, if prisoners have the right to vote or receive HIV/AIDS treatment, or when a state can deport illegal immigrants to a country where they will likely be tortured. As these courts pass their judgments, they often find themselves in conflict with states that are violating human rights of marginalized groups on a large scale and are unwilling to implement international rulings. Although international human rights courts have become increasingly popular venues among victims and activists who seek justice when justice fails at home, we are only beginning to understand how activists play roles in shaping the development of regional human rights courts' case law—the body of judgments that shapes how judges will make their decisions in the future. We now have plenty of international relations and international legal research on the interactions between states and international courts: how judges in these courts wrestle between deferring to the interests of member state governments whose actions are on trial and sticking closely to the conventions' fundamental yet evolving principles (Alter et al., 2019; Helfer & Voeten, 2014). As some states begin to resist international courts' authority, scholars have begun to examine the dynamics of this backlash (Hillebrecht, 2022; Madsen et al., 2018; Sandholtz et al., 2018). Recent studies have also demonstrated that human rights advocates—whether NGOs or individual lawyers—have a significant impact on shaping the jurisprudence of international courts and the impact judgments have in concrete locations (Kahraman, 2018; Sundstrom, 2014; van der Vet, 2012; Kurban, 2020; Conant, 2018; Harms, 2021; Cichowski, 2016; Hodson, 2011; Haddad, 2018). Meanwhile, these advocates themselves have been subject to repression and stigmatization by governments as part of the backlash phenomenon. Without an adequate understanding of the factors shaping activists' engagement with international courts, we risk undervaluing their strategic impact on the expansion of case law, the human rights protection of marginalized groups who cannot find remedies at home, and the domestic implementation of these judgments in an age of state backlash. In this section, we summarize the three papers contained in this symposium and their original contributions to these themes. Over the last decade, dozens of countries have erected legal barriers or started vilifying campaigns to stymie the work of NGOs (Buyse, 2018; Chaudhry, 2022). One tactic in this toolkit is the enactment of burdensome regulation on NGOs that receive funds from foreign donors as they allegedly promote foreign agendas (Christensen & Weinstein, 2013; Dupuy et al., 2021). States that frequently abuse human rights are especially prone to target NGOs that engage in strategic litigation (Hillebrecht, 2019). Most NGOs depend on foreign funding, and NGOs that litigate international cases fall disproportionately in this category, but do funders affect the selection of cases? In “Foreign Agents or Agents of Justice? Private Foundations, NGO Backlash, and International Human Rights Litigation,” Heidi Haddad and Lisa Sundstrom examine the extent to which Western donors, particularly private foundations, have encouraged NGOs in Europe to litigate at the ECtHR as a human rights advocacy strategy. They examine overall patterns of donor funding and NGO litigation records, and look in more detail at the case of Russian NGOs' foreign funding and litigation records. The analysis is extremely timely, as the Russian government's criminalization of independent civil society actors, especially in the human rights field, and their accusation that foreign funding turns NGOs into “foreign agents” have been crucial elements of the Russian regime's autocratization. This claim has also provided fuel for Russia's disenchantment with the ECtHR in recent years, contributing to the assessment of many observers that Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine was the last straw in an inevitable collision course leading to its exit from the Council of Europe. Haddad and Sundstrom debunk the idea that foreign donors are pushing NGOs toward strategies of human rights litigation. Instead, they argue, there is more evidence that NGOs themselves promoted the mechanism of international litigation as a strategy that donors later adopted. This article is a poignant reminder of the advocacy tools that Russian human rights activists and citizens have lost as a result of their government's departure from the Council of Europe, including ECtHR jurisdiction. Yet it also provides insight into the likely roles of foreign donors in other country cases where NGOs are using international court litigation as a human rights advocacy strategy, which is often a target of the ire of national governments, as explored in the next article in the symposium. When states attack human rights NGOs within their borders and/or international human rights courts themselves, how does this affect the willingness of those NGOs to take cases to international courts, and the ways in which they do so? De Silva and Plagis ask this question in their article about state backlash against NGOs in the case of Tanzania and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. A fascinating empirical question they pose is: does state backlash against NGOs increase NGO litigation at international courts (to contest state repression at those courts and use international mechanisms when domestic ones are not available), roughly in line with Keck and Sikkink's famous “boomerang pattern” (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), or decrease it due to heightened fear and restricted NGO capabilities that state repression creates? Employing a process-tracing analysis of NGOs' involvement in three cases before the African Court at different stages of the Tanzanian government's backlash against the Court, De Silva and Plagis find that “two-level backlash” by states can result in both phenomena, either promoting or deterring NGO legal mobilization at international human rights courts, depending on certain conditions. The three selected cases concerning the death penalty, the rights of persons with albinism, and the rights of pregnant schoolgirls and mothers, which took place at different time periods, demonstrate a number of patterns of state backlash interacting with NGO strategies. The authors find that domestic-level state backlash deterred domestic NGOs from partnering with international NGOs in litigation, but that such backlash, when it repressed domestic political and legal mobilization opportunities, actually encouraged both Tanzanian and international NGOs to turn to the African Court more frequently to seek remedies. International-level backlash in turn only deterred NGOs from international litigation when such backlash consisted of state efforts to restrict NGOs' ability to engage in litigation, and not when the international backlash was in the form of routine noncompliance with African Court rulings. Importantly, the authors find that NGO responses to state backlash were significantly shaped by their degree of legal consciousness and expertise with the rules, proceedings, and workings of the African Court. Those NGOs with less knowledge and experience were more likely to back away from engaging with the Court under the pressure of state backlash. De Silva and Plagis conclude that “NGOs' persistent human rights advocacy in the face of state backlash is a double-edged sword,” in the sense that they may not be deterred by state backlash initially, but there is a danger that their continued determination to engage in international litigation could prompt governments to engage in even more severe forms of backlash, with critical impacts on international courts and already vulnerable human rights defenders. Rights advocates have a growing menu of institutions and courts available to them. How do activists choose at which institution to lodge their cases in a world where legal remedies have diversified, or as some have argued, fragmented (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002)? In “What Makes an International Institution Work for Labor Activists? Shaping International Law through Strategic Litigation,” Filiz Kahraman goes beyond the tendency of legal mobilization studies to only examine how activists interact with a single court or institution. Instead, Kahraman opens up how rights advocates imagine which institution is most receptive to their claims. Drawing on a comparative interview study of British and Turkish trade union activists and their legal mobilization campaigns at international courts and quasi-judicial institutions like the International Labor Organization (ILO), Kahraman examines how activists first probe and then strategically identify which court or international institution is most susceptible to their primary goals of influencing structural reforms and setting new norms. Through this probing process—or dynamic signaling game between courts and litigants—activists push a court's jurisprudence and case law into new issue areas. For instance, at the ECtHR, Turkish trade unionists challenged domestic courts' ruling that public sector workers did not have the right to establish unions, even though the ECtHR had no established case law on labor rights in 1990s. They won the case, with the ECtHR finding that Turkey violated the right of public sector workers to unionize. These cases not only had an impact within Turkey, but over the next decades, similar cases brought by British unionists would spin off the early precedent set by the Turkish legal mobilization efforts. Kahraman argues that they ultimately pushed the ECtHR to recognize the basic trade union rights as fundamental human rights. Kahraman sheds light on the often hidden strategies behind international litigation. Activists litigate not just for the immediate impact on the current case they work on, but how they envision that all the cases they work on may shape norms and domestic structural reforms further in the future. Whether an institution is perceptive of claims lies in the eye of the beholder. Kahraman finds that besides targeting institutions with high compliance rates, they also take cases to institutions with low rates of compliance, especially “if these institutions have extensive judicial authority to create new international norms.” So, it is not the de jure protection set by an international courts, but rather how activists perceive the juridical responsiveness and judicial authority of courts—or, how judges adopt either an activist approach or restraint in response to incoming cases and how willing states are to implement cases of a court, respectively—that determines why activists select certain courts or quasi-judicial institutions (like the ILO). Kahraman gives us new tools to interpret how activists perceive authority and receptiveness and respond to opportunities. Rather than static external legal remedies, courts and quasi-judicial institutions are opportunity structures that are malleable to the strategic vision of the activist or litigant. The articles in this symposium together reveal a number of key overlapping insights. At the broadest level, they demonstrate that activists' behaviors and strategies influence international courts' jurisprudence, politics within states, and the human rights outcomes of everyday citizens—and these influences have often been hidden in our existing canon of research on international courts. In addition, all of these articles show that, while activists may face challenges in their efforts, often including significant backlash from their home state governments, they also continue to retain significant agency through their creative efforts to develop legal strategies and circumvent state repression. Activists perennially innovate: sparking the ideas that inspire donors who fund them; calculating how to continue their litigation work when government actors threaten them; and taking risks in litigation to push courts to expand how they define human rights. However, along with these uplifting conclusions, there are worrying patterns that demand future research. States are increasingly pushing back against the powers of international courts to bind them to costly measures, and as this symposium has shown, national governments often point to activists as contributors to this “problem” of invasive international human rights standards. A growing body of research has tracked how human rights defenders of all kinds globally are under threat from actors like governments and corporations who disagree with their contentious actions. We need more studies that gather comprehensive data and systematically track these threats, specifically with regard to activists who engage in international human rights litigation. We suspect that such activists are likely disproportionately targeted due to the international visibility of their complaints. We also desperately need research into possible innovative responses to these threats to activists—responses from activists, funders, governments of countries that support human rights, and international courts themselves. Freek van der Vet is a University Researcher at the Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, Faculty of Law, University of Helsinki and the principal investigator of the Toxic Crimes Project. Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom is Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. She is the director of the ActinCourts network at UBC and conducts research on legal mobilization by Russian activists.

Ratner, Steven R. <i>The Thin Justice of International Law: A Moral Reckoning of the Law of Nations</i>.New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 496. $85.00 (cloth).

Corruption, being the abuse of public office for private or political gain, currently receives an increasing amount of attention from scholars and practitioners in various disciplines, including law. While the phenomenon is as old as mankind, the last fifteen years saw the rise of many anti-corruption treaties, aimed at criminalisation, prevention and cooperation. At the same time, there seems to be relatively little work done on corruption in the field of human rights law or international criminal law. This book argues that these areas of law can certainly contribute to fighting corruption, by giving a human face to both victims and perpetrators. The study commences with Part A, containing a broader analysis of the 'multi-headed monster' named corruption, looking into issues of definition, measurement, and consequences. This is followed by an overview of the content and functioning of the global and regional anti-corruption treaties that are currently in force, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Hereafter, Part B considers whether or not types of corruption can be qualified as a violation of internationally recognised human rights, enshrined in the International Bill of Rights. It is argued that corruption, especially in the public sector, can have a severe negative impact upon both civil and political rights, as well as upon economic, social and cultural rights. Moreover, the study examines to what extent this is recognised by the human rights supervisory mechanisms at the global and regional level. The concluding observations and case law of the human rights treaty bodies are scrutinised, as well as the outcomes of the various Special Procedures and the Universal Periodic Review System of the UN Human Rights Council. At the regional level, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, as well as the cases of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights are discussed. Furthermore, Part C of the book aims to view corruption from the angle of international criminal law, inter alia by examining whether or not types of corruption can be qualified as a crime under international criminal law. In this context, the question is answered whether corruption can fall under the current provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court de lege lata. Also, the various possibilities offered by international criminal law de lege ferenda to combat corruption are touched upon. Finally, Part D draws conclusions and formulates recommendations as to how human rights law and international criminal law can best be used to address corruption. This includes a draft General Comment on corruption and human rights, with the purpose of providing a starting point for further reflection on the topic.

The article is devoted to the pressing issue of ensuring the protection of human rights during armed conflict, particularly in the context of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The authors substantiates the need to improve legal mechanisms for the protection of human rights during war, especially under martial law, occupation, and forced displacement of the population. It is noted that violations of human rights and freedoms under such conditions are systemic and large-scale, indicating the insufficient effectiveness of existing international legal instruments. The study covers a broad range of international legal acts governing the protection of human rights during armed conflict. In particular, the importance of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL), their functional correlation, and interaction in times of armed conflict are analyzed. It is emphasized that both branches share a common goal – to ensure the protection of human dignity – but differ in scope and conditions of application. Special attention is given to the right to life as a fundamental and absolute right, which has the status of jus cogens and must be protected even during martial law. The article gives particular focus to the legal regulation of the status of participants in armed conflict (combatants, hors de combat, prisoners of war), as well as the civilian population, which requires special protection. The content of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols is revealed, as well as their role in the system of international humanitarian law. It is noted that Ukraine is a party to these international treaties, which entails the obligation to apply them within its domestic legal system, in particular through direct-acting norms and the provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (Article 438 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). The article also examines practical issues of law enforcement during armed conflict, particularly by the aggressor state. Emphasis is placed on the need for criminal prosecution for violations of IHL norms and the obligation of states to ensure compliance with international standards in the field of human rights protection. The importance of international monitoring mechanisms is underscored, while also pointing out their limited effectiveness, especially in conditions of hybrid warfare and legal uncertainty. The jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is analyzed separately, along with its approaches to assessing human rights violations during armed conflict. The authors notes that although the ECtHR does not directly apply IHL norms, it evaluates situations in accordance with the provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, without giving a legal qualification to the actions of the parties to the conflict as war crimes. This indicates a certain divergence in approaches to the qualification of violations. In conclusion, the authors emphasizes the need for harmonization of IHL and IHRL in legal practice, the improvement of protection mechanisms for victims of war, and the strengthening of accountability for violations of legal norms during armed conflicts. It is emphasized that only through the consolidation of efforts by states, international organizations, and civil society can proper protection of human rights during wartime be ensured.

This book examines the tension between international immunity rules, international human rights law, and international criminal law. The progressive development of a normative system of international human rights law and international criminal law without the simultaneous development of international institutional enforcement mechanisms brought the question of the role of national courts in the application of these norms to the fore and has made the question as to the relation between immunity rules and human rights and international criminal law an immediate one. The tension between the centuries old immunity rules and the relatively recent developments in international human rights law and international criminal law presents itself in two distinct forms. Firstly, it can be questioned whether immunity rules as such are compatible with certain fundamental rights of individuals under international law such as the rights of access to court, the right to a remedy, or the right to effective protection. Secondly, it can be questioned whether immunity rules apply unabridged in proceedings concerning grave human rights abuses. This book sets out to clearly distinguish the different scope and nature of the rule of state immunity, the rule of functional immunity, and the personal immunity of diplomatic agents and heads of state. While strong arguments against certain applications of immunity rules can be derived from international human rights law and international criminal law, this book argues that an unqualified attack on immunity rules risks casting a shadow over all human rights based arguments.

The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC) is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the entire international community that threaten security, peace, and well-being of the world. This article argues that serious (transitional) economic offences should belong in this group. Ignoring these crimes, which often represent economic violence characteristic of transitional and post-conflict countries, can lead to another cycle of armed conflict and/or physical violence as well as to internal and external insecurity. Responses to globalization are having a significant effect on international law and institutions with a view to protecting economic and social human rights, human security, and human dignity. Sometimes, as in the case of Croatia, national states are not able to and/or unwilling to prosecute serious and systemic economic crimes, which in turn undermines individual and collective security. The same could be said for international criminal law. By ignoring these crimes and violations – unlike what international human rights law, supranational criminology, and transitional justice does – the core international criminal law no longer responds to the needs of societies and individuals. The Rechtsgut in need of protection by prosecuting serious economic crimes that fulfill the threshold of core crimes on an international level is comprised of the “security, peace and well-being of the world.” Therefore, one could argue that the International Criminal Court’s possible involvement in economic violence does have a legal base, without needing to amend the ICC’s Statute (hereinafter: ICCSt). Since one must be aware of the diversity that exists as to the criteria for international criminalization, this article is based on broader grounds in order to argue in favor of international criminalization of these economic crimes. The article therefore emphasizes the importance of connecting narratives of international criminal law, with discourses on international human rights law (based on Art. 21 of the ICCSt), human security, (supranational) criminology, transitional justice, and (economic) criminal law. In the line of (human) security discourse, this approach seeks to find arguments as to whether or not it is necessary to begin prosecuting serious (transitional) economic offences as crimes under international law. First, this article gives a brief overview of the failed experiment in Croatia concerning the prosecution of transitional economic crimes that served as incentive, based on the ICC’s complementarity principle.

Foreword Preface to the Third Edition Table of cases Table of International Instruments Abbreviations Introduction 1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Recognition of the Right to Life 2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: drafting, ratification and reservation 3. Interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 4. Towards abolition: the Second Optional Protocol and other developments in the United Nations 5. International humanitarian law 6. International criminal law 7. European human rights law 8. Inter-American human rights law 9. African human rights law Conclusion Appendices: I. Universal Declaration of Human Rights II. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights III. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights IV. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aimed at Abolition of the Death Penalty V. General Comment 6(16) (excerpts) VI. Convention against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment VII. Convention on the Rights of the Child VIII. Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty IX. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War X. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians XI. Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to The Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts XII. Protocol Additional II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to The Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts XIII. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court XIV. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms XV. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty XVI. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union XVII. European Union Minimum Standards Paper XVIII. Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Commitments XIX. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man XX. American Convention on Human Rights XXI. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty XXII. African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights XXIII. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child XXIV. Arab Charter on Human Rights Bibliography Index.

This book fills a major gap in the scholarly literature concerning international criminal law, comparative criminal law, and human rights law. The principle of legality (non-retroactivity of crimes and punishments and related doctrines) is fundamental to criminal law and human rights law. Yet this was the first book-length study of the status of legality in international law - in international criminal law, international human rights law, and international humanitarian law. This was also the first book to survey legality/non-retroactivity in all national constitutions, developing the patterns of implementation of legality in the various legal systems such as Common Law, Civil Law, Islamic Law, and Asian Law around the world. This is a necessary book for any scholar, practitioner, and library in the area of international, criminal, comparative, human rights, or international humanitarian law.

As is well known, different countries may have a different attitude toward the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order. In those countries that qualify the ratified international human rights law merely as statute, the formal rank of international human rights law is often used as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on domestic constitutional law. Through a comparative analysis between Germany and Taiwan, though, this paper shows that, despite similar determinations on the formal rank of international (human rights) law, the German and the Taiwanese Constitutional Courts have developed quite different views on the normative significance of international human rights law to their domestic constitutional orders. The different constitutional practices in Germany and Taiwan thus not only reflect Taiwan’s unique international status, but also indicate that the formal rank of international human rights law does not have much to do with its normative binding force on domestic constitutional law. Those who use formal rank as an argument against the binding force of international human rights law on constitutional law presuppose the absolute dichotomy of international and domestic law and thereby overlook the potential compatibility between international human rights law and constitutional law. From a human rights perspective, I argue that international human rights law should not be regarded as an “external” law, but rather as a framework order which delegates domestic constitutional orders to concretize international human rights law according to their own needs or interests so as to fulfill their international task of human rights protection on national level. Viewed this way, the determination on the formal rank of international human rights law in domestic legal order matters only because it has to do with the determination of a certain constitutional order on the way in which it concretizes international human rights law.

Human Rights as Peacemaker: An Integrative Theory of International Human Rights

The article presents both theoretical and practical reflections on international humanitarian law as a part of public international law. The author analyses the principle of legal certainty as an integral component and foundation of any normative legal regulation within a specific legal field. A correlation is drawn between international humanitarian law and related branches of international law, such as international criminal law and international human rights law. The study discusses the fundamental principles of international humanitarian law in the context of contemporary approaches to its interpretation as jus in bello, with references to previous definitions. The article analyses the definition of international humanitarian law in the context of balancing its two main principles: military necessity and humanity. A distinction is made between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. The study explores scholarly approaches to understanding the interrelationship and mutual influence of international humanitarian law and international human rights law based on the principles of complementarity and affinity. Consequently, the differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law are identified. The author analyses practical examples of differentiating these branches of public international law at the present stage based on the lex specialis principle. The article also identifies future trends in the continued mutual development of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It explores the influence of international criminal law on international humanitarian law, establishing that the field of international criminal law complements international humanitarian law, especially when it comes to the practical application of international criminal law norms in punishing acts that fall under the prohibitive norms of international humanitarian law. Finally, the article systematizes approaches to the integration of elements within the system of public international law.

Preface List of Contributors Introduction Progressive Nuances in International Human Rights Paradigm 1. The Historical Development of International Human Rights, Michelo Hansungule 1. Introduction 2. Some Historical Perspectives on Human Rights 3. Universal Rights 4. The European View 5. Human Rights as Moral Ideas in Diverse Societies, Religions, and Cultures 6. Africa 7. Middle East (Islamic World) 8. Asia 9. Post-War Developments 10. Conclusion 2. Civil and Political Rights, Joshua Castellino 1. Introduction 2. The Covenant 3. The Rights Package 4. Future Challenges 3. An Introduction to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Overcoming the Constraints of Categorization through Implementation, Vinodh Jaichand 1. Introduction 2. Historical Development 3. Similarities and Differences in Content of ICCPR and ICESCR 4. The Norms and Enforcement 5. On Justiciability: An Example of the Protection of ESC Rights in a Region 6. On Justiciability: Domestic Enforcement 7. Conclusion 4. Women's Rights in International Law, Mmatsie Mooki, Rita Ozoemana, Michelo Hansungule 1. Introduction 2. Recognition of Women's Rights: United Nations Charter and the International Bill of Rights 3. Women's Rights in other United Nations Convention 4. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women 5. United Nations Groundbreaking Conferences 6. Violence Against Women 7. Conclusion 5. Globalization and Human Rights, Heli Askola 1. Introduction 2. Globalization 3. Economic Globalization and Human Rights 4. Political, Social and Cultural Globalization and Human Rights 5. Conclusion 6. Role of the UN in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Elvira Dominguez-Redondo 1. Introduction 2. From Codification to Efficiency: The Different Phases of the Human Rights Discourse within the United Nations 3. Normative Development of the UN System of Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 4. Charter-based and Treaty-based Monitoring Mechanisms: Public Special Procedure and the Work of the Committees 7. Attributes of Successful Human Rights on-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) - Sixty Years After the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, George E. Edwards 1. Introduction 2. NGOs & Human Rights NGOs 3. Ten Characteristics of Successful Human Rights NGOs 4. NGO Self-Regulation Via Codes of Conduct and Ethics 5. Conclusion 8. Do States have an Obligation under International Law to Provide Human Rights Education?, Paula Gerber 1. Introduction 2. Human Rights Education (HRE) in International Law 3. Obstacles to the Realization of HRE 4. Conclusion 9. Application of International Standards of Human Rights Law at Domestic Level, Joshua Castellino 1. Introduction 2. The Codification of International Human Rights Standards as Law 3. Domestic Implementation of Rights: The 'Engine Room' of Universal Instruments of Human Rights 4. Conclusion 10. Role of Regional Human Rights Instruments in the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, Azizur Rahman Chowdhury, V. Seshaiah Shasthri, Md. Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan 1. Introduction 2. European Human Rights Treaties and Their Implementation 3. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 1969 4. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981 5. Concluding Remarks Index

INTRODUCTION. The year of 2018 marks with a global celebration of 70th anniversary of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the landmark international document which represents the universal recognition that basic rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human beings which is solemnly proclaimed by the UN member states. The most debatable and ambiguous issue is the determination of the legal status of this essential document. Given the fact that the Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly in a form of the resolution, it has a recommendatory character. However, the Declaration which adopted as “standard to which all nations and states should strive to achieve” has undergone a certain legal transformation related to the constant development and refinement in the process of concluding a rich body of legally binding international human rights treaties that affected both domestic and international law. In this regard, the statements on the necessity of recognition of the certain provisions of the Declaration as norms of the international customary law are timely and fully justified. The article analyzes national judicial practice of sovereign states and the International Court of Justice in order to identify the possibility of such recognition. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The article is based on a considerable amount of materials, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, working materials of the UN Commission on Human Rights, statements made during General Assembly meeting (documented as verbatim records) on adoption of the Declaration, decisions and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, as well as the doctrinal positions of different authors. The methodological basis of the research comprises the general scientific methods (the dialectical, historical, statistical methods, methods of generalization and system analysis) and special methods of cognition (comparative legal and formal legal methods, methods of interpretation of legal norms). RESEARCH RESULTS. In the basis of the study of the international legal acts and international judicial practice, national legislation and judicial practice of concrete states, as well as doctrinal positions of scientists, the author makes conclusions on the legal status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. In the article the author gives a historical reference on the diplomatic contestation in the period of the adoption of the Declaration which subsequently affected the final text of the document. Taking into account the moral significance, as well as weighty contribution of the Declaration to the adoption of international and regional human rights treaties, national legislation and judicial practice, the author comes to the conclusion that the certain provisions of the Declaration should be recognized as norms of the international customary law. The author also concludes that in modern conditions, when a number of states are still not a party to the main international human rights treaties, the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should act for them as binding norms of international customary law that are formed as a result of international practice of states and are gradually recognized by them as a legal norm. This conclusion is also formed on the basis of the practice of the International Court of Justice, the decisions and advisory opinions of which are analyzed by the author in this article.