The intersection of counter-terrorism law and government recognition in post-conflict transitions

United Nations (UN) organs have the primary responsibility in the collective security system. The UN Security Council is a body with broad responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security. Accordingly, this body makes recommendations and decisions with the aim of establishing international peace and security. It also enacts measures that do not involve, but also those that involve the use of armed force. In relation to the Security Council, the UN General Assembly has a subsidiary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Republic of Austria was a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council from 1990 to 1992. It was important for Austria that the UN system of collective security functions properly, having in mind the fact that the territory of the former Yugoslavia is in its immediate vicinity, as well as the fact that the basic principles of international law were violated, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the officials of the Republic of Austria at the United Nations initiated, participated in the preparation and voting of several UN Security Council resolutions with the aim of implementing certain collective security measures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most important acts related to the implementation of the set of collective security measures adopted by the United Nations organs with the strong involvement of the Republic of Austria are: UN Security Council Resolutions 749 and 752 (activities of the Republic of Austria in stopping the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina at an early stage), UN Security Council Resolutions 757 (economic sanctions against FR Yugoslavia), UN Security Council Resolution 761 (sending UNPROFOR to Sarajevo Airport), UN Security Council Resolution 764 (proposal to impose coercive measures), Council Resolutions 770 and 771 UN Security Council (delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina and its right to self-defense), UN Security Council Resolution 779 (right to return the refugees), UN Security Council Resolution 781 (establishment of a no-fly zone), Security Council Resolution 787 UN (proposal for the establishment of protected zones), UN General Assembly Resolutions 48/88 and 49/10 (request for lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina).

This article examines European Union (EU) military operations from the perspective of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and UN collective security. The EU has supported UN peacekeeping missions through its own military operations within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), based on the authorisation of these operations by the UN Security Council. However, the EU’s military operation on the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Sophia, was established in 2015 without such prior UN Security Council authorisation. Although the UN Security Council authorised the operation subsequently, it was received in a less positive light than previous operations and was criticised not only for the way in which it was established, but also for its performance. The article argues that this break with prior practice does not indicate a new direction being taken by the EU as it has retreated from this approach and established a new military operation in the Mediterranean (Operation Irini), again firmly in line with a mandate issued by the UN Security Council in 2020. The assessment of EU military operations can be complex as there might be other EU agencies involved in the process such as Frontex, and their role in future operations, in particular in the field of migration, should be monitored. Yet this internal complexity does not alter their evaluation under international law. As soon as EU military operations are conducted on the territory of a third State, the EU needs to secure either a UN Security Council authorisation or State consent. Looking at this process from the perspective of the UN Security Council sheds light on the complexity of EU military operations and their position within UN collective security.

United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) resolutions (UNSCRs) are adopted by a vote of the five permanent members and ten non-permanent members of the UNSC. Each UNSCR is understood to be part of the “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” of the UN. The Indonesian government has been encouraged by various parties to make a legal instrument that would enforce the UNSCRs. Such an instrument would serve to bridge and reduce gaps in the rule of law regarding the enforcement of UNSCRs for nations. However, the government of Indonesia faces several challenges in implementing legal instruments for the UNSCRs. This article maintains that it is crucial to study accommodative policies regarding the national enforcement of UNSCRs by considering the example of Singapore. Singapore has special laws that respond to UNSCRs (The UN Act Chapter 339-UN Act). UN Act 339 is the legal umbrella in Singapore for the government’s implementation of UNSCRs. The UN Act is also an attempt by the Singaporean government to carry out its international obligations to the United Nations.

The use of force� /no matter how benevolent, enlightened, or impartial in intent� /has dramatic consequences. It shapes the struggle for power and helps to determine the outcome of political contests, which is why it is inherently controversial. It is why international debates about Libya� /the first road test of the Responsibility to Protect’s (R2P) coercive element (also known as Pillar Three)� /were understandably contentious. Pillar Three is defined as ‘‘the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide ... / protection.’’ 1 While peaceful means of response are primarily preferred, should that prove inadequate to ensure protection, the international community should use more robust action: ‘‘no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.’’ 2

Zooming in on the serving European Union (EU) Member States and exploring the legal parameters defining regional actorness both directly and indirectly, this article analyzes the EU's representation at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Looking at the theory and practice behind Articles 52, 23 and 103 of the UN Charter, we shed fresh light on the only provision in the European Treaties that explicitly referred to the UN Security Council, i.e. the former Article 19 of the EU Treaty. We define that provision as a regional interpretation of Article 103 of the UN Charter and discuss its implementation in day-to-day decision-making, especially as for economic and financial sanctions measures. Hereby, we focus on the negotiations leading to UN Security Council Resolution 1822(2008).

The fact that many groups designated as terrorist are party to non-international armed conflicts raises tensions between international humanitarian law (IHL) and international counter-terrorism law. One such area of tension – the topic of this article – relates to the granting of amnesties. IHL encourages the use of amnesties, and United Nations (UN) bodies have welcomed the granting of amnesties as part of peace agreements. At the same time, several UN Security Council resolutions adopted since 9/11 require States to ensure that persons responsible for terrorist acts, including those committed within situations of armed conflict, are brought to justice. This article analyses the ways in which such counter-terrorism rules impact States’ implementation of the amnesty provisions in IHL, and, in turn, how that interaction shapes the sustainability of the peace which amnesty schemes can facilitate. It makes two main arguments. First, UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism include certain binding obligations that must inform States’ implementation of the amnesty provision in IHL. Second, the indeterminacy of certain binding obligations in the UN Security Council resolutions, allied to the weak nature of the IHL amnesty obligation, creates challenges for States seeking to comply with both sets of rules. After outlining the rationales for amnesties under IHL and the UN Security Council framework on terrorism (Section 2), this article examines the varying normative weight and specificity of the rules at issue (Sections 3 and 4) and illustrates the inconsistent State practice to date (Section 5). Finally, this article proposes some guidance on the implementation of these two sets of rules (Section 6).

Introduction On 24 September 2003 the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC) inaugurated a new agenda item entitled ‘Justice and the Rule of Law’, acknowledging the UNSC’s ‘heavy responsibility to promote justice and the rule of law in its efforts to maintain international peace and security’.1 This book examines how the UNSC has responded to this mandate, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping, sanctions and the use of force. The contributors to this volume discuss both how the concept of the rule of law (ROL) regulates, or influences, UNSC activity and how the UNSC has in turn shaped the notion of the ROL. The UNSC’s designation of the ROL as an important theme offers principled law as the solution to the problem of unprincipled politics, and stable peace as the alternative to destabilising war. The idea is that threats to peace and security should be managed in accordance with the norms and values enshrined in the UN Charter. However, as many contributors to this collection note, the concept of the ROL is famously opaque and contested. Some commentators question the ability of the ROL to guide actions to maintain international peace and security on the basis that it is insufficiently coherent.2 Others criticise attempts to transplant a notion with western origins and an associated suite of western rule-oflaw institutions into other contexts.3 The veto power accorded to the UNSC’s five permanent members by the UN Charter is also regarded as undermining the capacity of the ROL to temper the exercise of raw power in and through the UNSC.4 The relationship between the UNSC and the ROL provides a fascinating case study of how powerful actors both shape and are shaped by powerful ideas. Terence Halliday has pointed to the tension between two different modes of UNSC interaction with the ROL – the external and the internal. Halliday describes the UNSC’s external invocations of the concept as ROL ‘on the offense’ and claims of internal disregard of the ROL placing the UNSC ‘on the defence’.5 It is difficult for the UNSC to claim to act in the name of the ROL externally, without at the same time accepting the concept’s applicability to the internal workings of the UNSC. Given these tensions and weaknesses in the ROL, how does it regulate behaviour in the international arena?

The paper discusses United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 2240 (2015). The Resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and authorises for a certain period of time UN member states to inspect and seize vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya when they reasonably suspect that these are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking. The paper sees in resolution 2240 an example of how the UN Security Council may empower states to take action against transnational social phenomena that raise serious concerns from the perspective of human rights – regarding especially the right to life. The idea that transpires from this resolution is that transnational phenomena, such as smuggling of migrants and human trafficking, require (coordinated, as the study argues) action by all involved states and, more generally, international actors (although the focus in the study is on states). Because of their transnational nature, such situations involve a plurality of duty bearers, each one of which is partially connected to the situation and has an obligation to be pro-actively engaged – to the extent that its individual connection with the situation at issue justifies and requires it. This leads to a situation of multiple duty bearers who exercise parallel and, possibly, also overlapping jurisdiction as a means to fulfill their duties under international law – especially regarding the so-called positive dimension of human rights, i.e. the duty to protect. This implies that concurrent state responsibility (in the sense of liability) may arise, if more than one of these duty bearers break their duties. With its resolution, the UNSC contributes to the idea of shared responsibility by multiple states to react against transnational social phenomena that raise concerns from the perspective of human rights and human security. Because human trafficking and smuggling raise issues of human security, the idea of multiple duty bearers and concurrent state responsibility advanced in the study can be associated with the UN human security policy framework. The paper argues that this framework ought to be attuned to fully meet the particular needs, nature and features of transnational phenomena, such as trafficking and smuggling, that threaten the security and well-being of people. For human security to be successful in its goals, it needs to be adjusted to the transnational nature of these phenomena. What is required when a situation necessitating protection exceeds or transcends the borders of a state, is establishing frameworks of cooperation and coordination between the various involved parties. This is an essential precondition for human security to deliver effective results and prosper in the era of inter-connection and globalisation.

Recent practice shows that domestic courts are increasingly confronted with complaints lodged by individuals or entities affected by measures adopted by the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This chapter aims instead at examining the possible role of the European Union (EU) judge in reviewing the international validity of Security Council resolutions or of EU acts implementing such resolutions. It addresses and critically assesses the European Court of Justice (ECJ)'s assertion that it lacks the competence to conduct a review on the basis of international law standard. The chapter examines certain solutions which may help to mitigate some of the inconveniences inherent in the inward looking approach followed by the ECJ in its Kadi judgment, as well as to enhance the role of EU courts in contributing to promote the goals of the international legal order. Keywords:European Court of Justice (ECJ); international law; international legal order; Kadi ; United Nations (UN) Security Council

Asset freezes are since 2000 being applied by the United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) to non‐state actors. This came about as a ‘mutation’ of the sanctions program initiated by Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) and 1390 (2002): currently the targets are only supected terrorists or terrorism financiers.This ‘mutation’ has created perplexities and problems, namely for the EU, which enforces UN SC Resolutions by a combination of first and second pillar methods. The main problem concerns issues of fundamental rights, currently being litigated.The debate on the compatibility of the current practice of UN SC asset freezing within EU law takes place amidst a fundamental lack of clarity as to the exact purposes and operational objectives of such freezes. It is argued that this practice amounts to an ad hoc (para‐)criminal procedure measure, enacted by political bodies rather than courts, and without judicial oversight.The current UN SC practice of asset freezing against non‐state actors breaches the right to judicial review, as well as the presumption of innocence. If this practice it is to continue at all, methods that make it fully compatible with the rule of law must be adopted. Especially, their renewal ad aeternum should not be possible.

In October 2000, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In addition to states, the resolution also calls on regional organizations to mainstream gender into all stages of all peacekeeping operations. Drawing on feminist institutionalism and a norm translation perspective, we argue that networks of norm entrepreneurs played an important role with respect to the incorporation of the resolution into the security policies of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). The varying institutional contexts that the entrepreneurs faced in the two organizations nevertheless affected what they were able to accomplish and how, therefore in turn, the EU and the OSCE institutionalized UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the accompanying norms.

Preserving peace and security around the world is one of the top priorities of the United Nations (UN), in general, and the Security Council of the UN, in particular. In order to accomplish this priority the UN either directly intervenes in the conflicts or adopts resolutions or recommendations regarding the ongoing conflicts. In this respect, in 1993, during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions – namely, 822, 853, 874, 884 – at the result of the occupation of Azerbaijani regions, which were outside of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, by Armenian forces. The resolutions condemned the occupation of regions of Azerbaijan and demanded respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Furthermore, by these resolutions, the Security Council demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and hostile acts that endangered peace and security in the region, and the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of all occupying forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. However, the UN Security Council resolutions as well as all other regional and international initiatives for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were rendered inoperable by further occupation of Azerbaijani territories by the Armenian side. In this regard, the aim of this study is to investigate the resolutions of the UN Security Council concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, analyze whether or not these resolutions had binding effects over the conflicting parties in general, and find out what were the positions and arguments of the parties regarding these resolutions.

According to the UN Charter (Article 26), the UN Security Council is the primary organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Nuclear states agreed to the adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution that provided positive security assurances. The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution №255 on June 19, 1968, was of particular significance. This resolution stipulated that instances of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon state would require immediate action by the UN Security Council and its permanent members, who are nuclear-armed states. The aim of the work is to determine the role of the UN Security Council in the system of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The methodological basis of the study will focus on the analysis and understanding of the impact of the UN Security Council on strategies and measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the international context. The results of our research have shown that the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq’s nuclear program, which could have led to the development of nuclear weapons, proved to be significant. To achieve this, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution №687 adopted on April 3, 1991, the Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established. During an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council at the highest level on September 24, 2009, Resolution UN Security Council Resolution № 1887 was adopted, aimed at supporting nuclear non-proliferation, criticizing Iran and North Korea. Resolution №1887 outlines measures to strengthen control and the rights of nuclear-weapon states to demand the return of nuclear materials and equipment in case of violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or withdrawal from it. It also involves enhancing security measures for the storage of nuclear materials and strict export controls. Conclusions. In our opinion, the powers of the UN Security Council in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be utilized more promptly and effectively. The insufficient effectiveness of this international mechanism in preventing proliferation remains a cause for serious concern among UN members worldwide. To enhance the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, we propose the adoption of a comprehensive resolution that includes provisions on the procedure for a state’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its violation of commitments to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. This resolution should stipulate the imposition of sanctions against such a state based on a special report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Such a mechanism can ensure an effective impact of the international community on states that withdraw from the NPT.

IntroductionOn July 5, 2006, North Korea test-launched an array of missiles, which ended a self-imposed moratorium of eight years. Ten days after the missile test (on July 15, 2006), in its toughest official response to North Korean actions since 1994, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1695. This resolution condemned the missile tests, demanded North Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic mi - ssile program, and required all member states to comply with measures limiting North Korea's access to missile-tested materials or technology. On October 9, 2006, North Korea set offits first nuclear test. The UN Security Council voted unanimously on October 14 to slap North Korea with trade, travel, and other as punishment for its claimed nuclear weapons test. This resolution (1718) is much stronger than the earlier resolutions; it calls for inspection of North Korea cargoes, bars the travel to UN member states of North Koreans responsible for North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program, requires UN member states to freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities designated by the UN as engaged in North Korean WMD activities, and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.Under the latest resolution (2094), tougher impose penalties on North Korean banking, travel, and trade, and were passed in a 15-0 vote that reflected the country's increased international isolation. China, the North's longtime benefactor, helped the United States draftthe resolution, in what outside experts called a sign of Beijing's growing annoyance with Pyongyang's defiant behavior on the nuclear issue. The Chinese had entreated the North Koreans not to proceed with the February 12, 2013, underground nuclear test, their third. It is questionable whether these new will work. In other words, will the compel North Korean leaders to comply fully with UN demands, or will they lead the North Korean masses to rebel against their leaders? This article discusses reasons for the possible failure of these new against North Korea, the consequences of their failure to stop North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, and policy options on a nuclear North Korea.The Effectiveness of Sanctions Against Outlaw CountriesThe term sanctions means restrictions on normal commercial relations with a target country, including trade, investment, and other cross-border activities. Economic are either unilateral or multilateral. A unilateral sanction is imposed by one country, such as the U.S., against another country, such as North Korea. Multilateral require the cooperation of at least two nations. The clearest examples of multilateral are those imposed by the Security Council of the United Nations.Multinational were relatively rare before 1990. The UN Security Council, obviously incapacitated due to Cold War-related veto powers, imposed only twice (Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977) in the 45 years of its existence prior to the August 1990 embargo of Iraq.1 Since 1990, however, the UN Security Council has increasingly imposed economic to prevent, manage, or resolve violent conflict. When a UN sanction is imposed, all UN member nations are required to comply with the order and to enforce the sanction against the outlaw country.2The active utilization of as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy dates back to the aftermath of World War I, when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson suggested that the adoption of was a method that could keep the world free of war. However, empirical studies on the effectiveness of economic by Pape3 and others found that historically, have a poor track record. The rare success of cases such as South Africa is associated with unique factors that are unlikely to be found elsewhere. …

The United Nations (UN) was formed to maintain world peace and security. The UN gives a mandate to its main body, called the Security Council (SC), to maintain peace and security stability, take necessary actions, and act as a mediator in all issues and conflicts that occur based on the provisions written in the UN Charter. As a member of the UN Security Council, Indonesia is fully committed to maintaining world peace regarding the UN mission. In carrying out its role, Indonesia refers to the free and active foreign policy, the 1945 Constitution, and the UN Charter. This research used qualitative methods to analyze the dynamics of Indonesia's membership in the Security Council in dealing with global issues. The results proved that Indonesia’s policies have tried to fight terrorism crimes through the UN Security Council membership. The mechanisms for conflict resolution put forward an approach to law enforcement, prevention, and the formation of UN Security Council resolutions related to terrorism crimes.