Abstract
By distinguishing different principles of council design, this chapter outlines the conditions under which intergovernmental councils incentivize governments to coordinate public policy-making in such a way that protects governments’ autonomy so that federal stability is maintained. It argues that intergovernmental councils effectively protect the federal distribution of power if they process federally salient policy matters, are highly institutionalized, make binding resolutions, and if they are not dominated by the federal government. How these aspects of council design are operationalized and measured is also explained in the chapter. However, councils’ effectiveness as federal safeguards is also shaped by mechanisms and institutions outside the council system such as the party system, external pressure, or the federal spending power, which are also discussed.
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