Abstract
I examine the interplay of task and asset allocation in solving the double moral hazard and multi-task problems that plague complex principal-agent relationships. The results offer insight into several important issues in organizational design, including why firms rather than workers so often own assets, why fully delegating all tasks and asset ownership (as in turnkey construction contracts) may not solve all agency problems, and why team production may have advantages over assembly line production.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
