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Abstract
Abstract The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) might be our current best bet at a scientific explanation of phenomenal consciousness. IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. Currently, it offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future developments shall explain the qualitative structures of every possible conscious experience. But this ambitious project is hindered by one fundamental limitation. IIT fails to acknowledge the crucial roles of attention in generating phenomenally conscious experience and shaping its contents. Here, we argue that IIT urgently needs an account of attention. Without this account, IIT cannot explain important informational differences between different kinds of experiences. Furthermore, though some IIT proponents celebratedly endorse a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis reveals that such as dissociation is in fact incompatible with IIT. Notably, the issues we raise for IIT will likely arise for many internalist theories of conscious contents in philosophy, especially theories with primitivist inclinations. Our arguments also extend to the recently popularized structuralist approaches. Overall, our discussion highlights how considerations about attention are indispensable for scientific as well as philosophical theorizing about conscious experience.
Highlights
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Albantakis et al, 2023; Tononi et al, 2022; Ellia et al, 2021) is currently in the spotlight of consciousness science
IIT focuses on the distinctively subjective and phenomenological aspects of conscious experience. It offers the fundaments of a formal account, but future developments shall explain the qualitative structures of every possible conscious experience
Though some IIT proponents celebratedly endorse a double dissociation between consciousness and attention, close analysis reveals that such as dissociation is incompatible with IIT
Summary
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Albantakis et al, 2023; Tononi et al, 2022; Ellia et al, 2021) is currently in the spotlight of consciousness science. Though the focus is typically on perceptual, top-down and voluntary selection, there is reason to believe that attention is a more general process of informational optimization, encompassing cognitive, bottom-up and automatic varieties (Chun et al, 2011; Montemayor and Haladjian, 2015; Marchi, 2020; Lopez, 2022) Such pervasiveness of attentional processes increases the likelihood of them being implicated in different forms of consciousness (Marchetti, 2012; Pitts et al, 2018; Noah & Mangun, 2020).. Haun and Tononi (2019) recently offered what might be the first discussion of the role of attention within the IIT framework Though this is a step in the right direction, we shall point at some important questions that this initial account must still address. The most general take-home message of our discussion is that considerations about attention are indispensable for scientific as well as philosophical theorizing about conscious experience
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