Abstract
This chapter questions the assumptions underlying the economic case for an independent European central bank (IECB). Discussion of the IECB typically conflates the issue of independence with the brief that will be given to the bank, namely the single-minded pursuit of price stability in the European Union (EU). In what follows we assume that the bank will follow that brief, as established in Delors (1989) and EC (1992b).
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